ity  of  California 
tern  Regional 
ary  Facility 


UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA 
AT   LOS  ANGELES 


Gift  of 
Malbone  W.  Graham 


o 


PREPAREDNESS 

THE  AMERICAN  Versus  THE  MILITARY  PROGRAMME 


PREPAREDNESS 


THE  AMERICAN  Verms  THE 
MILITARY  PROGRAMME 


BY 
WILLIAM  I.  HULL,  PH.D. 

Professor  of  History  and  International  Relations  in 
Swarthmore  College. 

AUTHOR  OF 

' '  The  Two  Hague  Conferences  and  their  Contributions 
to  International   Law,"    "The  New  Peace  Move- 
ment,"   "The  Monroe  Doctrine:  National  or 
International?" 


NEW  YORK          CHICAGO  TORONTO 

Fleming   H.    Revell    Company 

LONDON  AND  EDINBURGH 


Copyright,  1916,  by 
FLEMING  H.  REVELL  COMPANY 


New  York:    158  Fifth   Avenue 

Chicago:  17  N.  Wabash  Ave. 
Toronto:  25  Richmond  St.,  W. 
London:  21  Paternoster  Square 
Edinburgh:  100  Princes  Street 


PREFACE 

THIS  book  has  been  written  by  one  who  is  neither 
a  military  nor  a  naval  expert.  It  has  taken, 
therefore,  the  standards  of  adequacy  and  effi- 
ciency as  laid  down  by  the  military  and  naval  experts 
themselves,  and  has  used  them  as  a  measurement  of  the 
adequacy  and  efficiency  of  the  programmes  for  prepared- 
ness which  are  now  being  spread  before  the  American 
people. 

The  innumerable  facts  and  figures  upon  which  it  is 
based  have  been  taken,  in  so  far  as  is  possible,  from  the 
official  documents. 

The  book  is  by  no  means  purely  or  chiefly  negative. 
It  seeks  not  only  to  show  the  utter  inadequacy  of  the 
programmes  for  military  preparedness,  and  the  evils  of 
a  genuinely  adequate  military  programme;  but  also  to 
state  concisely  the  parts  of  the  American  programme  for 
preparedness,  their  support  by  reason  and  experience, 
and  the  inevitable  and  insuperable  obstacle  which  each 
and  all  of  them  find  in  the  military  programme. 

It  endeavors  to  give  full  credit  to  the  genuine  and 
laudable  desire  of  most  of  the  military  prepareders  "  to 
defend  this  country";  but  it  attempts  to  determine  pre- 
cisely what  a  "  defensive  war,"  against  a  first-rate  power, 
in  Twentieth  Century  warfare,  would  mean,  and  pre- 
cisely what  kind  of  a  military  programme  would  be 
truly  adequate  for  it.  Finally,  it  endeavors  to  prove 
to  the  countless  Americans  who  loathe  the  thought  of 
militarism,  but  who  see  no  other  adequate  means  of  de- 
fense, that  there  is  another  means  which  is  as  definite, 
as  practicable,  as  adequate  and  as  American,  as  it  is  jus- 
tified by  reason  and  tried  and  proven  by  experience. 

SWARTHMORE    COLLEGE.  W      I       H 

5 

398203 


CONTENTS 


I    THE  CAMPAIGN  FOR  PREPAREDNESS     .       .       n 

Its  Origin  and  Growth — Denunciation  and  Ridi- 
cule of  the  Pacifists — "  Frightfulness  " — Liter- 
ary and  Newspaper  Aids — The  Organized 
Campaign — The  Navy  League — The  Wom- 
en's Section — The  American  Legion — The 
National  Security  League — Summer  Training 
Camps — The  Governors'  Conference — Massa- 
chusetts in  the  Lead — The  Congressional 
Campaign — The  Presidential  Contest. 

II    PAST  ATTEMPTS  AT  PREPAREDNESS      .       .       36 

The  Present  Generation's  Preparedness — Amer- 
ican, German  and  British  Preparedness — 
America  and  the  Swiss  System. 

III  PREPAREDNESS  FOR  What?  ...       40 

IV  MOTIVES  OF  PREPAREDNESS    ....       42 

Politics — Profits — Professional  and  Social  Pres- 
tige— To  Preserve  the  Peace — Europe's  Ex- 
perience— The  Anglo-American  Experiment 
— For  a  Defensive  War — The  meaning  of  a 
"Defensive  War." 

V    PREPAREDNESS  PROGRAMMES  ....       72 

The  wildly  extravagant  and  indefinite — The  in- 
adequate. 

VI    PREPAREDNESS  ON  AND  UNDER  THE  LAND      79 

A.  The  Regular   Army — How  large  should  it 
be? — Where    shall     it    come     from? — What 
would  it  cost? 

B.  The   Reserves — Our   Unpreparedness — How 
many  do  we  need? 

C.  The  State  Militia,  or  National  Guard — Its 
Defects — Proposed  Remedies — Shall  it  be  dis- 
carded ? 

7 


8  CONTENTS 

D.  The  Continentals — Where  will  they  come 
from? — Opposition  to  them — Would  they  be 
"  adequate  " ? 

E  The  Sources  of  Supply — The  Supineness  of 
American  Adults — Possible  Adult  Sources — 
The  Schools  and  Colleges — The  Problem  of 
Officers. 

F.  Guns  and  Ammunition — Artillery — The  Pass- 
ing   of    the    Rifle — The    Modern    Arsenal — 
Where   are   our    Guns? — Ammunition — Pro- 
jectiles. 

G.  Fortifications — Inland  Forts — Moving  Forts 
— Coast    Fortifications — Island    Fortifications 
and  Naval  Bases — The  Problem  of  Big  Guns. 

H.  Underground  Preparedness — Intrenchments 
— Underground  quarters — Mines  and  Counter- 
Mines — Our  Underground  preparedness. 

I.  Social  and  Individual  Preparedness — Physi- 
cal Preparedness — Moral  Preparedness — Men- 
tal Preparedness — Economic  Preparedness — 
Political  Preparedness — International  Pre- 
paredness. 

J.  A  Summary  of  Preparedness  on  Land. 


VII    PREPAREDNESS  ON  AND  UNDER  THE  SEA     .     182 

A.  Preparedness    on    the    Sea — Dreadnoughts 
and  Superdreadnoughts — Their  Increased  Size 
and  Cost — How  many  do  we  need  ? — Armored 
Cruisers — Battle   Cruisers — Scout   Cruisers — 
Torpedo  Boats  and  Destroyers. 

B.  What    shall    our    Programme    be? — Great 
Britain's     Two-Power     Policy — Our     Two- 
Ocean  Policy — A  Navy's  Cost  and  Obsoles- 
cence— The  Revolution  in  Naval  Warfare. 

C.  Preparedness    under    the     Sea — Submarine 
Boats — Submarine     Battleships — How    many 
do  we  need? — Submarine  Mines  and  Torpe- 
does— Anti-Submarine  Devices. 

D.  Speed — Fuel  and  Engines. 

E.  Armor,   Explosives   and   Projectiles — Their 
endless  Competition — Our  "  absolute  Unpre- 
paredness  " — The  Era  of  Scientists. 

F.  Navy     Personnel     and     Organization — Our 
Shortage    of    Officers    and    Men — How    can 
they  be  increased? — The  Lack  of  Training — 
The  Naval  Reserve— The  Naval  Militia— The 
Volunteer  Naval  Reserve — The  Professional 
versus  the  Novice — A  Defective  Naval  Or- 
ganization. 


CONTENTS  9 

G.  What  is  "  Adequate  "  Naval  Preparedness  ? 
— Overwater  Craft  —  Underwater  Craft  — 
Speed,  Guns,  Projectiles,  Explosives  and 
Armor — What  Revolution  will  this  War 
create  ? 

VIII  PREPAREDNESS  IN  AND  FROM  THE  AIR  .  .  236 
Captive  Balloons — Dirigible  Balloons,  or  Air- 
ships— Defenses  against  Dirigibles — Aero- 
planes— Aerial  Torpedo-Boats — Hydroaero- 
planes— The  Obsolescence  of  Aircraft — Aerial 
Personnel — What  is  Adequate  Aerial  Pre- 
paredness?— Our  Unpreparedness — Coast  De- 
fense— 'Our  Programme  for  Dirigibles — Sci- 
entific Preparation — Our  Needs. 

IX    RESULTS  OF  PREPAREDNESS     ....     254 

X    THE  AMERICAN  PROGRAMME  ....     257 

A.  The  Great  Experiment  of  the  Constitution. 

B.  The    Parts    of    the    Programme :     i.  The 
Limitation  of  Armaments — America's  Experi- 
ence— America's    Opportunity — The   Obstacle 
of  Preparedness.     2.  Mediation — Its  Success 
— Its    Rejection    in    1914 — The    Obstacle    of 
Preparedness.     3.  Commissions  of  Inquiry — 
Their    Success — Their    Rejection    in    1914 — 
The  Obstacle  of  Preparedness.  4.  Arbitration 
— Its  Success — The  International  Court — Its 
Rejection  in  1914 — The  Obstacle  of  Prepared- 
ness.   5.  An  "  American  "  Army  and  Navy. 

XI    THE  Two  DIVERGENT  PATHS        .       .       .     268 
XII     THE  PRESENT  CRISIS 270 


I 

THE  CAMPAIGN  FOR  PREPAREDNESS 

ITS  ORIGIN  AND  GROWTH 

ONE  of  the  most  striking  phenomena  in  the  public 
life  of  our  country  to-day  is  the  campaign  which 
is  well  under  way  for  the  achievement  of  "  pre- 
paredness "  or  "  adequate  armaments."     In  universality 
and  intensity  it  rivals  the  campaigns  in  behalf  of  Free 
Silver  and  the  extension  of  Slavery  to  the  Territories. 

It  is  a  campaign  in  which  the  elements  of  hatred,  fear, 
humor,  legend,  fiction,  "poetry,"  politics,  profits,  "pa- 
triotism," the  press,  the  pulpit,  the  school-master,  the 
employer,  the  laborer,  individual  initiative,  and  organized 
activities  are  playing  a  fervent,  fervid  and  at  times 
ferocious  part. 

The  issue  is  by  no  means  a  new  one,  even  in  our  own 
peaceful  Republic;  but  the  European  War  has  cast  its 
baleful  shadow  across  the  Atlantic,  and  beneath  this 
shadow  the  "  preparedness  "  campaign  in  our  own  coun- 
try has  sprung  up  like  a  mushroom  in  the  night. 

For  more  than  a  dozen  years, — ever  since  our  petty 
war  with  Spain  in  1898  was  supposed  to  have  made  us  one 
of  the  "  Great  Powers," — a  comparatively  small  coterie 
of  military  experts  have  been  demanding  armaments  ade- 
quate to  our  new  role  of  a  world  power.  During  this 
same  period, — ever  since  the  world  entered  at  the  first 
Hague  Conference  of  1899  upon  its  new  era  of  interna- 
tionalism,— a  group  of  men  imbued  with  this  Twentieth 
Century  spirit  have  been  combatting  the  demand  for 
"  adequate  armament "  as  opposed  to  real  and  adequate 
justice. 

11 


12  PREPAREDNESS 

DENUNCIATION   AND   RIDICULE  OF   THE  PACIFISTS 

The  latter  group  of  men,  who  have  accepted  without 
complaint  the  name  of  "  pacifists,"  have  recently  assumed 
importance  as  the  prime  obstacle  to  "  preparedness,"  and 
upon  them  have  been  poured  out  the  vials  of  wrath  and 
hatred  of  those  who  advocate  that  policy. 

The  great  protagonist  of  "  preparedness "  has  de- 
nounced the  pacifists  with  characteristic  superlativeness. 
From  the  Golden  Gate  of  Sunset  to  the  piney  woods  of 
Maine,  he  has  bespattered  the  Continent,  befogged  the 
atmosphere,  and  castigated  the  pacifists  with  such  names 
as  professional  pacificists,  peace-prattlers,  poltroons,  men 
with  mean  souls,  undesirable  citizens,  peace-at-any-price 
men,  mollycoddles,  college  sissies,  Chinafiers,  Belgium- 
izers,  cowards,  traitors!  He  has  declared  them  to  be 
"  beyond  the  pale  of  real  and  true  Americanism  " ;  "  puer- 
ile, peace-loving  mollycoddles  who  cannot  stand  before 
the  Liberty  Bell  without  a  blush  of  shame  " ;  "  men  who 
ought  to  move  to  China, — not  worth  defending, — en- 
dowed with  minds  that  dwell  only  in  the  realm  of  shadow 
and  of  sham."  He  has  declared  that  "  at  best  they  are 
an  unlovely  body  of  men,  and  taken  as  a  whole  are  prob- 
ably the  most  undesirable  citizens  that  this  country  con- 
tains." He  has  solemnly  warned  them  that  "  they  must 
be  made  to  understand  that  they  have  got  to  render  what- 
ever service  the  country  demands.  They  must  be  made 
to  submit  to  training  in  doing  their  duty.  Then  if,  in 
the  event  of  war,  they  prove  unfit  to  fight,  at  any  rate 
they  can  be  made  to  dig  trenches  and  kitchen  sinks,  or 
to  do  whatever  else  a  debauch  of  indulgence  in  profes- 
sional pacificism  has  left  them  fit  to  do." 

This  is  the  voice  of  an  ex-President  of  the  American 
Republic;  but  the  words  and  spirit  are  those  of  a  Prus- 
sian War  Lord.  It  is  natural,  therefore,  that  he  should 
resent  any  competition  in  the  use  of  the  word  fist,  mailed 
or  otherwise,  by  the  pacifists,  and  should  have  insisted 


THE  CAMPAIGN  FOR  PREPAREDNESS     13 

on  their  very  name  bringing  them  closer  to  the  class  of 
"  college  sissies  "  by  being  changed  to  pacificists.  The 
consistency  with  which  he  has  put  the  bellow  into  bel- 
lumist,  also,  has  stirred  up  emulation  among  the  like- 
minded,  and  they  have  launched  countless  missiles  by 
way  of  the  public  press,  which  bid  fair  to  rival  the  origi- 
nal Big  Stick  itself.  For  example,  one  of  them  begins  a 
long  letter  to  the  New  York  Tribune  with  the  persua- 
sive words :  "  I  am  sick  and  tired  of  the  fearsome 
tommy-rot  that  a  few  sheep-hearted  persons  are  writing 
and  talking  to  prevent  preparedness."  But  ex  uno  disce 
omnes. 

"  FRIGHTFULNESS  " 

To  this  campaign  of  ridicule  and  hatred,  there  has 
been  added  one  of  fear.  The  "  f rightfulness  "  of  the 
European  War  has  been  brought  home  in  every  possible 
way  to  the  imaginations  of  the  American  people  in  order 
to  induce  them  to  "  prepare."  United  States  Attaches, 
newspaper  correspondents,  and  travellers  of  many  kinds, 
coming  fresh  from  the  "  war  zone,"  have  poured  count- 
less articles  and  books  upon  the  American  public  to 
prove,  in  the  words  of  one  of  them,  that  "  for  the  United 
States,  there  is  one  lesson  written  across  Europe  in  seven 
letters  of  blood  and  flame :  PREPARE !  " 

Retired  officers  of  the  United  States  army,  and  engi- 
neers and  inventors  of  various  kind  and  degree,  have 
published  articles  and  books  which  prove  to  a  nicety  such 
theses  as  this,  that  "  one  hundred  thousand  English,  Ger- 
mans, or  Japanese,  equipped  with  the  longest  and  best 
modern  field  artillery,  with  plenty  of  ammunition  and 
supply  trains,  air-scouts  and  engineer  corps,  could,  in 
our  present  defenseless  condition,  march  through  this 
country  as  Xenophon's  10,000  marched  through  ancient 
Persia."  Very  definite  details  are  supplied  with  such 
warnings ;  for  example :  "  An  army  of  100,000  men 
could  land  (if  our  navy  were  evaded  or  destroyed)  in 


14  PREPAREDNESS 

Long  Island  or  New  Jersey,  and  go  anywhere  it  might 
see  fit,  live  off  the  country,  capture  our  big  cities,  and 
hold  us  up  for  ransom." 

The  newly  elected  president  of  the  Navy  League,  in 
his  inaugural  address,  declared :  "  Modern  conditions  of 
transportation,  it  is  calculated  by  the  best  authorities, 
would  make  it  possible  for  one  of  these  European  fight- 
ing organizations  to  land  300,000  soldiers,  fully  equipped 
for  aggressive  warfare,  on  our  shores  within  fifteen  days 
after  war  had  been  declared.  In  three  months  they  could 
have  a  million  fully  equipped  men  here  to  make  a  Bel- 
gium of  our  unprepared  country." 

A  distinguished  inventor  of  means  of  preparedness  de- 
clares :  "  An  enemy  could  do  and  would  do  to  us  what 
the  Germans  did  to  Belgium,  only  we  would  not  be  able 
to  give  as  good  an  account  of  ourselves  as  the  brave  Bel- 
gians did.  They  were  better  prepared  than  we  are  or 
could  be  on  short  notice.  We  would  become  a  nation  of 
hoboes  at  once  just  as  the  Belgians  have  become." 

A  congressman  from  the  State  of  Massachusetts  gave 
voice  to  the  prevalent  panic  when  he  deplored  what 
seemed  to  him  a  fact,  namely,  that  our  country  is  "  like 
a  great  fat  dowager,  covered  with  jewels,  out  amongst 
the  wicked  world,  without  a  single  policeman  within  six 
miles  of  her."  And  in  putting  his  speeches  on  prepared- 
ness through  the  United  States  Printing  Office,  prepara- 
tory to  franking  them  in  wholesale  throughout  the  coun- 
try, this  congressman  appropriately  gave  as  their  title, 
"  Safety  First,"  and  "  Where  are  our  Guns?  " 

"  The  preparedness  "  which  was  worked  up  in  England 
a  few  years  ago  by  means  of  a  play,  "  An  Englishman's 
Home,"  is  being  advocated  in  America  by  means  of  a 
moving-picture  play,  entitled  "  A  Battle  Cry  of  Peace." 
All  the  melodramatic  power,  mechanical  ingenuity  and 
scenic  splendor,  for  which  the  moving-picture  show  has 
become  justly  famous,  have  been  placed  behind  this  per- 
nicious drama  and  have  made  of  it  a  terrible  provocative 


THE  CAMPAIGN  FOR  PREPAREDNESS     15 

of  fear,  and  a  blind,  unreasoning  demand  for  "  prepared- 
ness." 

The  president  of  the  American  Society  of  Aeronautical 
Engineers  is  reported  to  have  added  to  the  prevailing 
panic,  as  follows :  "  Records  in  Washington  show  that  a 
certain  European  nation  could  land  in  the  United  States, 
within  forty-eight  days,  750,000  men  with  250,000  horses 
and  munitions  sufficient  for  a  three  months'  campaign, 
with  half  the  transports  available  before  the  present 
war.  .  .  .  Furthermore,  similar  records  show  that  a  na- 
tion on  the  Pacific  could  land  350,000  troops  on  the  Pa- 
cific Coast,  within  sixty-one  days  with  half  its  trans- 
ports." 

Another  typical  "  scare  "  is  the  following,  which  comes 
to  us  from  Boston :  "  The  vast  lesson  that  the  present 
war  teaches  us  is  that  the  ocean  has  been  annihilated. 
The  United  States  is  more  alluring  as  a  prize  and  less 
competent  to  defend  itself  than  Belgium  was.  The  loot 
Germany  can  take  from  us  is  prodigious.  She  recognizes 
her  moral  right  to  take  it,  for  with  her,  power  determines 
morality.  She  has  not  a  scrap  of  any  other  kind  of  con- 
science than  might-conscience.  Let  her  be  victor  in  this 
war,  and  what  happens  ?  The  British,  French  and  Italian 
fleets,  partly  destroyed  and  partly  captured.  Out  of  the 
wreck,  Germany  emerges  complete  mistress  of  the  seas, 
with  a  fleet  several  times  greater  than  ours  and  an  army 
of  millions  of  trained,  armed  men,  thirsting  for  more 
worlds  to  conquer,  in  order  to  repair  the  German  na- 
tion's colossal  war  losses.  To  steam  across  the  Atlantic 
and  not  only  smash  us,  but  take  and  garrison  and  perma- 
nently own  us,  will  be  child's  play  and  warriors'  joy  for 
her.  And  she  will  do  it  as  surely  as  she  conquers  the 
Allies.  Moreover,  the  chances  are  now  ten  to  one  that 
she  will  conquer  the  Allies,  unless  the  American  Republic 
interferes  to  prevent  it.  Our  policy  of  neutrality  is, 
therefore,  a  policy  of  imbecility  and  death." 

Still  another  form  taken  by  the  prevalent  "  frightful- 


16  PREPAREDNESS 

ness  "  comes  from  a  New  York  novelist  and  newspaper- 
man, who  writes  of  it  as  follows : 

"  In  case  of  war  with  Germany,  the  United  States 
would  be  utterly  paralyzed  in  a  week.  German  secret 
propaganda  is  spread  through  our  whole  system  like 
poison,  and  it  would  cause  trouble  in  time  of  war.  Tele- 
graph wires  would  be  cut,  railroads  crippled  and  bridges 
blown  up.  I  could  take  you  to  restaurants  throughout 
the  country  where  the  German  keepers  are  clipping  out 
every  anti-German  article  in  the  papers  and  mailing  them 
to  some  headquarters." 

In  "  The  Passport,"  a  book  written  by  this  last  alarm- 
ist, there  is  a  chapter  describing  the  drilling  of  German 
troops  in  America;  and  two  weeks  ago  a  Washington 
dispatch  reported  that  military  drills  were  going  on  se- 
cretly in  the  German  turnvereins  of  America. 

"  Furthermore,  as  a  marine  writer  for  newspapers," 
the  same  author  continues,  "  I  have  often  scrutinized  the 
piers  of  the  German  lines  in  Hoboken.  The  piers  are 
ridiculously  massive  for  their  purpose ;  incidentally,  they 
command  the  city  of  New  York.  That  there  is  some 
secret  purpose  behind  many  things  the  Germans  do  is 
a  commonplace  after  what  we  have  seen  in  Europe." 

Not  only  has  the  frightfulness  of  the  European  War 
been  utilized  to  fan  the  flames  of  preparedness  in  our 
country,  but  almost  every  attempt  to  settle  international 
disputes  by  peaceful  means  has  been  used  as  a  bellows 
for  the  same  purpose.  Raucous  voices  have  been  insist- 
ently raised  to  declare  that  the  attempted  mediation  in 
Mexican  affairs  by  the  A.  B.  C.  powers  in  South  Amer- 
ica, in  cooperation  with  the  United  States,  would  in- 
fallibly have  succeeded  if  we  had  been  properly  pre- 
pared. Blatant  voices  have  shouted  that  Germany  would 
have  yielded  at  once  to  our  diplomatic  representations 
on  the  Lusitania  and  Arabic,  if  we  had  only  possessed  an 
"  adequate  "  army  and  navy. 

Even  the  movements  for  constructive  peace  in  the  fu- 


THE  CAMPAIGN  FOR  PREPAREDNESS     17 

ture  have  been  eagerly  utilized  by  the  prepareders  to 
prove  the  necessity  of  greatly  increasing  our  armaments. 
For  example,  the  League  to  Enforce  Peace,  which  began 
its  career  as  a  genuinely  pacific  and  Twentieth  Century 
institution  for  the  settlement  of  international  disputes, 
has  been  side-tracked  and  run  back  into  the  twilight  of 
militarism.  The  chairman  of  its  executive  committee, 
for  instance,  is  convinced  that  our  country,  to  perform 
its  share  of  work  in  "  enforcing  peace,"  must  increase  its 
army  to  500,000  men ;  and  the  Navy  League  has  joyously 
welcomed  this  so-called  Peace  League  as  a  prime  argu- 
ment for  the  great  and  indefinite  increase  of  our  navy. 
"  If  this  proposal  succeeds,"  says  one  of  its  leading  ad- 
vocates, "  it  will  mean  a  departure  from  the  traditional 
policy  of  the  United  States  in  the  avoiding  of  entangling 
foreign  alliances  and  will  commit  us  to  a  new  policy  and 
a  new  relation  with  the  world,  which  will  increase  enor- 
mously both  our  obligations  and  our  need  of  strength  on 
the  seas." 

LITERARY     AND     NEWSPAPER     AIDS 

Fiction,  legend,  "  poetry,"  oratory,  have  all  been  sum- 
moned to  arouse  us  to  a  realizing  sense  of  our  unprepar- 
edness.  "  War  novels,"  revealing  and  solving  the  problem 
of  unpreparedness,  are  climbing  into  the  class  of  the 
"  six  best  sellers."  Magazine  story-tellers  are  supplying 
thrills  by  narrating  the  "  Capture  of  New  York "  and 
the  "  Conquest  of  America  "  by  the  allied  powers  vic- 
torious in  the  European  War.  All  the  patriotic  hymns, 
from  "Yankee  Doodle"  to  "The  Star-Spangled  Ban- 
ner," are  being  utilized  and  parodied  for  the  purpose  of 
prodding  the  prostrate  public  into  proper  preparedness. 
"  Be  a  Rikki-Tikki-Tavi,  not  a  Chuchundra,"  is  the  key- 
note of  countless  articles  in  one  grave  journal  of  pessi- 
mistic outlook ;  "  Don't  fight  wildcats  with  soft,  soapy 
words,"  is  the  key-note  of  editorials  in  other  journals 
which  trail  their  funereal  length  across  the  Continent. 


18  PREPAREDNESS 

The  preparedness  campaign  has  been  a  bonanza  for 
newspaper  humorists,  as  well.  The  columns  devoted  to 
"  Spicy  Sayings  "  or  "  Sparkling  Sallies  "  are  replete 
with  scintillations  of  wit  at  the  expense  of  America  as 
"  a  nation  of  mollycoddles  and  poltroons,  with  a  wish- 
bone but  no  back-bone,  confronting  its  foes  in  the  Bat- 
tleship Piffle."  Cartloads  of  cartoons,  conceived  with  all 
the  cleverness  for  which  American  cartoonists  are  fa- 
mous, have  been  dumped  into  the  mill-race  of  the  daily 
and  weekly  papers  with  the  hope  that  they  may  strike 
home  through  the  American  love  of  humor  to  American 
"patriotism."  The  " peace-palaverer "  is  usually  the 
butt  of  these  cartoons ;  but  Belgium's  fate  is  a  close  rival 
in  their  devoted  attentions. 

Every  patriotic  celebration  has  been  made  the  occa- 
sion for  perfervid  orations  in  advocacy  of  preparedness ; 
as,  for  example,  Decoration  Day,  the  Fourth  of  July,  the 
erection  of  memorials  to  the  "  Mexican  Martyrs "  of 
1914. 

Countless  interviews  are  published,  also,  in  which 
"  prominent  officials,"  or  "  highly  intelligent  citizens  "  of 
the  great  cities,  are  given  an  opportunity  to  purvey  such 
advice  as  the  following  bit  from  one,  "  the  father  of  sons 
available  for  military  service."  "  Take  Mexico  and  keep 
it,"  is  the  advice  of  this  metropolitan  Napoleon  of  finance ; 
for,  he  continues,  "  this  task  would  expose  our  unpre- 
paredness  for  a  conflict  with  a  great  power,  and  it  would 
be  a  great  boon  to  us  by  creating  a  well-equipped  army 
of  300,000  veteran  soldiers  who  would  become  the 
nucleus  of  future  millions,  and  thus  result  in  organizing 
in  the  United  States  a  military  system  which  would  be  a 
framework  of  a  real  nation." 

THE  ORGANIZED   CAMPAIGN 

All  this  sporadic  propaganda  is  not  permitted  to  go  to 
waste  or  expend  itself  in  mere  "  hot  air."  For  the  express 
purpose  of  systematizing  it,  organizing  it,  and  bringing  it 


THE  CAMPAIGN  FOR  PREPAREDNESS     19 

to  bear  in  places  where  it  will  produce  results,  at  least 
three  national  societies  have  been  organized.  Other  pa- 
triotic organizations  of  the  various  sons  and  daughters 
are  by  no  means  debarred  from  increasing  the  crop  and 
participating  in  the  harvest  of  preparedness,  and  they  are 
eagerly  availing  themselves  of  the  opportunity.  For  ex- 
ample, at  a  national  conference  on  preparedness,  held  in 
Washington  in  October,  1915,  there  were  represented  the 
Grand  Army  of  the  Republic,  the  Army  and  Navy  Union, 
the  Union  Veteran  Legion,  the  United  Spanish  War 
Veterans,  the  Sons  of  Veterans,  the  National  Rifle  Asso- 
ciation, the  Southern  Commercial  Congress,  the  National 
Defense  League,  the  Navy  League,  and  various  others. 
But  the  three  societies  referred  to  have  no  other  raison 
d'etre  than  to  reveal  our-  unpreparedness  and  achieve  our 
entire  preparedness.  The  Navy  League,  the  American 
Legion,  and  the  National  Security  League  are  the  so- 
cieties referred  to. 

The  Navy  League 

The  Navy  League,  emulating  its  prototype  in  Germany, 
devotes  itself  to  anything  and  everything  which  promises 
to  increase  the  welfare  of  our  navy.  Assuming  the  major 
premise  that  the  navy's  size  is  equivalent  to  its  welfare, 
and  the  minor  premise  that  the  navy's  welfare  is  identical 
with  the  country's  welfare,  it  draws  the  conclusion  that 
whatever  increases  the  money  spent  upon  and  the  atten- 
tion paid  to  the  navy  is  patriotic,  and  therefore  deserving 
of  the  League's  financial,  social  and  political  support.  It 
has  not  become  so  much  of  a  factor  in  American  politics 
and  life  as  is  its  prototype  in  Prussia's  more  congenial 
clime;  but  patience,  effort  and  the  present  unparalleled 
demand  for  preparedness  will  yet  work  wonders  for  the 
League,  and  it  is  certainly  not  neglecting  to  exert  its 
powers  along  these  lines. 

It  has  organized  in  States,  Departments  and  Nation, 
with  field  secretaries  in  each  to  further  its  objects  in 


20  PREPAREDNESS 

every  community,  and  with  a  special  director  of  its  work 
in  Washington,  charged  with  the  specific  duty  of  keeping 
an  eye  on  Congress  and  commending  or  condemning  its 
action  in  regard  to  the  Navy.  It  employs  lecturers  to 
describe  our  unpreparedness  and  to  build  up  the  member- 
ship and  work  of  the  League ;  and  it  is  noteworthy  that 
these  lectures  are  given  preferably  at  "  parlor  meetings  " 
of  the  "  elite  "  society  in  Washington,  New  York,  Phila- 
delphia and  the  large  cities  in  which  the  real  "  Four 
Hundred "  are  to  be  found.  Moving-picture  lectures, 
also,  on  "  Our  Navy  and  What  it  Means,"  etc.,  are  re- 
sorted to ;  and  the  visit  of  a  fleet  of  war-ships  to  cities  or 
towns  is  utilized  for  the  holding  of  "  Monster  Mass 
Meetings,"  addressed  by  the  foremost  exponents  of  the 
Big  Stick,  and  for  other  means  of  "  whooping  it  up  "  for 
the  Navy. 

Its  principal  headquarters  are  in  New  York  City,  the 
center  of  the  country's  wealth  and  commerce,  and  it  was 
an  appropriate  key-note  which  was  struck  by  the  new 
president  of  the  League  in  his  recent  inaugural  address. 
At  the  end  of  the  present  war,  he  is  reported  to  have 
said,  this  country  is  going  to  have  practically  the  entire 
stock  of  gold  in  the  world  and  an  enormously  increased 
commerce;  history  has  proven  that  treaties  and  moral 
obligations  are  nothing  to  nations  that  covet;  hence  we 
should  have  an  army  of  1,000,000  soldiers,  preferably 
boys  between  eighteen  and  twenty-one  years  of  age ;  and 
we  should  build  up  a  vast  navy  at  once  and  pay  for  it 
by  annual  instalments!  This  worthy  man  finds  in  the 
war  experience  of  Belgium,  Great  Britain  and  Russia  a 
justification  of  his  demands ;  but  apparently  he  has  found 
in  the  war  no  reason  for  thinking  that  a  vast  navy  built 
up  at  once  might  become  obsolescent  at  once  and  entirely 
obsolete  soon;  nor  has  he  found  in  American  history 
or  ideals  anything  that  would  deprecate  the  building  up 
of  an  army  of  one  million  men, — or  boys. 


THE  CAMPAIGN  FOR  PREPAREDNESS     21 

The  Women's  Section  of  the  Navy  League 

A  Women's  Section  of  the  Navy  League  was  formed 
on  the  Fourth  of  July,  1915,  and  within  two  months  it 
boasted  of  having  secured  15,000  members,  which  is  4,000 
more  than  the  male  membership  of  the  League.  This 
result  was  achieved  by  a  thorough  organization.  Twenty- 
five  women  were  selected  in  each  State  and  invited  to  be- 
come members  of  a  National  Committee  and  to  aid  in 
organizing  State  committees  and  branches  of  the  League 
in  each  community.  One  professed  object  of  these 
branches  and  committees,  as  of  the  corresponding  ones 
among  the  men,  is  to  "  build  up  public  sentiment  which 
shall  influence  the  Members  of  Congress  to  vote  for  a 
strong  navy  as  a  means  of  guaranteeing  that,  no  matter 
what  international  storms  of  war  may  rage  abroad,  no 
foreign  invading  force  may  ever  carry  the  horrors  of  war 
over  the  borders  of  this  country." 

With  characteristic  feminine  enthusiasm,  the  Women's 
Section  of  the  League  has  planned  a  country-wide,  as 
well  as  State  and  local,  movement  to  influence  Congress, 
and  to  create  public  sentiment  and  support  by  means  of 
"  great  patriotic  pageants  "  and  similar  devices.  Before 
Congress  assembles  in  December,  1915,  the  Women's 
Section  expects  to  secure  100,000  members.  In  pursuit 
of  this  object,  it  is  making  appeals  to  women  to  become 
members  like  that  of  the  Registrar  of  the  Daughters  of 
the  American  Revolution,  who  argues :  "  It  is  time  that 
the  women  of  this  country  freed  themselves  of  the  stigma 
of  standing  for  peace  at  any  price,  lack  of  preparedness, 
and  national  cowardice,  which  has  been  attached  to  them 
because  certain  women  have  been  misled  by  grape- juice, 
anti- American  peace  propagandists  into  throwing  in  their 
own  lot  with  them." 

A  pledge,  called  the  "Women's  Patriotic  Pledge,"  is 
taken  by  new  members,  which  does  not  bind  them  to 
avoid  the  use  of  grape-juice,  or  to  partake  of  any  stronger 


22  PREPAREDNESS 

beverage,  but  which  reads  as  follows :  "  I  pledge  my- 
self to  think,  talk  and  work  for  patriotism,  Americanism, 
and  sufficient  national  defenses  to  keep  the  horrors  of 
war  far  from  America's  homes  and  shores  forever.  In 
these  days  of  world  strife  and  peril,  I  will  strive  to  do 
my  share  to  awaken  our  nation  and  our  law-makers  to 
the  dangers  of  our  present  undefended  condition  so  that 
we  may  continue  to  dwell  in  peace  and  prosperity  and 
not  have  to  mourn  States  desolated  by  war  within  our 
own  borders.  In  so  far  as  I  am  able,  I  will  make  my 
home  a  center  of  American  ideals  and  patriotism  and 
endeavor  to  teach  the  children  in  my  care  to  cherish  and 
revere  our  country  and  its  history  and  to  uphold  its 
honor  and  fair  repute  in  their  generation." 

All  this  fervid  activity  on  the  part  of  the  Women's 
Section  of  the  Navy  League  is  defended  by  the  women 
themselves  on  the  ground  that  "  American  women  should 
be  in  the  forefront  of  the  new  movement  toward  nation- 
alism and  national  defense;  for  they  have  most  to  gain 
by  the  establishment  of  a  navy  which  shall  be  able  to 
keep  war  forever  far  from  our  shores." 

Before  Congress  meets,  also,  about  the  middle  of  No- 
vember, the  Women's  Section  is  planning  to  hold  a  con- 
ference on  national  defense,  "  the  first  of  its  kind  ever 
held."  The  Memorial  Continental  Hall,  headquarters  of 
the  Daughters  of  the  American  Revolution  in  Washing- 
ton, is  to  be  placed  at  the  disposal  of  the  conference,  and 
the  national  committee  appointed  to  take  charge  of  the 
conference  is  composed  of  "  the  leading  social  lights  "  in 
the  large  cities.  One  of  these  writes,  in  accepting  her 
appointment : 

"  I  do  not  need  a  new  pledge,  as  I  have  been  preach- 
ing against  our  foolish  unpreparedness  for  many  years. 
I  am  glad  that  women  are  at  last  awake  to  its  menace 
and  hope  they  will  now  help  to  undo  the  great  harm  they 
have  caused  by  their  short-sighted  peace  propaganda  in 
the  past." 


THE  CAMPAIGN  FOR  PREPAREDNESS     23 

In  further  illustration  of  the  way  in  which  some 
women,  at  least,  have  awakened  to  their  responsibility 
for  preparedness,  may  be  mentioned  an  organization 
recently  formed  in  Washington  under  the  name  of  "  The 
Sponsors  of  the  Navy."  The  membership,  which  now 
numbers  more  than  one  hundred,  includes  only  "  the 
maids  and  matrons  who  have  had  the  honor  of  christening 
a  warship."  As  emphasizing  the  exclusive  character  of 
this  society,  it  has  published  an  edition  de  luxe  of  a  book 
entitled  "  Ships  of  the  United  States  Navy  and  Their 
Sponsors."  This  is  illustrated  by  "  fifty  handsome  half- 
tone pictures  of  christening  parties,"  etc. ;  it  is  limited  to 
500  copies,  and  is  sold  to  members  and  "  a  limited  num- 
ber of  subscribers  outside  of  the  membership  "  for  five 
dollars  a  copy. 

The  American  Legion 

The  American  Legion  is  the  second  of  the  prominent 
societies  formed  for  emphasizing  and  eliminating  our  un- 
preparedness.  It  has  arisen  to  meet  the  demand  that 
all  America's  men  and  resources  available  for  "  prepared- 
ness "  shall  be  inventoried,  classified  and  kept  on  tap  in 
case  of  "  need."  Ex-soldiers,  ex-athletes,  men  skilled  in 
every  science  or  art  that  could  conceivably  be  utilized 
for  military  purposes,  are  being  catalogued  by  the  Legion 
in  its  self-imposed  task  of  annual  and  perennial  census- 
taking.  The  list  of  trades  or  professions  whose  mem- 
bers could  be  of  service  in  aiding  its  campaign  for  pre- 
paredness is  a  long  and  elaborate  one,  including  at  present 
more  than  seventy ;  and  it  aspires  to  include  "  the  entire 
reserve  force  of  the  nation."  It  claims  to  have  enrolled 
more  than  50,000  men  within  the  first  six  months  of  its 
existence.  So  rapid  was  its  growth  and  so  conspicuous 
was  its  campaign  that  it  bade  fair  to  take  the  place  that 
the  Order  of  the  Cincinnati  held  at  its  inception  in  pub- 
lic fear  and  suspicion.  But  these  fears  were  modified 
when  it  was  explained  that  the  Legion  was  not  designed 


24  PREPAREDNESS 

to  organize  or  assemble  a  body  of  men  uniformed,  armed 
and  equipped  for  military  service;  but  only  to  procure  a 
list  of  men  available  in  war-time. 

The  very  rapid  increase  of  the  American  Legion,  and 
its  large  public  prominence,  is  a  striking  illustration  of 
the  influence  of  the  war  in  Europe  on  the  minds  of  the 
American  people,  and  of  the  way  in  which  public  senti- 
ment is  being  exploited.  The  inception  of  the  Legion 
was  in  a  few  back  pages  of  a  fifteen-cent  magazine.1  At- 
tracting the  attention  of  Major-General  Leonard  Wood, 
he  saw  in  it  a  possibility  of  furthering  his  military  aspira- 
tions for  the  United  States,  and  he  gave  it  his  powerful 
support.  The  next  step  was  to  secure  the  cooperation  of 
Colonel  Theodore  Roosevelt,  who  was  evidently  not  ob- 
livious to  the  possible  political  importance  of  the  Legion, 
and  accepted  the  chairmanship  of  its  executive  commit- 
tee. By  means  of  the  clarion  calls  sent  forth  by  this  last- 
named  official,  and  the  enthusiastic  aid  afforded  by  Gen- 
eral Wood  and  his  aide-de-camp,  the  Legion  is  growing 
apace  and  aspires  to  reach  soon  its  300,000  membership 
mark. 

Aside  from  the  rapid  growth  and  quasi-official  relations 
of  the  Legion,  thoughtful  critics  have  deprecated  the 
oath  or  pledge  which  its  new  members  are  invited  to 
take,  namely,  "  to  serve  my  country,  and  to  serve  her 
as  she  says,  not  as  I  say."  Again,  although  the  scientific, 
and  not  the  military,  aspects  of  the  Legion  have  been 
consistently  advertised,  one  of  its  purposes  is  to  enroll, 
in  a  special  branch  or  department,  men  who  have  had 
training  and  service  in  the  regular  army  or  navy.  This 
branch  is  designed  to  supply  the  country  with  "  the  first 
reserve,  which,  in  the  event  of  war,  could  be  quickly 
assembled  and  put  in  readiness  to  follow  to  the  front  the 
first  line,  consisting  of  the  regular  army  and  the  mili- 
tia." 

The  novel  and  distinctive  characteristic  of  the  Ameri- 

1  The  "  Camp  Fire  "  department  of  Adventure. 


THE  CAMPAIGN  FOR  PREPAREDNESS     25 

can  Legion,  however,  seems  to  be  the  mobilization  of 
brains  and  skilled  workmen,  ranging  from  wizards  of 
electricity  and  finance  to  cowboys. 

Closely  allied  in  spirit  with  the  formation  of  the 
"  scientific  branch  "  of  the  American  Legion  is  the  action 
taken  by  various  associations  of  civil,  mechanical,  elec- 
trical, mining  and  consulting  engineers,  bridge-builders, 
electricians,  telegraphers  and  other  trained  experts  in 
civil  life,  who  have  offered  to  cooperate  with  the  Army 
War  College  in  Washington  by  forming  reserve  corps 
to  be  available  in  case  of  war.  Plans  are  now  being 
worked  out  by  means  of  which  the  Government  may  be 
able  to  avail  itself  of  this  offer. 

TJne  National  Security  League  — . 

The  Navy  League  and  American  Legion,  prominent  ) 
though  they  have  suddenly  become,  have  temporarily 
been  eclipsed  by  a  third  society,  the  National  Security 
League  by  name,  which  has  attained  such  prominence 
and  engaged  in  such  feverish  activities  as  to  earn  the 
sobriquet  of  the  National  Hysteria  League.  (j§? 

•This  organization  makes  its  appeal  especially  to  busi- 
ness men  and  men  of  wealth,  with  a  predilection,  like 
that  of  the  Navy  League,  to  secure  the  support  of  the 
"  exclusive  social  set."  It  presses  upon  these  classes  such 
questions  as :  "  Will  you  consider  for  a  moment  the 
effect  upon  your  business  of  the  sudden  appearance  of 
a  large  hostile  force  off  our  coast  oron  our  border?  Do 
you  know  that  in  the  present  condition  of  our  defenses 
we  would,  in  such  an  event,  be  practically  helpless  ? " 
Interpreting  our  "  unpreparedness "  as  evidence  of  a 
lack  of  patriotism  and  a  subsidence  of  nationalism,  the 
League  has  taken  these  two  praiseworthy  sentiments 
under  its  special  guardianship. 

Organized  in  December,  1914,  the  League  recruited 
within  six  months  more  than  three  thousand,  and  within 
eight  months  more  than  twelve  thousand,  members, 


26  PREPAREDNESS 

comprising  "  the  influential  citizens,  the  best  men,"  in 
the  cities  of  New  York,  Philadelphia,  Boston,  Pittsburgh 
and  Chicago.  Each  new  member  promises  to  recruit  at 
least  five  others,  and  thus  an  "  endless  chain,"  or  a  "  five 
times  one  "  device,  has  been  started  for  it.  National  and 
State  field  agents  are  working  for  members  among  such 
fields  as  the  delegates  to  the  National  Manufacturers' 
Association's  annual  meeting,  held  during  the  summer  in 
Atlantic  City.  Two  hundred  cities  are  being  organized 
into  branches  of  the  League,  and  it  is  planned  to  have  a 
separate  headquarters  or  clubhouse  in  each  city.  Col- 
lege graduates  are  especially  welcome;  and  the  promis- 
ing field  of  college  undergraduates  has  been  entered  upon 
by  the  establishment  of  a  branch  of  the  League  at  Har- 
vard. It  has  held  "  unpreparedness  exhibits "  on  the 
leading  thoroughfares  of  the  large  cities,  during  two 
months  before  the  meeting  of  Congress. 

The  League  held  a  national  conference  and  "  monster 
mass  meeting  "  in  New  York  City,  in  June,  1915,  and  one 
feature  of  the  occasion  was  an  elaborate  "  exhibit "  of 
the  machinery  of  war,  from  small  arms  to  a  Whitehead 
torpedo,  twenty  feet  in  length.  Its  "  publicity  campaign  " 
has  been  truly  remarkable.  The  "  front  pages  "  of  the 
metropolitan  dailies,  the  Sunday  Pictorial  Supplements 
and  editorial  columns,  have  been  most  generous  in  their 
attention  to  the  League's  activities,  and  especially  to  its 
cooperation  with  the  Summer  Training  Camps  inaugu- 
rated by  the  United  States  Army. 

Summer  Training  Camps 

Four  of  these  camps  have  been  held  this  Summer,  at 
San  Francisco,  Chickamauga,  Ludington,  Michigan,  and 
Plattsburg,  New  York.  It  is  with  the  last  of  these  that 
the  League  has  been  especially  identified.  General  Leon- 
ard Wood,  the  head  of  the  camp  movement,  was  espe- 
cially helpful  to  the  League  in  its  work  of  inception  and 
organization.  He  made  speeches  at  luncheons  and  else- 


THE  CAMPAIGN  FOR  PREPAREDNESS     27 

where,  under  its  auspices;  and  the  League  has  recipro- 
cated valiantly  in  aiding  his  camp  movement.  It  was 
chiefly  instrumental  in  recruiting  and  sending  to  Platts- 
burg  fourteen  hundred  business  and  professional  men 
from  New  York  City,  Philadelphia  and  elsewhere.  These 
included  the  mayor  of  the  metropolis,  an  ex-Secretary 
of  State  and  ambassador,  prominent  newspaper  corre- 
spondents, college  athletes,  the  most  gilded  of  society's 
jeunesse  doree,  etc.  It  is  small  wonder,  then,  that  the 
newspapers  should  have  found  in  such  incipient  war- 
riors, especially  in  these  warlike  days,  fair  game  with 
which  to  supply  the  jaded  appetites  of  their  readers. 
Hence,  the  papers  have  been  filled  during  the  month  of 
the  camp's  duration  with  an  exhaustive  account  of  the 
camp's  daily  activities  from  taps  to  reveille,  copiously 
illustrated  by  pictures  of  the  eating,  bathing,  fighting, 
etc.,  of  the  future  heroes  and  present  celebrities.  As 
indicative  of  the  type  of  soldiers  illustrated  by  the  Platts- 
burg  campers  and  of  the  kind  of  interest  excited  by 
and  in  them,  the  following  excerpt  from  a  newspaper  ac- 
count is  a  fair  sample  of  countless  others.  "  The  regi- 
ment was  followed  throughout  the  day,"  says  this  ac- 
count of  the  sham  battle  in  which  the  march  occurred, 
"  by  a  long  line  of  automobiles,  and  to-night  in  the  bitter 
cold  [on  the  27th  of  August]  the  citizen-soldiers  are 
gathered  about  huge  camp-fires  with  many  of  their 
women  friends."  They  have  been  associated,  also,  with 
six  hundred  regulars  of  the  United  States  Army,  and 
General  Wood  has  been  the  presiding  genius  of  the 
camp.  In  addition  to  the  instruction  given  to  this  novel 
kind  of  "  rookies  "  by  regular  instructors  connected  with 
the  camp,  they  have  listened  to  fervent  exhortations  from 
orators  prominent  elsewhere.  One  of  these  orators, 
doubtless  "  intoxicated  by  the  exuberance  of  his  own 
verbosity,"  went  so  far  as  to  denounce  before  the  camp 
and  in  General  Wood's  presence  the  national  adminis- 
tration for  its  neglect  to  provide  the  country  with  ade- 


28  PREPAREDNESS 

quate  armaments,  and  for  its  supine  policy  in  dealing 
with  Germany.  This  insubordination  bordering  closely 
on  treason,  at  the  critical  time  at  which  it  occurred, 
called  forth  a  rebuke  to  the  head  of  the  camp  from  the 
Secretary  of  War,  and  for  a  time  word  went  forth  that 
it  would  be  well  for  the  newspapers  and  all  others  con- 
cerned to  moderate  their  transports,  lest  the  camp  should 
be  in  need  of  rescue  from  its  friends. 

But  in  the  main,  the  experiment  was  pronounced  so 
brilliant  a  success,  that  a  second  camp  at  Plattsburg  was 
held  in  September.  The  National  Security  League  re- 
cruited for  this  camp  "almost  as  many  prominent  men 
as  it  had  sent  to  the  first " ;  and,  to  prevent  hard  feeling 
between  the  country  and  the  town,  or  to  spread  the 
gospel  of  preparedness  as  widely  as  possible,  many  of 
these  prominent  men  were  recruited  from  the  rural  dis- 
tricts. 

One  month's  training,  of  course,  is  scarcely  sufficient 
to  develop  an  efficient  officer  for  a  real  army;  and,  al- 
though General  Wood  plans  to  institute  a  "  correspond- 
ence course  "  for  the  graduates  of  the  Plattsburg  Camp 
to  take  during  the  winter,  the  prime  object  and  the  ulti- 
mate result  of  the  camp  is  to  be,  not  so  much  instruction, 
as  inspiration.  The  graduates  of  the  camp  are  expected 
to  become  eager  and  effective  supporters  of  the  National 
Security  League  and  its  work.  They  are  to  talk  and 
write  about  the  camps  which,  it  is  hoped,  will  be  opened 
throughout  the  United  States  next  summer;  and,  in  par- 
ticular, they  are  to  mould  public  sentiment  and  bring 
pressure  to  bear  upon  congressmen  to  provide  for  "  ade- 
quate preparedness."  They  are  to  support  the  definition 
of  "  adequate  preparedness  "  which  is  provided  by  the 
General  Staff  of  the  Army  and  the  General  Board  of 
the  Navy,  and  are  to  frown  upon  any  mere  civilian  en- 
deavor to  decide  upon  so  "  technical "  a  question.  As 
business  men,  they  are  to  insist  upon  business  methods 
in  making  and  using  congressional  appropriations  for 


THE  CAMPAIGN  FOR  PREPAREDNESS     29 

military  purposes.  And  as  men  endowed  with  the  wis- 
dom of  this  world,  they  are  to  deprecate  the  member- 
ship, or  at  least  the  prominence,  in  the  National  Security 
League  of  men  who  are  actively  or  obviously  engaged  in 
the  manufacture  of  military  supplies. 

The  Governors'  Conference 

Since  the  right  and  duty  of  determining  the  size  and 
character  of  the  armed  forces  of  the  country  are  pos- 
sessed, in  our  democratic  Republic,  by  the  people  and 
their  representatives  in  Congress,  the  ultimate  aim  of 
the  campaign  of  preparedness  in  all  its  phases  is  to  or- 
ganize and  concentrate  "  political  pressure."  Hence,  the 
gubernatorial,  congressional  and  presidential  political 
cauldrons  are  already  seething  and  bubbling  from  the 
fuel  of  preparedness. 

At  the  eighth  annual  conference  of  the  Governors  of 
the  States,  held  in  Boston,  in  August,  1915,  the  ques- 
tion of  preparedness  was  kept  well  to  the  fore.  On  the 
arrival  of  the  governors  in  the  city,  each  was  met  by  an 
officer  of  the  Massachusetts  militia,  who  acted  as  his  aide 
throughout  the  conference.  This  was  done  avowedly 
to  "  give  the  clue  to  the  arriving  guests  that  the  para- 
mount issue  for  them  to  develop  in  conference  is  that  of 
preparedness."  The  entire  Massachusetts  militia,  6,000 
strong,  encamped  during  the  conference  on  Bos- 
ton Common,  in  front  of  the  State  House,  in  which  the 
conference  was  held.  The  Secretaries  of  War  and  the 
Navy  were  invited  to  address  the  conference,  and  the 
Secretary  of  the  Navy,  requested  to  send  a  battleship 
to  the  harbor,  responded  by  sending  all  the  available 
ships  of  the  Atlantic  fleet.  On  the  first  day  of  the  con- 
ference, the  fleet  manoeuvred  in  battle  drill;  on  the  sec- 
ond day,  a  parade  of  the  militia,  including  machine-gun 
companies,  field  artillery,  naval  brigade,  signal  and  hos- 
pital corps,  and  "  a  long  baggage  train,"  was  reviewed 
by  all  the  celebrities  of  the  State  and  city,  and  automo- 


30  PREPAREDNESS 

biles  were  supplied  to  the  governors  for  their  participa- 
tion in  it.  After  such  skilful  "  whooping  it  up  "  for  pre- 
paredness, the  stage  was  set  for  the  discussion  of  the 
question  on  the  third  day  of  the  conference.  The  public 
came  in  such  numbers  that  the  discussion  was  adjourned 
from  the  Senate  Chamber  to  the  Hall  of  the  House  of 
Representatives,  and  here  the  governors  of  sundry  States 
made  a  successful  appeal  "  to  the  galleries."  For  ex- 
ample, the  Governor  of  Illinois  declared  that  every  col- 
lege and  university  receiving  State  or  Federal  funds 
should  give  four  years  of  military  training  to  all  their 
students.  The  Governor  of  Massachusetts  went  on  rec- 
ord in  support  of  the  appropriation  of  State  or  Federal 
funds  for  military  training  in  all  the  public  schools.  The 
Governor  of  New  Jersey,  as  coming  from  the  State  of 
the  President  and  the  Secretary  of  War,  and  as  their 
personal  and  political  friend,  was  expected  to  "  put  the 
administration  on  record."  His  speech  was  a  distinct 
disappointment,  however,  to  the  enthusiasts  for  prepared- 
ness. He  contented  himself,  for  example,  with  advocat- 
ing the  addition  of  only  25,000  troops  to  the  regular 
army,  "  whereas,"  writes  a  well-informed  newspaper  cor- 
respondent, "  the  New  England  public,  regardless  of 
party  affiliations,  has  begun  to  think  in  terms  of  a  regular 
establishment  of  at  least  200,000  men,  and  of  a  system 
of  military  training  the  country  over  which,  with  an  in- 
creased State  and  newly  created  militia,  will  give  the 
nation  a  body  of  citizen  soldiery  1,000,000  strong,  upon 
which  the  country  can  rely  at  all  times." 

The  discussion  was  followed  by  the  adoption  of  no 
resolutions  in  favor  of  preparedness,  and  the  conference 
turned  quickly  away  from  a  subject  which  evidently  con- 
tained political  elements  of  dangerous  possibilities,  and 
took  up  that  of  "  the  conservation  of  mankind  and  nat- 
ural resources."  The  New  England  disappointment  in 
this  lame  and  impotent  conclusion,  was  expressed  in  a 
leading  newspaper's  comment  that  "  war  is  hell,  but  more 


THE  CAMPAIGN  FOR  PREPAREDNESS     31 

than  hell  is  necessary  to  convince  [peace]  fools  of  their 
folly." 

The  advocates  of  preparedness  are  hopeful,  neverthe- 
less, that  the  governors  were  sufficiently  impressed  to 
lead  their  people,  on  returning  to  their  homes,  in  a  de- 
mand that  their  congressmen  shall  support  a  programme 
of  preparedness.  Nor  were  the  New  Englanders'  efforts 
to  impress  the  governors  wasted  within  their  own  hori- 
zon. Under  the  stimulus  of  these  efforts,  and  of  Colonel 
Roosevelt's  Plattsburg  speech,  which  occurred  at  the 
same  time,  some  Harvard  graduates  set  on  foot  a  move- 
ment to  have  their  alma  mater  add  to  her  curriculum  "  a 
course  in  the  principles  of  military  command,"  which 
shall  be  made  as  attractive  to  as  many  students  as  possi- 
ble by  counting  towards  the  bachelor's  degree.  It  ap- 
pears to  be  confidently  expected  that  this  movement  will 
succeed,  and  that  Yale  and  the  other  New  England  col- 
leges will  follow  the  example. 

Massachusetts  in  the  Lead 

The  State  of  Massachusetts,  too,  under  the  double 
stimulus  of  the  Governors'  Conference  and  the  return 
of  the  New  England  contingent  of  "  rookies  "  from  the 
Plattsburg  Camp,  is  vastly  enthusiastic  over  plans  and 
hopes  of  "  preparedness."  A  well-informed  journalist 
of  the  Old  Bay  State  writes  of  these  as  follows :  "  The 
Old  Bay  State  is  about  to  set  an  example  to  the  nation 
that,  it  is  expected,  will  be  imitated,  first,  by  the  sister 
States  of  the  New  England  group,  and  later  by  the  other 
States  of  the  Union.  Massachusetts,  without  waiting 
for  the  Federal  Government  to  act,  is  tackling  the  prob- 
lem of  national  defense  on  its  own  account.  The  last 
Legislature  authorized  the  creation  of  a  "  commission 
on  military  education  and  reserve,"  the  first  of  the  kind 
ever  established  in  the  United  States.  That  commission 
has  been  organized  with  an  aggressive  Boston  lawyer, 
former  militiaman  and  Plattsburg  "  rookie,"  as  chair- 


32  PREPAREDNESS 

man,  and  a  distinguished  membership  that  includes  the 
names  of  two  college  presidents,  a  prominent  labor  leader, 
two  major  generals  and  one  brigadier  general,  and  a 
widely  known  editor.  It  has  decided  to  hold  a  series  of 
weekly  hearings,  at  which  opportunity  will  be  afforded 
for  a  period  of  six  weeks  for  every  person  or  organiza- 
tion in  New  England  that  is  interested  in  the  subject  of 
preparedness  to  be  heard.  It  is  expected  that  this  ques- 
tion, that  has  become  acute  since  the  Lusitania  incident, 
will  be  given  an  airing  that  will  attract  the  attention  of 
the  country.  It  will  come  at  an  opportune  time,  on  the 
eve  of  the  assembling  of  Congress,  so  that  it  is  probable 
that  the  discussion  here  will  prove  of  influence  later  on 
in  Washington.  The  appearance  here  at  the  first  hear- 
ing of  Major-General  Leonard  Wood  and  President 
Lowell,  of  Harvard,  will  give  the  hearings  a  good  start. 
Both  have  been  invited  to  attend.  Nobody  in  Massa- 
chusetts doubts  that  the  commission  will  be  able  to  sub- 
mit to  the  next  Legislature  a  comprehensive  plan  for 
strengthening  the  defense  of  the  State.  The  sentiment 
here  is  strong  and  it  is  believed  that  a  reasonable  pro- 
gram will  be  indorsed  by  the  legislative  branch  of  the 
Government.  Like  the  East  in  general,  New  England  is 
enthusiastic  for  legislation  providing  for  a  greater  de- 
gree of  preparedness.  None  of  the  apathy  on  the  sub- 
ject that  prevails  in  the  West  and  Middle  West  is  to  be 
found  here.  Still,  there  are  peace  propagandists  and 
professional  pacificists,  who  undoubtedly  will  be  bitterly 
opposed  to  the  State  "  going  in  "  for  military  prepara- 
tions on  a  larger  scale  than  now  exists  in  the  militia. 
There  will  be  no  attempt  to  stifle  their  voices,  but  there 
probably  will  be  efforts  to  effect  with  this  element  a  rea- 
sonable compromise.  The  report  to  be  compiled  by  the 
commission  will  embrace  some  eight  subdivisions  of  in- 
quiry, but  they  fall  generally  under  two  heads:  one  re- 
lating to  the  armed  military  forces  of  the  State,  and  the 
other  to  military  training  in  the  public  schools.  Except 


THE  CAMPAIGN  FOR  PREPAREDNESS     33 

in  Boston  and  a  few  other  cities  there  are  no  high  school 
cadets  in  Massachusetts,  and  inquiry  leads  to  the  con- 
clusion that  the  extension  of  this  system  likely  will 
meet  with  opposition.  A  compromise  may  be  reached  on 
a  basis  of  involuntary  physical  training  of  all  male  stu- 
dents, but  without  military  drills  with  guns.  Great  em- 
phasis will  be  laid  upon  the  physical  benefits  to  be  de- 
rived from  such  courses  of  exercises.  This  is  one  of 
the  lessons  that  New  England's  volunteers  have  brought 
back  from  the  Plattsburg  camp.  While  no  definite  pro- 
gram has  been  adopted  by  the  commission,  its  report 
probably  will  represent  public  opinion,  which  is  slowly 
crystallizing  in  favor  of  Federal  rather  than  State  mili- 
tary forces.  There  will  be  no  opposition  to  this  from 
the  States'  rights  philosophers,  but  it  seems  to  those 
who  have  gone  thoroughly  into  the  subject  that  the  ob- 
vious scheme  would  be  the  adoption  by  the  Federal 
Government  of  a  general  plan  of  national  defense  which 
the  States  as  individual  units  could  adopt,  thus  produc- 
ing uniformity  and  cohesion.  Very  likely  Massachu- 
setts will  lead  the  way  toward  this  end.  Another  ques- 
tion that  the  commission  will  study  will  be  that  of  the 
adaptation  of  the  Swiss  system  to  Massachusetts.  There 
also  probably  will  be  a  recommendation  for  the  estab- 
lishment by  the  State  of  a  permanent  camp  of  instruc- 
tion similar  to  that  at  Plattsburg  for  the  military  train- 
ing of  the  young  men  of  the  Commonwealth. 

The  Congressional  Campaign 

The  congressional  campaign  for  preparedness,  apart 
from  its  gubernatorial  phase,  is  well  under  way.  When 
the  crisis  in  the  diplomatic  relations  between  the  United 
States  and  Germany  was  acute  because  of  the  sinking 
of  the  Lusitania  and  Arabic,  it  was  confidently  hoped 
by  the  prepareders  that  Congress  would  be  called  in 
extra  session,  at  least  for  increasing  the  army  and  navy. 
Under  the  shadow  of  an  impending  war,  the  policy  of 


34  PREPAREDNESS 

preparedness  would  doubtless  have  received  an  enor- 
mous stimulus  in  such  a  session  of  Congress;  but,  for- 
tunately, for  many  reasons,  the  President  has  not  con- 
sidered it  necessary  or  desirable  to  summon  an  extra 
session.  The  regular  session  of  Congress,  however,  is 
rapidly  approaching,  and  the  preparedness  campaign  has 
fully  prepared  for  it.  Among  many  features  of  its  ac- 
tivity may  be  mentioned,  by  way  of  illustration,  the  ques- 
tionnaire sent  out  by  the  National  Security  League  to 
each  congressman,  demanding  to  know  his  attitude 
towards  "  the  prime  issue  of  the  day,  preparedness." 
The  replies  have  come  in  so  promisefully  that  the  League 
has  expressed  itself  as  very  well  satisfied  with  the  con- 
gressmen in  most  sections  of  the  country,  especially  in 
New  England  and  on  the  Pacific  Coast;  but  it  sounds 
the  warning  that  there  are  still  "  backward  parts  "  of  the 
country,  and  promises  to  devote  to  them  Its  very  par- 
ticular attention. 

It  has  organized  State  Delegations  for  National  De- 
fense, which  have  showered  the  President  and  Cabinet 
with  demands  for  preparedness ;  it  is  holding  mass  meet- 
ings throughout  the  country  to  procure  signatures  to 
preparedness  petitions,  which  it  hopes  to  have  signed 
by  15,000,000  voters;  it  has  named  December  6  as  "  Na- 
tional Defense  Day " ;  and  it  has  sent  its  officials  to 
Washington  to  be  ready  to  "  receive  "  the  returning  con- 
gressmen, and  to  secure  material  for  starting  "  back 
fires  "  in  the  home  districts  of  Senators  and  Representa- 
tives who  venture  to  oppose  the  programme. 

Meanwhile,  political  pulse-feelers  and  aspirants  to  the 
leadership  of  congressional  majorities  and  minorities, 
like  the  senior  Senator  from  Pennsylvania,  are  giving 
out  frequent  interviews  and  addresses,  solicited  or  other- 
wise, in  which  the  people  are  informed  that  their  inter- 
national affairs  have  been  and  will  continue  to  be  in  a 
very  grave  and  dangerous  crisis,  and  that  their  country 
is  "  potentially  the  strongest  and  practically  the  weakest 


THE  CAMPAIGN  FOR  PREPAREDNESS     35 

of  nations."     Therefore,   they  wail,  Prepare,  prepare, 
and  let  us  prepare  for  you. 

The  Presidential  Contest 

In  the  presidential  contest  of  1916,  also,  which  is  al- 
ready well  under  way,  the  Outs  are  preparing  to  smoke 
out  the  Ins  by  the  smoke  of  the  campaign  of  prepared- 
ness. At  the  Governors'  Conference  in  Boston,  a  rep- 
resentative of  the  Outs  from  the  Middle  West  declared 
that  while  the  Democrats  will  wage  the  fight  on  a  can- 
didate, their  present  leader,  the  Republicans  will  go  be- 
fore the  country  on  a  creed,  and  that  the  prime  article 
in  this  creed  will  be :  "  Protection  everywhere  honestly 
applied,  which  will  restore  our  prestige  abroad,  revive 
our  prosperity  at  home,  and  put  the  nation  in  a  position 
to  defend  its  honor  and  its  rights  on  land  and  sea  against 
all  comers." 

The  ex-presidential  advocate  of  "  the  third-cup-of- 
coffee  "  policy  has  lost  no  opportunity  to  convince  the 
voters  that  the  country  should  rid  itself  of  "  milk-and- 
water  statesmen,"  and  should  place  itself  under  the  pro- 
tection of  "  statesmen  of  blood  and  iron."  On  the  other 
hand,  the  possibility  that  the  political  enemy  might  reap 
all  the  advantage  that  may  accrue  to  the  advocacy  of 
preparedness  has  led  sundry  lesser  leaders  of  the  Demo- 
crats to  engage  in  verbal  fireworks  with  the  redoubtable 
Colonel,  in  order  to  assure  the  country  that  their  party 
also  is  eager  to  prepare.  The  non-partisan  observer  of 
the  wave  of  military  "  tommy-rot "  which  is  sweeping 
over  the  country,  listening  to  the  noise  of  this  quarrel 
between  the  politicians,  has  been  hopeful  that  it  be- 
tokened a  rift  in  the  lute  of  preparedness,  and  that  its 
discord  would  soon  fade  into  the  realm  of  oblivion  where 
such  wailing  discords  properly  belong.  But  it  is  only 
too  probable  that  the  rival  parties  will  continue  to  emu- 
late each  other  in  the  howl  for  preparedness,  until  the 
country  is  hounded  into  a  panic  and  flees  to  prepared- 
ness in  earnest. 


II 

PAST  ATTEMPTS  AT   PREPAREDNESS 

SUCH  are  some  of  the  phases  of  the  campaign  for 
preparedness  which  has  our  country  in  its  throes 
at  present.  In  view  of  the  alarm  which  is  being 
sounded  everywhere  and  incessantly,  it  may  be  sensible 
to  pause  for  a  moment  to  inquire  whether  we  have  ever 
prepared  before  this  year  of  grace  and  enlightened  pa- 
triotism, 1916,  or  whether  we  are  only  just  now,  under 
an  unprecedented  prodding,  beginning  to  get  ready  to 
commence  to  prepare?  Many  millions  of  words  were 
talked  into  the  Congressional  Record  last  winter  by  men.- 
bers  who  insisted  that  we  are  absolutely  unprepared,  and 
that  it  is  the  prime  duty  of  the  present  to  prepare. 

Glancing  back  casually  over  a  few  years  of  recent 
history,  we  may  be  surprised  to  learn  that  we  have  been 
at  least  going  through  some  of  the  motions  of  promoting 
preparedness. 

THE    PRESENT    GENERATION'S    PREPAREDNESS 

Taking  the  work  of  the  present  generation, — the  past 
thirty-four  years, — for  example,  we  find  that  we  have 
increased  our  regular  army  from  25,000  to  90,000  men, 
or  by  350  per  cent.  Even  during  the  Civil  War  of  1861- 
1865,  our  regular  army  was  increased  to  only  50,000 
men. 

One  generation  ago,  in  1880,  our  expenditure  for  the 
army  (exclusive  of  pensions)  was  $38,000,000;  to-day, 
the  same  expenditure  is  $106,000,000.  In  1880  our  ex- 
penditure for  the  navy  was  $13,500,000;  to-day,  it  is 
$145,000,000. 

86 


PAST  ATTEMPTS  AT  PREPAREDNESS     37 

Thus,  the  increase  on  the  army  during  the  generation 
has  been  nearly  300  per  cent.,  and  on  the  navy  1,100  per 
cent.  At  the  same  time,  the  expense  for  the  army  and 
navy,  per  capita  of  population,  has  increased  from  $1.00 
to  $2.50,  and  from  one-fifth  of  the  total  expenditures  to 
more  than  one-half. 

Most  of  this  extraordinary  increase  in  military  and 
naval  expenditures  has  occurred  during  the  latter  half 
of  the  generation.  In  the  seventeen  years  from  1882  to 
1898,  our  expenditures  on  the  army  amounted  to  $818,- 
000,000,  or  less  than  one-sixth  of  the  total;  during  the 
seventeen  years  since  the  Spanish  War,  from  1899  to 
1915,  they  have  amounted  to  $2,340,000,000,  or  more 
than  one-fourth  of  the  total.  In  the  first  seventeen 
years,  from  1882  to  1898,  our  expenditures  on  the  navy 
amounted  to  $419,000,000,  or  one-thirteenth  of  the  total 
expenditures;  in  the  second  seventeen  years,  from  1899 
to  1915,  they  amounted  to  $1,800,000,000,  or  one-fifth 
of  the  total. 

If  we  had  spent  upon  the  army  and  navy  during  the 
seventeen  years  from  1899  to  1915  the  same  sum  that 
we  spent  upon  them  during  the  seventeen  years  from 
1882  to  1898,  we  would  have  saved  the  tidy  sum  of  three 
billions  of  dollars.  That  is  to  say,  we  could  have  built 
the  Panama  Canal  eight  times  over  with  the  mere  in- 
crease in  our  army  and  navy  appropriations  during  the 
past  seventeen  years! 

Our  work  for  "  preparedness,"  then,  during  the  past 
generation  and  especially  during  the  latter  half  of  it,  has 
increased  enormously,  whether  it  be  viewed  from  abso- 
lute increase  in  size  and  expenditure,  or  from  the  in- 
crease relative  to  population,  total  expenditures,  or  great 
national  tasks. 

AMERICAN,    GERMAN    AND    BRITISH    PREPAREDNESS 

Again,  if  we  compare  our  recent  work  for  "  prepared- 
ness" with  that  of  the  so-called  "militaristic"  nations 


38  PREPAREDNESS 

of  Europe,  we  cannot  be  said  by  any  means  to  have  done 
nothing,  or  even  to  have  fallen  behind  them  as  far  as 
expenditure  of  the  people's  money  is  concerned.  Con- 
sider, for  example,  the  following  brief  comparison  of  our 
military  and  naval  expenses  with  those  of  "  militaristic  " 
Germany  and  "  navalistic  "  Great  Britain. 

Between  our  war  with  Spain  in  1898  and  the  beginning 
of  the  present  war  in  1914,  we  expended  for  military  and 
naval  purposes  (exclusive  of  pensions)  the  sum  of  four 
billions  of  dollars.  During  the  same  period,  Germany 
expended  for  the  same  purposes  a  sum  not  quite  so  large. 
And  yet  we  have  complained  bitterly  of  Germany's  "  mili- 
tarism "  and  "  preparedness,"  while  our  experts  tell  us 
that  we  are  "  absolutely  unprepared."  In  1881,  we  spent 
$38,000,000  on  our  army,  and  Germany  spent  $91,000,000 
on  its  army;  thirty  years  later,  we  spent  $122,000,000 
on  our  army  and  Germany  spent  $204,060,000  on  its 
army. 

During  the  same  thirty  years,  while  Germany  increased 
its  annual  expenditures  on  the  navy  from  $11,000,000  to 
$114,000,000,  we  increased  ours  from  $13,000,000  to 
$120,000,000.  A  former  Secretary  of  the  Navy  has  de- 
clared that  our  navy  has  cost  $500,000,000  more  than 
Germany's  navy  has  cost,  but  that  ours  is  a  poor  second 
to  it!  There  is  evidently  something  rotten  in  another 
State  than  Denmark. 

Even  Great  Britain,  "  the  mistress  of  the  seas,"  in- 
creased her  annual  naval  expenditures  between  1881 
and  1911  from  $51,000,000  to  $203,000,000,  or  by  only 
400  per  cent.,  while  we  increased  ours  within  the  same 
period  by  more  than  900  per  cent. 

Evidently,  if  militarism  and  navalism  are  to  be  meas- 
ured by  expenditures  for  military  and  naval  purposes, 
the  United  States  may  well  be  accused  of  illustrating  the 
familiar  phenomenon  of  the  pot  calling  the  kettle  black. 
At  all  events,  the  facts  stated  above  are  proof  positive 
and  superabundant  that  we  are  not  now  just  beginning 


PAST  ATTEMPTS  AT  PREPAREDNESS     39 

to  "  prepare,"  but  that  we  have  led  the  world,  during 
recent  years,  by  our  colossal  efforts  in  that  direction. 

AMERICA     AND    THE     SWISS    SYSTEM 

It  is  the  fashion  in  our  great  Republic  for  the  pre- 
pareders  to  demand  "  at  least  as  much  preparedness  as 
the  little  Republic  of  Switzerland  provides."  But  it  is 
quite  possible  that  our  people  are  ignorant  of  the  fact 
that  while  Switzerland  has  expended  for  military  pur- 
poses during  the  past  ten  years  the  sum  of  $65,000,000, 
we  have  expended  for  military  purposes  (exclusive  of 
the  navy)  during  the  same  time,  the  sum  of  $1,300,000- 
ooo,  or  just  about  twenty  times  as  much! 

It  is  true  that  our  army  numbers  less  than  one-fifth 
as  many  men  as  are  trained  for  war  in  Switzerland, — 
the  latter  possessing  an  army  of  "  citizen  soldiers  "  num- 
bering a  half-million.  To  balance  this  disadvantage, 
however,  we  have,  instead  of  the  Alps,  the  Atlantic  and 
Pacific  Oceans,  and  a  navy  upon  which  we  have  ex- 
pended during  the  past  ten  years  the  sum  of  $1,200,- 
000,000. 

Our  preparedness  upon  the  land,  however,  must  be 
made  equal  to  Switzerland's,  even  though  it  cost  us  one 
hundred  times  as  much  as  Switzerland  expends ;  and  our 
rank  as  a  "  world  power  "  demands  a  military  prepared- 
ness able  to  cope  with  that  of  a  victorious  Germany,  and 
a  naval  preparedness  second  to  none, — not  even  to  that 
of  an  undefeated  Great  Britain !  So  say  our  valiant  pre- 
pareders,  and  they  are  moving  heaven  and  earth  to  ac- 
complish their  object  of  "  preparing  "  our  reluctant  Re- 
public by  means  of  a  campaign  unprecedented  for  energy, 
ability  and  enthusiasm  even  in  the  Continent  of  War 
Lords  and  Political  Despots. 


Ill 

PREPAREDNESS   FOR  WHAT? 

THE  energy,  ability  and  patriotic  sentiment  back 
of  the  campaign  for  "  preparedness  "  would  cer- 
tainly be  most  praiseworthy,  were  they  exerted 
for  a  truly  praiseworthy  purpose.  It  is  an  excellent 
thing  to  prepare,  with  energy,  ability  and  love  of  coun- 
try, provided  that  we  prepare  for  the  right  thing  and  by 
the  right  means.  The  plausible  term  "  preparedness  "  is 
usually  explained  or  defined  by  the  further  plausible 
terms  "  adequate  armaments "  and  an  "  efficient  army 
and  navy."  Now,  there  is  something  peculiarly  attrac- 
tive to  the  man  of  the  Twentieth  Century,  and  particu- 
larly to  the  American,  perhaps,  in  the  term  "  adequat" 
or  "  efficient."  Whatever  we  have,  we  desire  to  be 
"  adequate  "  or  "  efficient." 

It  is  impossible,  however,  for  anything  to  be  merely 
adequate  or  efficient ;  it  must  be  adequate  for  something, 
it  must  be  efficient  for  something.  What  is  it,  then,  for 
which  the  armaments  that  are  being  so  vociferously  de- 
manded in  the  United  States  at  the  present  time  are  to 
be  adequate  or  efficient  ? 

In  our  Southland,  the  Captain  Hobsons  predict  every 
little  while  an  inevitable  war  with  Japan;  let  us,  then, 
they  insist,  make  our  armaments  adequate  to  prevent 
Japan  from  causing  the  sun  of  our  national  greatness  to 
set  in  the  Pacific. 

In  New  England,  the  Captain  Gardners  dream  of 
the  Yellow  Peril  and  its  menace  to  the  white  man's  civi- 
lization; of  perfidious  Albion  striking  at  our  hearts 
through  Canada,  or  sweeping  our  commerce  from  the 
seas  and  bombarding  Boston  and  New  York;  of  a  vic- 

40 


PREPAREDNESS  FOR  WHAT?  41 

torious  Germany  invading  our  own  coasts  or  South 
America  with  submarines,  superdreadnoughts  and  an 
army  of  several  million  veteran  soldiers.  Therefore, 
they  wail,  Let  us  arm!  Let  us  prepare  to  defend  our 
firesides  and  our  Monroe  Doctrine! 

In  our  Middle  States  and  throughout  the  West,  the 
Colonel  Roosevelts  iterate  and  reiterate  the  warning 
that  the  United  States  must  guard  againsj  the  imminent 
danger  of  being  Belgiumized  or  Chinafied,  and  like  the 
agitators  of  old  they  clamor:  To  your  tents,  to  your 
tents,  O  Israel !  "  The  most  important  lesson  for  the 
United  States  to  learn  from  the  present  war,"  they  de- 
clare, "  is  the  vital  need  that  it  shall  at  once  take  steps 
to  prepare." 

The  tumult  of  the  European  War  has  mingled  with 
these  voices  of  fear  and  warning,  and  many  of  our  fel- 
low-countrymen have  caught  the  contagion.  From  the 
builders  of  superdreadnoughts  down  to  the  "  social  lead- 
ers" who  are  shouldering  muskets  or  making  lint  and 
bandages,  Americans  are  busily,  even  hysterically,  en- 
gaged in  "  preparing."  Now,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that 
our  country  has  not  been  attacked  by  a  foreign  foe 
throughout  a  century  of  "  unpreparedness,"  and  in  spite 
of  the  further  fact  that  our  potential  enemies  are  busily 
engaged  in  destroying  each  other's  armaments,  it  is 
nevertheless  entirely  possible  that  these  prophecies  of 
evil  may  be  realized  some  time  in  the  future.  All  things 
are  possible, — even  that  Mars  may  make  an  attack  upon 
the  Earth  by  way  of  the  Moon ! 


IV 

MOTIVES   OF   PREPAREDNESS 

IT  is  true  that  to  the  unimpassioned  observer  of  the 
prevalent  passion  for  "  preparedness,"  there  appear 
other  reasons  for  the  advocacy  of  "  adequate  arma- 
ments" than  a  genuine  fear  of  foreign  invasion  and  a 
determination  to  get  ready  to  repel  it.    Before  discussing 
this  last  reason,  then,  let  us  briefly  consider  three  of  the 
others.    These  are  not  so  popular,  and  not  so  generally 
accepted, — at  least  in  public ;  but  they  undoubtedly  exist, 
and  they  add  considerable  weight  to  the  momentum  of 
"  the  campaign." 

POLITICS 

In  the  first  place,  there  is  politics.  Such  adroit  poli- 
ticians as  the  Roosevelts  and  the  Hobsons  leave  us  to 
conjecture,  rather  than  supply  us  with  admissions,  as  to 
the  close  connection  between  politics  and  the  preaching 
of  "  preparedness."  The  Gardners,  however,  have  sup- 
plied us  with  publicly  acknowledged, — or  boasted, — and 
most  convincing,  testimony  as  to  the  value  of  the  arma- 
ments plank  in  the  platform  of  the  politician  ambitious 
to  secure  the  suffrages  of  his  fellow-citizens.  For  ex- 
ample, after  Representative  Gardner,  of  Massachusetts, 
had  made  some  speeches  in  Congress  on  "  Preparedness," 
had  offered  a  resolution  for  the  appointment  of  a  com- 
mission of  inquiry  into  our  "  unpreparedness,"  and  had 
given  out  newspaper  interviews  and  a  carefully  prepared 
statement  to  thirty-two  selected  newspapers,  his  "  next 
step,"  he  naively  admits,  "  was  to  go  home  to  be  re- 
elected."  "  I  spoke  continuously  upon  this  topic," — dur- 

42 


MOTIVES  OP  PREPAREDNESS  49 

ing  his  campaign  for  reelection, — he  testifies,  "  and  upon 
very  little  else  in  my  district.  The  people  were  so  dis- 
gusted with  my  views  of  the  question  that  they  elected 
me  by  over  12,000  plurality, — somewhat  in  contrast  to 
what  happened  last  year.  I  have  the  honor  to  be  the 
worst  defeated  man  who  ever  ran  for  governor  in  Massa- 
chusetts on  the  Republican  ticket.  But  this  year,  after 
preaching  this  doctrine,  I  had  12,000  plurality."1 

This  emphatic  testimony  as  to  gubernatorial  aspira- 
tions and  success  has  not  fallen  by  the  wayside,  but  has 
been  taken  to  heart  by  the  candidates  for  the  governor- 
ship of  Massachusetts  in  1915.  One  of  these  candidates 
has  taken  it  so  much  to  heart  that  he  has  made  his  cam- 
paign in  an  armored  automobile  that  is  later  to  perform 
another  kind  of  campaign  service  on  the  battle-line  in 
France.  His  automobile  is  built  like  a  torpedo,  painted 
battleship  gray,  and  provided  with  peep-holes  or  port- 
holes, through  which  machine  guns  are  to  pour  their  mis- 
siles upon  the  Germans,  and  through  which  the  bel- 
ligerent candidate  pours  the  hot  shot  of  his  oratory. 

In  a  speech  before  the  House  of  Representatives,  Jan- 
uary 21,  1915,  Mr.  Gardner  repeated  and  emphasized 
his  testimony  as  to  the  political  value  of  advocating  "  pre- 
paredness," as  follows :  "  I  know  what  I  am  talking 
about,  for  I  have  already  tried  several  experiments  in 
that  line.  I  am  not  eloquent.  I  have  not  even  the  sub- 
lime gift  of  the  gab.  Hitherto  I  have  never  been  able  to 
make  an  audience  applaud  me  more  than  a  small  frac- 
tion of  a  small  second.  Hitherto  I  never  in  my  life  felt 
the  glowing  consciousness  that  an  audience  wanted  me 
to  continue.  But  on  this  question  of  the  national  defense 
I  have  got  my  audience  going  as  if  I  were  William  Jen- 
nings Bryan  talking  prohibition  to  a  convention  of  patent 
medicine  dealers.  Never  before  in  my  life  have  I  had 
applause  as  if  my  audience  were  paid  a  dollar  a  clap, 

1  Mr.  Gardner's  testimony  before  the  House  of  Representatives' 
Committee  on  Naval  Affairs,  December  18,  1914. 


44  PREPAREDNESS 

and  I  confess  I  like  the  new  sensation.  So  I  just  give 
fair  warning  that  if  any  one  of  you  pacifico  Members  of 
Congress  wants  to  challenge  me  to  a  joint  debate  in  the 
month  of  March  before  any  audience, — black,  white, 
yellow  or  pink, — I  am  at  your  service,  and  you  will  not 
have  to  give  me  any  gate  receipts  or  honorarium  or  any 
other  of  the  fifty-seven  different  varieties  of  high-brow 
pickings  either." 

We  must  acknowledge  that  Mr.  Gardner's  content- 
ment with  -votes  alone  as  compensation  for  his  elocu- 
tionary efforts  is  entirely  explicable ;  and  we  must  accept 
his  convincing  testimony  as  to  the  value  of  "  prepared- 
ness "  as  a  vote-getter.  His  listening  colleagues  in  Con- 
gress were  duly  impressed,  doubtless,  by  this  testimony; 
for  we  are  already  launched  in  the  mid-stream  of  a  con- 
gressional campaign,  the  chief  slogan  of  which  is  "  pre- 
paredness." The  protagonists  of  the  respective  parties 
are  already  contending  for  the  credit  of  having  brought 
this  issue  before  the  public;  and  Republican  leaders  are 
copiously  lamenting  the  advantage  that  the  Democratic 
congress  and  administration  have  in  being  able  to  carry 
through  a  programme  for  preparedness  during  the  com- 
ing winter,  and  before  the  election  of  1916.  From  ex- 
presidential  aspirants  for  "  third  cups  of  coffee,"  down  to 
candidates  for  the  office  of  borough  alderman,  politicians 
anxious  to  serve  their  country  are  filling  the  air  with 
vociferous  demands  for  "  adequate  armaments  "  or  "  pre- 
paredness." 

All  this  has  its  amusing  side,  characteristic  of  Ameri- 
can political  life;  but,  fundamentally,  it  is  playing  with 
fire.  The  man  who  dares  to  appeal  to  the  fighting  in- 
stincts of  the  American  people, — and  we  are  a  fighting 
people;  who  inflames  our  national  passions, — and  we 
have  them;  who  evokes  our  international  and  racial 
prejudices, — and  these  too  are  not  unknown  among  us; 
such  a  man,  be  he  desirous  of  the  highest  or  of  the  lowest 
office  within  the  gift  of  the  people,  richly  deserves  to  be 


MOTIVES  OF  PREPAREDNESS  45 

overwhelmed  by  an  avalanche  of  votes  at  the  polls  and 
retired  to,  or  kept  in,  the  innocuous  desuetude  of  private 
'life! 

The  influence  of  "  politics  "  on  the  programme  of  pre- 
paredness,— after  the  political  aspirant  has  ridden  into 
office  on  the  wave  of  preparedness  agitation, — may  be 
judged  by  the  following  facts  relating  to  coaling  and 
naval  stations  which  a  former  Secretary  of  the  Navy, 
Mr.  Meyer,  recalled  in  a  recent  magazine  article.  "  Until 
within  a  few  years,"  writes  Mr.  Meyer,  "  no  naval  ap- 
propriation could  pass  the  Senate  which  did  not  meet 
the  sanction  of  both  a  Northern  and  Southern  Senator, 
each  of  whom  was  a  member  of  the  Committee  on  Naval 
Affairs.  It  is  interesting,  in  consequence,  to  analyze 
some  of  the  appropriations  between  1895  and  1910.  In 
1899  a  site  was  purchased  in  Frenchman's  Bay,  Maine, 
at  a  cost  of  $24,650, — far  above  the  assessed  valuation, — 
and  later  an  additional  amount  of  $600,000  was  ex- 
pended to  obtain  there  an  absolutely  unnecessary  coaling- 
station,  which  has  since  been  dismantled,  as  it  was  prac- 
tically unused.  At  the  Portsmouth  Navy- Yard,  so  called, 
in  Kittery,  Maine,  a  dock  was  built  at  an  expense  of  $i,- 
122,800,  and  later  it  was  found  necessary  to  blast  away 
rock  in  the  channel  in  order  to  reach  the  dock,  at  an  ad- 
ditional expense  of  $745,300.  Between  1895  an<^  I9I° 
improvements,  machinery,  repairs  and  maintenance  in 
the  yard  amounted  to  $10,857,693,  although  there  was  a 
large  navy-yard  within  seventy  miles. 

"  On  the  other  hand,  at  Port  Royal,  South  Carolina, 
a  dock  was  built  at  the  insistence  of  the  Southern  Sena- 
tor, at  a  cost  of  $450,000,  which  proved  useless,  and,  al- 
though the  original  cost  of  the  site  was  but  $5,000,  it 
was  not  abandoned  as  a  naval  base  until  $2,275,000  had 
been  expended.  Not  the  least  daunted  by  this  extravagant 
waste,  the  same  Senator  determined  to  have  a  share  of 
the  naval  melon  for  his  State,  so,  with  the  assistance  of 
the  Northern  Senator,  he  obtained  the  establishment  of 


46  PREPAREDNESS 

another  naval  station  at  Charleston,  South  Carolina,  in 
1901.  There  was  no  strategic  value  thus  accomplished, 
nor  was  it  necessary,  with  the  Norfolk  Navy- Yard  lo- 
cated at  Hampton  Roads.  The  $5,000,000  which  has  been 
squandered  at  Charleston  includes  a  dry-dock  built  for 
battleships,  costing  $1,250,000,  but  which  experience 
shows  can  only  be  used  by  torpedo-destroyers  and  gun- 
boats. 

"  The  United  States  has  over  twice  as  many  first- 
class  navy-yards  as  Great  Britain,  with  a  navy  more 
than  double  the  size  of  ours,  and  more  than  three  times 
as  many  as  Germany,  whose  navy  is  larger  than  that  of 
the  United  States.  The  total  cost  of  navy-yards  up  to 
June  30,  1910,  with  land,  public  works,  improvements, 
machinery  and  maintenance,  including  repairs,  amounts 
to  $320,600,000.  Overburdened  with  a  superfluous  num- 
ber of  navy-yards  distributed  along  the  Atlantic  Coast 
from  Maine  to  Louisiana,  in  1910  I  recommended  that 
Congress  give  up  and  dispose  of  [eight]  naval  stations, 
.  .  .  none  of  which  was  a  first-class  station.  The  aver- 
age yearly  cost  of  maintaining  these  stations  between 
1905  and  1910  was  $1,672,675,  and  very  little  useful  work 
had  been  performed  at  any  of  them.  Later,  I  practi- 
cally closed  them,  but  could  not  abolish  or  dispose  of 
them,  no  action  having  been  taken  by  Congress.  Pensa- 
cola  and  New  Orleans  have  since  been  reopened  by  my 
successor.  The  Pensacola  Navy- Yard,  originally  a  mili- 
tary reservation,  had  cost  the  United  States  Govern- 
ment, up  to  1910,  $12,200,000,  with  little  return  in  the 
way  of  output. 

"  The  fundamental  cause  of  excessive  expenditures  is 
due  to  the  fact  that  appropriations  are  not  made  with  the 
sole  view  of  the  battle  efficiency  of  the  fleet  (which  is 
the  navy)  and  its  military  requirements.  Politics  and 
log-rolling,  as  I  have  shown,  have  entered  into  the  mak- 
ing of  appropriations  by  Congress.  A  more  recent  case 
is  the  training-station  outside  of  Chicago,  established  in 


MOTIVES  OF  PREPAREDNESS  47 

1905.  The  original  site  was  a  gift,  but  $3,646,000  has 
been  expended,  buildings  erected  on  a  lavish  scale,  quite 
unnecessary  and  not  suitable,  due  to  the  zeal  of  a  con- 
gressman of  the  district,  a  member  of  the  Naval  Com- 
mittee. One-half  the  amount  would  have  more  than 
met  the  requirements  and  have  been  better  adapted  to 
what  a  training-station  should  be." 

PROFITS 

Next  to  the  alliance  between  preparedness  and  politics, 
there  has  been  discovered  a  close  connection  between  pre- 
paredness and  profits,  between  dividends  and  dread- 
noughts. Certain  manufacturers  of  war  supplies  have 
engaged  actively  in  the  manufacture  of  war  scares.  Reg- 
ularly, for  years,  when  Congress  has  had  before  it  appro- 
priation bills  for  the  army  and  navy,  a  war  scare  has 
swept  over  the  country,  or  at  least  over  the  capitol,  and 
the  "  imminent "  danger  of  war  with  Japan  or  with  Ger- 
many has  been  used  to  dragoon  the  congressmen  into 
voting  as  large  appropriations  for  preparedness  as  possi- 
ble. In  Germany,  Great  Britain  and  Japan,  investiga- 
tion has  revealed  the  fact  that  similar  war  scares  have 
been  stimulated  by  the  manufacturers  of  armaments  with 
the  object  of  increasing  a  demand  for  their  products.  In 
our  country,  such  men  as  Mr.  Orville  Wright  are  mod- 
erate and  modest  enough  to  say :  "  I  do  not  advocate 
the  acquisition  (by  the  Government)  of  too  many  ma- 
chines because  I  happen  to  be  in  the  aeroplane  business  " ; 
but,  he  naively  adds :  "  What  would  stimulate  most  the 
manufacture  of  aeroplanes  here  [in  the  United  States] 
would  be  some  real  business  from  the  Government.  If 
a  builder  knew  that  he  had  a  market  for,  say,  100  ma- 
chines, provided  they  came  up  to  the  requirements  laid 
down  by  the  authorities,  it  would  prove  the  most  power- 
ful incentive  possible."  It  has  since  been  reported  that 
the  syndicate  which  recently  bought  the  aeroplane  pat- 
ents, factories,  training-school  and  equipment  of  Mr, 


48  PREPAREDNESS 

Wright's  company  at  Dayton,  Ohio,  has  promised  "  to 
cooperate  in  every  way  possible  to  make  the  prepared- 
ness movement  a  success." 

Not  all  the  inventors  and  manufacturers  of  military 
equipment  are  so  moderate  and  frank  as  Mr.  Wright. 
For  example,  the  head  of  the  Bethlehem  Steel  Company, 
— whose  "  war  orders  "  in  four  months  made  1914  the 
banner  year  in  the  company's  history, — gave  out  an  in- 
terview to  the  newspapers  as  follows : 

"  A  strong  navy  is  a  nation's  chief  asset.  Germany  is 
now  splendidly  equipped  upon  land,  but  as  control  of  the 
seven  seas  has  always  been  Great  Britain's  policy,  Ger- 
many must  equal  the  latter's  fleet  to  win.  Nations  con- 
trolling the  seas  have  ruled  the  world  in  the  past,  and 
it  will  always  be  so.  Let  America  take  warning." 

These  fervent  adjurations  to  the  public  to  prepare  are 
usually  salted  with  "  patriotism,"  the  injunction  to  pur- 
chase large  quantities  of  their  own  products  being  cou- 
pled with  expressions  of  undying  affection  for  the  land 
of  their  nativity, — or  adoption, — and  a  hyphenated  citi- 
zenship and  the  last  drop  of  blood  being  freely  prom- 
ised to  the  altar  of  the  country's  defense. 

But  this  "  patriotism "  would  be  more  impressive  if 
the  American  public  knew  that  American-made  arms 
and  ammunition,  battleships  and  airships,  would  be  sold 
only  to  the  American  government.  The  lamentable  fact, 
however,  is  that  patriotism  is  not  permitted  to  interfere 
with  profits,  and  American  manufacturers  have  engaged 
with  desperate  energy  in  enabling  America's  possible 
enemies  to  "  prepare."  For  example,  before  the  Presi- 
dent placed  an  embargo  on  the  shipment  of  arms  and 
ammunition  into  Mexico,  American  manufacturers 
poured  an  avalanche  of  such  material  across  the  border 
into  the  hands  of  the  government  and  the  rebel  troops 
alike.  During  the  continuance  of  the  embargo,  the  man- 
ufacturers piled  up  their  products  in  Mobile,  New  Or- 
leans and  other  Southern  ports,  and  as  soon  as  the  em- 


MOTIVES  OF  PREPAREDNESS  49 

bargo  was  lifted,  the  avalanche  began  again.  Through- 
out all  this  period,  it  appeared  but  too  probable  that  the 
United  States  government  would  be  called  upon  to  in- 
tervene in  Mexico  itself;  and  American  manufacturers 
who  were  loudly  demanding  this  intervention  were  sup- 
plying the  Mexicans  with  guns  and  bullets  which  were 
enabling  the  Mexican  anarchy  to  continue  and  which 
would  be  used,  in  case  of  intervention,  against  American 
soldiers. 

Again,  both  before  and  during  the  present  war  in  Eu- 
rope, these  same  manufacturers  have  joined  lustily  in 
the  demand  that  the  United  States  shall  "  prepare,"  and 
yet  they  have  made  and  shipped  hundreds  of  millions  of 
dollars  worth  of  military  equipment  to  the  very  nations 
against  whom  we  are  called  upon  to  prepare.  And  they 
have  actually  reversed  the  maxim  that  "  charity  begins  at 
home,"  by  selling  this  equipment  to  foreign  governments 
at  lower  prices  than  they  exact  from  our  own  govern- 
ment. For  example,  as  is  shown  in  the  report  of  the 
Secretary  of  the  Navy  for  1913:  in  1894  one  of  our 
producers  furnished  armor  plate  to  Russia  at  $249  a  ton, 
while  charging  our  own  government  $616.14  a  ton.  In 
1911,  the  same  company  furnished  armor  plate  to  Italy  at 
$395.03,  while  charging  the  United  States  $420;  and  in 
1913,  they  furnished  armor  for  the  Japanese  ship,  Ha- 
runa,  building  at  Kobe,  at  $406.35  a  ton,  while  exacting 
prices  ranging  from  $440  to  $504  for  the  American  bat- 
tleship No.  39. 

Another  significant  fact  is  revealed  in  the  report  of  the 
Secretary  of  the  Navy  for  1914,  which  says :  "  Twice 
were  the  armor-plate  factories  saved  a  monopoly  of  this 
business  through  a  '  mysterious  providence.'  There  are 
only  three  concerns  in  the  country  which  make  armor 
plate,  and  last  year  when  bids  were  invited,  all  three 
made  identically  the  same  bids  to  a  cent.  They  justified 
this  sham  of  bidding  by  saying  that  the  department  had 
fixed  the  price  and  divided  the  business  between  the  three 


50  PREPAREDNESS 

concerns  regardless  of  the  bidding,  making  the  award  on 
one-third  the  quantity  desired  to  each  firm  at  the  lowest 
figures  quoted,  which  was  always,  as  may  be  supposed, 
a  figure  which  gave  inordinate  profits." 

In  the  light  of  such  facts,  there  is  small  wonder  that 
the  question  has  been  raised,  Is  the  lack  of  battle 
cruisers  in  our  navy,  and  the  incessant  demand  for  more 
dreadnoughts,  due,  partly  at  least,  to  the  fact  that  the 
battle  cruiser, — which  is  of  verjj;  great  effectiveness, — 
requires  far  less  armor  plate  than  does  the  dreadnought  ? 
There  is  small  wonder,  also,  that  the  larger  question  has 
been  raised,  Would  it  not  be  advisable  for  the  govern- 
ment to  manufacture  its  own  military  and  naval  sup- 
plies ? 

The  shipment  of  military  supplies  of  all  kinds  to  as 
many  of  the  belligerent  nations  of  Europe  and  Asia  as 
can  procure  and  pay  for  them  has  been  enormously  stim- 
ulated by  the  present  war.  Naturally  laws  forbid  the 
direct  shipment  of  warships;  but  parts  of  ten  or  more 
submarines  have  been  manufactured  in  Pennsylvania, 
assembled  in  Canada,  and  shipped  to  Great  Britain,  by 
a  single  American  company.  This  company  has  also 
built  eight  or  more  submarines  in  Massachusetts  for  the 
British  government,  and  these  are  being  guarded  by 
United  States  naval  officials  "  until  such  time  as  a  dis- 
position satisfactory  to  all  parties  can  be  arranged." 

But,  although  debarred  for  the  present  by  neutrality 
laws  from  shipping  warships  and  armies  complete,  to 
our  "  possible  enemies,"  our  American  manufacturers 
have  found  a  bonanza  in  the  shipment  of  everything 
needful  for  them.  In  fact,  certain  large  fields  of  Ameri- 
can industry  have  been  revolutionized  by  the  attempt  to 
supply  the  great  powers  of  Europe  and  Asia  with  mili- 
tary equipment.  By  June  of  1915,  the  war  orders  placed 
in  the  United  States  totalled  more  than  one  billion  dol- 
lars, and  the  country  was  informed  that  this  was  a  mere 
beginning.  Fifteen  firms  in  Detroit  received  a  $31,- 


MOTIVES  OF  PREPAREDNESS  51 

000,000  order  in  one  day  from  Russia.  New  England 
is  declared  to  be  more  prosperous  than  at  any  other  time 
in  its  history,  its  exports  from  its  own  ports  having 
trebled  and  quadrupled  within  six  months  after  the  war 
began,  besides  other  uncounted  millions  shipped  by  New 
England  manufacturers  through  New  York.  The  ex- 
ports from  New  York  in  the  single  month  of  July,  1915, 
increased  nearly  $100,000,000  over  those  of  July,  1914, — 
the  month  before  the  war  began.  Every  railroad  and 
every  coastwise  steamship  line  running  into  the  city  have 
been  congested  for  weeks  by  exports  for  the  war.  In 
one  day,  there  cleared  from  New  York  seven  steamships 
loaded  with  100,000  tons  of  military  supplies,  including 
ammunition,  armored  automobiles,  guns, — two  of  these 
14-inch  guns,  53  feet  long  and  60  inches  wide  at  the 
breach.  Part  of  the  cargo  of  these  steamers  was  made 
up  of  hospital  supplies  and  coffins;  thus,  the  old-time 
policy  of  shipping  rum  and  copies  of  the  Bible  on  the 
same  ship  to  "  the  heathen  "  is  paralleled  by  the  present- 
day  shipments  of  death-dealing  and  body-healing  equip- 
ment on  the  same  steamer.  The  exports  of  surgical  goods 
have  doubled  during  the  year,  and  American  undertakers 
have  felt  the  stimulus  in  trade.  Another  day's  consign- 
ment was  that  of  100,000  shells  on  Norse  and  Danish 
steamers  for  use  in  the  German  army.  Orders  for  25,- 
000,000  shrapnel  shells  costing  $400,000,000,  .were  placed 
in  the  United  States  before  the  end  of  the  first  year  of 
the  war.  The  pressure  on  the  New  England  railroads, 
which  traverse  "  the  ammunition  belt,"  has  been  enorm- 
ous. The  piers  of  the  N.  Y.,  N.  H.  &  H.  R.  R.  are  sur- 
rounded by  lighters,  on  which  men  are  working  night 
and  day  to  keep  pace  with  the  accumulating  freight. 
Various  ports  on  the  Pacific  coast  have  been  nearly  over- 
whelmed by  the  war  exports  to  Vladivostok  and  Japan. 
To  move  these  exports  on  the  other  side,  20,000  freight 
cars  and  400  locomotives  had  to  be  shipped  from  Amer- 
ica to  transport  into  Russia  such  commodities  as  armored 


52  PREPAREDNESS 

cars,  dynamite,  pig-lead  and  copper,  guns,  rifles,  barbed 
wire  for  the  trenches,  etc. 

The  needs  of  the  cavalrymen  of  the  Old  World  have 
not  been  neglected  by  American  shippers.  A  Western 
firm  has  a  contract  to  supply  500  horses  per  week  to 
Great  Britain;  South  Omaha  sold  $4,000,000  worth  of 
horses  to  the  allies  in  the  first  year  of  the  war,  and  ex- 
pects to  double  this  in  the  second  year.  These  are  ex- 
amples of  the  export  trade  in  horses,  which  increased 
during  one  month  (February,  1915)  from  $200,000  to 
$9,300,000,  while  the  export  of  saddles  and  harness  in- 
creased eleven  fold. 

Nor  have  the  needs  of  foreign  aviators  been  neglected 
by  the  American  manufacturers  of  aeroplanes  and  their 
accessories.  Scores  of  plants  in  various  parts  of  the 
United  States  are  rushing  their  products  to  /'  the  possi- 
ble enemies  "  of  their  country.  For  example,  one  estab- 
lishment in  Buffalo,  with  a  capacity  of  twelve  aeroplanes 
a  day,  has  shipped  abroad  400  aeroplanes  and  1,000 
aeroplane  motors,  and  is  now  working  on  orders  for  600 
more  planes  and  1,000  motors.  The  same  firm  has 
shipped  twenty  huge  flying-boats  of  the  "  America " 
type,  equipped  with  two  90  horse-power  motors,  and  is 
working  on  another  biplane  of  180  horse-power,  with  a 
speed  of  90  miles  per  hour,  which  is  to  go  to  Great 
Britain.  Another  firm  in  Ithaca  has  been  filling  large 
orders  for  biplanes  of  90  horse-power,  and  is  now 
turning  them  out  for  export,  with  160  horse-power.  In 
Marblehead,  Los  Angeles,  Dayton,  New  York,  Norwich, 
Grinnell,  Paterson,  Bridgeport,  and  many  other  places, 
European  orders  for  war-planes  and  motors  have  been 
placed  in  enormous  quantities. 

Numerous  and  varied  industries  have  been  trans- 
formed from  subserving  the  interests  of  peace  to  supply- 
ing the  sinews  of  war.  As  a  few  examples  of  these, 
there  may  be  mentioned  the  New  York  Air  Brake  Co. 
and  the  Westinghouse  Air  Brake  Co.,  which  received  an 


MOTIVES  OF  PREPAREDNESS  53 

order  from  Russia  for  $30,000,000  and  $35,000,000  worth 
of  shells,  respectively,  each  shell  to  be  provided  with  260 
bullets;  the  Des  Moines  Monarch  Machine  and  Stamp- 
ing Co.,  which  has  a  $6,000,000  contract  for  1,000  shrap- 
nel shells  per  diem ;  automobile  companies  exported  $47,- 
000,000  worth  of  armored  automobiles  in  the  first  year 
.  of  the  war ;  a  brewery  plant  in  West  Virginia  has  been 
leased  by  the  National  Salt  and  Chemical  Co.  and  de- 
voted to  the  manufacture  of  explosive  chemicals;  sun- 
dry typewriting  and  adding  machine  companies  in  the 
Middle  West  have  formed  the  "  American  Ammunition 
Co.,"  for  securing  contracts  for  high  explosives  and 
shrapnel  shells,  and  received  a  contract  during  the  first 
week  after  organization  for  $10,000,000  worth  of  ammu- 
nition; the  manufacturers  of  locomotives,  electric  boats, 
cars,  car  and  foundry  supplies,  ball-bearings,  &c.,  &c., 
have  shown  wholly  unsuspected  ability  to  convert  their 
plants  into  war-supply  factories,  and  with  innumerable 
others  have  helped  to  make  the  United  States  the  great- 
est manufacturer  of  war  materials  in  the  world. 

The  industries  engaged  in  the  production  of  raw  ma- 
terials for  these  manufacturing  establishments  have  re- 
sponded pari  passu  to  the  demand  for  their  products. 
For  example,  the  output  of  copper  in  a  single  month 
(May,  1915)  surpassed  all  previous  records  by  more 
than  25,000,000  pounds;  and  despite  the  enormously  in- 
creased production,  the  price  of  copper  increased  eight 
cents  per  pound  in  four  months.  The  production  of  zinc 
and  lead  was  greatly  increased,  and  yet  their  prices,  too, 
increased  by  25c.  and  3^c.,  respectively,  attaining  heights 
that  have  not  been  touched  since  the  Civil  War.  Aus- 
tralian zinc  mines,  which  formerly  sent  their  metal  to 
Liege,  Belgium,  have  been  sending  it  to  the  United 
States,  where  it  is  refined  and  then  exported  to  Europe. 
The  town  of  Joplin,  Missouri,  has  sprung  into  inter- 
national importance  as  a  leading  center  of  zinc  or  spelter. 
Even  the  manufacture  of  benzol,  a  necessary  ingredient 


54.  PREPAREDNESS 

in  certain  kinds  of  explosives,  has  sprung  up  in  the 
United  States;  and  the  Lackawanna  Steel  Co.,  by  the 
utilization  of  coal  smoke,  is  said  to  have  become  the 
largest  manufacturer  of  benzol  in  the  world.  Steel  is 
once  more  king,  and  its  output  of  near  1,000,000  tons  a 
week  has  restored  pay  envelopes  to  200,000  idle  men  in 
this  single  industry. 

So  enormous  has  been  the  investment  of  new  capital 
and  labor  in  the  business  of  manufacturing  and  export- 
ing military  supplies,  that  existing  plants  have  been 
largely  extended,  and  new  villages  and  towns  have  sprung 
up  as  if  by  magic  to  meet  the  demand.  One  of  the  most 
striking  illustrations  of  this  phenomenal  growth  is  that 
of  North  Eddystone,  Pennsylvania.  Here  the  Reming- 
ton Arms  Co.  of  Bridgeport,  Connecticut,  and  Ilion, 
New  York,  has  had  erected  for  it  a  building  that  is  said 
to  be  the  largest  in  the  world.  It  covers  fifteen  acres  of 
ground,  is  seven  stories  high,  and  its  "  glistening  moun- 
tain range  "  of  steel  and  tile  is  all  under  one  great  glass 
roof.  It  took  the  Baldwin  Locomotive  Works  less  than 
four  months  to  erect  this  monster  building  for  the  Rem- 
ington Co.,  and  for  several  months  past  the  15,000  em- 
ployes whom  it  shelters  have  been  working  extra  time 
in  the  manufacture  of  rifles, — to  the  number  of  1,500,000 
per  annum! 

The  Baldwin  Locomotive  Works,  itself,  accepted  a 
contract  for  $97,000,000  worth  of  shrapnel  shells ;  but 
since  its  original  charter  did  not  permit  it  to  engage  in 
this  far-away  by-product  of  locomotive  making,  it  char- 
tered a  subsidiary  company,  the  Eddystone  Ammunition 
Co.,  and  erected  a  second  huge  plant  at  North  Eddystone 
for  it.  This  building  covers  nearly  fourteen  acres,  and 
turns  out  shrapnel  at  the  rate  of  20,000  rounds  a  day. 
The  president  of  the  company  has  planned  to  maintain 
this  industry  for  at  least  five  years ;  for  he  calculates  that 
even  though  the  present  war  does  not  last  that  long,  the 
United  States  and  other  nations  will  demand  the  utmost 


MOTIVES  OF  PREPAREDNESS  55 

product  of  the  plant  for  at  least  that  term  of  years.  More 
than  a  hundred  locomotives  are  nearing  completion  for 
the  task  of  transporting  the  rifle  and  shrapnel  products  of 
the  two  huge  plants,  and  a  great  ocean  pier  is  being 
erected  to  enable  ocean  freighters  to  assist  in  this  task 
and  in  that  of  moving  the  powder  manufactured  just 
across  the  river  by  the  Du  Pont  Powder  Works.  The 
Du  Pont  Company,  too,  has  come  upon  booming  times, 
and  is  reported  to  have  enough  orders  already  in  hand 
to  keep  its  various  plants  running  at  top  speed  for  five 
years.  There  is  small  wonder  that  in  the  enlargement  of 
one  of  its  plants,  it  found  it  necessary  to  create  a  new 
village  of  more  than  300  houses,  or  that  it  has  been 
obliged  to  apply  to  the  State  of  New  Jersey  for  a  grant 
of  five  miles  of  the  Delaware  water  front  at  Penn's 
Grove  and  Gibbstown. 

The  rise  of  the  Eddystone  works  has  brought  an  army 
of  some  40,000  skilled  workmen  to  the  vicinity  of  this 
little  town  in  Delaware  County,  Pennsylvania,  and  al- 
ready the  values  of  real  estate  in  adjacent  parts  of  the 
county  are  being  "  boosted  "  by  this  advent  of  a  popu- 
lation of  some  200,000  souls. 

It  is  but  natural  that  such  abnormal  development 
should  have  caused  a  wave  of  speculation  to  sweep  across 
the  country  in  these  and  many  allied  lines  of  industry. 
How  wild  and  dangerous  this  speculation  has  become  is 
illustrated  by  the  fact  that  the  purchase  of  stocks  on  the 
New  York  Stock  Exchange  increased  threefold  within 
three  recent  weeks ;  within  one  week,  there  were  two  "  2,- 
ooo,ooo-share  days,"  and  within  the  same  short  space  of 
time,  Bethlehem  Steel  gained  fifty-four  points  and  Cru- 
cible Steel  twenty-three  points.  The  common  stock  of 
these  two  companies,  although  no  dividends  had  ever 
been  paid  upon  it,  increased  within  a  year  from  $26  to 
$600,  and  from  $22  to  $83,  respectively,  while  the  stock 
of  the  Hercules  Powder  Co.  jumped  fifty  points  in  a 
single  day,  and  that  of  the  Bethlehem  Steel  Co.  seventy- 


56  PREPAREDNESS 

one  points  within  twelve  hours.  Many  stocks  have 
largely  increased  their  dividends  within  the  year,  while 
some  have  paid  large  ones  for  the  first  time.  Under  the 
"  boosting "  administered  by  war  orders,  the  Electric 
Boat  Co.,  for  example,  has  declared  a  dividend  of  12  per 
cent.,  which  is  the  first  since  1909.  The  Bethlehem 
Steel  Co.  was  considered  to  be  in  a  bad  way,  aside  from 
its  ordnance  department;  but  so  impressive  was  the  ac- 
quisition of  war-orders  to  the  extent  of  $150,000,000 
that  the  stock  of  the  company  has  increased  to  such  an 
extent  that  more  than  $15,000,000  has  been  added  to  its 
value.  Great  additions,  of  course,  have  been  added  to  its 
plant;  so  that  in  this  Pennsylvania  Bethlehem  there  has 
arisen  a  war-supply  factory  which  is  surpassed  the  world 
over  only  by  the  establishments  of  Krupp  in  Germany 
and  Creusot  in  France! 

The  year's  "  high  records  "  in  war  orders,  stock  prices, 
dividends  and  prices,  have  had  the  natural  result  of  com- 
bining certain  industries  into  gigantic  "  trusts,"  one  of 
which,  a  new  "steel  trust,"  promises  to  eclipse  the  $i,- 
000,000,000  Steel  Corporation  which  astonished  the  world 
a  decade  or  so  ago.  The  next  logical  and  probable  re- 
sult will  be  for  these  American  trusts  to  join  the  inter- 
national trusts  that  bestride  the  world  in  the  manufac- 
ture and  sale  of  military  supplies.  Some  faint  idea  of  the 
far-reaching  power  and  methods  of  these  world-trusts 
has  been  given  in  speeches  in  the  British  Parliament. 
For  example,  Philip  Snowden  declared  in  the  House  of 
Commons,  in  1914,  that  an  "armaments  ring"  not  na- 
tional, but  international,  with  international  management 
and  international  stockholders,  supplied  the  various  Eu- 
ropean governments  with  military  supplies;  that  mem- 
bers of  the  various  parliaments  were  large  stockholders 
in  these  concerns,  and  were  personally  interested  in  in- 
creasing the  demand  for  their  products  in  the  various 
countries.  Lord  Welby,  in  the  same  year,  declared : 
"  We  are  in  the  hands  of  an  organization  of  crooks. 


MOTIVES  OF  PREPAREDNESS  57 

They  are  politicians,  generals,  manufacturers  of  arma- 
ments, and  journalists.  All  of  them  are  anxious  for  un- 
limited expenditures,  and  go  on  inventing  scares  to  ter- 
rify the  public  and  to  terrify  Ministers  of  the  Crown." 
Reference  has  already  been  made  to  the  international 
newspaper  campaign,  financed  by  "  the  armaments  ring," 
by  means  of  which  the  demand  for  military  equipment 
and  supplies  has  been  enormously  increased. 

But  manufacturers  of  these  materials  are  not  only 
lured  on  by  a  real  and  factitious  demand ;  they  are  also 
subjected  to  an  enormous  pressure  from  behind.  That 
is,  the  host  of  stockholders  and  employes  urge  the  manu- 
facturers to  the  limit,  for  the  sake  of  profits,  wages  and 
opportunities  of  employment.  The  investment  of  enor- 
mous sums  of  new  capital  in  these  plants  has  created  a 
condition  of  affairs  in  which  an  exaggerated  demand  for 
their  products  is  necessary  for  the  realization  of  return, 
profits  and  dividends.  It  is  declared  by  financial  experts 
that,  so  large  has  been  this  diversion  of  capital  and  labor, 
this  country  would  experience  a  terrific  crisis,  should 
the  great  war  end  to-morrow.  Hence  many  a  to-morrow 
will  be  needed, — either  in  the  continuance  of  the  war  or 
in  the  increased  demand  for  military  supplies  by  the 
governments  in  time  of  peace, — before  this  return  can 
be  made. 

Added  to  the  stockholders'  demand  for  "prepared- 
ness "  as  a  means  of  protecting  the  new  "  infant  indus- 
try," or  of  repaying  and  maintaining  this  enormous 
vested  interest,  "  so  necessary  to  the  defense  of  the  coun- 
try/-' there  will  inevitably  be  added  that  of  the  tens  of 
thousands  of  new  laborers  who  have  been  drafted  into  it. 
The  Baldwin  Locomotive  Works,  for  example,  employs 
in  ordinary  times,  even  when  trade  is  booming,  only  19,- 
ooo  men;  by  adding  the  Eddystone  Ammunition  Com- 
pany to  its  business,  it  is  increasing  this  number  to  40,- 
ooo.  On  orders  from  Russia  alone,  it  is  said  that  the 
company  increased  its  employes  from  7,000  to  12,000. 


58  PREPAREDNESS 

The  Bethlehem  Steel  Company's  war  contracts  enabled 
it  to  keep  12,000  men  on  its  payroll  during  the  first  win- 
ter of  the  war,  instead  of  its  usual  3,500.  These  exam- 
ples illustrate  the  amount  of  employment  that  is  being 
offered, — in  many  cases  by  night  as  well  as  by  day, — to 
laborers  of  every  degree  of  skill,  from  lathe-turners  up 
to  ordnance  experts  of  the  United  States  Army,  who 
have  resigned  their  public  office  in  order  to  accept  lucra- 
tive positions  with  private  firms,  and  who  have  been 
released  by  the  government  so  that  they  may  aid  in 
"  the  development  of  industries  designed  to  defend  the 
United  States." 

The  Du  Pont  Powder  Co.  has  just  distributed  2,000 
shares  of  its  stock,  valued  at  $1,616,000,  among  its  em- 
ployes. The  proposal  to  devote  $3,500,000  to  the  enlarge- 
ment of  the  Philadelphia  Navy-Yard,  so  as  to  enable  it 
"  to  build  big  ships,"  has  been  hailed  with  delight  by  the 
local  newspapers,  for  the  reason  that  "  it  would  mean 
thousands  more  of  workmen." 

In  view  of  such  developments  as  these,  it  is  not  diffi- 
cult to  foresee  the  vastly  increased  political  pressure 
which  voters  in  such  a  State  as  Pennsylvania  will  bring 
to  bear  upon  their  representatives  in  Congress  to  procure 
for  their  districts  government  contracts  for  military  and 
naval  "  preparedness  " ;  nor  is  it  difficult  to  foresee  the 
lobby  and  the  "  invisible  government "  which  the  stock- 
holders in  these  industries,  scattered  as  they  are  through- 
out the  nation  and  abroad,  will  maintain  at  Washington 
and  other  capitals,  for  the  purpose  of  securing,  by  the 
use  of  graft  if  need  be,  and  in  the  name  of  "  prepared- 
ness," extravagant  appropriations  for  military,  naval  and 
aerial  purposes. 

But  many  other  industries  than  those  which  directly 
supply  military  necessities  have  been  stirred  to  their 
depths  by  the  campaign  for  preparedness,  and  are  swell- 
ing the  chorus  of  demand  for  it.  For  example,  at  the 
recent  annual  convention  of  the  National  Association  of 


MOTIVES  OF  PREPAREDNESS  59 

Cotton  Manufactures,  the  president  said  in  his  opening 
address : 

"  Military  preparedness  and  industrial  preparedness 
should  go  hand  in  hand.  The  sinews  of  war  must  be 
provided  by  the  latter  before  the  former  can  be  developed 
to  its  full  extent;  and  by  commercial  preparedness  I 
mean  not  only  the  strengthening  of  those  industries  which 
would  necessarily  contribute  supplies  for  a  possible  war, 
but  all  enterprises  of  manufacture,  transportation  and 
distribution,  so  that  we  can  put  behind  any  body  of  men 
enlisted  in  the  nation's  defense  '  a  united,  prosperous, 
contented  and  determined  population,'  and  be  able  to  sup- 
ply all  the  varied  wants  of  our  people  and  furnish  the 
fullest  support  to  the  Government  in  any  time  of  trial. 
....  It  is  the  duty  of  every  true  American  to  stand 
by  the  President  in  his  effort  to  preserve  our  national 
dignity  and  honor.  On  the  other  hand,  may  we  not  urge 
it  as  an  equal  duty  upon  the  President  to  stand  by  us 
in  an  effort  to  bring  back  and  maintain  the  business  pros- 
perity of  the  country?  In  the  crisis  that  confronts  us, 
all  considerations  of  party  advantage  or  sectional  benefit 
must  yield  to  the  paramount  necessity  of  placing  the 
nation  in  a  position  of  national  industrial  preparedness, 
ready  to  cope  with  any  emergency  that  may  arise,  and  the 
party  which  makes  this  its  ideal  will  be  the  one  to  enlist 
the  support  of  the  American  people." 

The  same  cue  was  taken  by  the  Federation  of  Trade 
Press  Associations  at  its  annual  convention,  on  which 
occasion  it  passed  a  resolution  urging  "  military  pre- 
paredness on  a  permanent  basis  for  the  United  States." 

PROFESSIONAL     AND     SOCIAL     PRESTIGE 

Closely  connected  with  profits  and  preparedness,  are 
the  social  prestige  and  personal  ambition  of  the  military 
and  naval  coterie  which  finds  its  center  in  Washington. 
Justice  Brewer,  of  the  United  States  Supreme  Court, 
gave  as  his  dying  message  to  the  American  people  a  sol- 


60  PREPAREDNESS 

emn  warning  against  the  danger  that  our  national  capi- 
tal is  becoming  more  and  more  the  chief  center  of  mili- 
tary and  naval  influence,  and  that  this  influence  makes 
itself  felt  most  powerfully  in  every  crisis  pregnant 
with  the  possibilities  of  war.  With  about  800  mili- 
tary officers  located  in  Washington,  and  with  them  and 
their  families  in  the  social  lime-light,  the  military  "  gla- 
mor "  of  Old  World  society  is  becoming  more  and  more 
prominent  in  the  capital  of  our  Republic.  In  receptions 
at  the  White  House,  at  the  Inaugural  festivities,  and  on 
almost  every  public  occasion,  the  army  and  navy,  in  the 
words  of  Justice  Brewer,  "  make  the  great  American 
display."  While  this  fact  is  certainly  inconsistent  with 
the  democratic  ideals  of  our  New  World  Republic,  it 
may  safely  be  left,  perhaps,  to  the  common  sense,  or  to 
the  sense  of  humor  and  of  the  ridiculous,  which  have 
heretofore  saved  Americans  from  many  of  the  follies 
and  fripperies  of  European  "  high  society."  But  the  real 
and  grave  danger  from  this  source  is  that  these  officers 
should  form  an  invisible  lobby,  a  military  clique,  socially 
powerful  and  backed  up  by  "  the  soldier  vote,"  and  by 
means  of  it  should  exert  a  constant  pressure  upon  Con- 
gress and  the  Executive  both  to  increase  armaments  and 
to  appeal  to  war  as  the  only  possible  arbiter  of  inter- 
national disputes.  That  this  danger  is  a  real  and  grave 
one,  is  illustrated  by  many  incidents  familiar  to  those 
who  read  the  daily  press  accounts  of  "  happenings  in 
Washington."  Among  them  may  be  mentioned  the  fact 
that  a  recent  chief  of  staff  of  the  American  army  de- 
clared that  we  are  wasting  time  in  striving  to  strengthen 
arbitration,  and  that  the  only  true  course  for  us  to  pur- 
sue is  to  make  our  military  and  naval  strength  so  great 
as  to  be  beyond  danger  of  attack.  Again,  the  "  fight- 
ing" admiral  who  started  in  command  of  the  American 
fleet  which  sailed,  as  "  messengers  of  peace,"  around  the 
world,  declared  that  the  fewer  statesmen  and  the  more 
battleships  we  have,  the  less  will  be  our  danger  of  hav- 


MOTIVES  OF  PREPAREDNESS  61 

ing  war.  Again,  the  country  is  filled  with  evidence  of 
the  feverish  activity  of  Major-General  Wood,  Chief  of 
Staff  of  the  United  States  Army  and  Commander  of  the 
Department  of  the  East,  in  furthering,  to  the  utmost  of 
his  ability  and  with  all  the  spectacular  effectiveness 
which  a  sensational  press  can  lend  him,  whatever  move- 
ment, from  "  business  men's  camps  "  to  military  train- 
ing in  our  public  schools,  that  holds  any  promise  of  in- 
creasing the  size  of  our  army.  The  militarism  of  Eu- 
rope has  taught  us  many  wholesome  lessons;  but  there 
is  none  of  them  more  needed  at  the  present  time  than 
that  which  points  out  the  pernicious,  the  fatal,  influence 
of  such  military  cliques  as  surround  the  Kaiser  and  the 
Czar.  Here,  if  anywhere  in  a  Republic,  eternal  vigi- 
lance is  the  price  of  liberty. 

TO    PRESERVE    THE    PEACE 

But,  while  we  must  not  shut  our  eyes  to  the  existence 
and  danger  of  the  unworthy  motives  which  are  pushing 
the  campaign  of  "  preparedness,"  we  must  candidly  ac- 
knowledge that  there  are  back  of  it  at  least  two  worthy 
motives,  however  mistaken  these  may  be.  The  first  of 
these  is  the  belief  that  the  best  and  only  effective  means 
of  preserving  the  peace  is  to  prepare  for  war,  or,  as 
present-day  casuists  put  it,  to  "  prepare  against  war." 
This  belief  is  a  very  plausible  one  and  has  salved  many 
a  man's  conscience  as  he  has  worked  for  or  consented  to 
the  increase  of  armaments. 

Europe's  Experience 

It  was  the  belief  which  "  the  master  mind  "  of  Bis- 
marck put  into  practice  in  Prussia  and  forced  upon  the 
rest  of  Europe,  making  of  the  most  civilized  of  conti- 
nents an  armed  camp,  a  Twentieth  Century  Sparta.  So 
firmly  was  this  belief  cherished,  so  thoroughly  was  it 
acted  upon  for  a  half-century,  that  in  the  years  preced- 
ing the  present  European  War,  the  enormous  sum  of 


62  PREPAREDNESS 

two  billions  of  dollars  per  annum  was  expended  by  Eu- 
rope upon  its  armaments, — all  in  the  name  of  peace !  For 
a  generation,  the  militarists  have  insisted  that  the  only 
preservative  of  the  world's  peace  was  the  German  army 
and  the  British  fleet.  The  German  Emperor,  they  de- 
clared, was  the  man  in  all  the  world  who  was  most  de- 
serving of  the  Nobel  Prize  for  doing  most  to  further  and 
maintain  the  peace  of  the  world. 

The  first  international  peace  congress  of  the  churches 
was  being  held  in  Constanz,  Germany,  when  the  Great 
War  broke  out;  and  as  the  delegates  travelled  through 
the  Black  Forest  and  down  the  Rhine,  and  saw  the  tens 
upon  tens  of  thousands  of  German  soldiers  being  mo- 
bilized on  the  French  frontier,  they  said  to  themselves : 
Now,  at  last,  in  the  face  of  this  most  stupendous  fact, 
this  particular  dream  of  the  militarists  will  be  shattered 
forever.  The  German  army  and  navy,  the  French  and 
Russian  armies  and  fortifications,  the  British  super- 
dreadnoughts,  and  the  vast  military  machine  of  civiliza- 
tion had  been  built  up  and  confidently  relied  upon  for 
a  generation  as  the  only  certain  means  of  preserving  the 
world's  peace;  and  now  in  one  frightful  moment  they 
made  possible  and  inevitable  the  largest  and  most  de- 
structive, if  not  the  most  brutal  and  vindictive,  war  in 
all  the  history  of  the  human  race! 

For  a  quarter  of  a  century,  those  statesmen  and  pub- 
licists who  repudiated  the  "  peace  "  dream  of  the  mili- 
tarists, and  gave  heed  to  the  plain  teachings  of  reason, 
prophesied  insistently  that  Armageddon  must  inevitably 
follow  upon  "  adequate  armaments." 

The  Anglo-American  Experiment 

A  century  of  experience,  most  significant  though 
wholly  neglected,  even  by  the  majority  of  Americans  and 
Englishmen,  taught  the  same  lesson.  This  experience 
began  at  the  end  of  the  French  Revolutionary  and  Napo- 
leonic cataclysms,  and  just  at  the  close  of  the  American 


MOTIVES  OF  PREPAREDNESS  63 

war  with  Great  Britain  in  1815.  At  that  time,  the  Ameri- 
can minister  at  the  Court  of  St.  James  was  that  shrewd, 
level-headed,  Yankee  diplomatist,  John  Quincy  Adams. 
He  learned  in  1817  that  the  British  government  was 
planning  to  build  war-ships  on  the  Great  Lakes  so  as  to 
prevent  another  breach  of  the  peace  with  the  United 
States  or  to  prepare  for  another  invasion  of  Canada. 
He  communicated  with  President  Monroe  in  regard  to 
the  matter  and  was  authorized  to  enter  into  negotiations 
upon  it  with  the  British  government.  Thereupon  he 
wrote  to  Lord  Castlereagh,  the  British  Secretary  of  State 
for  Foreign  Affairs,  as  follows :  "  The  increase  of  naval 
armaments  on  one  side  upon  the  Lakes  during  peace 
will  necessitate  the  like  increase  on  the  other,  and,  be- 
sides causing  an  aggravation  of  useless  expense  to  both 
parties,  must  operate  as  a  continual  stimulus  of  suspicion 
and  ill  will.  The  moral  and  political  tendency  of  such 
a  system  must  be  to  war,  and  not  to  peace.  The  Ameri- 
can government  proposes,  therefore,  mutually  to  reduce 
to  the  same  extent  all  naval  armaments  upon  the  Lakes. 
The  degree  to  which  they  shall  be  reduced  is  left  at  the 
option  of  Great  Britain.  The  greater  the  reduction  the 
more  acceptable  it  will  be  to  the  President  of  the  United 
States,  and  most  acceptable  of  all  should  it  be  agreed  to 
maintain  on  either  side,  during  the  peace,  no  other  force 
than  such  as  may  be  necessary  for  the  collection  of  the 
revenue.  The  undersigned  may  confidently  hope  that 
this  proposal,  mutually  and  equally  to  disarm  upon  the 
American  Lakes,  will  be  received  and  entertained  in  the 
same  spirit  in  which  it  is  made,  as  a  pledge  of  intentions 
sincerely  friendly,  and  earnestly  bent  upon  the  perma- 
nent preservation  of  peace." 

This  statesmanlike  offer  was  accepted  in  the  friendly 
spirit  in  which  it  was  made,  Castlereagh  replying :  "  As 
to  keeping  a  number  of  armed  vessels  parading  about 
the  Lakes,  it  would  be  absurd.  There  can  be  no  motive 
for  it,  and  everything  beyond  what  is  necessary  to  guard 


64  PREPAREDNESS 

against  smuggling  is  calculated  to  produce  mischief." 
The  two  governments,  accordingly,  soon  afterwards  en- 
tered into  the  Rush-Bagot  Agreement,  by  means  of  which 
it  was  provided  that  the  armed  forces  upon  the  Great 
Lakes  should  never  exceed  four  ships  of  one  hundred 
tons  displacement.  In  spite  of  numerous  attempts  by 
ship-builders,  ammunition-makers,  and  political  jingoes, 
on  both  sides  of  the  border,  and  in  both  England  and  the 
United  States,  to  abrogate  this  agreement  and  thus  pave 
the  way  for  profits,  politics  and  preparedness,  the  agree- 
ment has  been  faithfully  adhered  to.  There  is  to-day, 
on  this  "  American  Mediterranean,"  a  single  gun-boat 
of  four  hundred  tons'  displacement.  Compare  this  po- 
lice-boat with  a  superdreadnought  of  31,000  tons'  dis- 
placement, and  it  may  be  realized  how  effectually  the 
Great  Lakes  are  "  unarmed."  Not  only  along  this  part 
of  the  Canadian  border-line,  but  throughout  its  conti- 
nental extent  of  nearly  4,000  miles,  there  is  not  a  fort- 
ress or  a  gun.  And  yet,  despite,  or  because  of,  this  rank 
"  unpreparedness,"  we  are  celebrating  to-day  a  Hun- 
dred Years  of  Peace  with  our  great  British  neighbor.1 

Would  that  poor  old  Europe  had  possessed,  a  hundred 
years  ago,  a  statesman  so  level-headed  and  far-seeing  as 
John  Quincy  Adams,  and  that  it  had  been  persuaded  by 
him  to  a  mutual  limitation  or  destruction  of  armaments ! 
Those  "  invincible  "  fortifications  along  the  frontier  be- 
tween Germany  and  Belgium  and  France  would  never, 
then,  have  arisen  to  challenge  the  military  ?nd  political 
prestige  of  the  respective  war-lords ;  those  terrible  Ma- 
zurian  Lakes  between  Germany  and  Russia  would  not 
now  be  discolored  and  corrupted  by  the  blood  and  corpses 
of  tens  upon  tens  of  thousands  of  Russian  and  German 
youths. 

In  face  of  the  plain  teaching  of  reason  and  common 
sense,  of  the  experience  of  Europe  in  reaping  the  most 

1  Back  of  Canada,  of  course,  stand  the  British  Empire  and  the 
British  fleet,— "the  mistress  of  the  sea." 


MOTIVES  OF  PREPAREDNESS  65 

terrible  of  wars  from  armaments  sowed  to  preserve  the 
peace,  and  of  the  experience  of  the  United  States  and 
the  British  Empire  in  preserving  the  peace  between  them 
for  a  hundred  years  in  the  absence  of  mutually  menac- 
ing armaments,  it  may  readily  be  understood  how  all 
but  the  rabid  militarists  have  surrendered  forever  as  a 
foolish  fallacy  and  a  wicked  lie  the  hoary  old  belief  that 
"  adequate  armaments  "  should  be  built  up  to  preserve 
the  peace,  that  civilized  man  should  devote  all  the  re- 
sources of  Twentieth  Century  science  to  military  "pre- 
paredness against  war." 

FOR    A    DEFENSIVE    WAR 

But  there  is  one  bulwark  of  the  militarist  creed  still 
left.  It  is  this :  Since  it  is  impossible  in  the  face  of  rea- 
son and  experience  to  prepare  against  war,  both  reason 
and  experience  bid  us  to  prepare  for  war, — a  war  of  de- 
fense. Mr.  Orville  Wright,  for  example,  a  distinguished 
but  relatively  very  moderate  advocate  of  preparedness, 
writes :  "  I  believe  that  the  possession  of  too  much 
military  equipment  leads  to  war.  The  evidence  of  that 
is  in  Europe.  But  I  do  believe  that  this  country  should 
have  enough  war  paraphernalia  to  protect  itself  while  it 
completes  more  elaborate  preparations."  What  a  plau- 
sible, appealing  argument  is  this !  It  is  far  more  convinc- 
ing to  the  average  man,  of  self-preservatory  instincts, 
than  is  the  former  rather  altruistic  argument  that  we 
should  prepare  for  war  in  order  to  preserve  the  peace. 
Who  is  there  who  does  not  fervently  desire  to  defend  the 
country  and  his  own  fireside  against  the  attack  of  a  for- 
eign foe? 

It  is  true  that  never,  not  one  single  time,  have  foreign 
foes  declared  war  upon  us  before  we  declared  war  upon 
them.  It  is  true,  also,  that  we  have  had  many  a  dis- 
pute, some  of  them,  and  two  in  particular,1  of  grave, 
and  even  vital  importance ;  but  that-  in  spite  of  the  gravity 

1  The  Alabama  Claims,  and  the  Venezuela  Boundary, 


66  PREPAREDNESS 

of  these  disputes  and  of  the  bitterness  of  feeling  which 
was  created  because  of  them,  we  have  always  found 
peaceful  and  effective  means  of  settling  them.  Not  so 
much,  then,  because  of  our  geographical  isolation,  or  our 
vast  population  and  national  resources,  not  even  so  much 
because  of  our  peaceable  intentions,  may  we  look  with 
reasonable  equanimity  on  the  future ;  but  because  our  his- 
tory in  the  past  century  and  a  quarter  has  proved  again 
and  again  the  efficacy  of  diplomacy  and  arbitration  in 
settling  our  disputes  with  other  nations.  The  fact  that 
we  have  never  yet  been  decapitated,  in  spite  of  a  good 
many  opportunities  for  it,  is  certainly  no  convincing  ar- 
gument that  we  will  surely  be  decapitated  in  the  future. 

On  the  other  hand,  pacifists  are  reasonable  enough  to 
admit  that  because  our  Republic  has  heretofore  taken  the 
initiative  in  attacking  its  foreign  foes,  this  is  no  convinc- 
ing argument  that  we  shall  never  be  attacked  in  the  fu- 
ture. They  must  frankly,  however  sorrowfully,  admit 
that  all  things  are  possible, — especially  in  a  war-mad- 
dened world.  They  must  recognize,  with  whatever  sor- 
row or  contempt,  that  many  of  our  Republic's  leaders 
have  been  thrown  into  a  panic  of  fear  by  the  "  fate  of 
China  "  and  the  "  fate  of  Belgium,"  and  that  countless 
thousands  of  our  fellow-citizens  are  following  them  like 
sheep  to  the  slaughter. 

It  is  true  that  China  is  by  hundreds  of  years  the  oldest 
of  all  living  nations;  that  it  has  outlived  scores  of  na- 
tions that  were  far  better  "  prepared  against  war  " ;  that 
it  has  succeeded  on  numerous  occasions  in  conquering 
its  conquerors  by  the  simple  and  apparently  beneficial 
process  of  absorption ;  and  that  it  is  still  in  possession  of 
a  large  degree  of  vigor,  and  gives  good  promise  of  re- 
taining its  faculties  and  adding  untold  centuries  of  life 
to  those  which  it  has  already  enjoyed.  It  is  true,  also, 
that  Belgium  was  "  prepared  against  war  " ;  that  its  prep- 
arations were  enormously  larger,  relatively  to  wealth  and 
population,  than  were  those  of  its  invader;  and  that  it 


MOTIVES  OF  PREPAREDNESS  67 

would  have  been  a  physical  impossibility  for  Belgium  to 
have  amassed  enough  troops  and  "  defense "  to  have 
beaten  off  the  attack  of  an  empire  tenfold  as  populous 
and  with  ten  times  its  resources.  If  Belgium's  "  fate  " 
has  any  lesson  for  the  world  it  is  that  of  the  utter  folly 
of  so-called  "  preparedness  against  war,"  of  armaments 
that  are  not  and  never  can  be  "  adequate  "  for  purposes 
of  successful  defense. 

China  is  despised  also  by  those  nations  which,  after  a 
generation  of  stupendous  "  preparedness,"  have  grappled 
their  chains  to  their  souls  and  cherished  the  illusion  that 
they  are  invincible.  He  who  lives  will  see ;  and  in  the 
end  it  is  quite  possible  that  some  of  the  countries  in  the 
European  War  will  be  annihilated  by  the  warfare  which 
they  brought  upon  themselves  by  putting  their  "pre- 
paredness "  to  the  touch,  and  that  Chinese  students  of 
a  thousand  years  hence  will  read  the  story  of  their  de- 
struction. 

But  despite  such  considerations,  it  is  only  too  apparent 
in  our  country  and  throughout  the  world  to-day  that 
fears  have  no  ears,  that  panic  cannot  be  stayed  by  rea- 
son. The  Great  War  has  laid  its  benumbing  hand  upon 
the  minds  of  men,  and  subordinated  their  rational  cour- 
age to  the  painful  emotions  which  have  surged  up  at 
the  thought  of  shrapnel,  gas,  flames,  airships,  subma- 
rines and  the  tramp  of  armed  millions.  To  meet  the 
rush  for  "preparedness,"  then,  it  is  necessary  to 'con- 
cede that  we  may  be  called  upon  to  engage  in  a  defen- 
sive war. 

A  "Defensive  War" 

The  term,  a  defensive  war,  or  war  for  defense,  has  a 
simple  and  plausible  sound,  but  it  is  by  no  means  so  sim- 
ple and  convincing  as  it  seems,  especially  in  these  days 
of  complex  international  relations.  For  example,  Bel- 
gium and  France  are  regarded,  by  the  world  outside  of 
Germany,  as  engaged  in  a  defensive  war,  inasmuch  as 


68  PREPAREDNESS 

they  are  engaged  in  endeavoring  to  repel  actual  invasion 
of  their  territory.  But  Germany  insists  that  it,  too,  is 
fighting  just  as  truly  a  war  of  defense,  and  that  there  is 
a  difference  merely  in  method  and  not  in  principle  be- 
tween its  invasion  of  Belgian  and  French  territory,  be- 
fore the  Belgians,  or  the  French  and  British,  through 
Belgium,  were  able  to  invade  German  territory.  Cer- 
tainly, the  German  contention  would  appear  to  be  a  logi- 
cal one  that  if  you  are  going  to  fight  at  all,  for  defense 
as  well  as  for  aggression,  you  would  be  foolish  to  await 
an  enemy's  attack  upon  your  territory.  Ever  since  the 
days  when  the  Roman  Regulus  "  carried  the  war  into 
Africa  "  against  the  Carthaginians,  and  Hannibal  carried 
the  war  into  Italy  against  the  Romans,  it  has  been  ac- 
cepted as  a  fundamental  precept  of  military  science  that 
on  defense  as  well  as  attack  the  war  must  be  carried  at 
once  to  the  enemy's  territory  and  kept  there  at  all  haz- 
ards. Even  in  street-fighting,  a  primary  maxim  of  de- 
fense is  said  to  be  to  "  strike  the  first  blow  and  strike  it 
hard."  Mr.  Roosevelt,  when  President,  declared  himself 
in  favor  only  of  a  war  of  "  defense  "  for  the  United 
States,  but  at  the  same  time  insisted  that  our  coast  forti- 
fications should  be  kept  up  in  order  that  our  navy  might 
cut  loose  from  port,  seek  out  its  opponent  wherever  he 
may  be,  and  "hammer  that  opponent  until  he  quits 
fighting." 

A  war  for  the  defense  of  our  own  continental  territory, 
however,  is  not  the  only  kind  of  a  defensive  war  that  we 
might  be  called  upon  to  engage  in.  Our  Constitution, 
the  courts  have  decided,  has  not  followed  our  flag  to 
Porto  Rico,  the  Canal  Zone,  Alaska,  Hawaii,  Samoa,  or 
the  Philippines;  but  our  fleets  and  armies  would  as- 
suredly be  sent  to  these  distant  points  to  engage  in  a 
"  defensive  "  war. 

We  have  made  a  business  in  the  United  States  of  pro- 
ducing enormous  wealth;  therefore,  it  is  argued,  it  is 
a  business  proposition  to  build  up  a  big  army  and  navy 


MOTIVES  OP  PREPAREDNESS  69 

to  defend  it  on  land  and  sea.  The  wealth  of  such  cities 
as  New  York,  Philadelphia,  or  Boston  exceeds  the  value 
of  the  territory  of  some  of  our  States;  hence  a  defensive 
war  is  even  more  necessary  for  it.  England's  navy  has 
been  often  called  "  an  indemnity  bond  behind  every  shil- 
ling's worth  of  property  in  the  United  Kingdom  " ;  let 
the  United  States  adopt  the  same  insurance.  At  the 
end  of  this  war,  the  new  President  of  the  Navy  League 
declares,  the  United  States  will  possess  practically  all 
the  world's  gold  and  an  immense  commerce ;  therefore, 
since  treaties  and  moral  obligations  are  nothing  to  na- 
tions that  covet,  let  us  prepare  by  means  of  a  big  army  and 
navy  to  defend  our  treasures.  "  Why,"  another  emi- 
nent prepareder  inquires  with  finality,  "  be  rich,  aggres- 
sive, and  undefended  ?  " 

But  the  wealth  of  this  country  about  which  the  pre- 
pareders  are  chiefly  anxious  consists  of  the  munitions 
plants  and  anthracite  coal  mines,  ninety  per  cent,  of 
which  are  located  within  a  radius  of  160  miles  of  New 
York.  Since  these,  they  say,  are  of  immense  value  in 
themselves  and  constitute  the  chief  ultimate  means  of 
the  country's  defense,  they  constitute  Uncle  Sam's  solar 
plexus,  and  must  be  defended  at  all  hazards. 

From  the  point  of  view  of  American  territorial  de- 
fense alone,  our  task  would  be  the  protection,  against 
bombardment  and  invasion,  of  about  20,000  miles  of 
frontier;  while  only  the  blue  sky  above  is  the  limit  of 
airship  raids  upon  us. 

Again,  if  we  are  to  continue  to  assume  alone  the  bur- 
den of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  and  to  preserve  territorial 
integrity  and  enforce  popular  government  in  the  Latin- 
American  Republics,  our  armaments  are  liable  to  be  en- 
gaged in  "  defensive "  warfare  in  every  part  of  the 
Western  Hemisphere.1 

Again,  the  present  war  has  illustrated,  repeatedly  and 

1  Cf .  the  author's  "  Monroe  Doctrine :  National  or  Interna- 
tional?", New  York,  1915. 


70  PREPAREDNESS 

in  startling  fashion,  in  what  kind  of  a  "  defensive  "  war 
we  might  engage  if  we  are  determined  to  protect  by  our 
own  strong  arm  the  rights  of  neutral  nations  on  the 
high  seas. 

The  protection  of  our  own  citizens,  again,  whether 
they  are  travelling  on  belligerent  merchant  ships,  or  in 
foreign  lands,  or  are  engaged  in  commerce,  education, 
missionary  endeavor,  or  what  not,  under  the  shadow  of 
foreign  flags,  may  involve  us  in  a  war,  fought  in  any 
quarter  of  the  globe,  but  nevertheless  a  war  strictly  for 
"  defense." 

The  demand  for  preparedness  to  defend  our  own  fire- 
sides makes  a  strong  appeal;  but  the  men  and  societies 
who  are  making  this  demand  are  precisely  those  who  in- 
sist on  the  broad  interpretation  of  the  word  defense. 
They  find  that  a  defensive  war  is  necessary  to  prevent 
the  Japanese  from  "  Belgiumizing "  the  Philippines, 
Hawaii,  or  California;  to  protect  the  Venezuelan  fron- 
tier and  all  of  South  America  against  Great  Britain, — 
after  "  Great  Britain  has  embroiled  us  with  her  ally, 
Japan," — to  prevent  Germany  from  infringing  upon  the 
territorial  integrity  of  Latin  America;  to  champion  the 
rights  of  neutral  commerce  and  to  protect  neutral  lives 
against  belligerents  on  the  high  seas ;  to  avenge  the 
massacre  of  American  teachers  in  Turkey,  or  of  Ameri- 
can missionaries  in  China;  to  protect  the  honor  of  the 
American  flag  in  Mexico;  to  assert  the  honor,  dignity 
and  prestige  of  the  United  States  as  a  world  power  in 
every  port  and  country  under  the  sun. 

It  is  entirely  right  and  proper  to  defend  all  of  these 
persons,  properties  and  ideals,  by  the  right  and  proper 
method;  but  the  American  people  must  not  be  led  into 
a  programme  of  preparedness  on  the  specious  assumption 
that  preparedness  is  merely  for  "  defense,"  and  ends 
with  the  continental  bounds  and  territories  of  the  United 
States. 

Colonel  Roosevelt  insist^  that  our  promises  at  The 


MOTIVES  OF  PREPAREDNESS  71 

Hague  obligate  us  to  defend  Belgium  and  every  other 
neutral  state  against  violations  of  their  neutrality.  If 
the  majority  of  our  fellow-countrymen  accept  this  inter- 
pretation of  the  conventions  of  The  Hague,  our  armies 
will  be  called  upon  to  engage  in  trench  warfare  the 
whole  world  over,  and  our  navies  will  be  summoned  to 
fight,  on  all  the  Seven  Seas,  this  kind  of  a  defensive  war. 
Captain  Hobson  insists  that  Great  Britain  and  her  ally, 
Japan,  will  some  day  disturb  the  balance  of  power  in  the 
Pacific,  hand  over  China  to  the  tender  mercies  of  Japan, 
and  destroy  the  open-door  policy  in  the  Orient.  If  the 
majority  of  our  fellow-countrymen  embrace  this  favorite 
scarecrow  of  the  nautical  statesman  of  Alabama,  they 
may  engage  in  a  world-wide  war  to  defend  the  mastery 
of  the  Pacific,  the  integrity  of  China,  and  the  open  door 
to  American  merchants. 


PREPAREDNESS   PROGRAMMES 

GRANTED,  then,  that  we  may  be  attacked  by,  or, 
in  the  name  of  a  "  defensive  war,"  may  attack, 
a  victorious  Germany,  Japan  or  Great  Britain,1 
what  should  be  the  extent  of  our  "  preparedness,"  our 
"adequacy,"  our  "efficiency"?  In  such  a  contingency, 
we  should  be  called  upon  to  fight,  not  a  Mexico  or  a 
Spain,  but  a  first-class  military  and  naval  power;  to 
fight  it  possibly  on  any  part  of  the  earth's  surface;  and 
to  fight  it  in  Twentieth  Century  warfare.  These  funda- 
mental considerations  have  evidently  not  been  permitted 
to  control  the  programmes  for  "  efficient  preparedness  " 
and  "  adequate  armaments  "  which  are  now  being  so  vo- 
ciferously advocated. 

The  air  is  filled  and  our  ears  are  deafened  by  the  par- 
rot-like demand  for  "  preparedness,"  "  adequate  arma- 
ments," "  means  of  defense,"  etc.,  etc.,  while  the  vast 
majority  of  those  making  the  demand  have  no  more  con- 
ception of  the  real  meaning  of  these  terms,  or  of  the 
policy  they  call  for,  than  a  parrot  has  of  the  English  lan- 
guage. Sometimes  they  can  add  to  their  vocabulary  the 
words,  "  Swiss  System,"  "  Australian  Plan,"  "  New  Zea- 
land's Method  " ;  but  usually  these,  in  themselves  and  in 
their  application  to  American  conditions,  are  mere  shib- 
boleths. 

THE  WILDLY  EXTRAVAGANT  AND  INDEFINITE  PROGRAMMES 

Most  of  the  preparedness  programmes  are  character- 
ized by  vagueness,  elasticity,  extravagance.  Anything 

1  It  is  to  be  presumed  that  even  the  most  fearful  prepareders 
would  not  anticipate  an  attack  from  the  defeated  party  in  the 
present  war. 

73 


PREPAREDNESS  PROGRAMMES          73 

and  everything  which  gives  promise  of  increasing  our 
armaments  is  eagerly  welcomed  by  them.  Nothing  is  too 
large  to  ask  for;  nothing  is  too  small  to  take.  The  only 
definite  thing  about  them  is  that  the  democratic  inch  ac- 
quired shall  be  converted  as  speedily  as  possible  into  the 
most  numerous  of  militaristic  ells. 

How  big  must  our  stick  be?  How  large  are  "ade- 
quate "  armaments  ?  To  this  question  from  the  man  in 
the  street,  who  has  to  foot  the  bill,  the  bellumist  replies : 
What  an  absurd  and  unpatriotic  question!  We  do  not 
know,  of  course,  and  cannot  know  precisely  what  we  are 
trying  to  "  equal "  in  our  frantic  pursuit  of  "  adequacy  " ; 
for  the  sufficiency  of  numbers  and  the  efficiency  of  fight- 
ers is  as  uncertain  and  incalculable  as  the  shifting  sands 
of  the  sea.  How  can  we  ever  know  definitely  what  are 
"  adequate  armaments,"  when  projectiles  irresistible  this 
morning  and  defenses  invincible  at  noon  will  probably 
be  antiquated  before  the  sunset  of  today  or  the  dawn  of 
tomorrow  ?  But  this  we  do  know :  we  can  never  have  too 
much  of  a  good  thing.  Our  army  and  navy  and  air 
fleet  must  be  rolled  up  larger  and  ever  larger  until,  if 
"  adequacy "  require  it,  every  ounce  of  toiling  muscle, 
every  fruit  of  human  industry,  and  every  gift  of  the 
harnessed  forces  of  mother  nature  are  rolled  up  in  them. 

Then  "  adequate  "  for  what  or  whom  shall  our  arma- 
ments be?  Let  me  know  this,  at  least,  begs  the  taxpay- 
ing  man  in  the  street.  Now  there,  replies  the  bellumist, 
I  can  furnish  food  for  your  sentiment,  imagination  and 
fears,  even  though  I  may  not  satisfy  your  reason.  Arm- 
aments must  be  adequate  to  defend  the  national  honor, 
to  maintain-  the  prestige  of  the  Republic  against  the 
effete  monarchies  of  Europe,  to  assert  the  dignity  of  the 
United  States  as  one  of  the  world's  "  Great  Powers,"  to 
flaunt  the  flag  in  every  harbor,  to  let  the  Eagle  scream 
across  every  ocean,  to  protect  Uncle  Sam  against  a  pos- 
sible world  in  arms,  and  to  save  the  Union  against  a 
hyphenated  Armageddon !  Adequate  for  what  or  whom  ? 


74  PREPAREDNESS 

Why,  for  anything  or  anyone,  for  everything  and  all  the 
world!  Who  but  the  pusillanimous  or  the  treasonable 
would  measure  words  or  seek  for  definiteness  when  Old 
Glory  is  at  stake? 

THE    INADEQUATE   PROGRAMMES 

On  the  other  hand,  there  are  numerous  programmes 
for  "  adequate  "  armaments  which  are  characterized  by 
their  utter  inadequacy  when  measured  by  the  funda- 
mental necessities  of  "  defensive  "  warfare,  of  warfare 
with  a  first-class  military  and  naval  power,  and  of  war- 
fare by  means  of  Twentieth  Century  devices.  Their  ad- 
vocates, who  demand  the  defense  of  American  territory, 
the  Monroe  Doctrine,  the  rights  and  privileges  of  neu- 
trals and  of  humanity  in  general,  give  a  striking  illustra- 
tion of  "  thundering  in  the  preface  and  murmuring  in 
the  text,"  or  of  "  first  shaking  their  fist  and  then  shak- 
ing their  finger." 

The  American  Security  League  solves  the  problem  off- 
hand by  demanding  an  increase  of  100  per  cent,  in  ex- 
penditures on  our  navy  (or  $300,000,000  per  annum), 
and  50  per  cent,  on  our  army  (or  $150,000,000  per  an- 
num). The  Navy  League  follows  the  same  line  of  least 
resistance  or  of  no  thinking,  and  demands  an  increase 
in  naval  expenditures  to  $500,000,000  per  annum,  and 
in  military  expenditures  to  $250,000,000  per  annum, 
hoping  thereby  to  support  an  army  of  one  million  men. 
Where  the  money  for  this  increase  is  to  come  from, 
neither  league  deigns  to  explain,  except  that  they  both 
lean  towards  the  issuing  of  bonds.  Since  the  current 
deficit  runs  high  into  the  millions,  and  we  have  already 
resorted  to  the  collection  of  an  income  tax  in  time  of 
peace  to  enable  us  to  expend  two-thirds  of  our  revenues 
for  military  and  pension  purposes,  the  borrowing  of 
money  for  the  purpose  of  carrying  out  the  military  and 
naval  programmes  of  these  leagues  will  probably  not 


PREPAREDNESS  PROGRAMMES          75 

commend  itself  to  the  sound  common  sense  of  the  Ameri- 
can public. 

A  wholesome  respect  for  this  characteristic  of  the 
American  public  as  a  whole  and  in  the  long  run,  has  un- 
doubtedly helped  some  of  the  prepareders  to  moderate 
their  transports  when  they  begin  to  express  in  concrete 
terms  their  glittering  generalities  in  favor  of  prepared- 
ness. 

Even  the  arch-prepareder  par  excellence  becomes  very 
wary  and  moderate  when  he  descends  from  his  blithe 
and  irresponsible  pursuit  of  "  the  pacificists,"  and  is  re- 
quested to  "  get  down  to  brass  tacks  "  in  advocating  his 
policy  of  military  defense  and  the  financial  basis  of  it. 
Give  us  a  mobile  army  of  120,000,  he  says;  that  is,  let 
us  increase  our  present  mobile  force  about  fourfold. 
Then,  give  us  a  system  of  universal,  compulsory  train- 
ing for  our  boys  during  the  last  few  years  of  their  edu- 
cation in  the  public  schools,  sending  them  afterwards  for 
four  or  six  months'  training  with  the  regular  army,  and 
then  keep  them  in  trim  by  ten  days'  training  per  annum 
for  a  period  of  ten  years.  As  for  solving  the  extremely 
complex  problem  of  providing,  in  the  face  of  the  present 
revolution  in  naval  and  other  warfare,  an  "  adequate  " 
navy,  this  erstwhile  redoubtable  gentleman  gives  us 
a  striking  illustration  of  the  familiar  policy  of  "  letting 
George  do  it."  "  The  Navy,"  he  tells  us,  "  must  pri- 
marily be  used  for  offensive  purposes.  Forts,  not  the 
navy,  are  to  be  used  for  defense.  The  only  permanently 
efficient  type  of  defensive  is  the  offensive."  With  this 
conception  of  "  defense "  in  mind,  he  states  the  naval 
problem  as  follows :  "  Our  naval  problem,  therefore,  is 
primarily  to  provide  for  the  protection  of  our  own 
coasts  and  for  the  protection  and  policing  of  Hawaii, 
Alaska  and  the  Panama  Canal  and  its  approaches.  This 
offers  a  definite  problem  which  should  be  solved  by  our 
naval  men." 

What  a  decline  and  fall  have  we  here!    What  a  char- 


76  PREPAREDNESS 

acteristic  laboring  of  the  mountain  that  brings  forth  the 
mouse! 

Our  other  ex-president  appeals  for  "  reasonable  prep- 
aration," and  gives  his  definition  of  that  as  follows: 
"  First,  an  increase  of  our  navy  tonnage  as  rapidly  as 
possible  by  30  per  cent,  and  an  immediate  increase  of 
the  personnel  of  the  navy  by  nearly  20,000  sailors  and 
900  officers.  Second,  an  increase  in  ammunition  for  our 
great  coast  defense  guns,  the  making  of  a  few  1 6-inch 
guns,  and  the  defense  of  the  Chesapeake  at  Cape  Henry. 
In  addition,  an  increase  of  10,000  trained  coast  artillery- 
men and  600  officers  to  man  the  coast  defense  properly. 
Third,  an  increase  in  our  regular  mobile  army  of  50,000 
troops  and  a  quadrupling  of  the  supply  of  educated  mili- 
tary officers.  We  should  adopt  a  reduced  term  of  en- 
listment, with  inducement  to  the  formation  of  a  reserve 
of  trained  men." 

The  ex-president  of  a  New  England  university  advo- 
cates the  improvement,  without  increase,  of  the  army 
and  navy  "  in  the  light  of  the  present  war."  He  is 
skeptical,  however,  as  to  the  wisdom  of  the  plan  to  re- 
duce the  term  of  enlistment  in  the  army,  as  proposed  by 
General  Wood,  to  one  year  or  even  six  months,  so  as  to 
graduate  a  large  number  of  men  each  year  from  the 
regular  army  into  the  reserve  force;  and  prefers  the 
Swiss  system  of  universal  enlistment  and  a  training  of 
a  few  weeks  during  each  of  a  term  of  years. 

The  chairman  of  the  Senate  Committee  on  Military 
Affairs  proposes  an  increase  in  the  army  by  25,000,  or 
to  125,000  in  all.  The  chairman  of  the  House  Committee 
on  Military  Affairs  is  also  for  "  a  moderate  increase  "  in 
the  regular  army,  and  also  for  the  creation  of  a  reserve 
force, — provided  the  latter  is  financially  practicable,  of 
which  he  is  doubtful. 

The  Secretary  of  War  advocates  "reasonable  pre- 
paredness "  and  inclines  to  the  belief  that  "  a  well-trained 
body  of  four  to  five  hundred  thousand  citizen-soldiers  im- 


PREPAREDNESS  PROGRAMMES    77 

mediately  available,  together  with  our  permanent  force 
in  the  regular  and  militia  establishments,  will  give  us 
reasonable  guarantee  against  hostile  invasion  of  our  ter- 
ritory. In  reaching  this  conclusion,  due  weight  must 
be  given  to  the  cooperation  of  our  navy  and  our  land 
coast  defenses."  As  for  the  regular  army,  the  Secretary 
thinks  that  it  will  suffice  to  fill  up  the  ranks  in  the  exist- 
ing organization  by  the  addition  of  25,900  men;  and  he 
is  optimistic  enough  to  believe  that  this  will  require  but 
few  or  no  additional  officers  and  only  33  per  cent,  addi- 
tional cost  per  capita. 

The  Secretary  of  the  Navy  is  evidently  reluctant  and 
non-committal  on  the  question  of  "  preparedness."  He 
has  been  prodded  and  lampooned  to  an  extraordinary 
extent,  but  has  evidently  made  up  his  mind  to  go  no 
farther  than  his  official  position  strictly  requires  him  to 
go.  The  plans  which  he  is  preparing,  in  cooperation  with 
the  General  Board  of  the  Navy,  will  be  presented  in  full 
at  the  next  session  of  Congress,  and  are  briefly  discussed 
in  a  later  portion  of  this  treatise  under  the  topic  of  the 
Navy.  They  are  concerned  chiefly  with  increased  speed, 
submarines  and  aircraft. 

The  President  has  had  his  hands  full  with  the  ex- 
tremely difficult  task  of  insuring  respect  for  neutral  rights 
by  means  of  diplomatic  and  legal  measures,  and  at  the 
same  time  of  preventing  the  "  prepareders  "  from  push- 
ing him  and  the  country  into  a  resort  to  warfare  to  se- 
cure this  respect.  He  refused  point-blank  to  summon 
an  extra  session  of  Congress  to  consider  "  preparedness," 
but  yielded  to  the  prevalent  clamor  so  far  as  to  call  for 
reports  from  the  Secretaries  of  War  and  the  Navy  on 
the  present  actual  condition  of  the  national  defenses. 
Upon  the  basis  of  these  reports  he  is  now  endeavoring 
to  make  up  his  mind  as  to  what  measures,  if  any,  he  will 
bring  to  the  attention  of  Congress  in  its  next  regular 
session.  Unfortunately,  the  military  and  naval  experts 
are  working  at  cross  purposes,  and  the  President  has 


78  PREPAREDNESS 

been  confronted  thus  far  with  inadequate,  extravagant, 
or  conflicting  "  expert  testimony."  Unfortunately,  also, 
for  a  scientific  answer  to  the  problem  of  "  preparedness," 
this  problem  can  be  illuminated  only  to  a  negligible  ex- 
tent by  the  military  experience  of  the  past;  and  present 
preparedness  has  but  little  relation  to  future  needs ;  while 
the  whole  art  of  warfare  has  been  so  thoroughly  revolu- 
tionized in  this  present  war  as  to  warrant  but  small  re- 
liance upon  military  science  as  it  has  developed  under 
wholly  different  conditions. 

It  is  safe  to  assume  that  the  President  will  do  his  ut- 
most to  keep  down  to  a  minimum  the  manifold  plans  to 
increase  our  armaments ;  for  he  must  realize  that  what- 
ever Congress  does  will  be  done  merely  as  a  concession 
to  popular  clamor,  or  as  an  assuagement  of  the  temporary 
popular  anxiety  that  has  been  so  cleverly  worked  up  by 
exploiting  the  "  frightfulness  "  abroad.  The  President 
must  realize  also  that  these  plans  for  "  preparedness," 
even  the  wildest  and  most  extravagant  of  them,  are  as 
far  from  real  "  adequacy  "  as  is — Tipperary.  The  pal- 
pable confession  of  the  prepareders  that  "  we  don't  know 
where  we  are  going,  but  we  are  on  the  way,"  can  as- 
suredly make  but  small  appeal  to  a  man  of  the  President's 
mental  calibre. 

Let  us  compare  the  obvious  needs  of  a  genuine  emer- 
gency with  the  current  programmes  for  meeting  them. 
The  meaning  of  "  defensive  "  warfare  in  our  time,  has 
already  been  indicated.1  A  war  with  a  first-class  military 
and  naval  power,  waged  with  Twentieth  Century  de- 
vices, would  find  its  theater  on  the  land  and  under  it,  on 
the  seas  and  under  them,  and  in  and  from  the  air. 

1  Infra,  p.  67. 


VI 

PREPAREDNESS  ON  AND  UNDER  THE  LAND 

THE  programme  in  this  field  deals  with  the  stand- 
ing army;  the  reserves;  the  militia;  the  Conti- 
nentals ;    "  trained "   schoolboys,    college   youths 
and  business  men ;  guns  and  ammunition ;  entrenchments ; 
bases  of  operations ;  and  fortresses  along  the  frontiers. 

A.      THE    REGULAR     ARMY 

A  standing  army  of  professional  soldiers  is  regarded 
by  genuine  military  experts,  like  Von  Hindenburg  and 
Kitchener,  as  the  only  really  effective  "  arm  of  the  serv- 
ice." They  look  with  hearty  contempt  upon  "  uniformed 
mobs  who  pretend  to  be  soldiers."  The  military  experts 
of  our  own  country  point  with  pride  to  the  work  accom- 
plished by  the  regular  soldiers  in  our  various  wars,  and 
view  with  alarm  the  American  tendency  to  rely  upon 
volunteers.  They  declare  that  our  government  has  been 
guilty  of  murder,  from  the  Revolutionary  to  the  Span- 
ish War,  inclusive,  in  sending  out  untrained  troops  to 
be  shot  down  by  professionals.  Hence,  to  be  adequately 
prepared,  is  to  be  equipped  with  a  professional  army. 

How  Large  Should  it  Be? 

How  many  regular  soldiers  have  we?  How  many  do 
we  need?  Our  army  numbers  at  the  present  time  about 
90,000  men.  Many  of  these  are  on  garrison  duty  or  in 
our  island  possessions.  In  the  Philippines,  Hawaii  and 
Alaska,  we  have  about  18,000  men;  Japan,  we  are  told, 
would  attack  with  not  less  than  100,000.  There  are 
1,200  miles  of  coast  on  the  Pacific  to  defend.  In  the 
whole  United  States,  we  have  an  effective  field  force  of 

79 


80  PREPAREDNESS 

less  than  30,000  men;  less  than  10,000  of  these  are  at 
their  home  or  permanent  stations,  the  rest  being  scat- 
tered along  the  Mexican  border,  in  Colorado,  etc.,  at 
fifty-two  widely  separated  points.  Even  Mexico,  we  are 
told,  has  85,000  effective  troops ! 

Shall  we  double  the  number  of  our  mobile  force,  and 
make  it  60,000?  Shall  we  quadruple  it,  and  make  it  120,- 
ooo?  Why,  in  the  present  war  in  Europe  they  are  cap- 
turing 120,000  men  in  a  single  battle.  In  a  single  Rus- 
sian campaign,  the  Germans  carried  off  more  than  200,- 
ooo  prisoners;  before  the  first  eight  months  of  the  war 
had  elapsed,  they  held  812,000  prisoners  on  German  soil ; 
and  by  the  end  of  the  first  sixteen  months  they  hold 
more  than  3,000,000.  This  is  not  capture ;  it  is  immigra- 
tion. Sickness  alone  would  dispose  of  our  120,000  men. 
For  example,  during  the  first  six  months  of  the  Galli- 
poli  campaign,  78,000  British  soldiers  were  returned  to 
their  homes  because  of  illness.  Thanks  to  modern  medi- 
cal, surgical  and  sanitary  skill,  the  number  of  men  car- 
ried off  by  disease  is  now  very  small  as  compared  with 
the  number  of  killed  and  wounded,  whereas  in  former 
times  the  reverse  of  this  was  true.  As  to  the  number  of 
killed  and  wounded  in  the  present  war:  the  Allies  have 
lost  6,700,000  men,  5,600,000  of  whom  were  killed  or 
permanently  disabled;  the  Austro-Germans  have  lost  6,- 
350,000  men,  at  least  5,000,000  being  killed  or  perma- 
nently disabled.  More  than  2,000,000  men  are  reported 
as  simply  missing! 

Evidently,  we  can  no  longer  think  in  terms  of  tens  of 
thousands ;  or  even  of  hundreds  of  thousands ;  the  war- 
fare of  our  time  is  carried  on  by  millions.  In  our  Span- 
ish War,  seventeen  years  ago,  we  had  a  total  loss  by 
death  of  2,910,  and  2,604  of  these  died  from  disease.  In 
our  Civil  War  of  a  half-century  ago,  our  largest  number 
of  Union  soldiers  was  1,050,000  men,  all  of  whom  but  50,- 
ooo  were  volunteers  or  drafted  men.  The  Austro-Ger- 
mans have  lost  six  times  as  many ;  while  the  men  under 


PREPAREDNESS  ON  AND  UNDER  LAND      81 

arms  in  Europe  number  more  than  a  dozen  times  as 
many.  An  attache  representing  the  United  States  army 
in  Europe  declares  that  there  they  have  more  than  600 
well-trained  army  corps,  while  we  have  less  than  one ! 

Even  before  the  great  war  began,  Germany  and  its 
allies  had  a  peace  strength  of  1,400,000  trained  soldiers, 
and  a  war  strength  of  7,200,000  trained  soldiers;  while 
Great  Britain  and  its  allies  had  a  peace  strength  of  2,- 
250,000  trained  soldiers,  and  a  war  strength  of  9,660,000 
trained  soldiers. 

In  the  face  of  these  stupendous  facts,  the  recent  Chief- 
of-Staff  of  our  army  advocated  205,000  men  in  our 
standing  army  and  a  total  available  force  (militia  and  re- 
serves included)  of  800,000  men.  This  would  mean  an 
increase  of  100  per  cent,  in  the  army  and  400  per  cent, 
in  the  militia.  Would  it  be  truly  adequate? 

The  present  Secretary  of  War  proposes  to  increase 
the  regular  army  to  143,843  men,  thus  giving  to  the 
island  possessions  about  49,000,  and  to  the  continental 
United  States  about  95,000  men ;  to  these  he  would  add 
a  "  Federal  citizen  army  "  of  400,000  "  Continentals," 
and  retain  the  120,000  existing  State  militia.  Will  this 
increase  of  about  30  per  cent,  in  the  regular  army  and 
about  450  per  cent,  in  the  "  citizen  soldiery  "  be  truly 
adequate? 

The  General  Staff  of  the  Army  advocates  250,000  reg- 
ular troops  permanently  with  the  colors,  a  reserve  of 
300,000  fully  trained  men,  and  a  citizen  force  of  1,000,000 
men  with  at  least  one  year's  training.  The  National  Se- 
curity League,  with  much  and  ardent  alacrity,  has 
changed  its  original  demand  for  1,000,000  men  to  i,- 
550,000  men,  to  meet  the  General  Staff's  view,  and 
other  exponents  of  the  prevalent  hysteria  have  "  gone 
them  more  than  one  better."  For  example,  a  Philadel- 
phia clergyman,  preaching  a  Thanksgiving  Day  sermon 
in  the  City  of  Brotherly  Love,  not  long  ago,  expressed 
such  gratitude  for  America's  exemption  from  the  great 


82  PREPAREDNESS 

war  in  Europe  that  he  demanded  the  immediate  increase 
of  our  standing  army  to  five  millions  of  men,  so  that  it 
might  be  adequate  to  cope  with  European  armies  of  equal 
size  in  case  they  should  direct  their  conquering  footsteps 
towards  our  shores ! 

Where  Shall  It  Come  From? 

Now,  in  considering  such  programmes  for  the  acquisi- 
tion of  adequate  preparedness,  we  are  confronted  by  at 
least  two  questions  of  a  very  practical  kind,  namely, 
Where  are  these  millions  of  professional  soldiers  to  come 
from,  and,  What  would  be  their  cost  ?  It  is  true  that  the 
United  States,  with  a  total  population  of  about  one  hun- 
dred millions,  has  twenty  millions  of  men  between  the 
ages  of  eighteen  and  forty-four  years,  and  seventeen  mil- 
lions of  these  might  be  converted  into  real  soldiers.  But 
where  are  these  millions  of  men  to  come  from  ?  Are  they 
to  be  taken  from  the  productive  paths  of  American  in- 
dustry, and  the  women  be  permitted  to  do  their  work? 
That  is  the  way  they  solve  the  problem  in  the  Old  World  ; 
but  it  was  to  escape  precisely  that  sort  of  thing  that  our 
fathers  came  to  these  non-militaristic  shores. 

What  Would  It  Cost? 

As  to  the  cost, — in  dollars, — of  such  a  policy,  it  may 
be  estimated  from  the  fact  that  we  expend  upon  our 
army  establishment  the  sum  of  $1,314  per  soldier  per  an- 
num. All  things  come  high  in  the  United  States.  The 
French,  German  and  British  armies  cost  $291,  $306,  and 
$378  per  soldier  per  annum,  respectively.  The  German 
army,  which  was  ten  times  as  numerous  as  ours  before 
the  war,  cost  only  twice  as  much  per  annum.  Belgium, 
with  an  army  four  times  as  large  as  ours,  maintained 
it  at  one-eighth  the  cost. 

We  could  probably  apply  to  our  army  the  economy  of 
large  production,  if  it  were  greatly  increased  in  size, 
and  might  reduce  its  cost  to  say  $1,000  per  man.  But  the 


PREPAREDNESS  ON  AND  UNDER  LAND      83 

bill  would  still  be  decidedly  heavy.  For  example,  an 
army  of  5,000,000  would  cost  at  this  lowered  rate  the 
sum  of  $5,000,000,000  per  annum, — or  the  yearly  price 
of  thirteen  Panama  Canals.  An  army  commensurate 
with  the  ideas  of  our  General  Staff  would  cost  $250,- 
000,000  per  annum,  exclusive  of  the  cost  of  300,000  fully 
trained  reserves,  and  1,000,000  men  with  one  year's 
training ;  that  is  to  say  that  in  every  presidential  adminis- 
tration we  would  expend  upon  our  army  the  sum  total 
of  our  entire  national  debt,  which  we  have  been  strug- 
gling for  the  last  half-century  to  wipe  out! 

Even  the  more  moderate  plan  of  the  present  adminis- 
tration would  require  the  expenditure  on  the  army  of 
one  billion  dollars  within  the  next  five  years.  And  yet, 
in  spite  of  such  enormous  expenditures,  the  military  ex- 
perts insist  that  our  army  would  be  absolutely  unpre- 
pared to  cope  with  a  first-class  enemy, — a  victorious  Ger- 
many, for  example, — in  Twentieth  Century  warfare. 

We  have  increased  the  size  of  our  army  fourfold 
within  the  past  sixteen  years,  and  have  spent  upon  it  five 
times  as  much,  proportionately,  as  Germany  has  spent 
upon  its  superb  fighting  machine.  We  are  now  urged  to 
increase  our  army  within  the  next  five  years  by  anywhere 
from  1,500  to  5,000  per  cent.,  with  the  emphatic  assur- 
ance that  even  then  it  would  not  be  truly  adequate  to 
cope  with  its  most  powerful  enemy. 

What,  then,  is  an  "  adequate  "  army  and  an  adequate 
expenditure?  Our  military  experts  do  not,  and  cannot, 
know;  and  they  dare  not  tell  us,  publicly  at  least,  what  is 
their  nearest  guess.  All  of  our  historic  traditions,  na- 
tional prejudices  and  democratic  ideals  are  arrayed  solidly 
against  large  standing  armies  as  the  prime  source  and 
chief  support  of  tyranny.  Never  yet,  thank  God,  has 
there  been  room  beneath  the  Stars  and  Stripes  for  the 
mailed  fist,  the  spurred  heel,  the  war  lords  and  serried 
ranks  of  the  Old  World's  military  system. 


84>  PREPAREDNESS 


B.      THE     RESERVES 

The  American  antipathy  to  a  large  standing  army  has 
been  observed,  even  to  the  extent  of  neglecting  a  reserve 
army  composed  of  former  professional  soldiers. 

Our  Unpreparedness 

It  is  true  that  there  has  been  some  feeble  legislation 
designed  to  bind  former  professionals  to  the  colors  and 
make  them  available  in  time  of  war.  But  so  feeble  has 
this  legislation  been,  that  it  has  resulted  in  building  up  a 
reserve  army  of  just  sixteen  men!  A  congressman  es- 
pecially prominent  in  the  campaign  for  preparedness, 
joyfully  seized  upon  this  pregnant  fact  and  attempted  to 
rub  it  in  to  the  American  consciousness  by  giving  a  much 
advertised  dinner  at  his  home  in  Washington  for  "  the 
entire  reserve  army  of  the  United  States  of  America." 
Eight  of  the  sixteen  soldiers  accepted  his  invitation  and 
partook  of  his  hospitality.  Even  the  rumor  that  at  this 
dinner  grape- juice  was  to  be  eschewed  and  Gambrinus 
was  to  sit  next  to  Mars,  was  not  sufficient  to  mobilize 
two  members  of  the  reserve  army  from  California  and 
Porto  Rico  and  six  others  from  Indiana,  Pennsylvania 
and  New  York. 

Let  us  try  to  imagine  our  reserve  army  of  sixteen  men 
called  out  to  defend  this  great  Republic  from  invasion  by 
the  4,430,000  reserves  of  Germany,  the  3,300,000  reserves 
of  Russia,  the  1,610,000  reserves  of  Austria-Hungary, 
the  950,000  reserves  of  Japan,  or  even  the  476,500  re- 
serves of  Great  Britain!  Is  there  any  wonder  that  we 
are  trembling  with  fear  in  our  boots?  And  the  worst 
may  yet  be  to  come.  For,  although  these  possible  ene- 
mies of  ours  are  killing  off  their  soldiers  (reserves  and 
otherwise)  at  a  rather  lively  rate  at  present,  still  the 
victors  in  the  war  will  probably  have  a  few  hundreds  of 
thousands  or  even  millions  left,  and  these  will  be  not 


PREPAREDNESS  ON  AND  UNDER  LAND      85 

merely  reserves  trained  in  time  of  peace,  but  veterans 
seasoned  in  the  greatest,  most  scientific  war  in  history. 

How  Many  Do  We  Need? 

What  is  being  done  to  meet  such  unparalleled  emer- 
gencies? Well,  the  present  Secretary  of  War  proposes 
that  the  term  of  service  of  the  regular  soldiers  be  re- 
duced from  four  years  with  the  colors  to  two  years  with 
the  colors,  and  that,  the  term  of  enlistment  being  fixed  at 
six  years,  the  other  four  years  be  spent  in  the  reserves ; 
also  that  the  Continentals,1  after  serving  two  months 
yearly  for  three  years  with  the  colors,  be  for  three  more 
years  in  reserve.  By  this  process  of  graduation  from 
the  regular  army  and  the  Continentals,  the  reserves  are 
expected  to  increase  at  the  rate  of  100,000  a  year.  But 
this  increase  would  not  commence  until  the  end  of  three 
years  after  the  adoption  of  the  plan ;  and  meanwhile,  and 
for  many  a  year  afterwards,  we  should  be  a  long,  long 
way,  in  the  item  of  reserves,  behind  Germany,  Russia, 
Austria-Hungary,  or  Japan. 

As  to  the  cost  of  this  wholly  inadequate  plan,  some  idea 
may  be  gained  from  the  fact  that  the  reserves  are  to  be 
not  only  subject  to  call  for  war  service,  but  also  required 
to  attend  manoeuvers, — for  which,  of  course,  they  will  be 
paid ;  and  from  the  further  proposal  that,  in  order  to  pro- 
mote enlistment  in  the  regular  army,  the  recruit  who  has 
shown  the  required  proficiency  may,  after  one  year's 
service  with  the  colors,  pass  to  the  reserves ;  thus  remain- 
ing for  six  years  of  his  enlistment  on  the  reserve  force 
and  the  pay-roll  as  well. 

It  is  just  such  proposals  in  the  preparedness  pro- 
grammes that  necessitate  the  demand,  even  from  our 
relatively  moderate  Secretary  of  War,  for  more  than  one 
billion  dollars  to  be  spent  on  our  army  during  the  next 
four  years.  Surely  Ben  Franklin  would  say:  We  are 

1  See  page  89. 


86  PREPAREDNESS 

spending  too  much  for  our  whistle, — especially  for  a 
whistle  than  won't  blow. 


C.      THE    STATE    MILITIA,    OR    NATIONAL    GUARD 

Yielding  to  American  opposition  to  "  adequate  "  stand- 
ing armies,  our  military  experts  have  sought  to  procure 
adequacy  by  other  means.  The  most  familiar  of  these 
means  has  been  the  creation  and  maintenance  of  a  body 
of  militia  in  each  of  the  States.  This  has  been  regarded 
by  many  civilians  as  the  chief  bulwark  of  our  nation 
against  domestic  treason  and  foreign  foes.  But  it  is  now 
declared  to  be  only  a  broken  reed. 

Its  Defects 

First,  it  has  been  discovered  that  even  the  men  who 
have  joined  the  militia  do  not  take  seriously  their  duty 
to  become  prepared.  Of  the  120,000  militiamen  enrolled, 
only  50,000  appeared  last  year  for  practice  at  the  rifle- 
ranges  ;  47  per  cent,  of  those  armed  with  a  rifle  did  not 
appear  at  the  ranges ;  31,000  did  not  go  to  the  annual  en- 
campment ;  23,000  did  not  even  appear  for  inspection. 

Again,  the  number  enrolled  is  held  to  be  wholly  in- 
sufficient. The  recent  Chief-of-Staff  advocated  the  in- 
crease of  their  number  by  500  per  cent.,  or  to  600,000 
men.  But  how  shall  this  be  done  ?  It  is  found  that  there 
is  a  wide-spread  aversion  to  the  militia,  among  laboring 
men,  for  the  reason  that  it  has  been  or  may  be  used 
against  laborers  in  their  disputes  with  employers.  Em- 
ployers, on  the  other  hand,  are  opposed  to  releasing  their 
employes  for  ten  days  or  two  weeks  of  training,  not  only 
because  of  economic  reasons,  but  also  because  of  their 
distrust  of  "  tin  soldiering."  Either  enlist  in  the  regular 
army  and  become  a  real  soldier,  they  say  to  their  laborers, 
or  stick  to  your  job  and  don't  try  to  become  half -soldier 
and  half-workman. 


PREPAREDNESS  ON  AND  UNDER  LAND      87 

Proposed  Remedies 

During  the  present  preparedness  campaign,  pressure 
has  been  brought  to  bear  upon  employers  in  behalf  of 
the  militia,  and  some  of  them  have  offered  inducements 
to  their  workmen  to  join  the  militia.  But  even  the  en- 
thusiasts have  lost  all  hope  of  largely  increasing  the 
militia  in  this  way,  and  have  come  to  the  conclusion  that 
"  there  is  just  one  way  to  get  men  down  to  the  hard  work 
necessary  to  become  trained  militiamen,  and  that  is  by 
paying  them." 

A  small  payment,  it  is  generally  recognized,  will  not  be 
sufficient  largely  to  increase  the  number  of  militiamen 
and  their  devotion  to  training.  For  example,  the  Gov- 
ernor of  Illinois,  at  the  Governors'  Conference  held  re- 
cently in  Boston,  denounced  as  a  beggarly  pittance  the 
$15  a  year  paid  to  militiamen,  and  declared  that  "  if  a 
militiaman  were  paid  one  dollar  for  every  night  spent 
in  military  training  in  his  drill  hall  or  arsenal,  with  a 
provision  that  he  would  receive  no  compensation  unless 
he  attended  at  least  forty  nights  during  the  year,  I  be- 
lieve that  instead  of  120,000  militiamen  we  would  have 
1,500,000  or  2,000,000." 

This  programme,  which  would  carry  with  it  an  annual 
minimum  expenditure  for  wages  alone  of  from  $60,000,- 
ooo  to  $80,000,000,  evidently  does  not  appeal  to  the 
present  national  administration.  But  the  latter  does  pro- 
pose to  increase  the  Federal  appropriation  to  the  State 
militia,  which  is  now  $6,244,214  per  annum,  to  $10,000,- 
ooo  for  next  year.  If  this  does  not  suffice,  a  movement 
is  already  on  foot  to  increase  it  to  $30,000,000  per  an- 
num. There  is  evidently  a  very  inviting  field  of  activity 
here  for  the  congressional  "  pork-barrel."  When  it  is 
recalled  that  pensions  for  the  men  who  participated, — 
some  of  them  in  most  moderate  degree, — in  our  past 
wars,  have  increased  to  the  handsome  sum  of  $164,000,- 
ooo  per  annum,  the  question  may  well  be  urged:  Why 


88  PREPAREDNESS 

not  do  as  well  or  better  for  the  men  who  will  be  called 
upon  to  defend  us  in  our  future  wars  ?  Better  a  live  sol- 
dier who  can  fight  than  a  wounded  one,  or  the  widow 
of  one,  who  has  fought  some  half-century  ago.  So  runs 
the  plausible  argument, — direct  to  the  Federal  treasury. 

As  another  incentive  to  enlistment  in  the  militia,  it  has 
recently  been  provided  that  in  case  of  war  the  militia  of 
the  States  may  enlist,  individually  or  en  masse,  in  the 
Federal  army  and  be  received  on  a  plane  of  entire  equal- 
ity, all  the  rights  and  privileges  of  the  army  being  ex- 
tended to  equivalent  ranks  in  the  militia. 

In  return  for  this  Federal  recognition  and  financial 
aid,  it  is  proposed  that  Federal  control  of  the  State  mili- 
tia shall  be  greatly  strengthened,  both  in  the  direction  of 
equipment,  training  and  command. 

Shall  It  Be  Discarded? 

The  well-founded  American  antipathy  to  too  central- 
ized and  militaristic  a  national  government  appears  to 
have  been  lost  in  the  prevalent  struggle  for  "  prepared- 
ness." The  right  and  duty  of  the  States  and  the  centrali- 
zation of  government  in  the  nation  have  been  subordi- 
nated to  the  demand  for  "  efficiency."  In  consonance 
with  this  demand,  it  is  even  urged  from  many  quarters 
that  the  militia  should  be  taken  entirely  out  of  the  hands 
of  the  States  and  handed  over  to  the  government  at 
Washington.  "  In  the  early  history  of  our  country,"  it  is 
argued,  "  when  means  of  communication  of  all  kinds 
were  extremely  slow,  there  may  have  been  some  excuse 
for  a  National  Guard  or  State  Militia  as  provided  for  in 
the  Constitution.  In  these  days  of  quick  transportation, 
the  forty-eight  different  varieties  of  militia  should  be 
replaced  by  a  single  national  army  such  as  is  absolutely 
necessary  in  every  country  for  modern  defensive  mili- 
tary operations." 

The  State  militia,  it  is  urged,  has  proved  wholly  inade- 
quate in  every  war.  A  large  proportion  of  it  has  refused 


PREPAREDNESS  ON  AND  UNDER  LAND      89 

to  enlist.  In  the  Civil  War,  both  North  and  South  were 
obliged  to  offer  bounties  and  to  resort  to  conscription. 
In  the  Spanish  War,  sixteen  States  fell  short  of 
furnishing  their  quota  of  troops.  The  militiamen  who 
have  enlisted  acted  like  raw  recruits.  In  the  War  of 
1812,  they  ran  away  from  almost  every  battle;  and  1,500 
British  soldiers,  weakened  by  a  long  sea  voyage,  landed 
in  Maryland,  drove  off  5,000  militiamen  almost  without 
striking  a  blow,  and  burned  the  capital  city  of  the  United 
States.  In  the  Civil  War,  the  military  experts  decided 
that  about  two  years  of  severe  training  were  required 
"  to  lick  the  citizen  soldiers  into  shape." 

Rendered  practically  useless  by  such  glaring  and  in- 
herent defects,  why  has  the  State  militia  been  tolerated 
at  all?  A  congressman  from  Massachusetts  gives  one 
reason  for  it,  as  follows :  "  I  have  sat  [in  Congress] 
like  a  coward  for  twelve  years  in  silence  because  I  was 
afraid  to  tell  the  700  men  in  the  National  Guard  in  my 
district  that  I  did  not  think  they  were  an  adequate  pro- 
tection." 

The  fact  that  it  has  been  affectionately  regarded  as  a 
happy  medium  between  militarism  and  "  unprepared- 
ness  "  is  another  reason  why  it  has  not  been  discarded ; 
and  there  are  various  others  still.  But  the  expert  verdict 
pronounced  upon  it  is :  For  more  than  a  century  we 
have  tried  and  experimented  with  a  militia  system  that 
has  proved  a  burden  in  times  of  peace  and  a  humiliating 
failure  in  times  of  war.  To  the  lions  with  it !  Adequate 
preparedness  is  not  to  be  found  along  this  line. 

D.      THE     CONTINENTALS 

While  the  present  administration  has  refused  to  yield 
to  the  demand  of  the  radical  prepareders  for  the  aboli- 
tion of  the  State  militia,  and  has  increased  the  annual 
appropriation  for  it  by  60  per  cent.,  it  has  planned,  never- 
theless, to  supplement  it  by  a  Federal  force,  to  which  the 
historically  dear  and  honored  name  of  the  "  Continen- 


90  PREPAREDNESS 

tals  "  has  been  applied.  This  "  Federal  Citizen  Army," 
as  it  is  also  called,  is  to  consist  of  400,000  men,  enlisted 
at  the  rate  of  133,000  a  year  for  three  years.  The  re- 
cruits would  enlist  for  six-year  terms,  but  would  be  re- 
quired to  report  for  training  only  for  short  periods,  prob- 
ably two  months  each  year,  for  the  first  three  years,  and 
during  the  remaining  three  years  would  be  furloughed 
subject  to  call  to  the  colors  in  time  of  war. 

Where  Will  They  Come  From? 

In  launching  its  plan  for  Continentals,  the  War  De- 
partment has  made  the  following  appeal :  "  It  seems 
desirable  to  say  that  if  those  who  are  the  employers  of 
the  young  men  of  the  country  cannot  by  reason  of  age 
or  situation  in  life  give  their  personal  service,  they  can 
do  that  which  will  be  equally  useful  by  encouraging  in 
every  way  the  participation  of  those  in  their  employ  in 
the  plan  of  national  defense.  If  they  would  so  arrange 
their  business  that  a  certain  proportion  of  those  whom 
they  engage  could  undertake  this  national  service  without 
sacrificing  their  personal  interests,  those  who  did  this 
thing  would  be  acting  in  the  most  public-spirited  and 
patriotic  manner  possible." 

At  first  sight,  it  might  appear  probable  that  there  is 
sufficient  "  patriotism  "  among  the  employers  and  labor- 
ers of  the  country  to  enable  Uncle  Sam  to  procure  400,- 
ooo  Continentals  from  a  population  of  100,000,000. 
Switzerland,  with  a  population  of  only  4,000,000,  has 
raised  an  army  of  500,000  in  this  way. 

Opposition  to  Them 

But  even  before  this  plan  is  fairly  launched,  opposition 
to  it  has  sprung  up  on  various  sides.  It  is  urged,  on 
the  one  hand,  that  there  is  a  grave  economic  problem 
involved,  both  in  the  readjustment  of  wages  and  hours 
of  employment,  during  the  proposed  two  months  of  mili- 
tary training  each  year  for  three  years ;  and  in  the  raising 


PREPAREDNESS  ON  AND  UNDER  LAND      91 

of  the  very  large  revenue  which  would  be  required  to 
pay,  equip,  maintain  and  insure  the  400,000  Continentals 
against  sickness,  accident  or  death  while  in  service. 

Again,  the  political  aspect  of  the  plan  of  increasing 
the  Federal  military  forces  by  so  large  a  number  of  men 
at  the  expense  of  the  militia,  or  at  the  expense  of  the 
potential  military  power  of  the  States,  has  been  gravely 
urged  as  a  menace  to  a  well-balanced  Federal  and  State 
government. 

The  State  militiamen  are  naturally  inquiring:  Why 
should  the  State  militia  with  its  long  history  be  virtually 
superseded  by  this  new-fangled  military  force?  And 
how  can  400,000  volunteers  be  recruited  for  this  new 
force  within  three  years,  when  the  State  militia  by  most 
strenuous  effort  and  varied  devices  has  been  able  to 
recruit  in  many  years  only  120,000? 

Again,  from  the  side  of  the  regular  army  comes  the 
following  criticism  of  the  Continentals: 

"  The  administration's  reorganization  plan  begins  at 
the  wrong  end.  Instead  of  building  up  the  regular  army 
it  merely  aims  at  tripling  or  quadrupling  our  supply  of 
untrained  troops.  It  creates  a  great  body  of  militia 
officers  and  thus  dilutes  the  efficiency  of  the  officers'  corps 
as  a  whole.  It  sets  up  a  demoralizing  distinction  between 
regulars  and  Continentals.  If  the  Continentals  are  called 
into  being  we  shall  have  two  national  armies,  unlike  in 
quality,  training  and  spirit,  and  therefore  exceedingly 
difficult  to  amalgamate  in  case  of  need.  We  shall  simply 
follow  out  to  another  failure  the  disastrous  American 
tradition  of  reliance  on  second  and  third  class  troops 
which  has  caused  such  a  waste  of  blood  and  treasure 
in  all  our  wars." 

Would  They  Be  Adequate? 

Such  criticism  as  this  raises  the  question:     Would 
the  Continentals  be  truly  efficient  and  adequate? 
Learning  to  wear  a  uniform,  to  keep  step  on  a  march, 


92  PREPAREDNESS 

to  carry  and  shoot  with  a  rifle  and  to  carry  a  kit,  or,  if 
in  the  cavalry,  to  ride  a  horse  and  draw  a  sabre;  such 
is  the  popular  conception  of  the  military  art.  Of 
course  any  American  can  learn  it,  "  in  a  jiffy,"  and 
be  able  to  whip  any  half-dozen  foreigners  into  the  bar- 
gain. 

But  the  General  Staff  of  the  army  takes  a  very  dif- 
ferent view  of  this  matter, — even  in  the  United  States, — 
and  has  inaugurated  a  campaign  against  such  "  squirrel- 
gun  Yankeeism."  To  prevent  men  from  becoming  a 
hindrance  to  an  army  and  to  teach  them  to  be  of  real 
military  service,  the  General  Staff  estimates  that  not 
the  two  months'  training  proposed,  but  at  least  one 
year's  solid  training  is  absolutely  necessary.  It  has  out- 
lined, month  by  month,  the  training  required  for  hand- 
ling and  caring  for  the  soldier's  body  and  for  his 
weapons,  drill  in  battalions  and  regiments/ camp  life, 
patrolling,  scouting,  marching,  intrenching,  covering,  as- 
saulting tactics,  teamwork  in  brigades  and  divisions, 
war-games,  forced  marches,  signaling,  bridge-building, 
erecting  obstructions,  rifle-sighting,  range-finding,  ma- 
chine-gun practice,  and  a  thousand  and  one  other  details 
of  modern  military  efficiency. 

The  Swiss  system,  which  seems  to  have  inspired  the 
plan  for  our  Continentals,  provides  that  the  military 
training  of  the  citizen  soldiers  shall  begin  with  their 
early  school  life  and  include  athletic  exercises,  rifle  prac- 
tice and  two  or  three  months'  drill  in  camp.  This  regime 
lasts  until  the  age  of  twenty-one ;  for  eleven  years  after 
this,  eleven  days  each  years  are  devoted  to  training  for 
service  in  the  first  line  of  battle ;  twelve  years  more  are 
served  in  the  first  reserve,  or  landwehr,  with  eleven 
days'  training  in  alternate  years;  four  years  more, — to 
the  age  of  forty-eight, — are  served  in  the  second  reserve, 
or  landsturm,  when  the  training  is  only  occasional.  The 
efficiency  of  this  system  has  never  been  tried  in  war,  and 
from  the  point  of  view  of  training  it  may  well  be  ques- 


PREPAREDNESS  ON  AND  UNDER  LAND      93 

tioned  whether  it  could  withstand  such  an  ordeal  as  Bel- 
gium has  been  called  upon  to  face. 

Our  military  experts  declare  that  six  months,  at  the 
smallest  possible  estimate,  would  be  required  to  equip, 
organize  and  make  entirely  ready  for  a  really  great  emer- 
gency even  such  partially  trained  men.  And  in  modern 
warfare,  they  insist,  an  enemy  genuinely  prepared,  would 
progress  so  far  on  the  way  to  success,  in  these  six 
months,  that  his  unprepared  or  partially  prepared  antago- 
nist might  as  well  concede  defeat  without  a  contest. 

From  the  point  of  view  of  numbers,  also,  the  question 
may  well  be  raised  as  to  the  Continentals'  adequacy. 
The  Swiss  system  is  proportionately  far  and  away  ahead 
of  the  American  Continentals.  On  the  Swiss  basis,  the 
latter  should  number  12,500,000  instead  of  the  proposed 
400,000!  It  is  not  strange,  then,  that  the  plan  for  the 
Continentals  is  condemned  as  wholly  inadequate,  or  that 
the  demand  is  being  loudly  made  that  we  should  increase 
this  number,  as  well  as  that  of  the  regular  army,  well 
into  the  millions.  The  Governor  of  Illinois,  for  exam- 
ple, declared  in  the  recent  Governors'  Conference  in 
Boston  that  "  to  rely  upon  the  regular  army  of  100,000 
and  a  militia  of  120,000  men  in  case  of  war  with  a  first- 
class  power,  would  be  an  act  of  supreme  folly.  The 
citizen-soldiery  must  be  reorganized,  regenerated  and 
enormously  increased.  There  should  be  at  least  a  body 
of  citizen-soldiery  of  2,000,000  men." 

E.      THE    SOURCES    OF    SUPPLY 

In  the  course  of  this  analysis  of  the  regular  army,  the 
reserves,  the  State  militia  and  the  Continentals,  the  ques- 
tion has  arisen  in  connection  with  each  of  them,  Whence 
will  the  necessary  increase  come  ? 

The  Supineness  of  American  Adults 

Captain  Mahan,  a  leading  advocate  for  many  years 
of  "  adequate  armaments,"  voiced  the  discouragement 


94.  PREPAREDNESS 

of  the  prepareders  as  to  inducing  hundreds  of  thousands 
or  millions  of  busy  Americans  to  submit  to  military 
training  in  earnest.  On  this  point,  he  said :  "  A  peace- 
ful, gain-loving  nation  is  not  far-sighted,  and  far-sighted- 
ness is  needed  for  adequate  military  preparation,  espe- 
cially in  these  days." 

Hence,  our  far-sighted  military  experts,  almost  de- 
spairing of  enlisting  in  their  cause  large  numbers  of 
adult  Americans,  who  are  absorbed  in  the  task  of  per- 
forming the  world's  real  work,  have  directed  their  most 
solicitous  gaze  upon  the  rising  generation,  in  order  that 
from  it  they  may  redress  the  deficiencies  of  the  present 
one. 

But  they  have  not  entirely  despaired  of  the  adults  and, 
aided  by  the  fear  engendered  on  this  side  of  the  Atlantic 
by  the  war  in  Europe,  they  are  doing  their,  utmost  to 
corral  as  many  as  possible  of  the  20,000,000  American 
males  between  the  ages  of  eighteen  and  forty-four  into 
the  army.  Under  the  stimulus  of  the  Great  War,  a  por- 
tion of  the  public  is  now  responding  eagerly  to  the  baits 
which  Major-General  Wood  in  particular  has  held  out 
so  skilfully  and  enticingly  to  it.  Although  presumably 
appointed  to  attend  to  his  own  business  of  keeping  in 
order  and  efficiency  the  army  that  the  American  people, 
through  their  representatives  in  Congress,  have  estab- 
lished, General  Wood's  chief  activity  for  many  months  has 
been  the  capitalization  of  public  panic  for  the  increase 
of  that  army  by  hook  or  by  crook. 

The  Army  and  Navy  Journal  has  ably  seconded  Gen- 
eral Wood's  motions,  and,  to  start  the  ball  rolling,  has 
called  for  the  immediate  mobilization  of  a  volunteer 
army  of  1,000,000  men,  "not  for  the  purpose  of  making 
war,  but  to  avoid  war  by  preserving  neutrality  and  main- 
taining our  honor  and  dignity."  This,  it  argues,  could 
not  be  considered  in  any  quarter  an  act  of  war,  because 
it  would  be  no  more  than  a  precautionary  movement  in 
kind  with  that  instituted  by  every  neutral  nation  of  im- 


PREPAREDNESS  ON  AND  UNDER  LAND      95 

portance  on  the  globe;  Switzerland,  Holland  and  Italy, 
it  continues,  have  all  mobilized  and  strengthened  their 
defense  plans,  and  nobody  even  suspected  the  two  coun- 
tries first  named  of  having  belligerent  designs. 

Possible  Adult  Sources 

Compulsory  military  training  and  conscription  are  not 
yet  seriously  advocated,  in  public,  at  least,  by  many 
leading  Americans.  There  are  some  among  us  who  are 
so  recreant  to  the  traditions  and  ideals  of  our  Republic, 
and  so  determined  on  "  adequate "  preparedness,  that 
they  are  advocating  even  this  reactionary  step;  while 
the  Assistant  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  emulating  the  chief 
bearer  of  his  family  name,  has  publicly  advised  the 
American  people  to  "look  carefully  into  the  system  of 
compulsory  military  training  which  the  labor  party  in 
Australia  has  ordained  for  the  Australians."  The  terror 
of  the  "  Yellow  Peril "  has  forced  this  system  upon 
Australia,  and  it  may  yet  achieve  much  in  America. 

Meanwhile,  varied  kinds  of  pressure  and  inducements 
are  being  brought  to  bear  upon  laborers  and  employers. 

One  typical  proposal  is  to  establish  winter  training 
camps  for  a  half-million  of  the  unemployed,  who  would 
enlist  for  two  or  three  months  between  December  I  and 
April  I,  with  the  privilege  of  reenlisting  in  the  regular 
army  or  the  Continentals;  by  this  plan  some  optimists 
hope  to  build  up  an  army,  within  ten  years,  of  3,000,000 
trained  men! 

Another  plan,  adopted  by  several  railroads  east  of 
Pittsburgh,  is  the  offer,  to  any  employe  entitled  to  two 
weeks'  vacation,  of  a  furlough  of  two  extra  weeks  for 
the  purpose  of  joining  a  camp  for  one  month's  military 
training, — provided  his  department  can  spare  him. 
These  employes  receive  no  pay  for  the  extra  two  weeks ; 
but  the  leave  itself  and  the  offer  of  free  transportation 
to  and  from  the  camp  are  expected  to  induce  thousands 


96  PREPAREDNESS 

of  railroad  clerks,  enginemen,  conductors  and  train- 
men to  acquire  a  month's  military  training. 

Another  plan  is  to  have  the  State  or  Department  of 
War  equip  each  volunteer  fireman  with  a  military  uni- 
form and  a  modern  rifle,  and  subject  him  to  military  drill 
at  his  firehouse  twice  a  month.  There  are  250,000  vol- 
unteer firemen  in  the  State  of  Pennsylvania  alone,  and 
these  men  are  already  trained  to  fight  fire.  "  Given  a 
knowledge  of  the  manual  of  arms,"  the  enthusiastic 
supporters  of  this  plan  declare,  "  a  reserve  force  of  fire- 
men could  be  organized,  who  would  in  time  of  war  only 
need  to  become  acclimated  to  outdoor  life  and  camp  re- 
strictions to  be  thorough  and  efficient  soldiers." 

Crime-fighters,  also,  in  the  form  of  city-policemen,  are 
being  trained  in  vulnerable  New  York  to  resist  attack 
from  a  foreign  foe.  A  public  performance  was  recently 
given  by  New  York's  "  finest,"  who  showed  just  how  a 
battery  of  artillery  should  be  worked  and  captured. 
General  Wood,  who  was  present  at  the  performance, 
was  moved  to  say :  "  I  wish  we  had  a  million  men  like 
these  in  our  army  " ;  and  a  newspaper  commented  upon 
it  as  follows :  "  The  sham  battle  was  valuable  because 
no  one  who  saw  it  could  come  away  with  the  belief  that 
such  a  maneuver  could  have  been  accomplished  by  any 
fraction  of  the  million  untrained  men  that  we  have  been 
told  would  spring  to  arms  in  our  defense  between  sunrise 
and  sunset  if  our  country  were  to  be  attacked  by  a  foreign 
foe/' 

If,  now,  the  disease-fighters  in  the  form  of  our  city 
street-cleaners  could  be  trained  in  the  use  of  a  rifle  as 
well  as  a  broom,  we  might  begin  to  feel  some  small  meas- 
ure of  preparedness.  But,  on  second  thought,  the  fire- 
men, policemen  and  street-cleaners  are  found  to  perform 
such  useful  services  for  our  own  people  that  drafting 
them  off  to  fight  against  foreign  foes  might  inflict  irrep- 
arable damage  upon  us  from  the  foes  of  our  own  house- 
hold. Hence  the  persistent  and  varied  effort  to 


PREPAREDNESS  ON  AND  UNDER  LAND      97 

call  to  the  colors  laborers  engaged  in  less  vital  occupa- 
tions. 

In  illustration  of  this  effort  may  be  mentioned  the  plan 
of  certain  Bible  Classes  in  Philadelphia  which,  founded 
on  "  muscular,"  and  even  "  prize-fighting,  Christianity," 
have  attracted  many  exuberant  youths  and  others  to 
them.  These  Classes  established  a  training  camp  in  their 
suburban  headquarters  and  sent  out  an  appeal  to  ten 
thousand  of  the  city's  business  and  commercial  houses, 
legal  firms,  banks  and  patriotic  societies,  asking  that  a 
full  holiday  on  Saturdays  be  given,  so  that  their  em- 
ployes may  receive  a  "  week-end  course  of  military  train- 
ing from  Friday  evening  until  Monday  morning."  The 
local  newspapers  were  very  generous  in  their  accounts 
of  this  experiment,  and  the  public  was  treated  for  sev- 
eral weeks  to  glowing  descriptions  of  how  the  150  "  Bible 
Rookies  "  sprang  from  their  cots  in  the  early  dawn,  ate 
boiled  potatoes,  fish  and  prunes  in  true  army  style,  were 
drilled  in  the  rudiments  of  military  tactics  and  in  the 
use  of  rifle  and  bayonet,  were  visited  by  a  large  number 
of  society  folk  from  Philadelphia  and  New  York,  whom 
they  "  thrilled  by  their  surprising  fitness,"  witnessed  a 
sham  battle  given  for  their  benefit  by  United  States  ma- 
rines, cheered  the  founder  of  their  Bible  Classes  when 
he  was  promoted  to  the  rank  of  corporal  "  for  meritori- 
ous conduct  and  gallantry  in  drills,"  and  listened  to 
"  noted  military  officials  and  statesmen,"  whose  ad- 
dresses on  the  aversion  of  France  to  military  prepared- 
ness in  1911  and  other  salutary  topics  were  interspersed 
with  religious  services  and  sacred  solos. 

It  is  hoped  that  such  an  example  as  this  will  be  con- 
tagious and  that  the  joint  demand  for  Bibles  and  rifles 
will  sweep  over  the  country.  To  supply  this  demand, — 
at  least  for  the  purchase  and  use  of  rifles, — the  National 
Rifle  Association  of  America  has  been  formed,  with 
headquarters  under  the  shadow  of  the  capitol  in  Washing- 
ton. Congress  is  to  be  asked  to  aid  in  the  formation  of 


98  PREPAREDNESS 

rifle  clubs  throughout  the  country,  by  providing  for  the 
construction  of  rifle  ranges  and  for  the  distribution  of 
Krag  rifles,  ammunition  and  target  supplies.  The  Asso- 
ciation, in  a  recent  appeal  to  the  public  for  financial  as- 
sistance, states  that  it  has  already  organized  and  has  in 
active  operation  about  500  rifle  clubs  among  civilians, 
sixty  among  colleges  and  universities,  and  about  200 
among  the  public  and  private  preparatory  schools.  It 
also  states  that  its  aim  is  "  to  popularize  rifle  shooting 
which  is  so  necessary  for  national  defense,  and  place  it, 
in  that  respect,  on  the  same  plane  as  golf,  baseball,  and 
similar  pastimes  and  introduce  it  as  one  of  the  recognized 
sports  in  the  athletic  curriculum  of  the  colleges  and 
schools  of  the  country." 

The  Schools  and  Colleges 

The  great  Promised  Land  of  the  military  prepareders, 
however,  is  the  American  school  system,  public  and  pri- 
vate. They  turn  their  glowing  eyes  towards  it  and  des- 
cry a  magnificent  "  army  "  of  22,000,000  students. 

Exemption  of  the  Infants  and  Girls 

Nineteen  millions  of  these,  it  is  true,  are  in  the  ele- 
mentary schools  and  are  too  young  to  be  trained  to 
shoot  and  be  shot.  In  the  high  schools  and  colleges,  too, 
the  girls  and  young  women  would  probably  have  to  be 
made  exempt  from  military  training, — although  this  ex- 
emption has  been  repudiated  by  many  women,  one  of 
whom  declared  recently  at  Vassar  College :  "  A  full  bat- 
talion of  girls,  physically  vigorous,  well  balanced  and 
able-bodied,  prepared  and  trained  to  fight  and 
thoroughly  armed,  would  be  a  great  asset  to  our  coun- 
try." 

There  are  still  some  old-fashioned  people  who  believe 
that  women  trained  to  be  mothers  are  an  even  greater 
asset  to  the  country  than  if  they  were  trained  to  be  sol- 
diers; and  most  of  the  prepareders,  though  for  quite  a 


PREPAREDNESS  ON  AND  UNDER  LAND      99 

different  reason,  share  this  belief.  A  prominent  advo- 
cate of  preparedness,  who  is  equally  prominent  as  an 
opponent  of  "  race  suicide,"  declares  that  the  sentiment, 
"  I  did  not  raise  my  boy  to  be  a  soldier,"  is  on  precisely 
the  same  moral  level  as  the  sentiment,  "  I  did  not  raise 
my  girl  to  be  a  mother."  We  may  assume  that  this  cryp- 
tic utterance  implies  that  the  moral  level  referred  to  is 
a  low  one.  But  the  women  champions  of  woman-sol- 
diers aver  that  such  critics,  while  they  are  opposed  to 
race  suicide,  are  not  really  opposed  to  the  suicide  of 
races,  and  that  if  the  future  fathers  of  the  race  are  to 
be  killed  off  in  war,  the  future  mothers  of  the  race  may 
as  well  prepare  to  be  killed  also. 

Even  the  physical  weaklings,  with  as  good  brains,  and 
hearts  that  beat  as  warmly  with  patriotism,  as  any  in 
the  land,  demand  their  share  in  preparedness.  Espe- 
cially in  the  mining  districts,  where  many  youths  are 
under  the  regulation  military  height  and  physical  fitness, 
there  is  said  to  be  a  strong  demand  for  "bantam  bat- 
talions." 

Boys  the  "  Real  Fighters  " 

But  "  the  best  that  ye  have  "  is  the  demand  of  the 
Martians,  and  these  are  sought  for  in  the  best  qualified 
pupils  in  schools  and  colleges.  The  President  of  the 
Navy  League  clamors  for  "  a  standing  army  of  1,000,000 
young  men  between  the  ages  of  eighteen  and  twenty- 
one."  In  support  of  his  thesis  that  boys  are  the  real 
fighters,  he  argues  as  follows:  "The  standing  army 
should  consist  of  boys.  There  should  not  be  a  man,  ex- 
cept the  officers,  more  than  twenty-one  years  of  age  in 
the  whole  army.  I  say  this  because  in  all  real  fighting 
it  is  being  proved  that  the  boys  are  those  who  make  the 
real  fighters.  Instead  of  being  a  drawback,  however, 
this  fact  makes  the  problem  of  our  national  defense 
simpler.  We  have  proved  that  schools  such  as  West 
Point  and  Annapolis  not  only  create  the  best  soldiers 


100  PREPAREDNESS 

there  are,  but  that  they  develop  remarkably  fine,  well- 
educated  men,  who  make  the  best  citizens  when  they  go 
into  private  life.  Every  year  there  are  800,000  boys  who 
reach  the  age  of  eighteen  years  in  this  country.  It  is 
admitted  that  the  Government  benefits  itself  when  it 
takes  upon  itself  the  obligation  of  educating  these  boys. 
The  answer  to  the  military  side  of  the  problem  is  this: 
the  Government  must  educate  these  boys,  or  the  percent- 
age of  them  required,  at  schools  similar  to  West  Point 
and  Annapolis,  and  in  this  way  equip  them  not  only  to 
make  the  United  States  formidable,  but  to  take  their 
places  in  the  community  as  splendidly  educated,  splen- 
didly developed  citizens.  There  would  be  no  loss  of  time 
on  the  part  of  the  boys  and  there  would  be  no  economic 
loss  to  the  country,  but  no  nation  on  earth  would  dare 
attempt  a  war  of  conquest  at  our  expense." 

The  Governor  of  Illinois,  who  demands  a  body  of  citi- 
zen-soldiery of  2,000,000  men,  proposes  to  procure  them 
primarily  "  by  requiring  every  college  and  university 
in  the  United  States  which  receives  from  any  State  or 
from  the  Federal  Government  any  support  or  appropria- 
tion of  money  to  give  a  military  training  to  its  students 
during  the  four  years  of  the  university  or  college  course." 

The  400,000  Continentals,  proposed  by  the  present 
administration,  are  desired  to  be  from  eighteen  to  twenty- 
eight  years  of  age,  and  perferably  from  eighteen  to 
twenty-one.  The  20,000  officers  required  to  command 
them  are  to  be  gleaned  "  from  the  regular  army  and  na- 
tional guard,  from  civil  life,  from  military  schools  and 
colleges." 

The  Schools  as  Recruiting  Grounds 

With  such  demand  and  opportunity  looming  up  before 
the  youth  of  the  land,  the  slogan  has  gone  forth, 
"  Every  school-boy  a  soldier,  every  college-man  an  offi- 
cer." The  best,  the  easiest,  the  most  logical,  the  cheap- 
est method  of  creating  an  army  is  declared  to  be  "  to 


PREPAREDNESS  ON  AND  UNDER  LAND    101 

take  the  boy  when  he  is  fifteen  and  give  him  four  years 
of  thorough  military  training  with  his  academic  work  " ; 
thus,  "  while  educating  for  peace,  prepare  for  war." 

Train  the  school-boys  in  arms;  take  them  at  the  age 
of  fourteen,  and  give  them  instruction  in  the  use  of  a 
rifle, — preferably  a  wooden  one  for  the  first  year  or  two, 
— for,  say,  one  hour  every  other  day  throughout  their 
schooling;  let  a  practical  army  man  give  the  instruction, 
and  the  State  supervise  it  so  as  to  make  it  uniform  in 
all  schools,  and  pay  the  bill. 

Such  is  the  advice  or  demand  heard  on  every  side,  and 
our  statesmen  have  begun  to  respond  to  it.  A  State 
Senator  in  Pennsylvania,  for  example,  has  introduced  a 
bill  in  the  Legislature  which  provides  for  the  making 
of  military  and  naval  instruction  compulsory  in  all 
schools,  public,  private  and  parochial,  seminaries,  col- 
leges and  universities  in  Pennsylvania;  all  male  pupils 
over  the  age  of  ten  are  to  receive  this  instruction  for  one- 
half  day  during  each  week  of  every  school  term,  unless 
disqualified  by  physical  disability;  in  addition  to  this, 
encampments  are  to  be  held  in  June,  July  and  August, 
each  camp  to  last  one  week,  and  in  Philadelphia  and 
other  towns  and  cities  on  navigable  streams,  naval  in- 
struction to  be  given ;  the  expense,  of  course,  to  be  borne 
by  the  State. 

Military  Training  in  the  Schools 

This  recrudescence  of  the  educational  ideal  of  ancient 
Sparta  has  not  yet  become  a  wide-spread  reality  in  our 
Twentieth-Century,  American  Commonwealth  of  Penn- 
sylvania. But  there  are  many  voices  raised,  even  in  the 
State  of  William  Penn  and  the  Constitutional  Conven- 
tion, which  declare  that  the  efficiency  of  Germany  is  due, 
in  education,  industry,  science  and  all  the  arts  of  civili- 
zation, as  well  as  in  warfare,  to  military  discipline  and 
training.  '  What  other  system  of  education,  it  is  trium- 
phantly asked,  equals  military  training  in  breadth,  rich- 


102  PREPAREDNESS 

ness,  individual  development  and  cooperative  organiza- 
tion ?  If  a  distinctively  military  system  of  education  has 
worked  near  miracles  for  so  phlegmatic  a  people  as  the 
Germans,  what  rich  returns  would  it  not  bring  to  a  nerv- 
ous, energetic  people  such  as  ours  ? 

Even  the  answer  to  such  questions  which  comes  from 
a  Europe  weltering  in  the  blood,  the  manifold  miseries, 
the  political  and  moral  debasement  of  millions,  is  not 
sufficient  to  drown  these  voices.  The  day  is  not  far  dis- 
tant, they  confidently  predict,  when  a  good,  thorough 
course  of  military  discipline  will  be  required  in  every 
institution  of  higher  learning  in  our  land ;  then,  and  not 
until  then,  they  assure  us,  will  the  American  college  be 
freed  from  the  stigma  that  for  years  has  been  cast  upon 
it,  namely,  that  it  does  not  properly  equip  men  for  life 
work. 

As  preparation  for  this  "  life  work,"  some  high  schools 
have  accordingly  undertaken  the  task  of  properly  in- 
structing their  pupils  how  to  kill.  The  California  Board 
of  Education  has  recently  announced  that  military  in- 
struction is  to  be  provided  as  part  of  the  public  school 
course  in  that  State.  Wyoming  is  said  to  be  proud  of 
the  way  in  which  military  training  in  its  schools  has 
eclipsed  in  popularity  athletic  sports  and  games,  and 
has  given  its  youthful  citizens  a  new  efficiency,  especially 
in  "  wall-scaling." 

A  medical  gentleman  of  Philadelphia,  whose  specialty 
appears  to  be  the  development  of  America's  facilities  for 
supplying  wooden  legs  to  the  French  and  British  soldiers 
who  have  suffered  the  amputation  of  their  own  legs,  has 
recently  offered  to  be  one  of  a  hundred  men  to  sub- 
scribe $1,000  each  for  the  purpose  of  introducing  mili- 
tary training  into  the  high  schools  of  the  city.  This 
offer  received  the  enthusiastic  endorsement  of  Major- 
General  Leonard  Wood,  who  is  one  of  the  "  international 
counselors  of  the  Philadelphia  Bible  Classes,"  and  the 
founder  of  those  classes  promptly  subscribed  the  second 


PREPAREDNESS  ON  AND  UNDER  LAND    103 

$  1,000  to  the  proposed  fund.  Thus  far,  only  one  other 
subscriber  is  reported  to  have  come  forward;  but  it  is 
hoped  that  the  alumni  associations  of  the  high  schools 
will  at  least  establish  rifle-clubs  in  their  respective 
schools. 

In  colleges  and  universities,  also,  courses  in  military 
training  are  being  introduced  and  extended,  and  rifle 
and  revolver  clubs  are  being  formed.  The  presidents 
of  some  of  our  leading  universities  are  leading  this  phase 
of  preparedness,  chiefly  for  the  reason,  as  expressed  by 
one  of  the  most  prominent  of  them,  that  this  country 
should  go  in  for  "  military  strength  which  is  available 
but  not  visible." 

The  strength  and  menace  of  invisible  government  of 
various  kinds  have  made  themselves  visible  to  most 
thoughtful  people  in  this  country  during  recent  years; 
future  generations  will  scarcely  thank  these  eminent  uni- 
versity presidents  for  laying  the  foundations  of  another 
invisible  government  based  upon  "  available  but  not  visi- 
ble military  strength," — unless,  indeed,  those  generations 
shall  have  become  entirely  reconciled  to  and  dependent 
upon  militarism.  The  fear  of  the  Gaul,  the  Slav,  the 
Briton,  etc.,  has  been  so  thoroughly  instilled  into  the 
minds  of  the  Prussian  youths  of  recent  generations,  and 
they  have  become  so  thoroughly  trained  in  the  use  of 
arms  and  in  the  belief  that  by  arms  alone  can  interna- 
tional disputes  be  thoroughly  settled,  that  they  have  built 
up  a  military  strength  available  for  their  own  purposes 
and  visible  in  its  essence  and  results  to  all  the  world. 

The  Case  For  and  Against 

In  view  of  this  plain  lesson  of  reason  and  experience, 
it  has  caused  considerable  amazement  that  the  trustees 
of  the  educational  ideals  of  this  republic  should  thus  lend 
themselves  to  any  movement  which  possesses  the  least 
possibility  of  Prussianizing  and  Spartanizing  our  educa- 


104  PREPAREDNESS 

tional  system.  There  are  various  pretexts  or  excuses 
urged  by  and  for  them. 

For  example,  they  urge  that  there  is  a  fine  physical 
result  in  military  training.  When  shown  that  athletics 
and  free  sports  have  a  far  finer  physical  result,  they  insist 
that  military  training  supplies  mental  and  moral  values 
not  to  be  found  in  other  forms  of  education.  This  ex- 
cuse is  reminiscent  of  the  good  old  New  England  house- 
wife who  refused  to  screen  her  home  against  flies  for  the 
reason  that  it  would  be  flying  in  the  face  of  Providence 
and  that,  by  enabling  her  sons  to  suspend  their  individual 
fly-fighting,  would  make  them  so  pesky  lazy. 

If  the  educational  system  of  this  Twentieth  Century 
has  no  other  and  infinitely  superior  mental  and  moral 
equivalents  for  military  training  in  school,  it  had  better 
go  out  of  business  at  once  and  surrender  the, whole  task 
of  educating  both  boys  and  girls  to  the  officers  of  the 
army  and  navy. 

Falling  back  upon  the  plea  of  necessity,  the  advocates 
of  military  training  insist  that  we  must  train  our  school- 
boys to  defend  their  country  against  the  attack  of  a  for- 
eign foe.  When  asked  what  they  mean  by  "  military 
training  in  schools,"  they  speak  confidently  of  calisthen- 
ics, keeping  step,  manoeuvring,  scaling  walls,  handling 
arms;  they  admit  that  a  real  rifle  is  dangerous  in  the 
hands  of  a  boy,  but  say  that  he  can  "  manipulate  "  a 
wooden  gun  for  the  first  few  years  of  his  training. 

Its  Utter  Inadequacy 

In  the  light  of  modern  warfare,  how  preposterously 
inadequate  such  training  is.  It  is  in  truth  no  better  than 
"  tin-soldiering."  Even  real  rifles  are  being  antiquated 
by  artillery  that  fires  shrapnel  shell  twenty  miles,  by 
machine  guns,  by  hand  grenades;  gunpowder  is  being 
discarded  for  cordite,  turpinite  and  the  rest  of  the  — ites, 
for  cholorine  and  other  asphyxiating  gases.  Shall  we 
go  into  the  business  of  turning  our  boys  into  chemical 


PREPAREDNESS  ON  AND  UNDER  LAND    105 

and  physical  laboratories  and  machine-shops  for  the  pur- 
pose of  giving  them  an  adequate  training  in  the  Twentieth 
Century  art  of  killing  men  ?  That  is  what  the  universities 
of  Germany  are  devoting  themselves  to  at  present; — in 
time  of  a  great  war,  it  is  true ;  but,  if  we  are  going  to  pre- 
pare for  real  war,  it  is  difficult  to  see  why  our  universities, 
colleges  and  high  schools  should  not  devote  themselves  to 
the  invention  and  manufacture  of  man-killing  compounds, 
devices  and  machinery  in  time  of  peace.  Warfare  is  now 
so  largely  a  matter  of  explosives  and  machinery  that 
mere  "  drill "  is  like  the  progress  of  the  pendulum. 

Again,  the  utter  inadequacy  of  any  thorough  military 
training  in  schools  has  been  tacitly  admitted  by  the  advo- 
cates of  preparedness,  who  have  planned  supplementary 
training  in  such  things  as  summer  camps  and  winter 
courses  of  correspondence.  Even  to  the  tyro  in  the 
study  of  the  art  of  warfare  as  practised  in  our  time,  such 
plans  are  obviously  ridiculous.  Their  adoption  would 
mean  merely  one  more  futile  and  extravagantly  expen- 
sive experiment  in  the  long,  unending  series  of  experi- 
ments that  have  caused  the  squandering  of  hundreds  upon 
hundreds  of  millions  of  dollars  on  our  military  and  naval 
establishments  during  the  past  dozen  years,  yet  which 
have  left  us,  in  the  words  of  our  military  and  naval  ex- 
perts, "absolutely  unprepared." 

How  futile  such  experiments  in  the  military  training 
of  school  and  college  boys  would  necessarily  be,  may  be 
estimated  by  a  consideration  of  real  warfare  in  the 
trenches,  in  superdreadnoughts  and  submarines,  in  air- 
ships and  aeroplanes.  We  have  heard  much  in  the  East 
recently  of  how  they  have  solved  the  problem  of  military 
training  in  the  schools  out  in  the  State  of  Wyoming. 
That  system,  which  goes  through  the  familiar  "  drilling  " 
and  rifle-practice,  culminates  in  what  is  described  as  a 
marvelous  dexterity  in  scaling  walls. 

Now,  we  may  picture  in  our  mind's  eye  a  regiment  of 
Wyoming  youths  carrying  a  defensive  war  against  Ger- 


106  PREPAREDNESS 

many  into  the  enemy's  territory.  They  cross  the  Atlantic 
with  its  mines  and  submarines  and  part  of  a  continent 
bristling  with  intrenchments.  "  Somewhere  in  Germany  " 
they  would  find  at  least  two  walled  towns  to  be  captured 
by  them, — not  of  great  political  or  military  value,  but 
still  provided  with  walls ;  and  there  they  would  find,  also, 
a  few  forts,  likewise  provided  with  walls, — and  with  other 
equipment  as  well.  They  would  doubtless  advance  with 
all  possible  bravery  and  with  all  possible  perfection  of 
goose-step  and  maneuver  across  the  landscape  towards  the 
coveted  wall.  But  before  they  could  arrive  within  ten 
miles  of  it,  some  such  machine  as  a  42-centimeter 
"  Chubby  Bertha,"  mounted  on  top  of  the  wall  or  behind 
it,  would  hurl  a  lyddite  shell,  or  a  Zeppelin,  hovering  a 
mile  or  two  in  the  air,  would  drop  two  tons  of  explosives, 
upon  the  gallant  regiment  and  blow  it  into,  fragments. 
Were  it  not  trifling  with  a  grave  subject,  it  might  even 
be  said  that  such  a  regiment  of  trained  Wyoming  youths 
would  be  but  as  dust  in  the  balance  against  the  Chubby 
Berthas  of  Essen.  But  this  is  running  the  theme  into 
the  ground. 

Sparta,  Prussia  or  America:  Which  Shall  It  Be? 

Successful  warfare  in  our  time  is  in  sober  earnest  a 
most  complicated  science  and  a  most  difficult  art.  It  is  a 
profession  in  itself,  and  the  business  of  professionals. 
Shall  this  kind  of  professional  training, — the  training  to 
kill, — be  placed  in  our  schools  and  given  to  children  and 
youths  before  they  have  learned  the  art  of  living?  Even 
training  in  the  science  of  medicine  and  the  art  of  healing 
is  to  be  given  only  after  a  broad  training  for  life  has  been 
secured  in  high  school  and  college. 

Ancient  Sparta  urged  the  plea  of  necessity,  of  pre- 
paredness for  defense,  and  devoted  its  schools,  its  indus- 
try, its  religion,  its  government  so  consistently  to  defense 
that  at  last  there  was  nothing  left  in  Sparta  worth  de- 
fending, and  for  many  centuries  it  has  been  a  country 


PREPAREDNESS  ON  AND  UNDER  LAND     107 

village  and  its  name  a  byword  of  reproach  for  extreme 
militarism.  Ulrich  von  Hutten,  a  scion  of  the  old  Ger- 
man nobility,  became  imbued  four  centuries  ago  with 
the  spirit  of  the  Renaissance,  and  appealed  to  his  fellow- 
junkers  to  turn  away  from  their  immemorial  occupation 
of  warfare  and  military  training,  and  to  devote  them- 
selves to  the  new  world  of  industry,  literature,  science 
and  art.  They  were  deaf  to  his  appeal,  and  military  pre- 
paredness,— continually  followed  by  what  it  prepared  for, 
— has  been  the  key-note  of  German  history  through  all 
the  sad  centuries  since. 

Shall  our  Twentieth  Century  American  Republic  adopt 
in  earnest  as  its  educational  system  the  Spartan  and  Prus- 
sian watchword,  "  In  time  of  peace  prepare  for  War  "  ? 
Or  shall  it  confidently,  unfalteringly  enlist  under  the  ban- 
ner of,  "  In  time  of  peace  prepare  for  Peace  "?  Teachers 
and  writers  of  history  have  but  recently  become  emanci- 
pated from  their  slavery  to  drum  and  trumpet  history; 
they  have  determined  to  accept  no  other  false  gods, 
but  to  devote  their  labors  henceforth  to  the  real  things 
of  life  in  the  past.  Shall  we  do  less  for  the  future  ?  Shall 
we  devote  our  schools  to  training  drum  and  trumpet  men? 
Or  shall  we  train  them  for  those  great  realities  of  life 
for  which  von  Hutten  and  his  compeers  of  the  Renais- 
sance plead  so  eloquently,  and  which  the  world,  bleeding 
from  every  pore  from  the  wounds  of  militarism,  still  so 
sorely  needs?  There  must  be  no  uncertainty  in  our  an- 
swer. We  will  train  our  youths,  not  for  the  destruction 
of  human  life,  the  debasement  of  human  character  and 
the  dethronement  of  civilization,  but  for'all  the  construc- 
tive works  of  a  true  and  beneficent  civilization,  not  the 
least  of  which  is  a  means  for  the  judicial  settlement  of 
disputes  between  the  nations.  We  will  teach  them,  too, 
the  indubitable  truth  that  genuine  military  preparedness 
is  by  its  very  essence  opposed  to  such  civilization  and 
judicial  settlement ;  that  it  constitutes  their  chief  obstacle; 
that  they  proceed  along  precisely  opposite  paths  of  prog- 


108  PREPAREDNESS 

ress  and  retrogression,  and  that  we  cannot  pursue  them 
both.1 

The  Problem  of  Officers 

It  is  a  truism,  which  is  usually  neglected  in  popular 
advocacy  and  consideration  of  preparedness,  that  we  can- 
not have  an  army  without  officers,  and  that  the  larger 
the  army  the  more  numerous  the  officers. 

How  Many  Do  We  Need? 

Our  present  regular  army  has  4,572  officers.  At  its 
full  authorized  strength,  it  would  require  154  more.  If 
we  adopt  the  administration's  plan  of  increase  for  the 
regular  army,  it  would  need  2,514  more. 

The  400,000  Continentals  would  require  about  25,000 
officers.  The  State  Militia,  or  National  Guajd,  has  8,223 
officers.  That  is  to  say  that  we  have  at  present  about 
13,000  officers,  and  require  for  the  most  moderate  plan 
of  proposed  increase  about  27,000  more.  In  addition  to 
these,  a  reserve  corps  for  all  branches  of  the  army  is 
urgently  demanded.  The  first  problem  is,  therefore,  how 
can  we  procure  this  number  of  highly  trained  men? 

The  chief  defect  in  the  British  army,  at  the  outbreak 
of  the  present  war,  is  declared  by  military  critics  to  have 
been  the  lack  of  well  trained  officers.  Germany  had  more 
than  45,000  highly  trained  officers  in  reserve,  ready  to 
lead  any  kind  of  troops. 

How  Shall  We  Train  Them? 

The  Military  Academy  at  West  Point,  which  has  grad- 
uated about  5,000  officers  in  its  century  and  more  of  ex- 
istence, is  to  be  increased  in  capacity  as  far  as  possible. 
But  this  would  be  far  from  sufficient,  and  various  other 
plans  are  being  advocated. 

For  example,  General  Wood  recommended,  when  Chief 
of  Staff  in  1913,  that  400  men  should  be  selected  each 

1  See  pages  259  to  267. 


PREPAREDNESS  ON  AND  UNDER  LAND    109 

year  from  the  graduating  classes  of  institutions  in  which 
officers  of  the  army  give  military  instruction;  the  men 
thus  selected  to  be  commissioned  as  provisional  second 
lieutenants  in  the  regular  army  for  a  period  of  one  year 
with  full  pay  and  allowances,  and  discharged  at  the  end 
of  the  year  with  a  certificate  of  proficiency,  if  they  merit 
it,  as  company,  troop,  or  battery  officers  of  militia,  volun- 
teer and  the  regular  army  in  time  of  war.  During  the 
past  half-century,  there  has  been  one  college  or  univer- 
sity in  each  State  which,  in  return  for  an  appropriation, 
prescribes  military  training  of  a  certain  amount, — usually 
three  hours  a  week  for  two  years, — for  freshmen  and 
sophomores,  and  this  may  be  continued  as  an  elective  for 
two  years  longer.  Counting  those  in  Hawaii  and  Porto 
Rico,  there  are  fifty-two  of  these  "  land-grant "  colleges 
and  universities,  and  sixteen  similar  institutions  for  the 
colored  race;  in  these,  there  are  about  27,000  students 
enrolled  for  military  drill.  From  these  then,  General 
Wood's  400  could  doubtless  be  obtained  each  year.  But 
the  discrepancy  between  400  a  year  and  the  40,000  officers 
needed,  according  to  General  Wood,  to  develop  the  volun- 
teer strength  of  the  army,  is  a  large  one  and  would  take 
a  century  or  so  by  this  plan  to  overcome. 

The  training  in  these  "  land-grant  "  colleges,  also,  seems 
to  be  far  from  adequate.  A  graduate  of  one  of  them  re- 
cently criticised  it  as  follows :  "  The  military  training 
was  taken  very  much  as  a  joke  by  the  great  majority  of 
students  and  discipline  was  almost  Zero.  We  had  better 
discipline  by  far  in  the  Boys'  Brigade  to  which  I 
had  formerly  belonged.  .  .  It  is  an  uphill  job  at  the  best 
[to  enlist  the  students'  interest  in  military  training],  for 
they  are  there  for  another  purpose  and  consider  military 
drill  and  the  study  of  tactics  as  a  necessary  evil." 

Another  plan  is  advocated  by  a  United  States  Senator 
who  proposes  to  convert  several  army  posts  "  which  have 
no  particular  strategic  importance,"  into  training-schools 
subordinate  to  West  Point. 


110  PREPAREDNESS 

Another  Senator  proposes  to  authorize  the  President  to 
commission  as  officers  of  the  reserve  corps,  not  above 
the  grade  of  colonel,  such  citizens  as  may  qualify  under 
the  rules  laid  down  by  the  Secretary  of  War.  This  plan 
is  designed  to  recruit  officers  from  men  who  have  had 
training  in  the  regular  army  or  militia  and  retired  to  pri- 
vate life.  These  men  are  criticised,  however,  as  having 
grown  rusty  in  knowledge,  skill  and  physique. 

Another  plan  is  embodied  in  a  bill  presented  in  the  last 
session  of  Congress  and  approved  by  the  House  Commit- 
tee on  Military  Affairs,  which  provides  for  the  establish- 
ment in  each  State  of  a  training-school  with  a  capacity 
of  not  less  than  300  students,  and  to  which  the  State  shall 
contribute  $40,000  and  the  United  States  $80,000  yearly. 
By  this  plan  it  is  estimated  that  100  men  would  be  grad- 
uated yearly  from  each  of  these  schools,  or  4,800  in  all, 
and  that  within  ten  years  we  could  procure  by  means  of 
them  nearly  50,000  officers  for  the  reserve.  That  is  to 
say,  by  the  expenditure  of  some  $50,000,000  at  once,  and 
an  annual  expenditure  of  $1,250,000  for  ten  years  there- 
after, we  might  place  our  officers'  reserve  in  1925  where 
Germany's  was  in  1914. 

Summer  Training  Camps 

Although  the  expense  of  such  methods  as  these  has  no 
terror  for  our  enthusiastic  prepareders,  they  are  entirely 
too  slow  for  most  of  them  who  clamor  to  be  prepared  at 
once,  lest  "  the  German  foe  should  land  upon  our  shores 
to-morrow."  Hence  the  great  outburst  of  effort  to  take  a 
short  cut  to  the  desired  end  by  the  establishment  of 
"  summer  camps,"  designed  especially  for  the  military 
training  of  college  students  during  their  long  vacation. 

In  the  summer  of  1913,  the  War  Department  main- 
tained two  such  camps,  one  at  Gettysburg  and  one  at 
Monterey,  California.  The  next  summer,  the  number 
was  increased  to  four,  and  the  camps  were  located  at 
Asheville,  North  Carolina;  Ludington,  Michigan;  Mon- 


PREPAREDNESS  ON  AND  UNDER  LAND     111 

terey,  California,  and  Burlington,  Vermont.  This  sum- 
mer, the  camps  were  again  four  in  number,  and  were 
located  at  Chickamauga  Park,  Georgia;  Plattsburg,  New 
York;  Ludington,  Michigan,  and  the  Presidio  in  San 
Francisco. 

The  number  of  men  attracted  to  these  camps  thus  far 
has  not  been  very  considerable, — about  300  in  1913,  700 
in  1914,  and  1,000  in  1915,  and  the  training  they  receive 
is  confessedly  only  a  beginning  or  less.  As  one  military 
critic, — a  captain  of  infantry  in  the  National  Guard  of 
Pennsylvania, — puts  it :  "  There  are  no  short  cuts  to 
efficiency  in  the  art  of  military  science.  The  attempt  to 
qualify  men  as  officers  by  giving  them  a  course  during 
the  summer  of  four  weeks'  instruction  is  absurd.  They 
can't  even  get  a  smattering  of  the  requirements.  It  would 
be  the  height  of  folly  and  suicidal  to  entrust  the  lives  and 
health  of  the  men  to  officers  with  such  meagre  training." 
"  You  can  make  a  volunteer  soldier,"  says  another  critic, 
an  officer  in  the  regular  army,  "  but  you  can't  make  a  good 
officer  in  a  year,  any  more  than  you  can  train  a  good 
lawyer  or  a  good  singer  in  a  year." 

The  two  summer  camps  established  at  Plattsburg,  New 
York,  in  1915,  for  business  and  professional  men,  have 
been  subjected  to  the  same  criticism.  They  amount  to 
little  or  nothing  for  real  military  training,  is  the  verdict ; 
even  when  followed  up  with  "  correspondence  courses  " 
during  the  winter,  and  with  "  upper  classes  "  next  sum- 
mer for  the  graduates  of  this  summer's  course,  they  are 
still  obviously  inadequate.  Their  real  purpose  has  been 
to  serve  as  "  the  small  end  of  a  megaphone  through  which 
General  Wood's  words  of  military  wisdom  may  pene- 
trate to  the  uttermost  ends  of  the  land."  This  "  military 
wisdom  "  is  summed  up  in  the  words  of  the  General  to 
his  Plattsburg  "  rookies,"  as  follows  :  "  I  hope  that  when 
you  go  away  from  here  you  will  use  your  influence  as 
good  citizens,  and,  in  contrast  to  that  of  the  masses,  by 
whom  you  should  not  be  influenced,  to  help  secure  good 


PREPAREDNESS 

legislation  for  the  establishment  of  an  adequate  arma- 
ment in  this  country." 

F.      GUNS    AND    AMMUNITION 

Artillery 

Although  "  the  man  behind  the  gun  "  is  still  of  some 
moment,  just  as  the  factory-child  behind  the  loom  is  still 
of  some  importance,  the  power  of  machinery  has  asserted 
itself  in  war  even  more  than  in  industry.  The  gun- 
makers,  especially,  have  had  their  "  innings  "  in  the  prep- 
arations for  and  conduct  of  the  present  war,  and  have 
made  many  a  "  home-run." 

Siege  Guns 

The  results  of  their  labors  were  first  made  visible  to 
the  world  in  the  campaign  in  Belgium,  when  the  fortresses 
of  Liege  and  Antwerp  crumbled  into  dust  before  their 
onslaught.  The  famous  42-centimeter,  or  1 7-inch  gun, 
affectionately  known  to  the  German  soldiers  as  "  the 
chubby  Bertha,"  and  the  "  Skoda  Forty-two  "  of  Aus- 
tria, or  as  it  is  known  in  the  trenches,  "  the  Pilsener," 
caused  so  great  a  change  in  warfare  one  year  ago  that, 
military  experts  in  Europe  declare,  "  the  infantryman  no 
longer  fights ;  but,  when  the  big  guns  have  finished  the 
fighting,  he  merely  occupies  the  trenches  they  have  won." 
These  great  guns  hurl,  not  solid  shot,  but  immense  shrap- 
nel shells,  the  weight  of  which,  in  the  case  of  the  Skoda, 
is  2,800  pounds ;  penetrating  to  the  depth  of  twenty  feet 
in  the  earth,  they  explode  two  seconds  after  impact,  and 
resemble  in  sound  and  results  an  earthquake.  They  kill 
every  living  thing  within  150  yards,  and  many  who  are 
farther  distant;  the  mere  pressure  of  their  gas  destroys 
the  partitions  and  roofs  of  "  bomb-proof  "  shelters,  and 
kills,  blinds  or  maims  scores  of  men  who  might  otherwise 
escape  the  eruption  of  metal  fragments,  stones  and  earth. 
If  the  shells  are  fired  from  a  short  distance,  their  explo- 


sion  melts  rifle-barrels  as  if  they  had  been  struck  by  light- 
ning, while  men  are  totally  annihilated,  clothing,  flesh  and 
bones,  so  that  they  are  simply  reported  as  "  missing," 
since  no  proof  of  their  death  is  found. 

The  Germans'  success  in  bombarding  Dunkirk  at  a 
range  of  twenty-two  miles, — their  gunners  being  guided 
by  a  Taube  flying  above  the  city, — has  caused  them  to  ex- 
periment in  the  construction  of  guns  designed  to  reach 
from  Calais  to  Dover;  these  guns,  carrying  a  projectile 
weighing  about  one  ton,  and  with  a  muzzle  velocity  of 
3,700  feet  a  second,  are  calculated  to  have  a  range  of 
twenty-eight  miles,  thus  enabling  them  to  command  the 
English  coast  from  Calais  to  Dover  and  a  distance  of  six 
or  seven  miles  inland.  The  French  are  reported  to  have 
completed  and  to  have  put  into  use  for  their  terrific  drive 
on  Metz,  a  55-centimeter  (or  22-inch)  gun  which  hurls 
a  shell  weighing  two  tons  a  distance  of  fifteen  miles. 

Field  Guns 

In  Poland,  the  battle  of  infantry  and  cavalry  disap- 
peared before  the  battle  of  artillery.  The  biggest  guns, 
which  shot  the  straightest  and  pounded  the  defensive 
works  the  hardest,  won  the  three  weeks'  battle  for  Lodz 
and  the  four  weeks'  battle  for  Warsaw.  The  battle  of 
Riga  and  Dvinsk  has  languished  because  the  increasing 
distance  and  the  swampy  nature  of  the  ground  has  re- 
tarded the  mobilization  of  the  "  Chubby  Berthas  "  and 
their  supply  of  shells.  A  student  of  the  Russian  strug- 
gle writes  as  follows : 

"  Infantry  fights  still  go  on.  But  they  take  a  subsi- 
diary character.  Russian  infantrymen  and  the  German 
infantrymen  no  longer  '  take  '  positions.  The  '  taking ' 
is  done  by  the  guns.  The  infantry  merely  accept  as  a 
present  the  position  which  the  guns  have  conquered.  The 
guns  pound  trenches  to  bits  and  make  them  untenable. 
When  they  are  untenable  the  infantry  goes  ahead  and 
occupies  them.  Sometimes  the  infantry  fails  to  occupy 


114,  PREPAREDNESS 

them.  This  means  that  the  artillery  pounding  has  not 
been  as  severe  as  was  expected.  It  does  not  mean  that 
the  attacker's  infantry  has  been  beaten  by  the  defenders. 
The  best  infantry  is  the  infantry  of  the  side  whose  ar- 
tillery pounds  hardest.  Infantry  cannot  even  push  fur- 
ther the  victory  of  artillery.  Its  advance  is  limited  to  the 
actual  few  hundred  yards  which  artillery  has  smashed 
and  crushed.  Before  it  can  get  further  it  must  wait  till 
its  artillery  again  opens  the  door." 

In  East  Prussia,  at  the  Battle  of  Tannenberg,  the  ar- 
tillery of  an  army  corps  was  posted  and  concentrated 
upon  a  single  brigade  of  the  advancing  Russian  corps; 
the  brigade  was  wiped  out  in  twenty  minutes,  only  700 
men  escaping.  Next,  a  division  was  attacked  in  the  same 
way,  and  the  battle,  which  began  as  a  "  mobile  battle," 
was  turned  into  a  series  of  artillery  massacres.  Von 
Hindenburg  is  a  "  hero  of  artillery  "  in  a  far  truer  sense 
than  Napoleon  ever  was,  and  has  applied  the  use  of  the 
big  gun  to  battles  in  the  field  as  well  as  to  the  destruction 
of  fortresses. 

Mobility  and  Durability 

The  heaviest  artillery,  which  was  formerly  immovable 
except  along  the  lines  of  railroads,  can  now  be  moved 
from  place  to  place  and  concentrated  against  fortresses 
or  in  the  field,  by  means  of  motor-cars  and  good  roads. 
By  the  use  of  cars  provided  with  belted  wheels,  the  big 
guns  can  now  be  fired  from  the  carriages  on  which  they 
are  mounted,  instead  of  being  removed  to  platforms 
solidly  constructed  of  wood  and  concrete,  as  was  for- 
merly requisite.  The  shells  for  the  big  guns  cost  about 
$4,000  each,  and  each  shot  does  about  $1,000  damage  to 
the  lining  of  the  guns.  Accordingly,  the  "  life  "  of  the 
"  Chubby  Berthas  "  is  placed  at  about  120  shots,  and  that 
of  the  United  States'  i6-inch  guns  at  225,  while  the  Aus- 
trian 12-inch  guns  are  reported  to  be  lasting, — probably 
with  re- rifling, — for  more  than  1,200  shots. 


PREPAREDNESS  ON  AND  UNDER  LAND    115 

The  disintegration  of  the  inner  tubes  of  the  big  guns, 
which  is  caused  by  gases,  is  said  not  to  be  insuperable 
and  has  already  been  diminished.  The  1 7-inch  gun,  for  ex- 
ample, fires  as  many  shots  without  spoiling  the  tubes  as 
were  fired  ten  years  ago  by  the  1 2-inch  gun.  The  in- 
ventor of  the  17-inch  gun  is  accordingly  now  working 
upon  the  construction  of  a  ^6-inch  gun,  which  by  means 
of  a  replacement  system,  will  diminish  disintegration,  and 
by  means  of  specially  constructed  trucks  can  be  trans- 
ported by  rail.  The  1 7-inch  mortars  fire  a  shell  four 
times  heavier  than  the  shells  of  the  12-inch  guns,  and  the 
36-inch  gun  is  to  fire  a  shell  thirty  times  as  heavy  as  that 
of  the  12-inch  guns!  The  Russo-Japanese  War  of  ten 
years  ago  gave  to  a  skeptical  world  the  1 2-inch  gun;  will 
the  present  war  give  us  the  36-inch  gun  ? 

THE    PASSING    OF    THE    RIFLE 

The  Machine-Gun 

This  is  indeed  the  day  of  big  things,  in  war  as  well  as 
in  peace.  The  day  of  smaller  things, — even  of  what  has 
been  idolized  as  "  the  deadly  rifle," — appears  to  be  pass- 
ing in  the  strain  and  stress  of  this  greatest  war  in  history. 

The  machine-gun  and  hand-grenade  are  declared  to 
have  sounded  the  rifle's  doom.  The  artillery  has  replaced 
the  rifleman  from  the  front  of  the  stage  of  battle,  and 
even  in  his  obscure  corner  he  is  rapidly  being  transformed. 
The  machine-gun,  which  was  formerly  regarded  as  a 
weapon  only  of  defense,  has  been  proved  during  the  pres- 
ent war  to  be  a  deadly  weapon  of  offense  as  well.  The 
Germans  have  replaced  the  old  type,  which  required  two 
men  to  move  and  handle  it,  by  a  new  type  which  requires 
only  one  man.  They  have  neglected  the  cult  of  the  rifle, 
we  are  told  by  a  British  military  expert,  and  are  manu- 
facturing machine-guns  by  the  thousand,  light  enough  for 
one  man  to  carry,  but  more  deadly  than  the  concentrated 
fire  of  an  entire  company  of  riflemen.  The  concentrated 


116  PREPAREDNESS 

fire  from  one  side  of  an  English  square,  at  the  Battle  of 
Waterloo,  emptied  less  than  a  score  of  French  saddles  at 
effective  range;  one  modern  machine-gun  would  have 
destroyed  an  entire  squadron.  "  The  German  prefers 
the  machine-gun  to  the  rifle,"  this  expert  assures  us,  "  for 
not  only  does  it  enable  him  to  sit  down  comfortably  and 
squirt  death  at  the  foe  as  water  is  squirted  through  a 
hose-pipe,  but  also  it  gives  him  that  sense  of  superiority, 
that  pleasant  feeling  of  security  which  the  possession  of 
a  superior  weapon  always  conveys  to  the  fighting  man. 
In  modern  warfare,  and  particularly  in  trench  warfare, 
with  its  accompaniment  of  short,  swift  rushes  against 
barbed-wire  entanglements,  the  soldier  who  can  fire  a 
hundred  shots  to  his  opponent's  five  has  ninety-five 
chances  of  coming  out  of  the  struggle  unscathed.  In  the 
compilation  of  casualty  lists  the  machine-gun  talks  with 
a  hundred  tongues." 

Hand-  Grenades 

The  Germans  have  accordingly  prophesied  that  after 
this  war  the  rifle  will  be  entirely  obsolete.  The  French, 
too,  are  of  the  same  opinion,  but  believe  that  it  will  be  re- 
placed not  so  much  by  the  machine-gun  as  by  hand-gre- 
nades. A  member  of  the  French  Legion  writes  as  follows 
to  the  New  York  Sun:  "  Our  new  acting-captain,  when 
chatting  with  some  of  the  boys,  told  them  that  grenades 
were  more  useful  in  this  war  than  rifles.  The  grenade 
soldiers  (real  grenadiers)  did  terrible  damage  in  the  First 
Regiment's  fight.  He  intends  to  form  a  grenade  section 
in  our  company.  '  It  is  the  weapon  for  this  war,'  he  said, 
'  and  is  replacing  the  rifle.  Before  a  battle,  the  artillery 
shell  the  enemy  trenches  for  hours,  and  when  the  damage 
is  almost  complete  the  order  to  advance  is  given.  The 
grenade  men  go  first  and  throw  their  bombs  into  the 
trenches  and  complete  the  confusion.  That's  the  only 
practical  way  in  this  warfare,'  he  wound  up.  So  we  are 
to  become  bomb-throwers.  Well,  it's  all  in  a  day's  work." 


PREPAREDNESS  ON  AND  UNDER  LAND    117 

The  Modern  Arsenal 

This  latest  development  in  warfare  is  one  evidence  of 
an  apparent  return  to  primitive  methods  and  obsolete 
weapons.  Modern  "  grenadiers  "  are  restoring  to  almost 
stationary  warfare  the  almost  forgotten  art  of  throwing 
hand-grenades.  Darts  and  arrows  are  again  raining  from 
the  sky ;  helmets,  masks,  bucklers,  greaves,  shirts  of  mail, 
breastplates,  shield,  hand-bayonets,  or  "  trench  daggers," 
sling-shots,  bows,  catapults,  spears,  lances,  scaling-ladders, 
and  man's  oldest  implement,  the  spade,  have  all  been 
restored  to  important  roles  in  this  latest  outbreak  of  man's 
earliest  occupation.  The  use  of  and  protection  against 
aeroplane  missiles,  fragments  of  shells,  curtains  of  fire, 
asphyxiating  gases,  and  machine-gun  bullets,  have  re- 
stored primitive  fashions  in  horrible  forms.  Nothing 
that  was  devised  in  the  past  is  being  overlooked  in  the 
frantic  search  for  means  of  offense  and  defense;  while 
all  modern  devices  are  being  developed  to  the  utmost. 
The  artillery, — field,  foot,  horse,  mountain,  seacoast,  and 
siege, — howitzers,  mortars,  mitrailleuses,  machine-guns, 
magazine-guns,  rapid-fire  guns,  disappearing  guns, — 
from  3-inch  up  to  17, — pistols,  revolvers,  automatic  pis- 
tols, rifles,  breech-loading  and  magazine, — such  are  a  few 
of  the  myriad  weapons  available  in  the  great  arsenal  of 
modern  war. 

Where  Are  Our  Guns? 

In  the  presence  of  such  an  array  of  facts  and  figures, 
the  question  is  being  pressed  home  upon  us,  Where  are 
our  Guns?  Mr.  Bryan  has  declared  that  in  case  of  in- 
vasion "  a  million  men  would  leap  to  arms  overnight " ; 
and  Mr.  Roosevelt  retorts,  "  To  whose  arms  would  they 
leap?" 

Artillery 

We  are  said  to  have,  on  hand  or  being  manufactured, 
852  field  artillery  guns ;  the  largest  of  these  is  the  6-inch 


118  PREPAREDNESS 

howitzer,  and  of  them  we  have  only  32.  For  the  pro- 
posed increase  in  the  regular  army  and  for  the  Continen- 
tals, we  need  about  3,000  more.  This  is  based  on  an  esti- 
mate of  three  guns  for  every  1,000  men ;  but  the  present 
war  has  shown  the  need  of  increasing  this  estimate  to 
five  guns  for  every  1,000  men. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  war,  Russia  had  6,000  field 
guns,  Germany  5,000,  France  4,800.  Von  Hindenburg 
has  1,700  field  guns  and  400  mortars,  howitzers  and  siege 
guns,  and  the  Austrians  800  guns,  in  the  Russian  cam- 
paign alone.  In  the  Battle  of  San,  in  Galicia,  last  May, 
the  Austrians  and  Germans  concentrated  the  fire  of  1,500 
guns  upon  one  short  section  of  the  Russian  lines.  Even 
Bulgaria  has  1,035  pieces  of  field  artillery.  In  the  single 
battle  of  Mukden,  in  the  Russo-Japanese  War,  the  Rus- 
sian army  had  1,204  field  guns  in  action,  and  Japan  had 
922  guns  on  the  same  front ;  "  yet  any  ordinary  engage- 
ment in  the  present  war  makes  the  Battle  of  Mukden 
look  like  a  peace  conference," — so  say  our  experts. 

The  United  States,  therefore,  is  evidently  in  a  very  bad 
way.  Our  regular  army  has  only  72  pieces  for  coopera- 
tion with  the  infantry,  24  to  accompany  the  cavalry  and 
48  pieces  of  mountain  artillery, — 144  in  all!  But  the 
worst  is  yet  to  come.  General  Wood  testified  that  "  the 
entire  capacity  of  this  country,  working  night  and  day,  is 
500  guns  a  year.  Hence,  almost  a  year  would  be  re- 
quired to  supply  the  field  artillery  guns  for  one  field  army 
of  a  little  less  than  70,000  men ;  and,  since  no  war  within 
the  past  forty-five  years  has  lasted  for  a  year  [  ?] ,  our  war 
would  probably  be  over  before  we  could  manufacture  an 
appreciable  number  of  guns." 

It  is  true  that  an  expert  and  inventor,  who  is  interested 
in  the  sale  of  machine-guns,  declares  that  "  in  case  of 
war  we  should  have  no  need  of  1 7-inch  mortars  or  other 
great  guns,  such  as  the  Germans  are  using,  for  our  field 
armies.  There  are  no  forts  for  us  to  batter  down.  What 
we  should  require  is  weapons  with  which  to  kill  men, — 


PREPAREDNESS  ON  AND  UNDER  LAND    119 

particularly  machine-guns."  In  view  of  the  part  played 
by  big  guns  on  the  battlefields  of  the  present  war,  how- 
ever, it  is  obvious  that  this  inventor's  wish  is  father  to 
his  thought.  General  Wood,  on  the  contrary,  declares 
that  "  the  fire  of  modern  field  artillery  is  so  deadly  that 
troops  cannot  advance  over  terrain  swept  by  these  guns 
without  prohibitive  losses.  It  is  therefore  necessary  to 
neutralize  the  fire  of  hostile  guns  before  our  troops  can 
advance ;  and  the  only  way  to  neutralize  the  fire  of  this 
hostile  field  artillery  is  by  field  artillery  guns ;  for  troops 
armed  with  the  small  arms  are  as  effectual  against  this 
fire,  until  they  arrive  at  about  2,000  yards  from  it,  as 
though  they  were  armed  with  knives."  When  we  recall 
that  the  effective  range  of  guns  like  those  on  the  Queen 
Elisabeth,  or  like  the  "  Chubby  Berthas,"  is  12,000  yards, 
or  anywhere  from  seven  to  fifteen  to  twenty  miles,  we 
can  see  the  force  of  the  argument  for  other  big  guns  to 
silence  them.  How  many  do  we  really  need  ?  How  large 
should  they  be  ?  How  much  would  they  cost  ? 

With  our  852  guns,  completed  and  partly  completed, 
we  could  equip  an  army  of  170,000  men ;  if  we  need  5,000 
in  order  to  cope  with  the  Germany  of  1914,  and  can  pro- 
duce 500  a  year,  it  would  take  us  eight  years  to  get  ready 
on  the  single  item  of  field  guns.  Or  if  we  can  increase 
our  output  of  guns  to  keep  pace  with  our  increasing  army, 
we  should  be  obliged,  in  order  to  equip  a  very  modest 
army  of  800,000  men  within  one  year,  to  increase  our  an- 
nual output  of  guns  from  500  to  4,000. 

These  guns  are  expensive.  The  best  of  them, — and 
surely  we  want  the  very  best  for  "  adequate  defense," — 
cost  $125,000  each;  hence  4,000  more  would  represent 
an  outlay  of  $500,000,000.  This  for  the  guns  alone,  and 
for  a  modest  little  army  of  800,000.  If  we  are  to  have 
an  "  adequate  "  army  of  some  5,000,000  men,  our  guns 
should  cost  us, — a  sum  as  large  as  our  entire  national 
debt  at  the  end  of  the  Civil  War! 

Again,  these  guns  are  obsolescent.     They  deteriorate 


120  PREPAREDNESS 

very  rapidly  with  use,  and  they  are  speedily  outclassed  by 
larger,  longer-firing  and  harder-hitting  ones.  Our  1 6-inch 
guns  defending  the  Panama  Canal,  for  example,  are  be- 
lieved or  hoped  to  have  a  "life"  of  225  shots.  The 
French  "  75's  "  and  British  4  ^2-inch  howitzers  are  firing 
from  five  to  twenty-five  shots  a  minute.  With  an  esti- 
mate of  one  shot  in  ten  minutes,  our  i6-inch  guns  would 
last  about  one  day  and  a  half  of  constant  firing.  The 
artillery  duels  in  the  present  war  last,  we  are  told,  for 
a  week  at  a  time.  How  many  guns  at  this  rate  should 
we  need  for  "  adequate  "  defense,  how  much  would  they 
cost  and  how  long  would  they  be  "  adequate  "  ? 

Again,  the  increase  in  the  size  and  range  of  guns  has 
rivalled  that  in  dreadnoughts.  They  creep  along  by 
inches,  it  is  true,  but  every  added  inch  or  fraction  thereof 
makes  the  entire  existing  outfit  back-numbers.  The  17- 
inch  mortar,  for  example,  fires  a  shell  four  times  heavier 
than  that  of  the  12-inch  guns;  the  36-inch  gun,  now 
being  worked  upon  in  Germany,  is  to  fire  a  shell  thirty 
times  heavier  than  that  of  the  12-inch  guns.  What  is 
"  adequacy  "  along  this  line  ? 

Machine-Guns 

As  stated  above,  some  of  our  military  experts  believe 
that  we  are  not  so  much  in  need  of  big  guns  as  of  ma- 
chine-guns,— the  best  weapons  with  which  to  kill  men. 
"  We  now  have  some  hundreds  of  such  guns,"  one  of 
these  experts  remarks,  "  we  ought  to  have  at  least  5,000 
to  start  with,  and  it  would  take  several  months  to  make 
them."  The  Germans  are  reported  to  have  had  50,000 
machine-guns  early  in  1915,  and  are  believed  to  have 
greatly  increased  their  supply. 

Our  army  officials  insist  that  the  present  war  has 
proved  the  necessity  of  increasing  the  supply  of  machine- 
guns  by  about  400  per  cent.,  or  from  three  to  twelve  for 
every  1,000  infantrymen  and  cavalrymen  in  action.  If 
we  are  to  supply  our  modest  little  army  of  800,000  at  this 


PREPAREDNESS  ON  AND  UNDER  LAND    121 

rate,  we  shall  need  9,600.  If  it  takes  three  months  to 
make  5,000,  a  half-year  would  be  required  to  supply  us 
with  10,000;  and  if  we  want  as  many  as  Germany  had  at 
the  beginning  of  the  war,  we  should  need  two  and  a  half 
years  to  produce  them.  Long  before  that  time,  however, 
it  might  well  have  been  decided  that  the  new  one-man 
machine-gun  is  far  better  than  the  old  style ;  and  then  we 
should  be  in  for  supplying  not  twelve,  but  a  hundred,  for 
every  1,000  soldiers. 

Rifles 

As  has  been  seen,  there  are  many  critics  who  regard 
the  day  of  the  rifle  as  past, — eclipsed  by  that  of  the  ma- 
chine-gun and  hand  grenade.  There  are  still  conserva- 
tives, however,  who  regard  it  as  the  main  small  arm.  Our 
army  officers  demand  five  rifles  for  every  man  expected 
to  be  put  into  action.  For  an  army  of  800,000  this  would 
mean  4,000,000  rifles,  and  for  one  of  5,000,000  men  it 
would  mean  25,000,000.  We  now  have  about  500,000. 
Shall  we  increase  our  stock  by  from  800  to  5,000  per  cent., 
and  what  kind  shall  we  invest  in?  A  generation  ago,  all 
the  great  powers  began  to  re-arm  their  troops  with  maga- 
zine rifles  of  small  calibre,  using  high-power  cartridges 
with  smokeless  powder.  Ever  since,  there  has  been  heated 
discussion  as  to  which  kind  is  the  most  effective.  Shall 
we  buy  the  Springfield,  the  Lee-Enfield,  the  Mauser,  the 
Mannlicher,  the  Schmidt-Rubin,  the  Lebel,  or  the  Ari- 
sakae  ?  We  thought  we  had  solved  the  problem  with  the 
Krag- Jorgensen ;  but  a  few  years  after  their  adoption  in 
our  army,  they  were  discarded  and  have  been  stored  up 
for  a  number  of  years  in  government  arsenals.  This  year, 
they  are  being  given  to  the  "  Government  civilian  rifle 
clubs  "  which  have  been  organized,  under  stress  of  "  pre- 
paredness," in  the  various  States  by  the  National  Rifle 
Association.  There  were  355,000  of  these  rifles  discarded 
by  the  United  States  army,  and  it  was  an  expensive  ex- 
periment. 


128  PREPAREDNESS 

The  present  war  is  expected  to  develop  the  long  sought 
automatic  rifle ;  if  so,  it  will  doubtless  have  a  try-out,  un- 
less the  machine-gun  and  shrapnel  outclass  the  automatic 
as  well  as  the  simple  rifle. 

Ammunition 

Napoleon's  belief  that  "  God  is  on  the  side  of  the  big- 
gest battalions  "  has  been  revised  by  the  present  war  to 
mean  that  "  God  is  on  the  side  of  the  biggest  ammunition 
factories."  The  reason  for  this  revision  is  seen  in  such 
facts  as  this,  that  the  British  army  used  more  ammuni- 
tion in  the  single  battle  of  Neuve  Chapelle  than  they  used 
in  the  entire  Boer  War,  which  lasted  nearly  three  years ! 
To  meet  this  demand  for  munitions,  the  belligerent 
governments  have  taken  over  the  control  of  all  the  manu- 
factories, in  their  respective  countries,  and  those  that 
could  do  so  have  imported  hundreds  of  millions  worth 
from  neutral  lands,  especially  from  the  United  States. 

War  was  once  considered  preeminently  the  profession 
of  gentlemen  of  high  degree;  but  now  it  is  so  much  a 
matter  of  pulling  levers  and  pushing  buttons  that  it  has 
become  a  promising  field  fox  the  exploitation  of  woman 
and  child  labor,  and  its  business  of  slaughter  is  one  that 
smacks  chiefly  of  the  mechanic  or  machinist. 

The  "  electrical  wizard  "  of  America  has  recently  ad- 
vised his  fellow-countrymen  to  "  maintain  a  potential  pre- 
paredness for  a  war  in  which  the  fighting  is  done  by  ma- 
chines, not  by  men."  In  explanation  of  this  advice,  he 
continues :  "  Consider  the  great  amount  of  powder  being 
shot  off  on  the  European  battle  front  every  day.  I  would 
have  built  great  factories  in  which  twice  as  much  powder 
as  that  could  be  manufactured.  I  would  locate  and  have 
stored  away  enough  material  to  make  up  the  powder. 
Then  I  would  not  make  it.  I  would  have  everything 
ready  so  that  within  forty-eight  hours  I  could  go  ahead 
turning  it  out.  Then  as  to  shells ;  I  think  it  is  a  wasteful 
thing  to  make  shells  on  lathes  as  they  make  them  now. 


PREPAREDNESS  ON  AND  UNDER  LAND     123 

We  should  get  up  shell  machines  for  making  them  rapidly 
and  in  enormous  quantities.  Then  I  would  grease  the 
machines  up  and  store  them  away  with  a  great  quantity 
of  steel  billets  ready  to  be  worked  up  on  short  notice.  In 
fact,  I  would  make  my  preparations  potential  and  I  would 
do  it  right  away.  The  preparation  should  not  be  a  mili- 
tary one  at  all.  I  don't  like  this  military  idea  at  all.  It 
should  be  done  solely  on  an  economic  basis,  a  business 
basis." 

Powder 

The  chief  difficulty  with  this  genius's  ingenious  plan 
appears  to  be  the  obsolescence  of  powder  and  shot. 
"  Trust  in  God, — and  keep  your  powder  dry "  once 
seemed  a  sufficiently  simple  faith ;  but  to-day  "  powder  " 
is  very  uncertain,  both  in  quantity  and  quality.  So  many 
new  and  more  powerful  explosives  have  been  invented, 
that  powder  itself  is  believed  by  some  experts  to  be  on 
the  verge  of  being  discarded,  at  least  in  warfare. 

The  making  of  powder,  too,  has  been  revolutionized 
during  the  present  war.  Even  in  our  neutral  country, 
where  invention  has  not  as  its  parent  the  cruel  necessity 
of  warfare,  two  inventions  have  been  introduced  in  the 
making  of  powder  which  are  claimed  of  themselves  alone 
to  amount  to  a  revolution  in  that  industry.  These  are, 
first,  a  process  by  which  smokeless  powder  can  be  made 
from  the  raw  cotton  within  three  weeks  and  seasoned  in 
five  days,  while  the  process  in  use  before  the  war  required 
more  than  three  months;  and,  second,  a  process  which 
yields  black  powder  with  much  less  smoke  than  the  old 
variety. 

Another  surprising  development  along  this  line  has  been 
the  rise,  or  fall,  of  cotton  from  its  status  as  a  symbol  of 
domestic  peace  to  a  munition  of  war  as  important  as  steel, 
lead  or  copper.  The  enormously  increased  demand  for 
smokeless  powder  as  a  propulsive  ammunition, — the 
power  behind  the  bullet  and  the  shell, — has  caused  an 


PREPAREDNESS 

enormous  increase  in  the  demand  for  cotton,  which  is  the 
basis  of  this  ammunition.  As  illustrative  of  this  demand, 
it  may  be  mentioned  that  every  shot  fired  by  a  1 4-inch 
gun  uses  up  three-fifths  of  a  bale  of  cotton.  During  the 
nine  hours  of  the  battle  in  the  North  Sea,  4,500  bales  were 
shot  away.  In  the  first  attack  on  the  Dardanelles  last 
March,  50,000  bales  were  consumed  by  the  battleships  of 
the  Allies.  One  battery  of  the  French  field  artillery 
shoots  away  cotton  at  the  rate  of  240  pounds  (about  one- 
half  bale)  per  minute ;  and  there  are  more  than  2,000  of 
these  batteries  on  the  Western  battle-front.  As  a  result 
of  such  enormous  consumption,  it  is  estimated  that,  of 
the  14,000,000  bales  consumed  by  the  world  this  year, 
3,000,000  bales  will  go  into  smokeless  powder ;  while  be- 
fore the  war,  only  123,000  bales  were  consumed  annually 
by  the  powder-making  industry ! 

How  much  smokeless  powder,  then,  or  raw  cotton,  and 
what  kinds  of  powders, — the  nitrates  or  the  chlorites, — 
shall  we  store  up  in  order  to  be  "  adequately  "  prepared 
for  the  next  record-breaking  war  that  is  said  to  be  loom- 
ing up  before  us  ? 

Explosives 

In  the  days  when  solid  shot  was  king,  the  supreme  task 
was  to  hurl  the  shot  with  the  utmost  possible  force  and 
velocity;  hence  powder,  or  propulsive  ammunition,  was 
of  prime  consideration.  Now,  when  shrapnel  shell  is 
king,  explosive  ammunition  is  the  chief  thing  needful. 
It  is  not  so  important  how  fast  or  with  what  force  the 
shell  is  hurled,  just  so  it  gets  there.  It  may  be  dropped 
from  an  aeroplane,  or  shot  into  the  air  and  permitted  to 
fall,  or  tossed  from  trench  to  trench  by  hand.  Just  make 
it  "  connect,"  and  the  shell  will  do  the  rest.  It  is  no 
longer  the  pounding  force,  but  the  explosive  force,  that 
is  the  chief  thing  needful.  Hence  the  application  of  the 
science  of  chemistry  to  the  development  of  new  explo- 
sives. Cordite,  for  example,  so  popular  with  the  British ; 


PREPAREDNESS  ON  AND  UNDER  LAND    125 

tri-nitro-toluene  (or  "T.  N.  T."),  which  is  one  of  Ger- 
many's favorite  explosives ;  the  "  poudre  Turpin  "  of  the 
French,  which  is  said  to  double  the  explosive  effect  of 
the  shells  fired  by  the  3-inch  guns,  or  famous  "  75's  " ;  lyd- 
dite, familiar  to  the  public  in  the  days  of  the  Boer  War; 
melinite,  which  an  American  claims  to  have  invented, 
and  a  host  of  others  which  have  raised  might  to  the  wth 
power  of  dynamite.1  One  of  these  is  just  reported  as 
in  use  by  the  Germans  on  the  Western  front,  and  is  thus 
described :  "  It  is  a  new  and  extremely  powerful  explo- 
sive contained  in  missiles  which  the  French  soldiers  call 
bottles  of  champagne,  cylindrical  in  form  and  about  as 
long  as  a  champagne  bottle;  that  is  to  say,  about  12  to 
16  inches,  and  about  5  inches  in  diameter.  We  suppose 
they  are  filled  with  liquid  air  or  liquid  carbonic  acid. 
They  are  thrown  a  distance  of  from  300  to  400  yards, — 
this  is  the  maximum, — and  without  any  great  initial  ve- 
locity. You  can  follow  the  projectile  through  the  air  and 
see  where  it  is  going  to  drop.  They  are  apparently 
thrown  by  means  of  mortars,  and  when  they  fall  and 
explode  the  effect  is  equivalent  to  that  produced  by  the 
explosion  of  a  charge  of  132  pounds  of  melinite.  A  single 
bottle  of  champagne  makes  a  hole  from  45  to  55  feet  in 
diameter  and  30  to  40  feet  deep." 

Which  of  these  shall  we  invest  in  for  our  "  adequate  " 
preparedness  programme?  Or  shall  we  wait  until  Mr. 
John  Hays  Hammond,  Jr.,  has  perfected  his  new  explo- 
sive, which  is  said  to  melt  the  thickest  armor-plate  and 
pass  through  a  battleship  or  a  fort  like  hot  lead  through 
butter!  Even  then  we  could  not  rest  content;  for  we 
should  be  certain  to  have  some  other  chemist  or  physicist 
far  surpass  the  worst  that  Mr.  Hammond  could  do.  It 
is  Twentieth  Century  science  that  is  being  applied  to  war- 
fare now,  and  Twentieth  Century  science  has  no  such 
word  as  finis  in  its  vocabulary. 

1  See  page  217. 


126  PREPAREDNESS 

Gases  and  Liquids 

The  step  from  solids  and  near-gases  to  gases  and 
liquids  is  an  easy  one  in  a  chemical  laboratory,  and  war 
has  learned  to  take  it  in  regular  and  practical  fashion. 

A  fluid  substance,  resembling  tar,  has  been  set  on  fire 
and  poured  or  sprayed  into  the  enemy's  trenches ;  or  from 
behind  the  thick  column  of  smoke  engendered  by  it,  at- 
tacks have  been  made.  Thus,  we  have  revived  in  modern 
form  the  ancient  Chinese  "  stink-pot,"  which  the  less 
scientific  Europeans  of  the  Middle  Ages  dubbed  bar- 
barous and  fiendish. 

Blazing  petroleum,  also,  poured  down  the  trenches  and 
into  the  dug-outs,  "  burns  out "  their  occupants  and 
spreads  a  curtain  of  fire  and  suffocating  smoke,  from 
behind  which  attacks  of  offense  and  defense  are  made. 
The  Greeks  of  the  Byzantine  Empire,  when  Constanti- 
nople fell  into  the  hands  of  the  Turks,  four  centuries  and 
a  half  ago,  used  a  crude  form  of  this  device  which  was 
celebrated  for  centuries  under  the  name  of  "  Greek  fire." 

That  form  of  turpinite  which,  exploding,  is  said  to 
asphyxiate  every  living  thing  for  a  mile  around;  and 
the  bombs  filled  with  laughing-gas  which  are  described 
as  "  causing  their  victims  to  laugh  for  fifteen  minutes  and 
then  to  burst  into  blinding  tears," — such  are  two  samples 
of  weapons  devised  in  French  laboratories. 

The  German  laboratories  appear  to  have  been  mobilized 
more  rapidly  than  the  French,  and  to  have  reached  the 
field  of  battle  first.  Hence  the  world  has  heard  more 
of  the  asphyxiating  gases, — chlorine  and  other, — which 
the  Germans  are  accused  of  having  used  with  great  effect 
since  the  early  Spring  of  1915.  First,  in  the  trench  war- 
fare on  the  Western  front,  where  "  three-foot  cylinders, 
charged  with  chlorine  gas,"  were  emptied  or  blown  upon 
the  enemy,  preparatory  to  a  vigorous  infantry  attack 
with  the  bayonet,  upon  the  helpless  foe  flopping  in  the 
trail  of  the  poison  gas.  Again,  on  the  Russian  front, 


PREPAREDNESS  ON  AND  UNDER  LAND     127 

particularly  in  the  attack  on  the  fortress  of  Ossowetz, 
where  an  assault  was  prepared  for  by  the  firing  of  600 
asphyxiating  gas  bombs,  and  these,  not  proving  sufficient 
to  poison  the  garrison,  were  followed  by  twice  as  many 
two  days  later,  when  the  fort  was  taken. 

The  British,  too,  learned  and  practised  the  art  of  gas 
warfare,  and  on  at  least  one  battlefield, — that  of  Hulluch, 
— the  white  gas  of  the  Britons  mingled  with  the  pink  and 
green  of  the  Germans.  An  eye-witness  gives  the  follow- 
ing account  of  this  most  "  scientific  "  of  battles :  "  The 
whole  line  of  battle  was  in  a  grayish  mist,  which  obscured 
all  landmarks,  so  that  even  the  tower  bridge  was  only 
faintly  visible.  But  presently,  when  our  artillery  lifted, 
there  were  new  clouds  arising  from  the  ground  and 
spreading  upward  in  a  great,  dense  curtain  of  fleecy  tex- 
ture. They  came  from  our  smoke  which  was  to  mask  our 
infantry  attack,  and  beyond  them  rolled  another  wave  of 
cloud  of  thinner,  whiter  vapor,  which  clung  to  the  ground 
and  then  curled  forward  to  the  enemy's  lines.  *  That's 
our  gas,'  said  a  voice  on  one  of  the  slag  heaps,  amidst 
the  little  group  of  observers,  '  and  the  wind  is  dead  right 
for  it.'  Then  there  was  silence,  and  some  of  the  ob- 
servers held  their  breath  as  though  the  gas  had  caught 
their  own  throats  and  choked  them.  They  tried  to  pierce 
that  great  bar  of  cloud  to  view  the  drama  behind  its  cur- 
tain :  the  men  caught  in  those  fumes  in  terror-stricken 
flight  before  its  advance  and  the  sudden  cry  of  the  enemy 
trapped  in  their  dug-outs. 

"  Later,  from  our  place  of  observation,  there  was  one 
brief  glimpse  of  the  human  element  in  this  scene  of  im- 
personal powers  and  of  the  secret  forces  across  the  stretch 
of  flat  ground  beyond  some  of  those  zigzag  lines  of 
trenches.  Little  things  were  scurrying  forward.  They 
were  not  bunched  together  in  groups,  but  scattered.  Some 
seemed  to  hesitate  and  then  fall  and  lie  where  they  fell, 
while  others  hurried  on  until  they  disappeared  in  drifting 
clouds.  It  was  all  that  one  could  see  of  our  infantry  at- 


128  PREPAREDNESS 

tack,  led  by  bombers.  The  enemy  was  firing  a  tempest  of 
shells.  Some  of  them  were  curiously  colored,  of  pinkish 
hue  or  with  orange-shaped  puffs  of  vivid  green.  They 
were  poison  shells,  giving  out  noxious  gases.  All  the 
chemistry  of  death  was  poured  out  on  both  sides.  Below 
it  and  in  it  our  men  fought  with  fierce  valor,  and  in  these 
fields  swept  by  shell  fire  from  heavy  guns  reached  the 
enemy's  trenches  and  earthworks  for  10,000  yards." 

To  combat  this  chemistry  of  death,  various  devices  are 
borrowed  from  the  chemistry  and  mechanics  of  life,  such 
as  protective  helmets,  which  make  their  wearers  look  like 
members  of  the  Ku  Klux  Klan,  or  official  initiators  into 
secret  societies;  and  aluminum  gas-masks,  which  give  a 
highly  grotesque,  ape-like  appearance  to  their  human 
wearers. 

A  new  weapon  to  fight  against  gas  attacks  is  an  ap- 
paratus for  hurling  fire-bombs  into  the  advancing  gas. 
This  is  described  as  follows :  "  The  object  of  the  ap- 
paratus is  to  cause  large  and  rapidly  spreading  fires  by 
means  of  specially  designed  incendiary  bombs  thrown  in 
the  path  of  the  advancing  gas  at  a  distance  of  several  hun- 
dred yards.  By  this  means,  since  the  heating  of  the  air 
must  cause  an  upward  current,  the  gas,  which  at  ordinary 
temperature  is  heavier  than  air  and  creeps  with  the  wind 
along  the  ground,  is  caught  in  the  upward  current  and 
driven  out  of  harm's  way." 

"  Back  home,"  also,  in  the  warring  countries,  and  even 
in  England,  instruction  has  been  given  in  schools  and 
elsewhere  as  to  the  nature  and  manufacture  of  chlorine 
and  other  "  military "  gases,  and  the  best  methods  of 
fighting  them,  whether  "  at  the  front "  or  in  case  of  in- 
vasion. 

After  the  so-called  "  Second  Battle  of  Ypres,"  and 
after  the  German  invasion  of  Poland,  the  Germans  were 
bitterly  denounced  as  having  "  lifted  the  lid,"  abrogated 
every  rule  of  "  civilized  warfare,"  and  made  of  them- 
selves "  barbaric,  slaughtering  beasts."  It  was  then,  too, 


PREPAREDNESS  ON  AND  UNDER  LAND    129 

that  the  Polish-American  Committee  of  Petrograd  ad- 
dressed to  President  Wilson  the  following  appeal :  "  In 
the  name  of  God  and  humanity,  the  Polish  nation  ad- 
dresses to  you,  as  President  of  the  United  States  and  a 
Christian,  the  prayer,  that  you  will  use  your  powerful 
influence  to  compel  Germany  at  any  cost  to  renounce  the 
employment  of  asphyxiating  gases.  In  a  military  respect 
the  utility  of  these  gases  is  more  than  doubtful;  but  if 
applied  henceforth  they  will  poison  our  citizens,  make 
the  water  and  the  crops  unfit  for  use  and  poison  our  wells 
and  cattle.  The  effect  after  the  war,  we  believe,  will  be 
to  cause  the  population  to  die  out  slowly  as  a  consequence 
of  chlorine  poisoning." 

Such  attacks  as  these  brought  forth  vigorous  articles 
in  German  newspapers  which  defended  the  use  of  gas  as 
being  "  as  humane  as  various  other  means  of  warfare." 
The  enemies  of  Germany  also,  it  is  declared  by  the  Illus- 
trierte  Zeitung,  are  utilizing  gases,  to  the  utmost  extent 
of  their  ability ;  but,  it  continues,  "  the  progress  in  Ger- 
man chemistry  has  enabled  us  to  equip  our  troops  with 
more  effective  means  of  defense  than  our  enemies."  It 
is  argued,  also,  that  since  gases  travel  slowly,  unless  the 
wind  is  high,  the  enemy  can  escape  it  simply  by  evacuating 
the  trenches  or  retreating ;  that  "  the  practice  of  firing 
gas  projectiles  can  be  no  more  objectionable  than  floods 
artificially  produced,  as  was  done  by  our  enemies  in 
Flanders  " ;  and  that  "  continuous  changes  in  the  modes 
of  warfare  make  constant  innovations  in  the  implements 
of  war  a  necessity.  The  transformation  undergone  by 
the  trench  system  influenced  war  technics.  Whoever  can 
conceive  and  realize  the  veritable  purgatory  of  trench- 
fighting  with  its  artillery  fire,  its  hand  grenades,  its  sub- 
terranean mines  and  the  bombs  from  above,  cannot  con- 
sider a  cloud  of  smoke,  slowly  approaching,  more  in- 
humane than  any  of  the  means  enumerated." 

This  German  magazine's  plea  that  "  there  is  no  plausi- 
ble reason  why  we  should  not  make  an  ally  of  the  atmos- 


130  PREPAREDNESS 

phere  in  forcing  our  enemies  to  vacate,  when  they  resort 
to  the  other  element  [water]  in  battling  with  us/'  is  rem- 
iniscent of  Mark  Twain's  proposal  to  the  German  Em- 
peror to  make  war  forever  impossible  by  the  following 
means :  "  Your  Majesty  must  send  to  my  aid  the  most 
eminent  men  of  science  in  your  realm,  who  shall  help  me 
successfully  to  accomplish  my  purpose  to  extract  from  the 
atmosphere  of  our  earth  its  oxygen;  for  then  a  general 
asphyxiation  of  its  inhabitants  will  take  place,  and  with 
universal  asphyxiation  we  shall  have  universal  peace." 

Despite  the  vigorous  defense  of  the  use  of  gases,  put 
forth  by  the  German  press,  the  outside  world  is  almost 
a  unit  against  this  use,  on  both  physical  and  moral 
grounds.  One  scientific  statement  regarding  it  is  as  fol- 
lows :  "  The  effect  of  this  poison  is  not  merely  disabling, 
or  even  painlessly  fatal,  as  suggested  in  the  German 
press.  Those  of  its  victims  who  do  not  succumb  on  the 
field  and  who  can  be  brought  into  hospital  suffer  acutely, 
and,  in  a  large  proportion  of  cases,  die  a  painful  and 
lingering  death.  Those  who  survive  are  in  little  better 
case,  as  the  injury  to  their  lungs  appears  to  be  of  a 
permanent  character,  and  reduces  them  to  a  condition 
which  points  to  their  being  invalids  for  life." 

The  Belgian  Government  described  and  denounced  its 
use  as  follows :  "  Clouds  of  this  gas  were  projected  and 
descended  on  the  trenches  occupied  by  the  Allied  troops. 
The  gases  formed  a  low-lying  cloud  of  dark-greenish 
color,  which  turned  yellow  as  it  streamed  upward  to  the 
height  of  about  100  yards.  A  minute  and  a  half  after  the 
gases  reached  them  the  men  in  the  trenches  were  seized 
with  vomiting  and  spat  blood,  their  eyes  and  the  inside 
of  the  mouth  grew  sore,  and  they  were  then  stricken  by 
a  sort  of  stupor  lasting  for  hours." 

The  Bishop  of  Pretoria,  an  eye-witness  of  its  results, 
writes  concerning  it :  "I  have  just  come  in  from  visit- 
ing some  of  our  men  in  a  clearing-hospital  at  the  front 
who  have  been  '  gassed  '  by  this  latest  and  most  damnable 


PREPAREDNESS  ON  AND  UNDER  LAND    131 

invention  of  the  German  Imperial  Staff,  of  which  the 
Kaiser  is  the  head.  A  more  cruel  and  diabolical  method 
of  conducting  war  it  would,  I  believe,  be  impossible  to 
conceive.  If  the  gas  used  merely  knocked  the  men  out 
for  the  time  being,  so  that  the  Germans  could  walk  over 
their  unconscious  bodies  with  impunity,  it  would  be  a 
sufficiently  cowardly  method  of  making  war ;  but  when  as 
a  fact,  in  a  large  percentage  of  cases,  it  kills  men  by 
a  slow  and  torturing  death,  no  language  that  I  am  master 
of  can  express  what  I  am  convinced  every  man,  woman 
or  child  would  feel  who  saw  what  I  have  seen  of  the 
obvious  agonies  of  great,  fine,  healthy  men  and  lads  under 
the  ghastly  effects  of  this  poisonous  gas.  There  in  that 
one  clearing-hospital  were  scores  of  men  (and  they  only 
a  small  percentage  of  the  total  number  who  had  been 
'  gassed  ')  suffering  in  varying  degrees  from  suffocation — 
the  worst  cases  fighting  desperately  for  every  breath  in 
ghastly  pain,  and  many  of  them  had  been  going  through 
this  torture  for  days." 

Such  are  a  few  echoes  of  the  storm  of  protest  that  has 
greeted  the  use  of  poisonous  gases.  But  the  fact  remains 
that  this  use  is  now  resorted  to  by  all  the  belligerents  in 
the  great  war,  that  it  is  scientific,  efficient  and  "  ade- 
quate." Shall  we,  then,  mobilize  our  chemical  labora- 
tories and  prepare  for  the  war  ahead  of  us  by  providing 
as  efficiently  as  possible  this  kind  of  "  adequate  defense  "  ? 

Our  Ammunition  Preparedness 

Before  we  order  the  entrees  and  dessert,  our  prepared- 
ers  reply,  we  had  better  look  after  the  bread  and  butter, 
and  piece  de  resistance  of  our  preparedness.  Let  the 
gases,  liquids  and  explosives  wait  until  we  have  laid  in  a 
sufficient  supply  of  powder  and  shot. 

How  are  we  off  on  this  initial  item  of  ammunition? 
We  must  apparently  be  in  a  very  bad  way  indeed.  Gen- 
eral Wood  testified  last  Winter  before  the  House  Com- 
mittee on  Military  Affairs  that,  "  at  the  Battle  of  Muk- 


132  PREPAREDNESS 

den,  the  Russians  expended  in  nine  days  more  than  250,- 
ooo  rounds  of  ammunition.  The  entire  yearly  capacity 
of  the  United  States,"  he  continued,  "  is  just  that 
amount."  Mukden,  however,  was  ten  years  ago ;  to-day, 
a  single  battery  of  French  artillery  is  consuming  in  one 
day  as  many  shells  as  the  United  States'  arsenals  manu- 
facture in  a  half-day ;  their  75-millimeter  rifles  fire  as 
many  as  twenty-five  shots  a  minute.  A  record  of  500 
shots  per  gun  per  day  is  said  to  be  quite  ordinary. 

Few  though  our  guns  are,  if  they  were  all  put  in  ac- 
tion, it  is  declared,  there  would  not  be  enough  ammuni- 
tion in  our  entire  country  for  an  engagement  lasting  one 
single  day.  Is  there  any  wonder  that  our  prepareders, 
contemplating  battles  in  the  Old  World  lasting  weeks 
and  campaigns  lasting  months,  should  tremble  in  their 
boots  at  thought  of  our  unpreparedness  in  ammunition 
alone?  We  have  not  enough  ammunition,  declares  Con- 
gressman Gardner,  to  last  our  coast  defense  guns  three- 
quarters  of  an  hour;  and,  he  adds,  "  at  the  present  rate 
of  appropriations,  it  will  take  eighteen  years  before  we 
have  ammunition  for  our  coast  defense  sufficient  to  last 
one  hour !  "  Mr.  Hudson  Maxim  declares  that  we  could 
fight  only  about  two  hours  with  the  supply  of  ammuni- 
tion we  have  on  hand, — about  enough,  perhaps,  for  prac- 
tice. 

What  is  "  adequate "  preparedness  along  this  line  ? 
The  new  plan  for  Congressional  action  is  to  provide  for 
an  increase  of  nearly  500  per  cent,  in  the  amount  of  am- 
munition per  gun,  this  to  be  manufactured  and  stored 
ready  for  use.  This  is  far  too  modest  a  demand. 

But  if,  for  purposes  of  an  "  adequate "  supply,  we 
should  increase  our  stock  by  2,500  or  3,000  per  cent.,  how 
can  our  manufacturers  meet  such  a  demand?  General 
Wood  testified,  as  has  been  stated  above,  that  the  entire 
yearly  capacity  of  the  United  States  is  just  250,000  rounds 
of  ammunition, — the  amount  expended  by  the  Russians 
a  decade  ago  in  a  nine  days'  battle.  The  stimulus  of  the 


PREPAREDNESS  ON  AND  UNDER  LAND    133 

great  war  on  the  American  manufacture  of  munitions  has 
been  responded  to  in  most  extraordinary  fashion * ;  and 
this  stimulus  has  been  felt  and  responded  to  in  almost 
equal  degree  by  the  Government's  arsenals.  For  exam- 
ple, their  capacity  for  turning  out  small  arms  ammunition 
at  the  beginning  of  this  war  was  about  10,000,000  rounds 
a  week;  this  capacity,  however,  was  cut  in  half  by  the 
impossibility  of  getting  powder  enough  to  load  the  shells. 
To-day,  it  is  said  to  be  possible  to  turn  out  30,000,000 
rounds  a  week. 

With  this  increase  in  productive  capability,  it  might  seem 
that  the  fears  of  the  prepareders  would  be  calmed.  But 
they  have  discovered  that  it  has  taken  a  whole  year  thus 
to  transform  American  industries  for  the  making  of  muni- 
tions, and  that  so  far  less  than  one  per  cent,  of  the  am- 
munition used  by  the  Allies  has  come  from  these  indus- 
tries. They  point  out,  also,  that  90  per  cent,  of  the  am- 
munition manufactured  in  the  United  States,  together 
with  all  our  coal  mines,  the  Springfield  Armory  Works, 
the  Picatung  Arsenal,  where  nearly  all  our  high  explo- 
sives are  made,  our  ship-building  plants,  and  other  cen- 
ters of  "  preparedness,"  are  located  within  a  radius  of 
160  miles  of  Peekskill,  New  York;  and  they  have  dis- 
covered, also,  that  "  some  foreign  power  could  seize  all 
of  these  within  three  days,  and  would  put  us  at  work 
running  these  plants  for  their  benefit."  With  these  es- 
tablishments captured,  the  "  second  army  of  defense,"  to 
be  mobilized  in  the  Middle  West,  could  not  be  supplied, 
and  the  whole  country  would  be  captured.  Hence,  this 
section  of  the  United  States  with  Peekskill  as  its  center, 
is  so  vitally  important  that  it  constitutes  "  Uncle  Sam's 
Solar  Plexus,"  and  should  be  defended  in  the  good  old- 
fashioned  way  in  which  solar  plexuses  have  always  been 
defended. 

From  another  point  of  view,  of  course,  the  munitions 
industries  in  this  organ  of  the  Republic's  body,  may  well 

1  See  pages  47-59- 


134  PREPAREDNESS 

be  considered  "  Uncle  Sam's  Cancer,"  and  the  proper 
mode  of  dealing  with  it  to  be  to  "  cut  it  out,"  instead  of 
defending  it.  "  Adequate  defense  "  by  and  of  it,  how- 
ever, is  the  present  question  at  issue ;  and  it  may  be  con- 
ceded as  a  possibility  that  if  all  this  section's  population, 
wealth,  natural  resources,  and  industrial  capability  were 
concentrated  upon  the  achievement  of  "  adequate  de- 
fense," even  though  against  a  first-rate  power  or  alliance 
of  first-rate  powers,  in  Twentieth  Century  warfare,  the 
effort  might  be  successful.  But  still  the  pressing  ques- 
tion would  arise :  Would  a  people's  life  and  territory  so 
dedicated  be  really  worth  defending?  The  Federal  Gov- 
ernment has  begun  to  put  its  2,000  convicts  in  the  At- 
lanta and  Fort  Leavenworth  penitentiaries  to  work  on 
the  manufacture  of  munitions  of  war ;  this  would  appear 
to  be  somewhat  more  in  accordance  with  the  eternal  fit- 
ness of  things, — though  hard  on  the  convicts. 

Projectiles 

Under  this  name  may  be  briefly  considered  some  of 
the  various  types  of  missiles  which  are  discharged  from 
a  gun  or  cannon,  or  hurled  by  hand  or  some  other  force. 

Bombs 

Among  these,  the  bomb  has  terrified  the  world  on  the 
occasion  of  various  anarchistic  outbreaks,  and  has  been 
somewhat  elaborately  developed  for  military  uses.  In  the 
present  war,  there  are  numerous  kinds  of  bombs  in 
use,  among  them  the  "  hair-brush,"  the  "  cricket-ball," 
the  "  policeman's-club,"  and  the  "  jam-tin."  These  have 
been  described  as  follows :  "  The  hair-brush  is  very  like 
the  ordinary  hair-brush,  except  that  the  bristles  are  re- 
placed by  a  solid  block  of  high  explosives.  The  police- 
man's truncheon  has  gay  streamers  of  tape  tied  to  its  tail 
to  insure  that  it  falls  to  the  ground  nose  downward.  Both 
these  bombs  explode  on  impact,  and  it  is  not  advisable 
to  knock  them  against  anything, — say  the  back  of  the 


PREPAREDNESS  ON  AND  UNDER  LAND    135 

trench, — when  throwing  them.  The  cricket-ball  works 
by  a  time  fuse.  The  removal  of  a  certain  pin  releases  a 
spring  which  lights  an  internal  fuse,  timed  to  explode  the 
bomb  in  five  seconds.  You  take  the  bomb  in  your  right 
hand,  and  remove  the  pin  and  cast  the  thing  madly  from 
you.  The  jam-tin  variety  appeals  more  particularly  to 
the  sportsman,  as  the  element  of  chance  enters  largely 
into  its  successful  use.  It  is  timed  to  explode  about  ten 
seconds  after  the  lighting  of  the  fuse.  It  is,  therefore, 
unwise  to  throw  it  too  soon,  as  there  would  be  ample 
time  for  your  opponent  to  pick  it  up  and  throw  it  back. 
On  the  other  hand  it  is  unwise  to  hold  on  too  long,  as  the 
fuse  is  uncertain  in  its  action  and  is  given  to  short  cuts." 

In  spite  of  the  element  of  "  sport "  in  the  throwing  of 
the  last  two  kinds  of  bombs,  their  throwers  are  familiarly 
known  in  the  trenches  as  "  anarchists."  The  first  two 
varieties  of  bombs  are  the  modern  variant  of  the  Seven- 
teenth Century  hand-grenades,  and  have  restored  to  their 
throwers  the  name  of  "  grenadiers."  But,  unlike  the  an- 
archist in  time  of  peace  and  the  military  grenadiers  of 
the  olden  time,  our  modern  bomb-throwers  in  the  trenches 
are  obliged  to  wear,  besides  steel  helmets  and  bullet-proof 
waistcoats,  masks  for  the  purpose  of  nullifying  the  effects 
of  poisonous  gases. 

The  return  to  hand-throwing  was  due  to  trench-fight- 
ing at  close  quarters,  in  which  guns  of  long  range  were 
useless.  This  trench-fighting,  however,  has  stimulated 
the  German  gunmakers  to  devise  and  construct  guns  of 
shorter  range  than  were  ever  known  before.  Hence,  at 
the  same  time  that  they  are  striving  to  make  guns  with  a 
range  of  thirty  miles,  they  are  developing  guns  designed 
to  toss  missiles  containing  high  explosives  "  about  as  far 
as  a  foot-ball  .player  can  kick  a  goal." 

The  "  Minnenwerfer  "  and  the  "  Rumjars  "  are  the 
best  known  of  these.  The  former  were  the  first  in  the 
field,  but  have  already  been  surpassed  by  the  Rumjars  a 
hundred-fold  in  accuracy  and  deadly  result.  These  dis- 


136  PREPAREDNESS 

charge  missiles  which  strongly  resemble  the  one-gallon 
stone  jars  in  which  the  British  army's  rations  of  rum  are 
carried;  hence  their  name.  They  are  of  two-gallon  ca- 
pacity, and  are  charged  with  tri-nitro-toluol,  which  is 
exploded  either  by  a  time  or  delayed  percussion  fuse. 
The  explosion  seems  to  be  more  instantaneous  than  that 
of  any  other  projectile,  and  there  is  therefore  a  concen- 
trated fury  in  the  noise  of  its  bursting  that  distinguishes 
it  from  all  other  projectiles. 

Another  variety  of  missile  is  known  as  the  "  Sausage," 
which  is  fired  probably  from  compressed-air  guns,  since 
the  discharge  is  almost  inaudible.  The  "  Percy,"  like 
the  "  Rumjar,"  explodes  with  an  extraordinary  crack, 
and  the  "  Pip-squeaks  "  are  similar,  but  smaller ;  while 
the  "  Whizz-bang  "  is  still  another  bomb  exploded  by  a 
time-fuse,  but  thrown  by  hand. 

"  Incendiary  fire-bombs  "  are  another  product  of  the 
military  laboratory,  the  component  elements  of  which  pro- 
duce sufficient  heat  to  kindle  a  flame  in  anything  that 
will  burn.  Phosphorus  is  thought  to  be  one  of  these  ele- 
ments, and  any  one  struck  by  a  fragment  of  these  bombs 
is  badly  burnt  as  well  as  wounded,  the  burns  often  prov- 
ing fatal  even  when  only  a  limb  is  struck.  A  Russian 
commission  appointed  to  examine  these  missiles,  has  re- 
ported the  presence  of  prussic  acid  in  them,  which  poisons 
as  well  as  burns. 

Shrapnel  Shells 

The  name  of  a  young  English  officer  of  artillery,  Col- 
onel Shrapnel,  who  lived  and  died  a  century  ago,  has 
been  made  by  the  present  war  a  household  word.  The 
shrapnel  shell  which  he  invented  has  been  developed  and 
has  become  the  main  reliance  of  artillery,  which  has  been 
the  main  reliance  in  the  war.  Its  inventor  observed  the 
comparative  ineffectiveness  of  solid  shot,  which  killed  or 
damaged  one  man  only,  and  of  the  ordinary  shell,  which 
simply  burst  into  a  few  unaimed  fragments.  He  accord- 


PREPAREDNESS  ON  AND  UNDER  LAND    137 

ingly  filled  the  shells  with  bullets  and  added  a  charge  of 
powder  sufficient  to  burst  the  shells.  Later,  it  was  found 
that,  unless  the  burst  was  exactly  timed,  the  effect  even 
of  this  missile  was  slight.  Accordingly,  it  is  now  accu- 
rately regulated  so  that  it  occurs  a  trifle  above  and  fifty  to 
sixty  yards  in  front  of,  the  enemy's  lines.  Under  these 
circumstances,  it  hurls  a  blast  of  bullets  with  deadly 
effect.  This  effect  has  been  described  as  follows: 
"  Shrapnel  does  not  burst  into  fragments  like  common 
explosive  shell ;  it  has  merely  a  sufficient  charge  of  pow- 
der to  blow  its  own  head  off  and  at  the  same  time  throw 
out  the  bullets  contained  in  the  shell  casing.  These  have, 
naturally,  the  velocity  of  the  projectile  itself,  together 
with  the  slight  additional  force  of  the  bursting  charge. 
These  bullets  scatter  in  a  cone-shaped  spray  like  a  charge 
of  shot  from  a  shotgun.  Properly  bursting  under  all  ideal 
conditions,  one  three-inch  in  diameter  shrapnel  from  a 
field  gun  can  disorganize  a  company  of  infantry,  and 
two  or  three,  also  bursting  perfectly,  simply  annihi- 
late it." 

All  kinds  of  guns  are  used  for  the  discharge  of  shrap- 
nel, and  especially  the  howitzer,  which  throws  a  very 
heavy  projectile  a  short  distance.  Dropped  upon  troops 
in  such  high-angle,  howitzer  fire,  shrapnel  is  said  to  burst 
upon  them  "  like  a  shower-bath  of  leaden  death." 

A  12-inch  shell,  weighing  about  870  pounds,  carries  a 
charge  of  thirty  pounds  of  high  explosive;  the  casing  is 
thin  and  light ;  the  rest  is  bullets.  Three-inch  shells,  man- 
ufactured in  the  United  States  for  use  in  Russia,  con- 
tain 260  bullets  each,  and  they  can  be  made  to  explode 
either  by  impact  or  at  any  given  point  in  their  flight  from 
one  to  twenty-two  seconds. 

Thus  it  is  seen  that  such  projectiles  are  very  ingenious 
pieces  of  mechanism, — each  sometimes  including  as  many 
as  thirty  pieces  of  mechanism,  and  each  as  accurate  as  a 
watch.  The  largest  of  them, — those  used  in  the  "  Chubby 
Berthas," — cost  $4,000  each,  and  each  shot  causes  $1,000 


138  PREPAREDNESS 

damage  to  the  lining  of  the  guns.  The  smaller  shells  run 
from  $500  down  to  $10  each. 

Expensive  though  shells  are,  their  i:  deadliness "  de- 
mands their  use  on  an  enormous  scale.  The  French  ar- 
tillery is  consuming  a  daily  average  of  7,000  tons.  Within 
ninety  minutes,  in  an  engagement  near  St.  Mihiel,  Ger- 
man guns  poured  20,000  shells  of  4-  to  8-inch  caliber  into 
one  small  corner  of  the  French  intrenchments ;  it  is  small 
wonder  that  many  of  the  soldiers  were  reported  to  have 
been  "  driven  crazy  by  the  terrific  hail  of  shells."  Within 
the  first  few  weeks  of  the  war,  the  German  armies  alone 
had  shot  off  as  many  shells  as  had  been  fired  before  in  all 
of  human  history.  Their  daily  average  in  France  and 
Belgium  was  120,000;  and  the  French  responded  with 
80,000  shells  each  day,  while  the  British  general  de- 
manded of  his  government  100,000  more  per  day. 

"  Shells,  more  shells,  still  more  shells,"  has  been  the 
incessant  demand  from  the  battle-fronts  ever  since  the 
early  days  of  the  war.  It  was  speedily  recognized  that 
the  war  was  primarily,  not  the  soldier's,  but  the  manu- 
facturer's job.  Hence  the  mobilization  and  government 
control  of  the  munitions  plants.  So  successfully  was  this 
accomplished  in  France,  it  is  reported,  that  the  govern- 
ment has  ceased  to  manufacture  shells  for  their  75-milli- 
meter guns,  as  they  now  have  enough  on  hand  to  fire 
100,000  rounds  every  day  for  a  year.  Mr.  Lloyd-George 
has  recently  declared  that  the  Teutons'  shell-making  ca- 
pacity is  250,000  daily.  The  British  capacity  is  still  far 
below  this,  in  spite  of  a  great  popular  outcry  against  the 
government's  dilatoriness ;  and  no  stone  is  being  left  un- 
turned,— even  the  chemical  ability  of  women  students, 
the  suppression  of  strikes  and  intemperance  among  the 
laborers,  and  the  curbing  of  the  employers'  greed, — to 
supply  this  deficiency  in  the  sinews  of  war. 


PREPAREDNESS  ON  AND  UNDER  LAND    139 

How  Many  Bombs  and  Shells  Have  We? 

Our  government  and  manufacturers  have  not  practised 
on  a  large  scale,  until  the  present  war,  the  art  of  making 
bombs  and  shells.  We  have  improved  somewhat  in  this 
respect  within  the  year.  For  instance,  the  New  York 
Air.  Brake  Co.  is  filling  a  foreign  order  for  $30,000,000 
worth  of  shells.  Another  American  firm  has  a  contract 
for  6,000,000  shells, — 7,500  per  diem. 

Such  are  examples  of  a  truly  enormous  industry.  But 
great  as  it  is,  it  is  wholly  insufficient  for  the  needs  of  a 
great  war.  Less  than  i  per  cent,  of  the  Allies'  ammu- 
nition has  come  as  yet  from  America ;  and  our  munitions 
factories  cannot  compare  in  productivity  with  those 
of  Europe, — especially  of  Germany.  We  have  still  a 
very  long  road  to  travel  before  we  can  compete  in  quan- 
tity, if  not  in  kind,  with  the  projectile-making  ability  of 
our  "  possible  "  enemies. 

Shall  we  "  prepare  "  by  multiplying  our  output  many 
fold,  and  by  "  going  in  "  for  all  the  latest  death-dealing 
missiles?  The  expense  will  be  considerable.  The  com- 
paratively simple  shots  from  a  1 3-inch  gun  each  cost  us 
$1,605!  How  many  of  these  shall  we  provide?  Shall 
they  be  solid  shot,  or  shrapnel,  or  high  explosive,  Benzol, 
shells  ?  The  prepareders  want  us  to  take  no  chances  and 
provide  "  adequate  "  quantities  of  all  three,  and  of  every 
new  kind  as  it  is  successively  invented. 

Will  our  moral  standard,  as  well  as  our  pocket-book, 
stand  for  this  ?  An  automatic  machinery  company  in  our 
Middle  West,  which  advertised  the  sale  of  machinery  for 
making  "  poisonous  acid  shells  which  make  those  struck 
to  die  in  agony,"  brought  down  upon  itself  a  stern  public 
rebuke  from  the  Secretary  of  Commerce,  who  wrote  to 
it  as  follows :  "  It  is,  I  confess,  difficult  for  me  to  under- 
stand how  any  one  who  was  not  callous  in  a  high  degree 
could  have  drafted  such  a  statement  for  publication  with 
a  view  to  selling  his  own  wares.  If,  as  has  been  sug- 


140  PREPAREDNESS 

gested,  your  thought  was  to  horrify  people  with  the  war, 
no  suggestion  of  such  a  purpose  appears  in  the  advertise- 
ment itself.  On  the  contrary,  you  urge  the  cruel  and 
agonizing  nature  of  the  death  caused  by  certain  missiles 
as  an  evidence  of  their  effectiveness,  and  suggest  this  as 
the  basis  of  a  sale  for  the  machines  which  make  these 
hideous  things.  At  a  time  when  every  instinct  of  patriot- 
ism calls  for  calm  and  self-restraint,  when  sobriety  of 
statement  is  almost  a  supreme  duty,  you,  as  you  admit, 
to  gain  notice  to  an  advertisement,  draw  a  picture  of 
human  misery  as  a  means  of  earning  a  profit  through  the 
sales  of  machines  to  produce  it." 

This  sounds  like  the  humanity  which  we  love  to  asso- 
ciate with  America ;  but  if  we  are  thus  to  permit  "  moral 
squeamishness "  to  stand  in  the  way  of  making  "  effi- 
cient" weapons,  what  is  to  become  of  "adequate  pre- 
paredness "  ?  And  if  we  prepare  "  adequately,"  what  is 
to  become  of  our  moral  standards, — especially  when  we 
get  what  we  prepare  for? 

G.      FORTIFICATIONS 

From  the  day  that  a  Stone  Age  man  hurled  the  first 
projectile  at  his  human  foe,  the  science  and  art  of  forti- 
fication have  endeavored  to  keep  pace  with  the  science 
and  art  of  projectiles  and  explosives.  Every  land,  our 
own  included,  is  strewn  with  the  ruins  of  "  impreg- 
nable "  fortresses,  which  some  new  "  irresistible  "  pro- 
jectile has  made  useless  and  deserted. 

Inland  Forts 

Our  own  problem  of  inland  fortification  has  been  a 
relatively  simple  one,  since  we  have  never  had  to  cope 
with  a  real  foe,  "  worthy  of  our  mettle,"  in  this  favored 
hemisphere.  But  from  the  days  of  the  Colonial  block- 
house to  the  present,  we  have  built  many  forts  to  resist 
or  subdue  the  Indians.  For  more  than  a  century,  our 
Federal  government  has  been  establishing  scores  of  army 


PREPAREDNESS  ON  AND  UNDER  LAND    141 

posts  upon  "  the  frontier,"  and  with  the  progress  of  the 
frontier  westward,  our  "  forts  "  and  army  posts  have 
followed  the  retreating  Indian,  until  about  150  of  them 
were  built  across  the  continent  from  New  York  to  San 
Francisco.  The  Secretary  of  War  has  declared  that 
forty-one  of  these  are  absolutely  useless,  so  far  as  our 
Indian  or  any  other  "  enemy  "  is  concerned. 

The  value  of  these  posts  to  the  communities  among 
which  they  are  located  is  so  great, — in  the  way  of  sup- 
plying a  local  market,  "  putting  money  into  circulation," 
etc., — that  it  has  been  found  impossible  to  abolish  them. 
For  example,  the  Secretary  of  War  has  shown  that  $6,- 
000,000  has  been  spent  during  a  decade  on  two  absolutely 
useless  posts  in  Wyoming,  and  that  more  than  $5,000,000 
per  annum  could  be  readily  saved  by  abolishing  them  and 
some  others  equally  useless;  but  the  political  power  of 
the  congressional  "  pork  barrel "  is  such  that  this  meas- 
ure of  simple  economy  has  thus  far  been  successfully 
opposed.  It  has  been  shown,  also,  that  the  long  distances 
at  which  these  posts  are  separated  from  each  other  make 
speedy  concentration  of  the  regular  army  very  difficult; 
and  since  only  six  of  them  can  accommodate  more  than 
one  regiment,  and  only  one  a  brigade,  the  much  desired 
team-work  on  the  part  of  the  army  and  its  subdivisions 
is  made  impossible. 

But  so  far  from  abolishing  such  posts,  a  movement  is 
now  on  foot, — promoted  by  the  preparedness  campaign, 
— to  establish  large  sections  of  the  army  in  fortified  posts 
at  the  "  strategic  centers  "  of  the  country.  These  are 
not  designed,  of  course,  as  preparedness  against  the  In- 
dians, but  as  preparedness  against  any  foreign  foe  who 
may  attempt  to  land  upon  our  coasts  and  conquer  our 
land.  The  mountain-crests  and  passes  of  the  Alle- 
ghanies,  the  Rockies  and  the  Sierra  Nevadas;  the  val- 
leys of  the  rivers  which  flow  into  the  Atlantic,  the  Gulf 
and  the  Pacific;  the  lakes  and  forests  and  plains  of  our 
great  continental  domain,  open  up  fascinating  vistas  of 


142  PREPAREDNESS 

opportunity  to  the  military  strategist;  and  he  assures 
us  that  "  impregnable  "  forts  like  those  of  Verdun  and 
Helgoland  are  absolutely  needed  to  prepare  us  against 
invasion  and  conquest  by  our  Japanese,  German  or  Brit- 
ish foes.  What  could  these  foes  not  do  to  us,  swarming 
across  the  Pacific,  the  Sierras  and  the  Rockies,  into  the 
Great  Plains;  or  across  the  Atlantic  and  the  Alleghanies 
into  the  fertile  valley  of  the  Ohio  and  the  teeming  lands 
of  the  Central  West;  or  across  the  Great  Lakes  and 
down  the  Mississippi  into  "  the  heart  of  the  Continent  "? 

We  have  already  expended  within  the  last  few  years 
$13,000,000  in  defending  Pearl  Harbor,  Hawaii,  and 
among  its  defenses  we  have  utilized  an  extinct  volcano, 
known  as  Diamond  Head,  by  fortifying  it  and  equipping 
it  with  four  mortars  which  have  a  range  of  from  six  to 
nine  miles.  How  many  and  wonderful  are  the  natural 
opportunities  for  effective  fortifications  and  efficient 
bases  of  operation  in  almost  every  nook  and  corner  of 
our  continental  as  well  as  island  possessions! 

Why  should  we  not  prepare,  and  prepare  "  ade- 
quately," along  this  line  of  infinite  possibilities? 

Moving  Forts 

But  nothing  that  is  stationary  is  worth  much  in  these 
stirring  times.  Forts  should  not  wait  to  be  attacked; 
like  warships  upon  the  sea,  they  should  be  foot-loose  and 
seek  out  the  enemy  wherever  he  is  to  be  found,  and 
then  hammer  him  until  he  stops  fighting. 

That  is  what  is  being  done  in  this  greatest  of  wars  in 
Europe.  Railroads  are  no  longer  merely  means  of 
transporting  men  and  supplies;  they  are  now  the  means 
of  conveying  forts.  These  forts  are  trains  of  heavily 
armored  cars,  loop-holed  for  rifles,  machine-guns  and 
rapid-fire  guns  of  large  caliber  mounted  on  pivots  or  on 
revolving  turrets.  They  serve  admirably  as  posts  for 
sharpshooters,  who  can  fire  from  them  in  such  shelters 
as  railroad  cuts ;  or  can  dash  out  in  support  of  a  retreat- 


PREPAREDNESS  ON  AND  UNDER  LAND    143 

ing  column  of  soldiers  and  turn  defeat  into  victory,  as 
was  done  repeatedly  near  Nieupoort,  Belgium.  They 
can  even  elude  the  fire  of  big  guns,  by  moving  rapidly  to 
and  fro  upon  the  tracks ;  for  these  "  land-going  iron- 
clads "  have  more  than  the  speed  and  much  of  the  effec- 
tiveness of  battle  cruisers.  They  are  still  in  their  infancy, 
and  great  possibilities  lie  before  them. 

What  could  America  not  do  along  this  line  of  prepared- 
ness, with  the  greatest  railway  system  in  the  world? 
Fancy  how  we  could  build  and  equip  our  freight  and 
passenger  cars,  and  our  trolley-cars  as  well,  so  that  they 
could  be  recruited  in  time  of  need  as  moving  fortresses 
throughout  the  length  and  breadth  of  country,  town  and 
city! 

Unfortunately,  such  moving  forts  as  these  can  travel 
only  on  the  rails.  But  they  have  been  supplemented  by 
forts  which  can  travel  on  every  highway  or  country 
road.  The  armored  automobile  has  sprung  full-fledged 
into  existence  during  the  present  war,  and  is  being  used 
with  great  military  effectiveness.  Manufactured  or 
bought  by  thousands,  and  equipped  with  armor  plate  for 
•the  protection  of  their  vitals,  and  with  machine-guns 
for  an  attack  on  the  vitals  of  the  enemy,  they  have  been 
sent  forth  on  their  death-dealing  mission  singly  or  in 
troops.  Working  independently,  like  the  panoplied 
knight-errant  of  old ;  or  cooperating  in  flocks,  or  shoals, 
like  troops  of  giant  cavalrymen,  or  like  chains  of  mov- 
ing forts,  they  have  engaged  in  many  kinds  of  attack 
and  defense,  and  have  rivalled  the  exploits  of  Richard 
of  the  Lion's  Heart. 

America,  with  its  marvellous  facilities  for  leading  the 
world  in  armored  automobiles,  and  with  its  continental 
stretches  of  roadway,  will  surely  not  be  left  behind  on 
this  item  of  the  preparedness  programme !  Already,  we 
have  listened  to  the  appeal,  or  responded  to  the  chal- 
lenge ;  for  the  Army  Bill  in  the  last  Congress  carried  an 
appropriation  of  $50,000  for  one  armored  motor  car. 


144  PREPAREDNESS 

This  is,  of  course,  only  a  beginning,  though  a  somewhat 
expensive  one.  But  patience,  patience ;  with  proper  ma- 
nipulation of  popular  fear  and  congressional  log-rolling, 
we  can  yet  fill  our  land,  or  roads,  with  armored,  and 
therefore  truly  useful,  automobiles.  What  clouds  of  jit- 
neys, touring  and  de  luxe  autos  would  our  manufac- 
turers not  build  for  Uncle  Sam's  safety?  Nay,  more, 
why  should  not  every  private  individual  who  owns  an 
automobile  be  required  to  provide  it  with  armor  and  a 
machine-gun  so  as  to  be  able  to  respond  at  once,  like  the 
minute-men  of  Concord  and  Lexington,  to  the  call  to 
arms?  Away  with  the  foolish  and  unpatriotic  objection 
that  automobiles,  unarmored,  are  already  sufficiently 
deadly  to  our  own  population!  If  we  are  going  to  pre- 
pare for  war,  and  to  prepare  adequately,  let  us  get  down 
to  business! 

Coast  Fortifications 

But  why  talk  about  the  inland  fortifications  of  our 
country  ?  They  would  be  needed  only  in  case  our  enemy 
should  land  upon  our  shores;  and  this  he  must  not  be 
permitted  to  do.  Our  navy,  as  the  first  line  of  defense, 
must  surely  stop  him;  and  if  that  fails  to  do  so,  our 
coast  fortifications  must  beat  him  off. 

Our  Deficiencies  in  Forts 

Our  "coast"  fortifications,  however,  do  not  really 
defend  our  coasts;  the  utmost  they  can  do  is  to  defend 
some  of  our  harbors, — the  harbors  of  our  principal  sea- 
ports. The  strips  of  coast  which  they  "  protect "  are 
not  more  than  fifteen  to  twenty  miles  in  length, — about 
200  miles  in  all,  a  military  expert  testified  last  winter 
before  a  congressional  committee.  Before  that  same 
committee,  an  admiral  declared  that  he  saw  no  reason 
why  a  foreign  foe  could  not  land  on  any  foot  of  our 
American  sea-coast.  Two  hundred  miles  protected, — 
after  a  fashion ;  three  thousand  miles  along  the  Atlantic, 


PREPAREDNESS  ON  AND  UNDER  LAND    145 

and  some  five  thousand  miles  on  the  Gulf  and  the  Pacific, 
to  say  nothing  of  four  thousand  miles  of  frontier  on  the 
British-Canadian  border,  still  to  be  protected !  The  out- 
look is  sufficiently  gloomy. 

Our  prepareders  have  grappled  with  the  problem. 
After  the  hundreds  upon  hundreds  of  millions  invested 
during  past  years  in  forts,  obsolete  or  obsolescent,  our 
congress  was  induced  last  year  to  appropriate  $6,000,000 
for  coast  fortifications.  This  is  a  mere  drop  in  the 
bucket.  One  fort  now  building  at  Los  Angeles  is  to  cost 
more  than  $3,000,000.  The  new  plan  provides  for  build- 
ing another  fort  at  the  mouth  of  the  Chesapeake  Bay  to 
protect  the  passage  between  Capes  Henry  and  Charles, — 
which  leads  up  to  Baltimore  and  Washington;  and  for 
the  appropriation  of  $20,000,000  a  year  for  four  years, 
to  go  as  far  as  it  can  towards  protecting  the  rest  of  the 
coast.  One-fourth  of  the  $80,000,000,  however,  is  to  go 
towards  defending  our  unprotected  island  possessions 
and  naval  bases  in  some  such  way  as  we  have  protected 
Pearl  Harbor,  Hawaii.  This  last  cost  $13,000,000;  how 
far  would  $20,000,000  go  in  defending  the  rest  of  our 
island  family  and  Alaska?  Four  years  are  a  long,  long 
time,  if  the  Germans  or  the  Japanese  are  to  land  upon 
our  shores  to-morrow. 

How  much  can  we  do,  in  four  years  and  with  $60,- 
000,000,  for  the  continental  United  States?  How  much 
did  the  "  impregnable  "  fortresses  of  Liege,  Namur  or 
Antwerp  cost?  Though  we  should  get  really  impregna- 
ble fortresses  for  protecting  another  small  fraction  of 
our  enormous  coast-line,  our  experts  insist  that  there 
is  nothing  to  hinder  a  strong  enemy  from  landing  else- 
where on  our  coast  and  capturing  our  big  cities  by  march- 
ing inland  to  their  rear. 

Our  Deficiencies  in  Personnel 

Even  the  number  of  coast  fortifications  at  present  in 
our  possession  are  woefully  under-manned.  The  Regu- 


146  PREPAREDNESS 

lar  Coast  Artillery  Corps  is  short  612  officers  and  io,c 
enlisted  men.  The  new  plan  provides  for  the  enlistment 
of  10,000  more.  But  the  Regulars  man  only  one-half 
the  guns,  and  depend  on  the  Coast  Artillery  Militia  to  do 
the  rest.  The  shortage  in  the  Coast  Artillery  Militia  is 
299  officers  and  11,409  enlisted  men.  The  seacoast  States 
have  been  urged  by  many  and  varied  inducements  to 
make  up  this  deficiency;  but  despite  this  effort,  the  de- 
ficiency was  greater  last  year  than  it  was  the  year  before. 

This  shortage  is  based,  moreover,  only  on  peace  condi- 
tions; in  time  of  war,  not  less  than  two  complete  man- 
ning bodies  would  be  required,  and  the  shortage  would 
be  far  greater.  Three  bodies,  working  eight  hours  each, 
is  the  experts'  desired  minimum.  How  are  these  men 
to  be  secured,  and,  more  especially,  how  are  they  to  be 
properly  trained  for  their  difficult,  highly  professional 
duties  ? 

Again,  to  protect  coast  fortifications  against  sudden 
land  raids,  Coast  Artillery  Supports  are  necessary. 
These  are  ordinarily  drawn  from  the  "  mobile  army  " ; 
but  our  mobile  army  is  itself  wofully  deficient.  Again, 
our  fortifications  outside  of  the  United  States  must  be 
manned  entirely,  and  not  only  one-half,  by  the  Coast 
Artillery  Regulars;  the  insular  fortifications  now  ready 
for  garrisons  will  still  further  deplete  our  home  Regu- 
lars and  leave  them  about  equal  to  one-third  of  one  relief. 
It  would  appear,  then,  that  for  "  adequate  "  prepared- 
ness along  this  line,  we  should  increase  the  personnel  of 
our  coast  defenses  by  at  least  40,000  men, — this  with 
our  present  fortifications.  When  we  get  an  "  adequate  " 
number  of  fortifications,  no  man  can  say  how  many  thou- 
sands or  hundreds  of  thousands  of  coast  defense  men 
we  shall  require. 

Island  Fortifications  and  Naval  Bases 

But  why  wait  for  the  enemy  to  attack  our  coast  forti- 
fications at  home?  Let  us  prepare  to  waylay  him  in 


PREPAREDNESS  ON  AND  UNDER  LAND    147 

the  Pacific  or  Atlantic  on  his  way  across  the  ocean.  And 
let  us  not  keep  our  fleet  only  in  its  home-ports,  but  send 
it  out  in  great,  crushing  divisions  to  our  naval  bases,  so 
that  it  can  reach  the  enemy  fleet  in  cruises  of  not  more 
than  2,000  miles  in  radius. 

In  the  Pacific,  we  have  four  points  from  which,  at 
2,ooo-mile  cruises,  we  can  "  command  the  ocean."  These 
are  at  Pearl  Harbor,  Hawaii ;  Unalaska,  Alaska ;  Samoa ; 
and  Guam.  By  the  expenditure  of  $13,000,000  we  have 
built  up  a  fairly  respectable  base  at  the  first  of  these. 
Let  us  do  the  same  at  the  other  three  points,  and  we 
may  feel  reasonably  prepared, — except  in  so  far  as 
trained  men,  big  enough  guns  and  plenty  of  ammunition 
are  concerned.  Let  us  remember,  however,  that  unless  we 
supply  these  deficiencies  at  Pearl  Harbor  and  prevent 
their  occurrence  at  the  other  bases,  the  Japanese  might 
seize  and  utilize  for  themselves  these  "  impregnable " 
fortresses,  even  as  the  Fortress  of  Malta  was  manned 
by  just  enough  men  to  open  its  gates  to  the  enemy. 

In  the  Atlantic,  we  have  made  a  beginning  with  Guan- 
tanamo  and  the  Panama  Zone,  and  can  experiment  with 
Porto  Rico  and, — if  we  can  get  them  from  Denmark, — 
with  St.  Thomas  and  St.  John;  but  we  are  obviously  in 
dire  need  of  more  naval  bases  in  the  Southern,  Northern 
and  Eastern  Atlantic,  and  in  the  Southwestern  Pacific, 
if  we  are  to  be  "  adequately  "  prepared  for  the  defense 
of  our  own  country,  our  island  possessions,  and  the  Mon- 
roe Doctrine  against  a  "  victorious  "  Great  Britain  or 
Germany. 

The  Problem  of  Big  Guns 

Twenty-nine  years  ago,  some  experiments  were  made 
at  Fort  Malmaison,  in  France,  which  proved  that  the  best 
"  impregnable "  fortifications  erected  up  to  that  time 
were  obsolete.  Their  walls  and  works  were  destroyed 
with  "  laughable  ease  "  by  8-inch  shells  charged  with  the 
new  high  explosive  known  as  "  melinite."  The  question 


148  PREPAREDNESS 

then  arose:  On  which  shall  we  bet  our  money, — on 
"impregnable"  forts  or  on  "irresistible"  projectiles? 

The  French  and  Belgians  went  in  for  the  forts,  the 
Germans  for  the  projectiles.  The  best  engineers  of 
France  and  Belgium  built  those  forts  which  were  re- 
garded as  an  eighth  wonder  of  the  world, — at  Belfort, 
Toul  and  Verdun,  Liege,  Antwerp  and  Namur.  The 
best  that  concrete  walls  from  six  to  ten  feet  thick,  and 
armor  plate  of  similar  or  greater  thickness,  could  pro- 
vide, was  lavishly  provided,  and  France  and  Belgium 
confidently  awaited  the  issue. 

Meanwhile,  the  Germans  developed  their  guns  from 
8-inch  to  i6^-inch  and  their  howitzers  to  17^-inch, 
and  they  learned  how  to  move  them  and  to  move  them 
fast ;  they  developed  their  shells,  also,  to  weights  of  more 
than  a  ton,  and  filled  them  with  new  and  improved  high 
explosives.  The  test  came  in  1914  at  Liege  and  Namur, 
and  the  projectile  was  shown  to  have  won  the  race, — and 
the  battle.  As  in  1886,  the  forts  were  utterly  demolished, 
their  armor  plate  and  concrete  walls  were  cracked  into 
fragments,  their  massive  embankments  were  pulverized. 
At  Liege,  while  the  guns  were  getting  warmed  and  lim- 
bered up,  the  forts  lasted  two  days,  at  Namur  they  lasted 
five  hours ! 

In  another  great  fortress,  at  Maubeuge,  in  France,  a 
garrison  of  3,000  soldiers  essayed  to  defend  it;  the  Ger- 
mans hurled  a  few  shells  from  a  42-centimeter  gun  upon 
it,  and  200  Frenchmen  more  dead  than  alive  survived 
to  creep  out  of  the  hole  which  was  all  that  was  left  of 
the  fort. 

With  the  example  of  Belgium  and  Maubeuge  before 
them,  the  French  determined  to  pin  their  faith,  not  to 
their  "  impregnable "  forts,  but  to  intrenchments  and 
other  things,  especially  big  guns. 

How  "  impregnable,"  then,  must  our  forts  be  to  with- 
stand the  "  Chubby  Berthas  "  and  other  big  guns,  femi- 
nine and  masculine,  that  might  be  trained  against  them? 


PREPAREDNESS  ON  AND  UNDER  LAND    149 

The  eight  1 5-inch  guns  of  the  British  battle  cruiser, 
Queen  Elisabeth,  for  example,  are  reported  by  one  of 
our  military  experts  and  ardent  prepareders  to  be  able 
to  begin  at  the  Battery  and  wipe  out  New  York  City  up 
to  Fourteenth  street,  while  the  cruiser  lies  at  Rockaway 
Beach  entirely  out  of  range  of  the  guns  in  New  York's 
forts;  or,  this  cruiser  and  any  of  the  German  first-line 
ships,  "  could  lie  off  Nahant  and,  without  coming  under 
the  fire  of  a  single  gun  from  shore,  could  destroy  the 
navy-yard  at  Charlestown  and  as  much  of  Boston  as  sur- 
rounds it." 

Most  of  our  coast  defense  guns  are  1 2-inch,  which  have 
an  effective  range  of  13,000  yards,  as  against  an  effective 
range  of  21,000  yards  possessed  by  our  opponents; 
hence,  another  expert  declares,  "  the  most  modern  ships 
could  anchor  several  thousand  yards  [or  more  than  four 
miles]  outside  the  range  of  our  coast-defense  guns  and 
proceed  to  silence  our  batteries,  unmolested  and  with 
great  deliberation." 

We  have  a  few  14-inch  guns  in  our  insular  possessions, 
and  one  1 6-inch  gun  for  the  protection  of  the  Panama  Ca- 
nal. The  new  plan  is  to  provide  us  with  two  more  1 6-inch 
guns;  and  to  remount  the  1 2-inch  guns  so  that  their  max- 
imum elevation  can  be  increased  from  10°  to  15°,  and 
thus  increase  their  range  from  13,000  to  20,000  yards. 
This  will  cost  a  very  large  sum  of  money,  and  will  ne- 
cessitate the  use  of  a  lighter  shell  than  that  now  carried, 
which  is  only  700  pounds.  Can  such  projectiles,  fired 
three  miles  up  in  the  air  so  as  to  enable  them  to  carry 
20,000  yards,  be  considered  "  adequate  "  defense  against 
projectiles  weighing  more  than  a  ton  with  an  extreme 
range  of  24,000  yards  and  an  effective  one  of  21,000? 

A  half-year  after  the  war  began,  the  Secretary  of  War 
asked  for  an  appropriation,  for  strengthening  our  coast 
defenses,  of  $40,000,000;  but  during  that  half-year,  the 
superiority  of  the  modern  gun  to  the  modern  fort  was 
established,  and  the  experts  sent  forth  their  verdict  as 


150  PREPAREDNESS 

follows :  "  The  day  of  concrete  and  iron  has  passed  away. 
Closed  works  must  be  replaced  by  open  earthwork  re- 
doubts massively  built,  connected  together  with  over- 
head cover,  and  so  devised  as  to  admit  of  rapid  impro- 
vised extension  to  meet  the  ever-changing  conditions  of 
attack." 

That  is  to  say,  the  fort-makers  are  going  to  do  their 
best  to  "  come  back  "  and  continue  their  world-old  con- 
test with  the  gun-makers.  Meanwhile,  the  greatest  war  in 
history  is  going  on  and  with  it  the  application  of  ever 
new  discoveries  in  chemical  science  and  mechanic  arts. 
Meanwhile,  also,  the  development  of  air-craft  and  high 
explosives  may  make  the  most  "  irresistible  "  gun  and 
the  most  "  impregnable  "  fortress  as  antiquated  in  war- 
fere  as  are  now  the  sling-shot  and  the  tree-trunk.  It 
may  soon  be  almost  as  far  to  look  back  through  a  series 
of  new  devices  to  the  steel-and-concrete  zort  and  the  16- 
inch  gun,  as  it  is  now  to  look  through  anchored  and  float- 
ing mines,  automobile  and  wireless  torpedoes,  aeroplane 
scouts  and  defenses  of  the  inner  harbor  and  passage-way, 
back  to  the  once  "  impregnable  "  booms,  or  chains  of  logs 
and  iron. 

H.      UNDERGROUND    PREPAREDNESS 

Submarine  warfare  in  our  time  is  matched  by  subter- 
rain.  The  prime  requisite  of  the  soldier  in  the  present 
war,  as  in  the  days  of  Julius  Caesar,  is  to  dig,  and  the 
second  is  to  hide.  It  has  remained  for  war,  not  peace, 
to  beat  swords  into  spades  and  spears  into  pick-axes.  Na- 
tions, precipitating  the  war  to  secure  a  place  "  in  the 
sun,"  have  sent  their  soldiers  into  the  trenches  and 
made  of  them  moles  and  ground-hogs,  burrowing  and 
living  underground.  "  Burrow  on  to  Berlin  or  to  Paris," 
is  the  slogan  in  this  war  of  spades  and  picks. 


PREPAREDNESS  ON  AND  UNDER  LAND    151 

Intrenchments 

The  old-time  rifle-pits,  or  trenches  three  feet  deep, 
with  the  earth  thrown  up  in  front  of  them  to  protect 
riflemen  or  skirmishers,  have  been  utterly  eclipsed  by 
the  trenches  of  today,  which  are  the  apotheosis  of  the 
trenches  of  our  own  Civil  War  and  of  the  Russo-Japa- 
nese War  of  a  decade  ago.  "  Intrenching,"  "  digging 
yourself  in,"  is  one  of  the  primary  arts  of  war,  not  only 
in  siege  operations,  but  in  the  field  as  well.  Not  "  throw- 
ing up,"  but  "  digging  down  "  and  "  digging  in,"  are  the 
watchwords  of  our  time.  Indeed,  a  battlefield  today 
is  declared  by  an  eye-witness  to  be  "  distinguishable  from 
any  other  stretch  of  ground  by  there  being  no  soldiers 
visible  on  it.  Movements  of  troops  near  the  front  have 
to  be  made  mostly  at  night,  and  in  the  day-time  the 
scene  of  conflict  looks  like  the  interior  of  the  crater  of 
Mauna  Loa, — a  torn  and  barren  plain  with  here  and 
there  a  volcanic  eruption." 

In  the  olden  times,  a  city  was  besieged ;  now,  a  country 
is  besieged.  Hence,  intrenchment  is  undertaken  on  a  large 
and  complicated  scale.  The  line  of  intrenchments  in 
France  and  Flanders,  extending  from  the  mountains  of 
Switzerland  to  the  North  Sea,  measures  420  miles  in 
length,  not  counting  its  minor  twists  and  turns  and  par- 
allels. The  Russo-German  line  is  at  least  500  miles  in 
length.  This  line  is  not  a  single,  but  a  double,  and 
in  most  places  a  triple,  line  of  trenches,  one  behind  the 
other,  so  that  if  the  first  be  taken,  the  others  may  be 
fallen  back  upon.  Multiplying  these  920  miles  by  two, 
for  the  two  opposing  lines,  we  have  1,840  miles;  and 
multiplying  these  by  three,  for  the  three  lines  of  trenches, 
we  have  5,520  miles.  Adding  to  these,  800  miles  which 
the  Germans  have  dug  in  Eastern  Belgium  and  along  the 
Rhine,  400  dug  in  Eastern  England  and  along  the  Suez 
Canal  against  a  possible  invasion,  100  dug  by  the  Aus- 
trians  and  Italians  along  the  Isonzo,  and  200  dug  in 


152  PREPAREDNESS 

Southern  Bulgaria  and  various  other  parts  of  the  battle- 
stage,  we  have  approximately  7,000  miles  of  trenches.  To 
these  must  be  added,  also,  about  two  miles  of  communi- 
cation trenches,  through  which  forces  are  brought  for- 
ward in  safety  to  the  firing  trenches,  for  every  mile  of 
trenches  on  the  front ;  thus  we  have  a  total  of  some  8,800 
miles. 

A  single  trench  this  long  would  reach  from  San  Fran- 
cisco to  New  York,  across  the  Atlantic  to  London,  to 
Paris,  to  Berlin  and  on  to  Petrograd.  If  the  war  con- 
tinues a  few  months  longer,  man  will  have  dug  himself 
around  the  globe.  In  the  light  of  these  sub-lunar  achieve- 
ments, it  is  suggested  that  the  "  canals  "  on  Mars  are 
really  intrenchments  in  which  the  Martians  have  dug 
themselves  in. 

Since  the  average  trench  is  six  feet  deep  and  five  feet 
wide  at  the  top,  it  is  estimated  that,  with  dugouts  and 
traverses,  two  cubic  yards  of  earth  have  been  removed 
for  every  yard  of  trench.  The  German  share  of  this 
digging  is  estimated  to  be  equivalent  to  the  Great  Wall 
of  China,  the  Germans  having  dug  for  fourteen  months, 
and  the  Chinese  built  for  ten  years.  If  all  the  armies 
dig  as  well  in  the  next  six  years  as  they  have  dug  in  the 
last  one,  they  will  have  dug  an  equivalent  of  the  Panama 
Canal,  in  half  the  time  required  for  that  greatest  of  >engi- 
neering  tasks. 

Underground  Quarters 

The  firing  trenches,  which  are  in  some  places  as  many 
as  eighteen  feet  deep,  but  very  narrow,  are  connected 
with  each  other  by  means  of  underground  tunnels,  which 
are  made  much  wider  for  the  movement  of  troops  and 
supplies,  and  for  the  "  quarters  "  of  the  men  at  the  front. 
These  "  quarters  "  have  taken  the  place  of  the  romantic 
bivouac  of  olden  times,  with  its  rows  of  little  tents,  out- 
posts and  sentry-guards.  They  are  commodious  cav- 
erns, fortified  in  many  places  on  roof  and  walls  with 


PREPAREDNESS  ON  AND  UNDER  LAND    153 

metal  and  concrete,  and  containing  at  least  some  of  the 
comforts  of  the  barracks,  but  lacking  the  greatest  of  all, 
namely,  sunlight  and  fresh  air.  In  those  most  up-to-date 
are  to  be  found  kitchens,  dining-rooms,  stables,  cow- 
sheds; one  boasts  a  bathroom;  another,  a  phonograph, 
which  since  the  quarters  are  connected  by  telephones, 
may  be  heard  all  down  the  line.  Since  aeroplane  scouts 
abound,  these  quarters  are  concealed  as  carefully  as  pos- 
sible by  means  of  earth  and  dead  or  growing  crops. 
Their  occupants  do  not  see  the  light  of  the  sun  for  days 
at  a  time.  Some  of  then  are  drained ;  but  rainy  weather 
brings  to  most  of  them  indescribable  misery  and  hard- 
ships. 

Mines  and  Counter-Mines 

This  extraordinary  development  of  trench-warfare  has 
not  crowded  out  the  old-fashioned  mining  and  counter- 
mining, but,  on  the  contrary  has  given  a  great  impulse  to 
it.  Deep  narrow  ditches,  known  as  "  saps  "  are  dug  at 
an  angle  from  the  trenches  towards  the  enemy's  works. 
These  saps  are  completely  underground,  of  course,  until 
at  the  sap-head, — advanced  at  times  to  within  four  yards 
of  the  enemy's  trenches, — the  grenadiers  burst  through 
the  crust  of  earth  and  hurl  their  grenades  or  bombs  at 
their  opponents.  The  ground  is  fairly  honey-combed  with 
zig-zags  and  parallels,  advanced  by  both  sides,  and  the 
mines  and  counter-mines  form  a  veritable  labyrinth  in 
which  the  sappers  and  miners  often  lose  their  way  and 
their  lives. 

The  development  of  high  explosives  has  given  to  mines 
and  counter-mines  an  enormous  increase  of  efficiency 
in  the  blowing  up  of  forts,  intrenchments  and  quarters. 
The  "  Western  Zone  of  War,"  about  ten  miles  in  width 
and  extending  from  the  Channel  to  the  German  frontier 
near  Basle,  with  its  hundreds  of  houses,  barns  and  vil- 
lages destroyed  and  the  very  landscape  itself  scarred  and 


154.  PREPAREDNESS 

seamed,  bears  eloquent  testimony  to  the  volcanic  action 
of  these  mining  operations. 

Our  Underground  Preparedness 

What  are  our  present  facilities  for  engaging  success- 
fully in  the  enormous  activities  of  the  underground  war- 
fare of  our  time?  How  many  and  what  facilities  must 
we  have  to  be  "  adequately  "  prepared  on  this  item  of 
the  military  programme? 

Well,  we  are  told  by  our  military  experts  that  if  our 
entire  field  force  in  the  regular  army  were  ordered  into 
the  trenches,  they  could  man  a  single  line  about  fourteen 
miles  long;  then,  if  we  sent  our  entire  militia  in  after 
them,  we  could  extend  this  single  line  to  sixty-five  miles. 
New  York  City  alone  has  a  circumference  of  about  one 
hundred  miles;  and  there  are  a  good  many  cities  and 
towns  in  these  United  States  outside  of  New  York  City. 
The  rule  of  our  Civil  War,  a  half-century  ago,  prescribed 
5,000  men  for  every  mile;  with  our  150,000  men  we 
might  live  up  to  this  rule  for  thirty  miles.  To  intrench 
for  420  miles,  the  length  of  the  intrenchments  on  the 
French  and  Belgian  frontier, — we  should  require  2,100,- 
ooo  men,  and  this  is  according  to  the  rule  of  a  half-cen- 
tury ago. 

The  training  of  this  vast  host  for  effective  "  digging 
in,"  and  for  effective  fighting  from  and  in  the  trenches 
and  mines  would  be  no  holiday  pastime.  Trench  war- 
fare in  our  day,  with  its  use  of  trench  guns  and  mortars, 
its  grenades  and  bombs,  its  endurance  of  unparalleled 
hardships  and  miseries,  can  scarcely  be  prepared  for  by 
the  antiquated  manual  of  arms  and  "  maneuvring  "  which 
our  coddled  militiamen  and  volunteers  regard  as  the  sum 
and  substance  of  a  "  military  training." 

Men,  however,  are  only  one  of  many  items  in  the  pro- 
gramme of  intrenchment.  Steam-shovels,  concrete,  steel, 
catacomb  dwellings, — what  an  endless  vista  of  "  pre- 
paredness "  opens  up  on  this  line !  What  a  magnificent 


PREPAREDNESS  ON  AND  UNDER  LAND    155 

series  of  intrenchments  might  we  not  prepare  for  along 
the  Great  Lakes  and  our  countless  rivers, — even  as  the 
bloody  Mazurian  Lakes  between  Russia  and  Germany, 
and  the  Aisne,  the  Marne  and  the  Yser  Rivers  in  France 
and  Belgium  have  afforded  splendid  opportunities  for 
"  water  trenches  " !  Even  little  Holland  has  equipped 
itself  with  a  system  of  trenches  which,  if  captured  by  the 
enemy,  can  be  converted  into  deep-flooded  ditches, — a 
hindrance  rather  than  an  aid  to  the  advancing  foe. 
Surely  mighty  America  should  do  as  much.  And  surely, 
with  our  matchless  field  for  intrenchment  around  half  a 
thousand  cities,  and  across  our  continental  domain,  over 
valley  and  plain  and  mountain,  our  prepareders  upon  the 
land  are  as  fortunate  as  are  our  prepareders  upon  the 
sea  and  in  the  air,  with  their  unequalled  opportunity  of 
two  mighty  oceans  washing  our  shores  and  a  heaven  of 
atmosphere  above  us ! 

I.      SOCIAL    AND    INDIVIDUAL    PREPAREDNESS 

The  warfare  of  our  time  absorbs  the  energies  of  entire 
nations.  The  fighting  and  fighters  "  at  the  front,"  al- 
though more  spectacular  than  those  "  back  home,"  are 
only  of  temporary  importance, — like  the  trigger  that  fires 
the  gun.  The  nation  itself  must  supply  the  gun  and  the 
ammunition  and  replace  the  broken  trigger.  Hence, 
"  military  efficiency "  as  Germany  has  taught  it  to  the 
world,  and  as  we  must  learn  it  if  we  are  to  prepare  for 
successful  war,  means  the  creation,  organization  and  mo- 
bilization of  the  entire  people. 

This  "  fundamental  preparedness "  is,  of  course,  a 
gigantic  task  and  has  innumerable  factors.  Its  scope 
can  only  be  indicated  here,  and  only  a  few  of  its  factors 
referred  to. 

Physical  Preparedness 

There  is  no  possible  reason  or  excuse  for  "  race  sui- 
cide "  among  a  people  bent  on  "  adequate  "  prepared- 


156  PREPAREDNESS 

ness.  The  fathers  and  mothers  of  the  race  should  not 
only  "  raise  their  boys  to  be  soldiers,"  but  should  raise 
plenty  of  them.  Nor  are  boys  only  needed  as  "  food 
for  powder  " ;  the  girls,  too,  can  play  a  most  worthy  part 
in  war,  for  example,  as  "  war  brides,"  as  industrial  work- 
ers, even  in  Amazonian  regiments  if  necessity  demand. 

Even  Germany,  with  her  relatively  large  population,  is 
in  peril  of  being  beaten  in  the  present  war  by  the  mere 
force  of  physical  attrition.  Enough  boys  do  not  reach 
the  "  fighting  age  "  of  fifteen  or  fourteen  years  to  fill 
the  gaps  in  the  ranks  of  their  elders.  The  United  States, 
with  a  territory  seventeen  times  larger  than  that  of  the 
German  Empire  and  a  population  only  one-third  larger, 
should  increase  its  birth-rate  and  immigration  many  fold 
to  be  as  relatively  prepared  as  is  Germany.  Texas  alone 
could  accommodate  one-fourth  more  people  than  Ger- 
many does,  and  Alaska  nearly  three  times  as  many! 
How  thrilling  to  think  of  the  1,200,000,000  people  whom 
we  could  accommodate  in  the  United  States, — in  ade- 
quate preparedness  for  the  war  that  confronts  us ! 

These  teeming  millions  must  be  thoroughly  well  de- 
veloped in  stature,  muscle  and  sinew,  for  we  must  send 
no  mollycoddles  to  the  front  when  the  great  test  comes. 
Hence  the  pressing  need  of  gymnastic  and  athletic  train- 
ing. Turn-vereins  must  spring  up,  as  thick  as  hops,  to 
vie  with  our  colleges  and  Y.M.C.A.'s  in  turning  out 
tall  and  muscular  men  and  women. 

Medicine,  hygiene  and  sanitation,  above  all,  the  most 
scientific  of  marriage  laws,  must  be  developed  and  dras- 
tically applied,  so  that  weaklings  shall  be  reduced  to  a 
minimum  and  stronglings  shall  increase  and  multiply. 
A  wise  charity,  preferably  administered  by  the  State, 
must  prevent  wasteful  weakness  and  death  from  snatch- 
ing from  the  State  the  able  soldiers  whom  it  may  so 
sorely  need. 


PREPAREDNESS  ON  AND  UNDER  LAND    157 

Moral  Preparedness 

Believing  that  there  never  have  been  and  never  can 
be  genuine  moral  equivalents  for  war  and  military  train- 
ing, the  State  to  be  adequately  prepared  must  cultivate 
in  its  citizens  the  virtues  of  the  fine  old  military  profes- 
sion,—the  profession  that  doth  most  befit  true  men. 

Implicit  obedience  and  the  willingness  to  "  stay  put " ; 
brute  courage  that  knows  no  fear;  callousness  to  human 
suffering,  whether  of  one's  enemies,  one's  family  or  one's 
self;  the  ability  to  steal  and  lie  without  being  caught, 
which  marked  the  good  soldier  of  Sparta,  and  which  is 
still  of  use;  these  and  a  score  of  other  martial  virtues 
rush  to  our  memories  and  clamor  to  be  reckoned  in  with 
adequate  preparedness. 

Such  semi-martial  virtues,  also,  as  industry,  which 
enables  the  people  to  pay  taxes  for  military  purposes, 
and  thrift,  which  enables  them  to  save  money  and  lend 
it  to  the  government  in  time  of  war;  these  and  various 
others  must  by  no  means  be  neglected. 

As  to  the  other  virtues,  especially  those  inculcated  by 
the  Christian  standard  of  morality, — such  as  humility, 
meekness,  purity,  mercy,  peace-making, — they  may  be 
tolerated,  provided  they  do  not  interfere  with  adequate 
preparedness;  if  they  do, — to  the  lions  with  them! 

Mental  Preparedness 

Knowledge  is  power,  especially  military  power ;  brains 
are  better  than  bullets ;  intellect  can  be  more  deadly  than 
either  muscle  or  morals.  Hence  the  necessity  of  a  proper, 
that  is  to  say,  a  practical  and  military,  system  of  educa- 
tion. Like  the  boys  of  Sparta,  the  youth  of  to-day  should 
be  trained  in  the  science  and  art  of  warfare,  from  their 
early  infancy  up.  Indeed,  the  State  should  take  them 
over  at  birth  and  see  to  it  that  they  are  brought  up  to  be 
truly  adequate  soldiers. 

Martial   literature,   like  "The   Hymn  of   Hate";— 


158  PREPAREDNESS 

patriotic  history,  like  Von  Treitschke's ;  a  common-sense, 
materialistic  philosophy,  like  that  of  Frederick  the  Great 
and  Nietzsche :  such  should  be  the  backbone  of  a  men- 
tal training  that  is  adequate  for  preparedness. 

Above  all,  the  physical  sciences  of  chemistry,  physics, 
mechanics,  should  be  strenuously  pursued  and  devoted  to 
the  discovery  of  the  most  efficient  gases,  explosives,  pro- 
jectiles, and  every  possible  device  and  vehicle  for  deal- 
ing wounds,  stupor,  death.  Laboratories  at  home,  in  the 
barracks,  with  the  armies  on  the  march  and  in  the  field, 
should  be  equipped  and  administered  for  their  prime  duty 
of  preserving  and  increasing  the  fighting  effectiveness  of 
their  own  soldiers,  and  of  putting  the  enemy  under  the 
sod. 

Economic  Preparedness 

The  equipment  of  the  modern  army  on  the  battle-front 
with  all  the  necessaries  of  living  and  killing  is  a  large 
and  complicated  task  and  requires  efficient  organization 
of  mobilization  and  distribution.  Some  idea  of  this  task 
is  gained  from  the  following  excerpts  from  a  letter  writ- 
ten by  a  captain  of  British  cavalry,  "  somewhere  in 
France,"  to  his  father: 

"  Next  to  the  destructiveness  of  the  thing,  what  most 
amazes  me  is  the  number  of  non-combatants  required  to 
transport,  to  supply,  to  connect  generally,  and  to  pro- 
vide and  equip  the  comparatively  small  fighting  line. 
Every  road  between  the  coast  and  the  trenches  hums 
with  motor  transport,  every  base  is  the  centre  of  converg- 
ing lines  of  supplies,  every  trench,  every  regimental,  every 
brigade,  every  divisional,  every  army  corps  headquar- 
ters is  connected  and  linked  up  with  field  telephones, 
motor  bicyclists  and  motor  cars.  In  fact,  far  more  men 
in  uniform  are  seen  behind  than  in  the  actual  fighting 
line,  and  what  is  satisfactory  is  that  the  whole  machine 
appears  to  work  admirably.  It  is  a  very  different  prob- 
lem to  tackle  from  the  South  African  war.  Here  each 


PREPAREDNESS  ON  AND  UNDER  LAND    159 

battle  is  a  prolonged  bombardment  of  a  series  of  care- 
fully prepared  positions;  all  the  appliances  of  twentieth 
century  civilization  can  be  brought  to  work  and  the  re- 
sult is  good." 

The  Secondary  Army  of  Invasion 

This  "  army  of  workers  "  constitutes  in  fact  a  genuine 
secondary  army  of  invasion.  The  primary  army  is,  of 
course,  down  in  the  trenches,  behind  the  batteries,  or 
traveling  at  breakneck  speed  in  motor-omnibuses  along 
deep-rutted  highways  from  one  sector  of  the  battle-line 
to  the  next.  The  secondary  army,  without  which  the 
former  would  be  worthless,  follows  on  behind.  It  is  less 
daring,  and  practically  immobile.  Little  is  heard  of  it, 
but  its  work  goes  on  constantly,  at  top  speed.  When  it 
is  considered  that  an  army  is  in  need  of  thousands  of 
supplies  of  many  different  sorts,  from  pork  sausage  to 
mended  auto  tires,  many  of  them  requiring  experts  at 
manufacturing  or  repairing,  the  importance  of  this  sec- 
ondary army  of  skilled  artizans  can  be  better  appreciated. 
Behind  the  German  line  these  supply-centers,  or  Haupt- 
punkte,  are  established  with  exceeding  care  and  thor- 
oughness. In  some  places  a  whole  French  town  is  con- 
verted into  an  army  depot,  supplying  the  line  for  per- 
haps several  miles  on  either  side. 

Food  Supply 

The  army  itself  depends  mainly  upon  meat  and  bread. 
Fresh  meat  is  demanded,  and  herds  of  cattle  have  be- 
come regular  camp-followers;  but  the  salting,  pickling 
and  canning  departments  are  of  great  importance.  The 
United  States  learned  in  1898,  in  the  days  of  the  "  em- 
balmed beef  panic,"  the  vital  importance  of  solving  for 
the  army  the  meat  problem  which  in  our  war  with  Spain 
caused  far  more  deaths  than  did  Spanish  bullets.  The 
vital  importance  of  providing  such  delicacies  as  beer, 
whisky  and  other  beverages,  is  illustrated  by  the  fact 


160  PREPAREDNESS 

that  the  British  government  has  procured  and  stored  for 
the  use  of  its  army  20,000,000  pounds  of  tea. 

The  efficient  production,  organization  and  economical 
distribution  of  food  supplies,  among  the  population  at 
home,  as  a  prime  means  of  military  preparedness,  has 
taken  on  immense  significance  in  the  present  war.  The 
utilization  of  every  existing  foodstuff,  and  the  inven- 
tion and  production  of  new  kinds,  or  of  substitutes  for 
old  kinds  which  may  grow  scarce;  government  control 
and  distribution;  the  issuing  of  meal  tickets,  etc.,  are 
examples  of  what  "  preparedness  "  means,  so  far  as  the 
food-supply  is  concerned. 

Shelter  and  Fuel 

As  an  illustration  of  what  is  meant  in  the  provision  of 
shelter  for  the  huge  armies  in  the  modem  field  of  battle, 
may  be  mentioned  the  fact  that  50,000  portable  wooden 
houses,  12  feet  x  30  feet,  each  containing  three  rooms, 
are  being  constructed  for  the  winter  campaign  of  the 
Russian  soldiers. 

These  afford  much  better  shelter  than  did  the  old- 
time  army  tent;  but  the  activity  of  Zeppelins  and  aero- 
planes makes  life  in  even  such  homes  very  precarious. 
Hence  we  should  prepare  to  make  "  cyclone  cellars  "  or 
underground  homes  for  our  army  in  the  field,  as  the 
Italians  and  Austrians  are  doing  in  the  campaign  before 
Gorizia.  The  kind  of  homes  needed  for  trench-fighting, 
as  shelters  against  airships,  shrapnel,  etc.,  has  already 
been  indicated. 

The  Age  of  Electricity 

Since  the  old-time  camp-fires  are  far  more  dangerous 
in  these  days  of  aeroplane  scouts  and  bombs  than  they 
were  even  in  the  days  of  Indian  warfare,  the  problem 
of  fuel  and  heat  is  a  serious  one.  Fortunately,  we  live 
in  an  electrical  age,  and  electricity  is  utilized  for  heat, 


PREPAREDNESS  ON  AND  UNDER  LAND    161 

light,  power,  telephone  and  wireless  communication,  and 
even  for  killing. 

Wire  fences,  highly  charged  with  electricity,  are  al- 
ready in  use  for  sentinel  purposes,  and  are  capable  of 
being  prepared  for  trench-fighting  as  well.  The  war  is 
carried  on  by  relays  of  night  and  day  shifts,  and  the 
field  of  operations  is  lighted  up  at  night  by  means  of 
powerful  search-lights.  These  lights  are  made  speedily 
available  by  being  mounted  on  swift  motor-cars,  or  on 
collapsible  towers  of  considerable  height.  A  great  va- 
riety of  them  have  already  been  developed,  both  for  light- 
ing up  the  battlefield  and  for  detecting  the  night-raids  of 
airships. 

The  United  States  has  made  a  beginning  on  this  line 
of  preparedness  by  installing  at  the  end  of  the  Panama 
Canal  four  great  search-lights  which  send  their  rays 
about  twelve  miles  out  to  sea;  but  what  a  world  of 
preparedness  of  this  kind  lies  before  us  yet  to  con- 
quer. 

Motor  Transportation 

War-automobiles,  both  for  attack  and  defense  and  for 
transportation,  are  as  thick  on  the  battle-front  of  to-day 
as  are  autos  and  motor-trucks  on  Broadway.  Not  only 
must  they  be  innumerable,  but  they  must  also  be  armored 
for  protection  against  bullets  and  airship  bombs,  pro- 
vided with  port-holes  for  rifle-fire,  and  mounting  a 
machine-gun.  For  such  purposes  as  scouting  and  swift 
attack  and  pursuit,  the  conveying  of  wireless  and  light- 
ing apparatus,  of  aeroplane-destroyers,  kitchen  and  hos- 
pital outfits,  periscopes  and  reconnaissance  outfits,  the 
automobile  is  of  immense  military  value.  The  motor- 
cycle, with  an  emergency  speed  of  fifty  miles  an  hour,  is 
a  fine  adjunct  to  the  automobile,  especially  for  the  bear- 
ing of  orders. 

The  United  States  has  begun  to  test  the  motor-cycle 
as  a  military  asset  by  holding  a  trans-continental  race; 


162  PREPAREDNESS 

and  it  has  developed  a  few  squadrons  of  armored  auto- 
mobiles. General  Wood  has  sounded  the  alarm  for  this 
kind  of  preparedness,  also,  and  advocates  not  only  the 
increase  of  government-owned  automobiles,  but  also  the 
enlistment  and  organization  of  the  hundreds  of  thousands 
of  private  automobile  owners,  who  with  the  five  or  six 
friends  accompanying  them  in  each  car,  could  be  given 
an  "  auto  military  training."  Here  is  another  endless 
field  for  preparedness  which  may  be  supposed  to  appeal 
especially  to  the  sporting  instincts  of  the  American  peo- 
ple. 

The  building  of  good  roads  and  of  concrete  bridges 
capable  of  sustaining  motor-trucks  and  their  heavy  loads, 
is  considered  of  even  more  pressing  importance  for  pre- 
paredness than  for  the  piping  times  of  peace. 

Horses 

Armored  automobiles  and  aeroplanes  are  rapidly  tak- 
ing the  place  of  the  old-time  cavalry  for  scouting  pur- 
poses and  for  swift  attack  and  pursuit;  and  thus,  in 
war  as  in  peace,  the  horseless  vehicle  and  the  horseless 
knight  are  antiquating  the  charger  and  the  steed  that 
snuffs  the  scent  of  battle.  That  former  president  of  the 
United  States  who  declared  in  a  letter  to  the  American 
Legion  that,  "  in  the  event  of  war  I  should  ask  permis- 
sion of  Congress  to  raise  a  division  of  cavalry,  that  is, 
nine  regiments,  such  as  the  regiment  I  commanded  in 
Cuba,"  would  probably  have  felt  strangely  out  of  date 
if  he  and  his  nine  regiments  had  been  ordered  into  the 
trenches,  or  into  their  automobiles,  when  the  anticipated 
invasion  began,  and  their  horses  sent  to  the  rear  for  the 
transportation  of  supplies  and  artillery. 

This  last  duty  is  so  onerous  that  the  horse  is  still  found 
to  be  a  useful  animal  when  engaged  in  it.  The  European 
belligerents  are  not  only  exhausting  every  available 
source  of  their  own,  but  are  making  large  demands  upon 
American  stock-yards  and  farms.  For  example,  France 


PREPAREDNESS  ON  AND  UNDER  LAND    163 

has  sent  several  orders  for  41,000  horses  each,  to  be 
filled  in  the  United  States ;  the  British  government  bought 
more  than  100,000  horses  and  mules  from  a  single  com- 
pany in  Kansas  City  for  use  in  the  Boer  War,  and  has 
bought  $5,000,000  worth  from  the  same  company  for 
use  in  the  first  six  months  of  the  present  war. 

The  prices  here  average  $150,  and  the  cost  delivered 
in  England  is  about  $300.  On  the  battle-front,  the  aver- 
age life  of  the  horses  is  from  eight  to  ten  days.  How 
many  horses  should  we  require  for  a  good-sized  war  with 
a  great  power?  And  how  much  would  they  cost  us, 
whether  we  used  them  here  or  transported  them  to  some 
foreign  shore? 

Even  for  use  in  time  of  peace,  when  the  life  of  a  horse 
is  a  great  many  times  longer  than  in  war,  we  have  only 
one-ninth  enough  horses  for  the  cavalry  in  the  militia, 
a  much  smaller  proportion  for  the  field  artillery,  and 
none  at  all  for  the  signal  and  sanitary  troops.  For 
transportation  purposes,  we  need  5,836  more  wagons, 
and  draft  horses  to  pull  them. 

Evidently,  it  is  high  time  that,  if  we  are  going  to  pre- 
pare to  equip  an  adequate  army,  in  the  item  of  horses,  in 
an  adequate  manner,  our  farmers  had  better  begin  at 
once  to  raise  a  greatly  increased  number  of  colts,  as  well 
as  boys,  to  be  soldiers;  and  Uncle  Sam  had  better  set 
aside  a  very  considerable  sum  of  money  to  buy,  main- 
tain and  replace  his  stock  of  soldier  horses. 

Railways 

The  Germans  have  led  the  world  in  the  construction 
and  organization  of  railways  primarily  for  military  pur- 
poses. Strategic  routes ;  bases  of  operation ;  armored 
trains;  rolling  stock  suitable  for  transporting  soldiers, 
big  guns  and  military  supplies;  long  station  platforms, 
even  in  small  towns,  suitable  for  the  speedy  embarka- 
tion of  troops ;  extra-long  axles  suitable  for  conveying 
German  cars  into  Russian  territory, — all  these  and  a 


164*  PREPAREDNESS 

myriad  of  other  railway  details  have  been  worked  out 
with  military  precision  for  military  purposes. 

The  rest  of  Europe  has  followed  Germany  as  fast  and 
as  far  it  could  along  this  line  of  preparedness.  But  the 
United  States  has  built  and  organized  its  railway  system 
primarily  for  purposes  of  peaceful  industry  and  inter- 
course; and  we  are  assured  that  a  military  emergency 
would  break  down  that  system  again  just  at  it  did  during 
our  war  with  Spain  in  1898. 

It  is  urged,  accordingly,  that  our  entire  railway  sys- 
tem be  reorganized  on  a  purely  military  basis;  that  the 
use  of  the  railroads  by  the  governments  be  regarded,  not 
as  a  commercial  proposition,  but  as  a  military  one;  that 
certain  roads  be  designated  for  the  transportation  of 
troops,  others  for  the  moving  of  military  supplies,  others 
for  the  return  of  empty  equipment,  others  still  for  sup- 
plying the  non-combatant  population,  etc.;  that  a  com- 
plete government  census  of  all  rolling  stock,  motive 
power  and  other  equipment  be  procured ;  that  the  million 
and  a  half  of  railway  employes  be  enrolled  and  made 
ready  for  mobilization  on  the  tracks  or  in  the  trenches; 
and,  in  short,  that  everything  needful  be  done  to  make 
our  railway  system  a  fit  fighting  force. 

It  is  needless  to  point  out  that  the  task  of  building 
our  trans-continental  and  local  railroad  lines,  which  this 
country  has  been  grappling  with  for  three-quarters  of  a 
century,  fades  into  insignificance  in  comparison  with  this 
task  of  military  reorganization  and  preparedness  which 
the  danger  lest  the  Germans  land  upon  our  coasts  to- 
morrow imposes  upon  us. 

Waterways 

The  enthusiastic  advocates  of  a  chain  of  inland  water- 
ways from  Maine  to  Florida  declared,  at  the  recent  eighth 
annual  convention  of  the  Atlantic  Deeper  Waterways 
Association,  that  such  a  chain  "  would  make  the  States 
along  the  Atlantic  seaboard  almost  invulnerable  to  for- 


PREPAREDNESS  ON  AND  UNDER  LAND    165 

eign  invasion."  A  state  senator  from  Rhode  Island  in- 
formed the  convention  that  a  system  of  inside  water 
routes  is  a  necessity  in  national  preparedness  and  would 
be  worth  more  than  forty  battleships.  A  congressman 
from  Pennsylvania,  the  president  of  the  Association,  ad- 
vocated both  the  completion  of  the  system  of  waterways 
and  the  building  of  adequate  armaments  for  it ;  and  both 
he  and  another  congressman  from  Pennsylvania  de- 
manded federal  appropriations  for  this  feature  of  "  river 
and  harbor  improvements  "  and  denounced  the  tendency 
to  speak  of  such  appropriations  as  being  in  the  interest 
of  "  the  pork  barrel." 

The  Association  set  aside  July  28  as  the  "  Waterways 
National  Defense  Day,"  and  arranged  on  that  day  ex- 
cursions of  state  and  federal  officials,  accompanied  by 
army  and  navy  officers,  for  the  purpose  of  showing  the 
utterly  unprepared  condition  of  our  coast  defenses.  It 
will  inaugurate  in  Congress  durmg  the  coming  winter 
a  campaign  for  preparedness  of  its  very  own,  designed 
to  secure  a  large  number  of  canals  like  that  across  Cape 
Cod,  through  which  it  would  be  possible  to  send  battle- 
ships from  Boston  to  New  Orleans  by  an  inside  route, 
and  submarines  and  destroyers  from  New  York  to  any 
port  on  the  Great  Lakes  and  thence  down  the  Missis- 
sippi. 

This  form  of  "pork  barrel "  legislation  will  doubtless 
be  bitterly  opposed  by  those  prepareders  who  desire  to 
see  the  national  revenue  expended  on  the  army  and  navy 
rather  than  on  inland  waterways.  But  those  prepareders 
who  insist  on  the  military  value  of  the  waterways  will 
doubtless  point  to  the  fact  that  Germany  has  developed 
its  waterways  for  military  purposes  and  has  made  of  the 
Rhine  and  other  rivers  as  important  links  in  its  chain  of 
defense  as  are  the  railways  themselves.  If  Germany, 
why  not  Uncle  Sam? 


166  PREPAREDNESS 

Agriculture,  Mining  and  Natural  Resources 

The  American  farmer  has  been  described,  with  all  too 
good  reason,  as  a  "  miner,"  who  merely  takes  from  the 
soil  a  fertility  that  he  never  replaces.  Germany  has 
taught  us  how,  by  intensive  and  really  scientific  farming, 
both  to  increase  enormously  our  crops  and  at  the  same 
time  to  retain  and  increase  the  fertility  of  our  soil.  This 
lesson,  very  useful  in  time  of  peace,  is  essential  to  ade- 
quate preparedness  for  war ;  and  it  would  be  but  logical 
for  our  government,  threatened  by  real  war  with  a  first- 
class  power,  to  take  the  farmers  in  hand  and  put  them 
to  school. 

Other  natural  resources  besides  the  soil  must  be  most 
carefully  conserved,  preeminently  in  the  name  of  pre- 
paredness. Germany  has  long  regarded  its  soil,  mines 
and  forests  both  as  important  national  assets  and  as  the 
primary  source  of  its  sinews  of  war.  The  almost  un- 
limited demand  made  by  the  present  war  for  coal,  iron, 
copper,  lead  and  oil,  has  so  emphasized  the  importance 
of  the  conservation  of  natural  resources  that  it  would  be 
strange  indeed  if  our  ardent  prepareders  do  not  demand 
the  government  ownership  and  control  of  these  absolute 
essentials  of  adequate  preparedness  for  and  participa- 
tion in  war. 

Manufactures 

Government  ownership  and  control  of  manufactures 
might  well  seem  essential,  also,  when  one  contemplates 
the  necessity,  as  exemplified  in  Germany  to-day,  of  an 
entire  transformation  or  revolution  in  industry  for  the 
purpose  of  maintaining  a  first-class  war  with  a  first-class 
power.  We  have  witnessed  in  our  own  neutral  country 
the  very  extraordinary  transformation  of  numerous  lines 
of  industry  for  supplying  the  demands  of  the  belligerents 
for  munitions  of  war.  And  yet  we  are  informed  that 


PREPAREDNESS  ON  AND  UNDER  LAND    167 

American  manufacturers  have  supplied  less  than  one  per 
cent,  of  the  muntions  that  have  been  used! 

If  our  own  country  were  engaged  in  a  first-class  war 
with  a  first-class  power,  how  could  we  possibly  maintain 
that  war  unless  the  government  followed  the  example,  not 
only  of  Germany,  but  of  Great  Britain  and  France  as 
well,,  and  took  into  its  own  control  the  manufactures  de- 
voted to  military  supplies? 

We  have  seen  how  slow  and  difficult  it  has  been  for 
these  countries  to  achieve  this  transformation  after  the 
war  began;  why  does  not  real  preparedness  demand  its 
achievement  in  times  of  peace?  Already,  some  Ameri- 
cans are  demanding  a  government  monopoly  in  the  man- 
ufacture of  munitions  of  war, — chiefly  for  the  purpose  of 
preventing  private  manufacturers  from  fleecing  the  gov- 
ernment by  charging  exorbitant  prices  for  their  products, 
and  by  artificially  stimulating  the  government's  demand 
for  them.  Should  not  adequate  military  preparedness  be 
added  as  a  conclusive  argument  for  this  government  own- 
ership and  control, — especially  in  view  of  the  serious 
trouble  which  the  British  government  has  experienced 
from  strikes  on  the  part  of  employees  in  munitions  fac- 
tories ? 

But,  after  all,  the  manufacture  of  military  supplies  is 
of  minor  importance,  even  in  war-time,  when  compared 
with  a  country's  entire  manufacturing  system;  for  what 
would  be  the  sense  in  fighting  for  land  and  people,  if 
the  people  at  home  should  be  left  to  die  from  lack  of  ade- 
quate manufactured  supplies?  Old  Sparta  and  Fred- 
erick II.  of  Prussia  were  right:  Adequate  preparedness 
for  war  demands  the  government  ownership  and  con- 
trol of  industry  in  time  of  peace  as  well  as  in  time  of  war. 
The  old  adage,  "  In  time  of  peace  prepare  for  war,"  is 
peculiarly  applicable  to  a  country's  industrial  system, 
upon  which  depends  the  welfare,  not  only  of  the  soldiers 
in  the  field,  but  of  the  entire  population  at  home. 


168  PREPAREDNESS 

Finance 

Ours  is  the  age  of  credit.  In  the  old  days  of  money 
and  barter,  preparedness  for  war  might  more  reasonably 
have  neglected  its  financial  basis ;  although  history  is  full 
of  examples  of  the  fact  that  bad  shillings,  or  paper  dol- 
lars, or  assignats,  have  caused  more  real  injury  and  mis- 
ery than  have  the  swords  or  bullets  of  the  enemy.  But 
for  "  adequate  preparedness  "  to  neglect  a  financial  prep- 
aration for  war  would  be  fatal. 

This  form  of  "  adequate  preparedness  "  is  too  large  a 
subject  to  be  discussed  here ;  but  it  may  be  suggested  by 
one  or  two  concrete  illustrations.  At  the  beginning  of 
the  present  war,  the  German  government  commanded 
the  banks  of  the  Empire  only  to  receive  gold  and  silver, 
and  not  to  pay  it  out,  even  to  depositors.  Hence,  it 
would  behoove  private  citizens  to  hoard  up  their  gold 
and  silver  at  home,  in  time  of  peace,  so  that  they  might 
have  some  of  that  useful  commodity  in  hand  when  our 
great  war  begins. 

Our  government,  too,  should  certainly  follow  the  ex- 
ample of  Germany  and  store  up  an  immense  and  con- 
tinually increasing  supply  of  gold  in  some  strong  fortress. 
Germany  started  its  present  war-fund  with  the  indemnity 
paid  by  France  in  1871 ;  the  United  States,  thanks  to  the 
extraordinary  balance  of  trade  in  its  favor  during  the 
present  war,  has  now  on  hand  an  unprecedented  supply  of 
gold.  It  should  keep  fast  hold  of  this  and  augment  it 
by  every  possible  method.  What  are  economic  laws, 
when  military  preparedness  is  at  stake  ?  "  Money  talks  " ; 
and  more  than  one  war  has  been  won  by  the  "  last  gold 
sovereign  " ! 

Again,  this  war  has  taught  us  the  necessity  of  govern- 
ments being  able  to  borrow  enormous  sums  of  money, — 
running  far  into  the  billions  of  dollars.  These  loans  have 
been  placed  among  their  own  citizens  and  with  our 
American  financiers.  Now,  it  is  evidently  a  very  foolish 


PREPAREDNESS  ON  AND  UNDER  LAND    169 

policy  for  us  to  indulge  our  ambition  to  become  a  "  Na- 
poleon of  finance  "  on  the  money-markets  of  the  world, 
or  to  emulate  the  "  Old  Lady  of  Thread-needle  Street " 
in  becoming  the  world's  creditor.  For,  not  only  shall  we 
need  every  dollar  of  our  own  capital  to  invest  in  our  own 
industries, — transformed  as  they  must  be  for  real  mili- 
tary preparedness, — but  we  must  also  husband  all  our 
resources  to  be  loaned  to  our  government  when  the  great 
war  bursts  upon  us. 

In  the  matter  of  taxation,  too,  we  are  obviously  far 
from  being  prepared.  Our  chief  reliance  for  revenue  has 
been  on  import  duties  which  would  be  very  greatly  re- 
duced in  time  of  a  first-class  war.  The  income  tax  is, 
and  has  long  been,  the  chief  reliance  of  European  nations 
for  both  the  preparation  and  conduct  of  war;  we  have 
only  made  a  beginning  along  this  line.  It  is  true  that 
our  present  income  tax  has  been  necessitated  by  our 
enormously  increased  expenditures  on  our  army  and 
navy;  but  our  military  experts  tell  us  that  we  are  still 
"  absolutely  unprepared."  The  rate  of  the  income  tax, 
therefore,  should  be  largely  increased,  it  should  be  made 
progressive  in  proportion  to  increased  incomes,  and  the 
exemption  limit  should  be  lowered  far  below  the  $3,000 
or  $4,000  point  where  it  is  at  present.  Let  us  really  pre- 
pare! 

Political  Preparedness 

It  is  entirely  obvious  from  the  above  considerations 
that  our  American  Republic  is  in  crying  need  of  political 
reform,  and  perhaps  of  revolution. 

Absolutism  vs.  Democracy 

It  has,  in  fact,  become  a  grave  question  during  the 
present  war  whether  or  not  a  democracy  can  really  pre- 
pare for  and  conduct  a  great  war  in  Twentieth  Century 
style.  The  English,  with  their  popular  form  of  govern- 
ment,— fully  as  democratic  as  our  own  in  most  respects, 


170  PREPAREDNESS 

— have  seemed  to  lose  faith  at  times  in  the  military  effi- 
ciency of  any  government  short  of  despotism.  Even 
Germany,  on  the  crest  of  a  wave  of  victory,  has  had 
trouble  with  a  relatively  innocuous  Reichstag;  while 
Russia  has  shuddered  at  the  bare  shadow  of  popular  gov- 
ernment as  represented  in  its  Duma.  What  would  not 
happen  to  the  military  efficiency  of  our  president,  in  time 
of  a  great  war,  with  "  Congress  on  his  hands  "  ?  We 
find  it  a  sufficiently  difficult  task  to  induce  or  compel 
Congress  to  appropriate  a  paltry  billion  in  preparation 
for  war. 

A  Censorship  of  Public  Opinion 

Again,  what  can  a  country  hope  to  achieve  in  the  way 
of  conscription  and  a  number  of  other  military  essentials, 
when  freedom  of  speech  and  a  free  press  are  rampant  ? 
A  strict  censorship  has  been  found  necessary  in  France 
and  Great  Britain,  but  has  been  increasingly  difficult  to 
enforce.  In  Germany,  now,  they  manage  such  things 
better;  for  in  time  of  peace  they  provide, — and  use  oc- 
casionally by  way  of  practice  and  wholesome  warning, — 
good,  strong  muzzles  for  the  mouth-pieces  of  popular 
sentiment.  Let  us,  therefore,  take  warning,  and  include 
in  our  adequate  preparedness  programme  a  sure  means 
of  preventing  public  opinion  from  interfering  with  mili- 
tary efficiency,  by  crushing  that  opinion  at  its  birth  or 
providing  a  strait- jacket  for  its  callow  youth. 

State  Socialism 

From  the  point  of  view  of  military  preparedness, — 
as  well  as  from  some  other  points  of  view, — it  is  a  shame- 
ful waste  of  the  human  instruments  of  warfare  to  per- 
mit disease,  crime,  pauperism  and  unemployment  to  de- 
crease the  number  and  undermine  the  efficiency  of  the 
population. 

The  German  government  has  dealt  with  these  evils  or 
weaknesses  with  the  iron  hand  of  a  military  paternalism 


PREPAREDNESS  ON  AND  UNDER  LAND    171 

or  state  socialism.  It  has  "  cleaned  up "  its  popu- 
lation and  made  it  truly  efficient  for  successful  war- 
fare. 

Why  should  not  we  go  and  do  likewise?  We  can 
stamp  out  the  "  white  plague  "  and  the  other  scourges  of 
the  poor,  and  thus  enable  their  children  to  grow  up  into 
sturdy  soldiers,  or  the  mothers  of  sturdy  soldiers. 

We  can  keep  our  convicts  busy  in  making  munitions  of 
war,  or  in  building  military  roads;  we  can  diminish  the 
commission  of  crime  by  threatening  to  place  our  crimi- 
nals in  war-galleys,  or  coast  fortifications,  or  on  the 
front  line  of  battle  when  war  begins. 

We  can  abolish  pauperism  by  establishing  the  Euro- 
pean system  of  insurance  against  illness,  disability,  acci- 
dent, old  age.  We  can  provide  pensions  for  everyone  in 
the  public  service  [think  of  our  $160,000,000  per  year  for 
the  soldiers  long  since  dead  and  gone],  and  for  the  in- 
ventor of  every  military  device.  We  can  give  employ- 
ment and  wages  to  the  vast  army  of  our  unemployed  by 
drafting  them  into  the  real  army  and  navy  to  be  trained 
into  efficient  fighters,  as  well  as  to  be  paid  wages. 

It  is  high  time  that  we  were  up  and  doing  before  the 
enemy  is  knocking  at  our  gates.  Let  us  get  over  our 
childish  aversion  to  paternalism  in  government  and  give 
a  genuine  patria  potestas  to  our  too  good-natured  Uncle 
Sam.  Let  us  drop  our  fear  of  the  name  of  socialism, 
and  go  in  for  a  thoroughgoing  state  socialism  which  will 
prepare  us  to  go  into  a  first-rate  war  and  win. 

Down  with  the  Hyphen 

United  we  stand,  divided  we  fall,  is  peculiarly  true  in 
war  and  in  preparation  for  war.  What  can  America 
achieve  in  a  first-rate  war,  or  in  preparing  for  it,  if  there 
are  no  real  Americans  in  America,  but  only  warring  fac- 
tions of  British-Americans,  German-Americans,  French- 
Americans,  Austro-Americans,  Russian-Americans, 
Turco- Americans,  etc.,  etc.?  The  first  step  in  the  pre- 


172  PREPAREDNESS 

paredness  programme  is  obviously  to  achieve  national 
union. 

In  the  time  of  the  French  Revolutionary  and  Napo- 
leonic Wars,  when  our  Republic  was  in  its  infancy,  our 
American  citizenship  was  rent  in  twain  by  a  pro-British 
and  a  pro-French  party.  Washington  and  a  few  other 
real  Americans  were  barely  able  to  hold  the  Union  to- 
gether. This  Union  received  many  a  jolt  in  the  half- 
century  that  followed ;  but  it  was  hoped  that  in  the  fires 
of  a  dread  civil  war  it  had  finally  been  welded  together 
forever  and  without  the  shadow  of  a  fear  of  the  old 
weakness  of  disunion.  This  hope,  it  now  appears,  was 
too  optimistic.  The  President  in  his  last  message  to 
Congress,  after  urging  a  complicated  plan  of  prepared- 
ness, declares  that  we  should  prepare,  not  so  much 
against  foreign  foes,  as  against  the  foes  within  our  own 
household.  His  words  are  as  follows : 

"  I  have  spoken  to  you  today,  gentlemen,  upon  a  sin- 
gle theme,  the  thorough  preparation  of  the  nation  to  care 
for  its  own  security  and  to  make  sure  of  entire  freedom 
to  play  the  impartial  role  in  this  hemisphere  and  in  the 
world  which  all  believe  to  have  been  providentially  as- 
signed to  it.  /  have  had  in  my  mind  no  thought  of  any 
immediate  or  particular  danger  arising  out  of  our  rela- 
tions with  other  nations.  We  are  at  peace  with  all  the 
nations  of  the  world,  and  there  is  reason  to  hope  that  no 
question  in  controversy  between  this  and  other  govern- 
ments will  lead  to  any  serious  breach  of  amicable  rela- 
tions, grave  as  some  differences  of  attitude  and  policy 
have  been  and  may  yet  turn  out  to  be. 

"I  am  sorry  to  say  that  the  gravest  threats  against 
our  national  peace  and  safety  have  been  uttered  within 
our  own  borders.  There  are  citizens  of  the  United 
States,  I  blush  to  admit,  born  under  other  flags,  but  wel- 
comed under  our  generous  naturalization  laws  to  the 
full  freedom  and  opportunity  of  America,  who  have 
poured  the  poison  of  disloyalty  into  the  very  arteries  of 


PREPAREDNESS  ON  AND  UNDER  LAND    173 

our  national  life ;  who  have  sought  to  bring  the  authority 
and  good  name  of  our  Government  into  contempt,  to  de- 
stroy our  industries  wherever  they  thought  it  effective 
for  their  vindictive  purposes  to  strike  at  them  and  to 
debase  our  politics  to  the  uses  of  foreign  intrigue.  Their 
number  is  not  great  as  compared  with  the  whole  number 
of  those  sturdy  hosts  by  which  our  nation  has  been  en- 
riched in  recent  generations  out  of  virile  foreign  stocks; 
but  it  is  great  enough  to  have  brought  deep  disgrace 
upon  us  and  to  have  made  it  necessary  that  we  should 
promptly  make  use  of  processes  of  law  by  which  we  may 
be  purged  of  their  corrupt  distempers. 

"  America  never  witnessed  anything  like  this  before. 
It  never  dreamed  it  possible  that  men  sworn  into  its  own 
citizenship,  men  drawn  out  of  great  free  stocks  such  as 
supplied  some  of  the  best  and  strongest  elements  of  that 
little,  but  how  heroic  nation  that  in  a  high  day  of  old 
staked  its  very  life  to  free  itself  from  every  entangle- 
ment that  had  darkened  the  fortunes  of  the  older  na- 
tions and  set  up  a  new  standard  here, — that  men  of  such 
origins  and  such  free  choice  of  allegiance  would  ever 
turn  in  malign  reaction  against  the  Government  and  peo- 
ple who  had  welcomed  and  nurtured  them  and  seek  to 
make  this  proud  country  once  more  a  hotbed  of  Euro- 
pean passion. 

"  A  little  while  ago  such  a  thing  would  have  seemed 
incredible.  Because  it  was  incredible  we  made  no  prepa- 
ration for  it.  We  would  have  been  almost  ashamed  to 
prepare  for  it,  as  if  we  were  suspicious  of  ourselves,  our 
own  comrades  and  neighbors !  But  the  ugly  and  incredi- 
ble thing  has  actually  come  about  and  we  are  without 
adequate  Federal  laws  to  deal  with  it. 

"  I  urge  you  to  enact  such  laws  at  the  earliest  possible 
moment  and  feel  that  in  doing  so  I  am  urging  you  to  do 
nothing  less  than  save  the  honor  and  self-respect  of  the 
nation.  Such  creatures  of  passion,  disloyalty  and  an- 
archy must  be  crushed  out.  They  are  not  many,  but 


174  PREPAREDNESS 

they  are  infinitely  malignant,  and  the  hand  of  our  power 
should  close  over  them  at  once.  They  have  formed  plots 
to  destroy  property;  they  have  entered  into  conspiracies 
against  the  neutrality  of  the  Government;  they  have 
sought  to  pry  into  every  confidential  transaction  of  the 
Government  in  order  to  serve  interests  alien  to  our  own. 
It  is  possible  to  deal  with  these  things  very  effectually. 
I  need  not  suggest  the  terms  in  which  they  may  be  dealt 
with. 

"  I  wish  that  it  could  be  said  that  only  a  few  men, 
misled  by  mistaken  sentiments  of  allegiance  to  the  gov- 
ernments under  which  they  were  born,  had  been  guilty 
of  disturbing  the  self-possession  and  misrepresenting  the 
temper  and  principles  of  the  country  during  these  days 
of  terrible  war,  when  it  would  seem  that  every  man  who 
was  truly  an  American  would  instinctively  make  it  his 
duty  and  his  pride  to  keep  the  scales  of  judgment  even 
and  prove  himself  a  partisan  of  no  nation  but  his  own. 
But  it  cannot.  There  are  some  men  among  us,  and  many 
resident  abroad  who,  though  born  and  bred  in  the  United 
States  and  calling  themselves  Americans,  have  so  forgot- 
ten themselves  and  their  honor  as  citizens  as  to  put  their 
passionate  sympathy  with  one  or  the  other  side  in  the 
great  European  conflict  above  their  regard  for  the  peace 
and  dignity  of  the  United  States.  They  also  preach  and 
practice  disloyalty.  No  laws,  I  suppose,  can  reach  cor- 
ruptions of  the  mind  and  heart;  but  I  should  not  speak 
of  others  without  also  speaking  of  these  and  expressing 
the  even  deeper  humiliation  and  scorn  which  every  self- 
possessed  and  thoughtfully  patriotic  American  must  feel 
when  he  thinks  of  them  and  of  the  discredit  they  are 
daily  bringing  upon  us." 

It  is  possible,  then,  that  we  have  come  to  this ;  that,  a 
century  and  a  quarter  after  our  political  union  began,  and 
a  half-century  after  one  great  civil  war  was  supposed  to 
have  cemented  it  forever,  we  shall  be  called  upon  to  fight 
another  still  more  awful  civil  war?  And  that  our  pre- 


PREPAREDNESS  ON  AND  UNDER  LAND    175 

paredness  must  be  directed  against  this  danger  which 
is  nearer  and  greater  than  is  the  danger  of  attack  by  for- 
eign foe?  What  would  be  the  scope  and  meaning  of 
"  adequate "  military  preparedness  for  such  an  emer- 
gency as  this? 

International  Preparedness 

If  we  are  to  prepare  "  adequately  "  against  naturalized 
or  alien  foes  within  our  own  borders,  as  well  as  against 
the  foreign  foe  from  whose  loins  they  sprang,  it  would 
appear  to  be  but  ordinary  prudence  to  carry  our  pre- 
paredness programme  into  other  lands  beyond  the  seas. 

A  Foreign  Press  Campaign 

We  have  witnessed  during  the  present  war  an  extraor- 
dinary appeal  through  the  manifold  products  of  the  press 
to  the  public  opinion  of  neutral  nations,  especially  of  our 
own.  Both  camps  of  combatants  in  the  war  have  de- 
fended continually  and  vehemently  their  own  motives 
and  conduct,  and  blackened  those  of  their  opponents. 
We  know,  it  is  declared,  who  our  future  enemies  are  to 
be.  Then  why  not  now,  in  time  of  peace,  create  public 
opinion  in  our  favor  throughout  the  world  and  against 
the  enemy,  in  wise  preparation  for  the  war? 

At  the  same  time,  a  campaign  in  newspaper,  magazine 
and  the  "  best  sellers,"  should  be  carried  on  at  home  for 
the  purpose  of  sowing  in  the  hearts  of  our  own  people 
seeds  of  suspicion,  envy,  hatred,  which  may  spring  up 
into  a  harvest  of  embittered  efficient  soldiers  when  "  The 
Day  "  of  reckoning  with  our  enemy  arrives. 

Foreign  Bases  of  Supply  and  Operation 

If  we  are  to  act  upon  the  wise  old  military  maxim  of 
carrying  our  war  of  defense  into  the  enemy's  territory, 
we  should  include  in  our  preparedness  programme  the 
organization,  within  that  territory  or  close  upon  its  bor- 
ders, of  adequate  bases  of  supply  and  operation.  These 


176  PREPAREDNESS 

will  be  all  the  more  necessary  for  us  because  of  the  long 
distances  across  the  oceans  to  our  central  base  at  home. 

We  know  how  important  to  Germany  have  been  the 
Belgian  railways  and  the  French  coal  and  iron  mines. 
Surely  there  must  be  some  way  in  which  we  can,  by 
hook  or  by  crook,  establish  in  time  of  peace  an  invisible 
control  over  such  resources  on  the  boundaries  of  the 
enemy's  country  which  would  stand  us  in  good  stead  in 
time  of  war. 

We  have  heard  stories  of  massive  concrete  piers  for 
ocean  steamers,  or  for  factories  and  warehouses,  built 
by  Germans  in  London,  Paris  and  other  advantageous 
places  [even  in  Hoboken!],  and  all  ready  for  use  as 
mountings  for  big  guns  when  the  German  troops  ar- 
rived. Surely  there  are  enough  iron,  cement  and  pa- 
triotic Americans  living  abroad,  to  accomplish  these  and 
other  forms  of  preparedness  in  the  territory  of  our  pro- 
spective foe! 

Espionage  and  Incendiarism 

To  spy  out  the  best  places  for  these  bases  of  opera- 
tion, and  to  enable  them  to  be  built  with  the  requisite 
degree  of  secrecy,  a  far-reaching  system  of  secret  service 
for  work  in  foreign  lands  must  be  organized.  Merely  to 
arrest  in  America,  now  and  then,  a  spy  or  two  of  Ger- 
man, British  or  Japanese  origin,  is  far  from  adequate 
preparedness. 

We  know  something  of  the  wide-spread  system  of 
espionage,  which  existed  before  the  war  among  the 
"  possible  enemies  "  of  Europe,  by  reading  of  the  many 
trials  and  convictions  of  foreign  spies,  in  the  various 
lands  which  are  now  at  war  with  each  other.  Doubt- 
less, they  all  learned  much  that  is  of  much  service  now 
that  war  has  come.  Here  is  one  fertile  field  in  which 
Yankee  ingenuity  and  cleverness  can  expand  itself  in 
patriotic  and  adequate  preparedness. 

But  even  it  is   far  from  sufficient.     We  have  had 


PREPAREDNESS  ON  AND  UNDER  LAND    177 

brought  home  to  us  the  military  importance  of  dynamit- 
ing munition  plants  and  paralyzing  industry  by  causing 
strikes  and  boycotts.  Here  is  another  fair  field  for  the 
cultivation  of  our  adequate  prepareders ;  and  it  lies  not 
only  within  the  territory  of  our  possible  enemy,  but 
within  that  also, — as  we  Americans  have  learned  full 
well, — of  those  neutral  lands  from  which  our  enemy  may 
hope  to  gain  his  military  supplies,  the  raw  materials  of 
his  industry,  and  his  food  supply  as  well.  In  the  bar- 
barous days  of  old,  ambassadors  were  those  who  were 
sent  to  lie  abroad  for  the  good  of  their  country.  In  our 
more  civilized  and  efficient  days,  we  might  send  forth  a 
cloud  of  spies,  incendiaries  and  the  like,  who  would  put 
the  I.W.W.  and  nihilists  to  shame  by  their  far-reaching 
preparedness  in  foreign  lands  for  our  victory  in  time  of 
war. 

Offensive  and  Defensive  Alliances 

Above  all,  in  these  days  when  war  itself  is  inter- 
nationalized and  a  half-dozen  nations  or  more  fight  on 
either  side,  it  behooves  us  to  instruct  our  ambassadors 
to  secure  understandings,  ententes  and  iron-clad  alli- 
ances with  the  powers  of  this  earth,  both  great  and  small. 
Even  the  little  fellows  in  the  Balkans  may  come  in 
handy,  as  we  have  seen. 

Washington's  warning  against  entangling  alliances  is 
entirely  out  of  date,  and  if  adhered  to  might  well  cause  our 
country  itself  to  be  eclipsed.  If  a  victorious  Germany  and 
her  allies  are  to  attack  us,  we  should  prepare  for  such 
an  emergency  by  making  an  offensive  and  defensive  alli- 
ance with  all  that  is  left  of  Germany's  opponents  and 
with  all  that  are  left  of  the  neutral  states.  If  a  victori- 
ous Great  Britain,  Japan  and  their  allies  are  to  attack 
us,  it  is  none  too  early,— perhaps,  in  view  of  our  last 
year's  experiences,  it  is  even  now  too  iate, — for  us  to 
bind  the  Teuton  and  the  Turk  to  our  sides  as  shield  and 
buckler. 


178  PREPAREDNESS 

J.      A   SUMMARY   OF   PREPAREDNESS    ON    LAND 

Looking  back  over  the  many  and  vitally  important 
items  in  this  programme  of  "  fundamental  preparedness," 
it  seems  almost  like  a  descent  from  the  sublime  to  the 
ridiculous,  from  the  text  to  the  foot-note,  to  become  ab- 
sorbed again  in  the  programme  for  mere  military  pre- 
paredness on  the  land  and  under  it.  But  since  this  is 
what  the  prepareders  of  to-day  have  fixed  their  hearts 
upon,  and  are  urging  upon  the  attention  of  our  citizens, 
the  plunge  must  be  taken,  and  a  summary  of  land  pre- 
paredness be  presented  before  we  proceed  to  the  pre- 
paredness programmes  for  the  seas  and  air. 

A  standing  army  of  regular  or  professional  soldiers  is 
alone  adequate,  one  school  of  experts, — the  most  expert 
of  all, — declares ;  not  tens  or  even  hundreds  of  thousands 
of  these,  but  millions  of  them  are  needed  for  adequate 
defense.  In  a  first-class  war  between  first-class  powers, 
capture  or  sickness,  death  or  permanent  disability,  or 
even  "  missing,"  accounts  for  hundreds  of  thousands  and 
millions.  Two  millions  "  missing,"  five  millions  captive, 
eleven  millions  dead  or  permanently  disabled;  such  is 
the  record  of  the  European  War  to  date. 

The  cost  of  an  "  adequate  "  standing  army  of  from 
250,000  to  5,000,000  men  would  be  from  $250,000,000  to 
$5,000,000,000  per  annum! 

If  we  depend  upon  Reserves,  we  find  that  we  have  16 
as  against  Germany's  4,430,000  reserves.  The  new  plan 
would  give  us  400,000  reserves  at  the  end  of  seven 
years,  and  at  the  cost  of  some  $200,000,000. 

The  State  Militia,  or  National  Guard,  has  so  many 
and  such  grave  defects  that  it  is  seriously  proposed  to 
abolish  it.  If  it  has  too  strong  a  political  hold  on  life 
for  this,  then  bolster  it  up  by  pay, — a  minimum  annual 
pay  of  from  $60,000,000  to  $80,000,000 ;  but  whatever  is 
done  to  it  to  strengthen  it  as  a  makeshift,  we  are  as- 


PREPAREDNESS  ON  AND  UNDER  LAND    179 

sured  that  it  will  never  be  numerous  enough  or  truly 
adequate. 

Volunteers,  in  the  shape  of  a  "  Federal  Citizen  Army 
of  Continentals  "  and  to  the  number  of  400,000  within 
the  next  three  years,  are  proposed  to  help  eke  out  the 
strength  of  our  regulars,  reserves  and  militiamen.  But 
these  newcomers  are  resented  alike  by  the  regulars  and 
the  militiamen;  neither  their  number  nor  training  is  re- 
garded as  adequate ;  and  their  cost  is  prodigious. 

To  enlist  150,000  regulars,  400,000  reserves,  2,000,- 
ooo  militiamen,  and  400,000  Continentals,  would  be  very 
difficult,  perhaps  impossible,  in  a  land  whose  people  are 
absorbed  in  the  world's  real  work.  Without  conscrip- 
tion, which  democracy, — even  in  Great  Britain  in  the 
midst  of  the  greatest  of  wars, — rejects  as  suicidal,  many 
novel  incentives  would  have  to  be  resorted  to,  and  many 
novel  sources  of  supply  would  be  needed  to  be  tapped. 

To  give  an  "  adequate  "  training  to  such  a  large  num- 
ber of  men  and  officers,  outside  of  the  regular  army, 
would  require  a  number  and  variety  of  experiments  in 
the  field  of  education,  which  would  prove  extremely  ex- 
pensive and  utterly  inadequate,  and  would  militarize  the 
American  republic  into  the  despotism  of  a  Prussia  or  a 
Sparta. 

Turning  to  the  material  of  warfare,  we  find  that  mod- 
ern war  requires  thousands  of  big  guns,  of  from  12-inch 
to  17-inch  calibre,  with  a  range  of  from  ten  to  twenty 
miles,  costing  about  $100,000  each,  and  lasting  for  about 
150  shots. 

Rifles  having  been  temporarily  eclipsed, — perhaps  an- 
tiquated,— by  machine-guns,  we  find  that  we  need  twelve 
of  these  for  every  1,000  troops ;  or,  if  we  adopt  the  Ger- 
man one-man  machine-gun,  100  for  every  1,000  troops. 
Our  facilities  for  making  them  can  turn  out  5,000  in 
three  months;  to  equip  a  small  army  of  800,000  men 
with  them  would  require  about  four  years. 

We  think  that  we  have  revolutionized  our  munitions 


180  PREPAREDNESS 

industry  during  the  present  war,  and  we  have;  but  that 
revolution,  compared  with  what  would  really  be  needed 
to  equip  us  "  adequately  "  for  a  great  war,  is  like  Shay's 
Rebellion  as  compared  with  the  French  Revolution.  If 
we  supply  Europe  with  I  per  cent,  of  the  ammunition 
required  in  the  present  war,  what  does  preparedness 
along  this  line  mean  in  supplying  ourselves  "  adequately  " 
for  a  great  war  of  our  own  ? 

What  kinds  of  ammunition  shall  we  prepare  ?  Smoke- 
less powder,  or  high  explosives,  or  poisonous  gases,  or 
burning  liquids?  How  many  and  what  kinds  of  bombs 
and  shells?  Shall  we  go  in  for  them  all,  and  make  as 
many  as  possible  of  every  kind?  If  so,  can  our  industrial 
system,  our  national  pocket-book,  and  our  moral  stand- 
ards endure  the  strain?  And  what  assurance  have  we 
that  the  year  of  grace, — and  science, — 1916,  will  not 
make  the  whole  lot  of  them  as  antiquated  and  inade- 
quate as  a  last  year's  bird's-nest? 

As  for  fortifications, — thus  far  we  have  merely 
"  played  politics  "  with  our  inland  forts,  which  would  be 
of  as  much  service  in  a  real  war  of  "  Chubby  Berthas  " 
as  an  Indian  tomahawk  or  a  tree-trunk.  For  these,  as 
for  moving  forts  in  the  shape  of  armored  trains,  trolleys 
and  automobiles,  we  have  illimitable  opportunity, — as  il- 
limitable as  our  valleys  and  rivers  and  mountains,  our 
railway,  trolley  and  high-road  systems.  Along  our 
coasts,  we  have  some  200  miles  partially  protected;  and 
about  14,000  miles  adequately  to  protect. 

Even  such  amazing  and  un-American  fortresses  as 
Liege,  Antwerp  and  Warsaw  are  inadequate  before  the 
onslaught  of  16  and  1 7-inch  guns.  Fortress  guns,  such 
as  our  12-inch  ones,  with  an  effective  range  of  13,000 
yards,  are  not  adequate  against  such  guns  as  the  1 5-inch 
guns  of  the  Queen  Elisabeth,  with  an  effective  range  of 
21,000  yards. 

Yes,  we  could  get  them,  too,  if  we  got  down  to  busi- 
ness on  the  military  programme.  But  we  should  at  least 


PREPAREDNESS  ON  AND  UNDER  LAND     181 

know  what  this  business  means,  from  every  point  of 
view;  and  of  this  we  should  be  informed  also,  that  the 
eternal  rivalry  between  the  means  of  offense  and  the 
means  of  defense  is  no  nearer  an  end  and  an  "adequate  " 
decision  than  it  was  in  the  days  of  the  sling-shot  and  the 
tree-trunk.  Indeed,  the  advent  of  the  aeroplane  makes 
"  preparedness"  of  every  kind  on  land  as  uncertain 
and  inadequate  as  a  mercury  or  quicksand  foundation  for 
a  temple. 

Dig,  hide,  burrow, — such  are  the  watch-words  in  this 
war  of  aeroplanes,  bombs  and  shrapnel.  Intrenchments 
stretching  8,800  miles  is  the  proud  record  of  this  pres- 
ent war.  We  are  said  to  have  men  and  facilities  at  pres- 
ent for  intrenching  for  about  65  miles.  When  we  con- 
template the  men,  tools  and  materials  needed  for  "  ade- 
quate "  digging-in,  living-under  and  fighting-from,  our 
broad  and  generous  piece  of  Mother  Earth,  we  realize 
something  of  the  endless  vista  of  preparedness  that  opens 
up  before  us  along  this  line. 

It  is  needless  to  recount  again  the  "  fundamental  pre- 
paredness "  of  the  individual  and  society,  by  the  count- 
less physical,  mental,  moral,  industrial,  commercial,  finan- 
cial, political  and  international  means  available  in  this 
Twentieth  Century.  But  it  may  again  be  stated  that 
these  means  are  absolutely  essential  to  "  adequate  "  pre- 
paredness; that  to  neglect  them,  or  to  use  them  half- 
heartedly, is  to  invite  disaster;  and  that  to  develop  them 
to  the  limit  is  not  only  an  endless  task,  but  one  that  is 
fraught  with  the  deadliest  menace  to  the  prosperity,  in- 
tegrity and  liberty  of  our  American  Republic. 


VII 
PREPAREDNESS   ON   AND   UNDER   THE   SEA 

BUT,  the  naval  experts  assure  us,  all  this  endless 
preparedness  on  the  land  and  under  it  is  wholly 
unnecessary ;  the  navy  is  the  best  and  only  really 
possible  defense  for  the  United  States.  With  only  Can- 
ada to  the  north  of  us,  and  only  Mexico  to  the  south, 
and  with  the  Pacific  and  Atlantic  Oceans  on  either  front, 
we  can  and  should  depend  upon  naval  preparedness  to 
defy  a  hostile  world. 

But,  some  enthusiasts  declare,  give  us  adequate  pre- 
paredness on  the  sea,  and  we  will  not  be  obliged  to  face 
a  hostile  world ;  a  good  navy  is  the  best  preservative  of 
peace.  The  field  secretaries  of  the  Navy  League  have 
been  preaching  this  philosophy  of  peace  for  years,  and 
they  are  still  preaching  it  in  spite  of  the  present  worst 
war  in  history  between  Great  Britain  and  Germany,  both 
of  which  countries,  all  the  experts  are  agreed,  have  far 
better  navies  than  our  own.  Surely,  if  any  navy  can 
preserve  peace,  Great  Britain's  might  have  been  ex- 
pected to  do  so. 

No,  other  naval  enthusiasts  admit,  we  can  never  hope 
to  build  a  navy  that  can  insure  peace;  but  we  can  build 
a  navy  for  defense  when  the  "  inevitable  "  future  war 
bursts  upon  us.  At  a  recent  meeting  of  the  Navy  League 
in  Philadelphia,  for  example,  a  doctor  of  divinity  de- 
clared :  "  Christianity  and  war  are  incompatible ;  you 
can't  link  an  army  and  navy  to  Christianity.  They  don't 
jibe.  It  is  true  that  I  preach  that  war  is  wrong.  But 
in  the  face  of  a  world-war,  and  the  danger  to  this  coun- 
try of  a  possible  war,  Christianity  is  helpless.  There- 
fore," he  continued,  "  I  hung  up  my  Christianity  on  Au- 

182 


PREPAREDNESS  ON  AND  UNDER  SEA  183 

gust  4,  1914,  and  will  not  take  it  down  until  the  end  of 
the  war.  And  a  navy  at  least  double  the  size  of  our  pres- 
ent one  is  a  sheer  necessity.  It  is  too  bad  that  it  is  not 
lawful  to  murder  the  man  who  does  not  understand  the 
need  of  a  greater  navy." 

The  frank  speaking  of  this  representative  of  the  Prince 
of  Peace  is  not  emulated,  at  least  in  public,  by  many  other 
clerical,  civil  or  military  critics;  but  his  sentiments  are 
evidently  shared  by  a  goodly  number,  and  it  is  obviously 
desirable  that  all  should  at  least  "  understand  the  need 
of  a  greater  navy."  Let  us,  then,  analyse  the  naval  pro- 
gramme, taking  into  consideration  our  present  prepared- 
ness on  and  under  the  seas,  the  preparedness  of  other 
nations,  and  what  we  should  be  called  upon  to  do,  so  as 
to  be  adequately  prepared  to  meet  a  first-class  naval 
power  in  Twentieth  Century  naval  warfare. 

A.      PREPAREDNESS    ON  THE    SEA 

Dreadnoughts  and  Superdreadnoughts 

We  naturally  turn  first  to  the  warship, — the  dread- 
nought, or  jM/>?rdreadnought,  as  it  has  so  recently  and 
so  rapidly  become. 

Their  Increased  Size  and  Cost 

Men  still  in  early  middle  life  have  watched  these  war- 
ships grow.  Twenty-five  years  ago  the  United  States 
built  its  first  real  modern  battleships;  these  were  the 
Massachusetts,  the  Indiana  and  the  Oregon,  of  11,000 
tons'  displacement.  Ten  years  ago,  the  first  "  dread- 
nought" was  launched,  with  a  displacement  of  18,000 
tons.  This  year,  the  Pennsylvania  was  launched  with 
31,400  tons;  and  the  superdreadnoughts  planned  for  1916 
and  1917  will  have  32,000  tons  or  more.  Within  the 
same  quarter-century,  the  cost  of  our  warships  has  in- 
creased from  $6,000,000  for  the  Massachusetts  to  $14,- 
000,000  for  the  Pennsylvania,  and  for  the  superdread- 
noughts planned  for  1916  and  1917,  $15,000,000  and  $18,- 


184  PREPAREDNESS 

800,000,  respectively.  Thus  within  twenty-five  years, 
our  warships  have  increased  nearly  three-fold  in  size 
and  more  than  three-fold  in  initial  cost. 

So  huge  are  these  naval  monsters  that  there  are  very 
few  harbors  in  the  world  that  can  accommodate  them, 
and  but  very  few  drydocks  that  can  build  or  repair  them. 
So  expensive  are  they  that  there  are  very  few  universi- 
ties or  colleges  that  possess  an  endowment  equal  to  the 
cost  of  a  single  one  of  them,  or  have  an  annual  expendi- 
ture equal  to  its  maintenance. 

How  Many  Do  We  Need? 

How  many  of  these  superdreadnoughts  do  we  need, 
to  be  "  adequately  prepared  "  ?  The  General  Board  of 
the  Navy,  which  is  the  official  adviser  of  the  Navy  De- 
partment, has  advocated  for  a  number  of  years  a  navy 
comprising  forty-eight  battleships,  less  than  twenty  years 
old,  and  192  destroyers.  This  the  Board  has  considered 
a  suitable  "  foundation  of  fighting  ships  for  purposes  of 
defense  against  the  strongest  nation,  except  Great  Brit- 
ain." 

Just  why  the  number  of  battleships  was  placed  at  forty- 
eight,  no  man  can  tell.  There  happen  to  be  forty-eight 
States  in  the  Union,  and  it  may  be  considered  a  delicate 
compliment  to  continue  the  plan  of  giving  each  of  them 
a  dreadnought  as  a  namesake.  Or  it  may  be  that,  since 
the  Board  advocated  the  building  of  four  battleships 
each  year,  it  calculates  that  at  that  rate  we  should  main- 
tain our  navy  at  forty-eight  ships  less  than  twenty 
years  old.  But  what  relation  either  the  namesake 
scheme,  or  the  four-each-year  plan,  has  to  "adequate 
preparedness,"  the  Board  has  never  deigned  to 
explain. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  present  war,  we  had  12  bat- 
tleships of  the  dreadnought  type,  either  built  or  building ; 
Great  Britain  had  36;  Germany  had  20;  France  had  12, 
and  Japan  had  6.  Of  the  pre-dreadnought  type,  we  had 


PREPAREDNESS  ON  AND  UNDER  SEA  185 

22;  Great  Britain  40;  Germany  20;  France  18,  and 
Japan  13.  If  we  had  been  called  upon  to  fight  Germany, 
our  battleships  would  have  been  to  hers  as  17  to  20;  or 
Germany  and  its  present  allies,  as  2  to  3.  If  Great 
Britain  is  our  foe,  then  our  battleships  would  have  been 
to  hers  as  I  to  2 ;  or  Great  Britain  and  her  present  allies, 
as  i  to  5.  And  let  us  not  lay  flattering  unction  to  our 
souls,  our  naval  experts  warn  us,  by  fancying  that  the 
sea-power  of  the  present  belligerents  is  being  mutually 
destroyed.  We  are  assured  that  even  during  this  year 
of  stupendous  warfare,  Great  Britain  has  laid  down  the 
keels  of  eleven  dreadnoughts  and  Germany  nine!  We 
are  warned,  also,  to  contemplate  the  navy  of  a  victorious 
Great  Britain,  or  a  victorious  Germany,  when  the  fleets 
of  its  defeated  rival  have  been  added  to  it. 

To  keep  pace  with  the  battleships  of  our  "  possible 
enemies,"  then,  how  many  shall  we  build  each  year?  If 
we  are  to  fight  Japan,  one  a  year  is  not  enough;  if  we 
are  to  fight  a  normal  Germany,  two  a  year  are  not 
enough;  if  we  are  to  fight  a  victorious  Germany,  four 
a  year  are  not  enough ;  if  we  are  to  fight  a  normal  Great 
Britain,  six  a  year  are  not  enough;  if  we  are  to  fight  a 
victorious  Great  Britain,  no  man  can  say  how  many  are 
enough ! 

Under  the  spur  of  the  preparedness  campaign,  our 
present  administration  is  proposing  the  expenditure  upon 
our  navy  during  the  next  five  years  of  one  billion  dollars. 
Of  this  sum,  more  than  one-half  is  to  be  expended  on 
the  construction  of  new  ships.  Sixteen  of  these,  costing 
about  $300,000,000,  are  to  be  battleships  and  battle  cruis- 
ers. That  is  to  say,  if  this  programme  is  adopted,  we 
shall  have  at  the  end  of  five  or  six  years,  28  dreadnoughts 
and  battle  cruisers,  while  Germany  had  28  a  year  ago, 
and  Great  Britain  had  46. 

It  may  be  salutary  for  us  to  remember,  also,  the  state- 
ment of  a  former  Secretary  of  the  Navy  that  we  have 
already  spent  a  half-billion  dollars  more  upon  our  navy 


186  PREPAREDNESS 

than  Germany  spent  upon  hers,  bat  that  ours  is  a  bad 
second  to  it! 

Armored  Crmuers 

Next,  consider  the  item  of  armored  cruisers.  The  first 
of  these,  the  New  York  and  the  Brooklyn,  were  built 
twenty-five  years  ago ;  they  had  8,000  and  9.000  tons'  dis- 
placement ;  and  a  speed  of  21  knots.  Since  then,  armored 
cruisers  have  grown  in  SJTC  to  14,500  tons*  displacement, 
and  in  speed  to  22  knots.  At  the  beginning  of  the  war, 
we  had  n  of  these,  as  against  34  for  Great  Britain,  9  for 
Germany,  20  for  France,  and  13  for  Japan. 

The  new  preparedness  programme  provides  for  no 
more  of  these  cruisers,  for  the  reason  that  they  have  been 
made  obsolete  by  the  submarine  and  the  battle  cruiser. 

Battle  Cnusers 

^ 

But  let  us  not  flatter  ourselves  on  being  ahead  of  Ger- 
many in  the  item  of  armored  cruisers,  even  though  we 
are  behind  Japan  and  have  only  one-third  as  many  as 
Great  Britain.  For  Germany,  Great  Britain  and  Japan 
have  been  building  battle  cruisers,  which  are  a  type  far 
superior  to  the  armored  cruiser,  having  a  displacement 
of  from  20,000  to  30,000  tons,  and  a  speed  of  from  27 
to  31.75  knots.  Of  these  formidable  warships.  Great 
Britain  had  built  or  building  at  the  beginning  of  the  war 
10,  Germany  8,  Japan  4,  and  die  United  States  none 
at  all! 

The  effectiveness  of  the  battle  cruisers  as  against  even 
the  heavily  armored  cruisers,  was  shown  in  the  Battle  of 
the  Falkland  Islands,  last  December,  when  the  British 
Invincible  and  Inflexible  so  readily  destroyed  the  Ger- 
man Schomkorst  and  Gneisenan. 

The  "  war  games  "  of  our  navy  during  the  past  sum- 
mer have  also  revealed,  to  the  navy  men,  the  ease  with 
which  an  invading  expedition  equipped  with  battle  cruis- 
ers, could  evade  or  destroy  our  existing  navy  and  land 


PREPAREDNESS  ON  AND  UNDER  SEA  187 

troops  on  the  Chesapeake  Bay,  the  Delaware  River,  and 
Long  Island,  thus  menacing  Washington  and  Baltimore, 
Philadelphia,  New  York  and  Boston.  The  "theoreti- 
cal "  battle  cruisers  in  these  war  games,  by  reason  of  their 
long  range  and  high  speed,  enabled  them,  according  to 
the  umpires,  "  to  pick  off  the  slower  and  weaker  cruisers 
almost  at  will,  at  the  same  time  eluding  the  supporting 
dreadnoughts."  One  of  our  naval  experts,  to  whom 
Japan  looms  large  on  the  western  horizon,  declares: 
*'  One  of  these  powerful  ships  [that  is,  Japan's  four  bat- 
tle cruisers]  could  in  one  swoop  crush  our  entire  Pacific 
fleet,  destroy  our  solitary  dry-dock  at  Olongapo  in  the 
Philippines,  cross  the  sea,  and  raid  every  unfortified  city 
on  the  Pacific  Coast  from  Sitka  to  San  Diego,  meanwhile 
coaling  in  our  ports,  and  on  the  way  home  capture  Guam. 
Nothing  of  ours  could  overtake  and  destroy  it." 

Under  the  spur  of  such  expert  terrorizing  as  this,  the 
new  preparedness  programme  proposes  to  remedy  this 
apparently  fatal  defect  in  our  navy  by  giving  us,  by  the 
end  of  1921,  six  battle  cruisers  at  a  cost  of  $105,000,000. 
This  would  place  us  ahead  of  Japan, — provided  that 
Japan  builds  no  more  in  the  meantime ;  but  even  then  we 
should  lag  behind  the  number  that  both  Great  Britain 
and  Germany  had  a  year  ago. 

Other  experts  declare  that  it  is  foolish  for  us  to  enter 
into  the  competition  of  building  battle  cruisers,  for  they 
seriously  question  the  genuine  efficiency  of  this  kind  of 
battleships.  It  is  argued,  for  example,  that  they  are  a 
hybrid,  and  possess  neither  the  speed  of  the  light  cruiser 
with  equal  engine  power,  nor  the  heavy  armor  and  ar- 
ray of  guns  of  the  dreadnought ;  that,  consequently,  they 
will  prove  a  failure,  as  all  other  hybrids  have  done, — 
notably  the  old  Texas  of  1889,  which  was  a  cross  be- 
tween a  battleship  and  a  cruiser,  and  because  of  "  ineffi- 
ciency "  was  finally  used  as  a  target  in  Chesapeake  Bay. 
Again,  the  halting  of  four  British  battle  cruisers  after 
they  had  sunk  the  German  battle  cruiser,  Bliicher,  in  the 


188  PREPAREDNESS 

Battle  of  Heligoland  Bight,  last  January,  is  pointed  to 
as  evidence  of  the  battle  cruiser's  helplessness  in  the  face 
of  the  submarine. 

At  the  very  least,  these  critics  urge,  the  European  bat- 
tle cruisers  should  be  given  a  fair  trial  in  the  present  war 
and  proven  a  real  success,  before  the  United  States  in- 
vests a  hundred  millions  in  them. 

Scout  Cruisers 

Again,  consider  the  item  of  "light  armored  cruisers" 
or  "scouts,"  which  are  used  for  the  protection  or  de- 
struction of  commerce;  for  scouting  service  and  the  de- 
struction of  torpedo  craft,  when  with  the  battle  fleet;  or 
for  the  same  service  when  with  the  torpedo  flotilla.  Of 
these,  the  United  States  had  built  or  building  at  the  be- 
ginning of  the  war,  14;  Germany,  46;  Great  Britain,  91 ; 
and  Japan,  13.  Our  new  programme  proposes  10  more 
of  these  before  1921  at  a  cost  of  $50,000,000;  but  even 
then  we  shall  be  a  long  way  behind  the  point  reached  by 
two  of  our  "  possible  enemies  "  at  the  beginning  of  the 
war! 

Torpedo  Boats  and  Destroyers 

Torpedo  boats,  as  launchers  of  torpedoes,  have  been 
antiquated  by  the  advent  of  submarines ;  but  torpedo  boat 
destroyers  are  still  demanded  as  the  protectors  or  senti- 
nels of  dreadnoughts  against  submarines.  Some  critics 
of  our  navy  consider  them  "  the  most  war-ready  units  of 
the  navy  " ;  but  declare  that  we  have  not  nearly  enough. 
The  General  Board  of  our  Navy  demands  four  of  them 
for  each  dreadnought,  or  192  in  all.  Counting  in  the 
torpedo-boats  of  earlier  type,  we  have  75;  Germany,  154; 
Great  Britain,  237  (besides  hundreds  of  armed  fishing- 
boats)  ;  and  Japan,  79.  The  new  programme  proposes  to 
give  us  within  five  years,  50  more  destroyers  at  a  cost 
of  $68,000,000,  or  125  in  all;  again,  a  long  way  behind 
the  Great  Britain  and  Germany  of  1914. 


PREPAREDNESS  ON  AND  UNDER  SEA  189 


B.      WHAT     SHALL    OUR     PROGRAMME     BE? 

Taking  note  of  the  five  classes  of  above-water  fight- 
ing-craft, we  find  ourselves  outclassed,  at  the  beginning 
of  the  present  war,  in  all  of  these  by  Great  Britain;  in 
four  of  them  by  Germany ;  and  in  three  of  them  by  Japan. 

Great  Germany  Japan  United 

Britain  States 
Battleships 

Dreadnoughts    36  20  6         12 

Pre-dreadnoughts    ...     40  20  13         22 

Battle  Cruisers  10  8  4          o 

Armored  Cruisers  34  g  13         j  i 

Scout  Cruisers   91  46  13         14 

Torpedo  Boats  237  154  79         75 

The  new  preparedness  programme  proposes  to  spend 
$411,000,000  within  the  next  five  years  upon  76  more 
ships  of  the  five  types,  and  thereby  increase  our  number 
to  210. 

Taking  them  all  together,  and  adding  coast  defense  ves- 
sels (of  which  Great  Britain  has  none),  for  Germany  2, 
Japan  2  and  the  United  States  4,  we  find  the  totals  to 
be:  Great  Britain,  448;  Germany,  259;  United  States, 
214;  and  Japan,  130. 

On  the  showing  of  these  official  figures,  we  might  over- 
take a  normal  Great  Britain,  in  the  next  twenty  years,  by 
trebling  our  yearly  outfit  of  war-craft ;  and  a  normal  Ger- 
many, by  doubling  it.  As  to  a  victorious  Great  Britain,  or 
a  victorious  Germany  :  who  shall  say  what  our  programme 
should  be?  As  to  the  expense  of  such  a  programme, 
we  may  get  some  idea  from  the  statement  of  a  former 
Secretary  of  the  Navy,  Mr.  Meyer,  that  we  have  already 
spent  $500,000,000  more  upon  our  navy  than  Germany 
has  spent  on  hers !  And  from  the  further  fact  that  the 
new  preparedness  programme,  with  an  expenditure  of 
nearly  $500,000,000  more,  would  not  bring  us,  by  the 
end  of  1921,  within  40  ships  of  what  Germany  had  in 


190  PREPAREDNESS 

,  or  within  one-half  of  Great  Britain's  number  a  year 


ago! 

Such  facts  as  these,  however,  are  of  small  significance 
to  our  prepareders.  They  reply,  as  Congressman  Gard- 
ner does  :  "  I  believe  that  we  ought  not  to  acquiesce  in 
the  John  Bull  theory  that  they  be  allowed  to  have  twice 
as  many  ships  as  the  United  States  [he  should  have  said 
thrice}  or  anybody  else  on  earth."  *  And  in  regard  to 
the  expense,  they  say,  also  with  Mr.  Gardner  :  "  The 
armament  of  Germany  and  Great  Britain  has  been 
made  almost  entirely  without  regard  to  cost  ;  —  when  it 
is  a  question  of  national  safety  and  the  safety  of  democ- 
racy, as  in  our  case,  I  think  they  should  be  made  without 
regard  to  cost."  2 

The  prepareders,  when  they  argued  that  peace  could 
be  maintained  only  by  "  adequate  armaments,"  were 
thoroughgoing  peace-at-any-price  men;  no\v  that  they 
believe  in  "  adequate  armaments  "  for  purposes  of  de- 
fense, they  are  still  any-price  men.  But,  instead  of  being 
willing  to  pay  as  they  go,  and  bearing  the  burden  of  ex- 
pense themselves,  they  propose  to  shift  the  burden  to  the 
shoulders  of  future  generations  by  issuing  bonds  to  se- 
cure the  funds  for  their  "  preparedness  "  programme. 
Iron-clad  as  is  their  determination  to  prepare,  they  are 
equally  determined  not  to  prepay. 

Great  Britain's  Two-Power  Policy 

The  British  Government  has  long  advocated  a  "  two- 
power  "  policy,  or  a  policy  of  "  two  keels  to  one  "  ;  that 
is,  the  policy  of  maintaining  England's  navy  as  equal  to 
the  navies  of  any  other  two  powers.  At  the  height  of 
the  popularity  of  this  policy,  England  held  a  review  of 
its  navy,  which  was  participated  in  by  twenty-eight  miles 
of  warships,  steaming  one  behind  the  other  as  close  as 
safety  would  permit.  That  same  summer,  England 

1  Before  the  Committee  on  Naval  Affairs,  December  18,  1914. 
*  Ibid. 


PREPAREDNESS  ON  AND  UNDER  SEA  191 

passed  through  an  acute  panic  of  fear  lest  she  was  liable 
to  an  invasion  from  Germany.  It  was  the  summer  when 
the  play,  "  An  Englishman's  Home,"  set  England  wild ; 
and  the  answer  of  England's  big  navy  men  was,  of  course, 
build  twenty-eight  more  miles  of  warships.  The  oppo- 
nents of  "  preparedness  "  endeavored  to  point  out  the 
need  of  ascertaining  and  removing  Germany's  hatred  or 
fear  of  England,  and  emphasized  the  fact  that  Germany 
was  building  and  launching  dreadnoughts  only  in  imita- 
tion of  England,  and  because  of  Germany's  fear  of  Eng- 
land's navy.  This  effort  was  in  vain;  the  mad  competi- 
tion continued  at  an  accelerated  rate,  until — the  greatest 
war  in  history,  and  the  determination  on  each  side  to  de- 
stroy the  other's  menacing  navy. 

Our  Two-Ocean  Policy 

England's  policy  of  "two  keels  to  one"  and  Ger- 
many's policy  of  "  a  navy  for  defense,"  was  brought 
across  the  Atlantic  during  a  recent  presidential  adminis- 
tration and  translated  into  a  "  two  ocean  policy,"  or  the 
policy,  in  the  words  of  President  Roosevelt,  of  having  a 
navy  so  large  that  one  fleet  could  be  maintained  on  the 
Atlantic  and  one  on  the  Pacific,  each  of  them  able  to 
cope  with  any  fleet  that  could  be  sent  against  it.  This 
policy  at  that  time  was  evidently  aimed  at  Germany  and 
Japan.  But  during  the  present  war,  it  has  been  defined 
by  a  United  States  Senator  as  follows :  "  Our  national 
defense  requires  a  fleet  at  least  as  powerful  as  those  of 
Great  Britain  and  France  on  the  Atlantic,  and  of  Japan 
and  Russia  on  the  Pacific  " ! 

When  asked  as  to  "  adequate  "  defense  against  Great 
Britain's  navy,  the  presidential  reply  was  that,  when  the 
Panama  Canal  is  opened,  the  two  fleets  can  readily  cooper- 
ate with  each  other  against  even  the  mistress  of  the  seas. 
President  Roosevelt's  successor  argued  that,  with  the 
opening  of  the  Canal,  we  should  be  able  to  keep  station- 
ary, and  even  to  diminish,  the  two-ocean  fleets.  Now, 


192  PREPAREDNESS 

however,  that  the  Culebra  Cut  continues  to  slide,  and 
reduces  for  weeks  at  a  time  the  level  of  the  water  in  the 
Canal  to  thirty  feet,  whereas  at  least  thirty-five  feet  are 
necessary  for  the  passage  of  a  dreadnought,  our  naval 
experts  have  returned  to  the  full  two-ocean  policy. 

It  has  been  found  in  fact  that  the  Panama  Canal  has 
become  a  great  military  and  naval  liability,  and  not  an 
enormously  valuable  asset.  As  a  part  of  the  coast-line 
of  the  United  States,  and  as  one  of  the  supposedly  great- 
est prizes  of  modern  warfare,  not  only  has  it  been  forti- 
fied at  enormous  expense,  but  its  defense  is  put  forward 
as  one  of  the  prime  reasons  for  greatly  increasing  our 
navy.  Taken  in  connection  with  our  naval  base  at  Guan- 
tanamo,  700  miles  distant,  it  is  regarded  as  "  the  Gibraltar 
of  the  American  Mediterranean,"  and  has  become 
the  object  of  utmost  solicitude  on  the  part  of  those  who 
demand  for  this  "  Caribbean  Gibraltar  and  Mediter- 
ranean "  as  much  or  more  naval  and  military  protection 
than  Great  Britain  accords  to  their  European  counter- 
parts. The  present  war  has  shown  also  the  ease  with 
which  a  dirigible  could  drop  explosives  on  the  Canal,  so 
as  to  block  it  up  for  an  indefinite  time ;  and  a  new  alarm 
has  arisen  lest,  when  the  United  States  goes  to  war  with 
Japan  and  sends  its  navy  into  the  Pacific,  Germany  will 
send  a  bomb  into  the  Panama  Canal  and  then  seize  the 
opportunity,  in  our  fleet's  absence  from  the  Atlantic,  to 
invade  Long  Island  and  New  York  or  Boston ! 

Hence  the  two-ocean  policy  is  regarded  as  indispensa- 
ble, as  far  as  Germany  and  Japan  are  concerned ;  while  as 
for  Great  Britain, — well,  why  should  John  Bull  be  per- 
mitted, as  Mr.  Gardner  pointedly  inquired,  to  have  twice 
or  thrice  as  many  warships  as  Uncle  Sam  ?  War  is  hell, 
Mr.  Gardner  admits ;  but,  he  continues,  "  the  most  pitia- 
ble animal  known  to  natural  history  is  a  cat  in  hell  with- 
out claws.  I  want  more  dogs  of  war,"  he  shouts,  "  and 
I  want  those  dogs  to  have  teeth."  Well,  if  we  are  really 
going  to  permit  our  country  to  go  to  hell,  in  the  role  of  a 


PREPAREDNESS  ON  AND  UNDER  SEA  193 

black  cat  or  a  yellow  dog,  we  had  better  get  down  to 
business  on  the  feline  chiropodist's  and  canine  dentist's 
tasks  that  lie  before  us.  But  let  us  go  into  the  business, 
at  least,  with  our  eyes  wide  open  and  realize  entirely  the 
kind  and  number  of  claws  and  teeth  we  should  require, 
as  cat  or  dog,  to  whip  the  British  lion  or  the  German 
double-eagle. 

A  Navy's  Cost  and  Obsolescence 

It  is  not  merely  the  greatly  increased  number  of  bat- 
tleships demanded  by  the  preparedness  programme  that 
we  should  bear  in  mind,  but  also  their  greatly  increased 
cost.  Fifteen  millions  of  dollars  seemed  to  be  and  was  a 
stupendous  price  to  pay  last  year  for  a  single  dread- 
nought ;  but  next  year,  it  will  cost  nineteen  millions.  Tor- 
pedo boat  destroyers,  too,  have  increased  in  price  from 
$925,000,  for  the  last  one  authorized  by  Congress,  to  $i,- 
360,000  apiece  for  those  now  demanded.  These,  of 
course,  are  merely  the  prices  of  the  ships  when  launched, 
— their  initial  cost ;  and  to  this  must  be  added  the  cost  of 
their  maintenance  and  up-keep,  ranging  as  high  as  $i,- 
000,000  per  annum  for  a  dreadnought. 

But  still  the  whole  story  of  cost  is  not  told.  For  no 
sooner  is  a  battleship  launched, — in  fact,  no  sooner  is  its 
keel  laid  down, — than  it  begins  immediately  to  deterio- 
rate ;  not  so  much  because  it  is  a  machine  and  deteriorates 
as  all  machines  must  do,  but  especially  because  bigger 
and  better  fighting  machines  are  immediately  planned  and 
constructed. 

As  an  American  newspaper  humorist  puts  it :  "  Straw 
hats  in  December  are  not  as  out  of  date  as  a  battleship 
by  the  time  it  has  become  launched.  It  costs  $15,000,000, 
and  is  the  most  powerful  thing  on  earth,  except,  perhaps, 
a  United  States  district  judge.  But  the  nation  which  has 
just  dug  down  for  it  can't  take  any  pleasure  in  it,  because 
the  country  next  door  has  just  completed  plans  for  a  ship 
which  will  make  this  one  look  as  foolish  as  a  rowboat 


194.  PREPAREDNESS 

with  a  hoop-skirt  for  a  turret."  Or  as  a  First  Lord  of 
the  British  Admiralty  puts  it :  "  It  is  wrong  and  waste- 
ful to  build  a  single  ship  for  the  navy  which  is  not  wanted. 
Nearly  three  years  of  her  brief  life  have  been  lived  before 
she  is  born.  Before  she  is  even  launched,  the  vessels 
which  are  capable  of  destroying  her  have  been  projected. 
It  is  an  ill  service  to  the  Navy  to  build  a  single  ship  before 
its  time."  The  "  life  "  of  a  battleship,  after  it  has  been 
launched, — that  is,  in  time  of  peace, — is  placed  by  the  ex- 
perts at  about  fifteen  years.  During  that  short  period 
only,  can  it  be  placed  in  the  "  first  fighting  line  " ;  and 
during  even  that  period  it  continues  day  by  day  to  lose 
in  absolute  and  relative  efficiency.  Hence,  each  genera- 
tion must  not  only  build,  but  rebuild,  its  fleet  of  dread- 
noughts. 

The  proud  "  sovereigns  of  the  seas  "  of  a  dozen  or 
fifteen  years  ago  are  as  useless  to-day  for  winning  a 
victory  in  a  first-class  naval  battle  as  is  a  last  year's  bird's 
nest  for  hatching  next  spring's  chickens.  Again,  com- 
pare the  six  battleships  of  the  Connecticut  class,  which 
were  built  or  building  in  1905-6,  with  the  three  super- 
dreadnoughts  of  the  California  class,  which  are  now  be- 
ing built.  Their  lengths  are  450  feet,  as  against  624  feet ; 
their  displacement,  16,000  tons,  as  against  32,000  tons; 
their  speed,  18  knots,  as  against  21  knots;  their  arma- 
ment 4  12-inch,  8  8-inch  and  12  7-inch  guns,  as  against 
12  14-inch  and  22  5-inch  guns;  their  cost  less  than  $8,- 
000,000,  as  against  more  than  $15,000,000. 

The  Constant  Revolution  in  Naval  Warfare 

But  even  yet  the  whole  story  is  not  told.  For,  not  only 
are  bigger  and  better  ships  of  the  same  type  built  from 
year  to  year  and  month  to  month,  but  entirely  new  types, 
or  fundamental  modifications  in  the  old  types,  are  in- 
vented, and  the  whole  science  of  ship-building  is  revolu- 
tionized. For  example,  although  the  price  of  torpedo- 
boat  destroyers  has  increased  during  the  war  by  50  per 


PREPAREDNESS  ON  AND  UNDER  SEA  195 

cent.,  their  usefulness  as  scouts  has  been  practically  nulli- 
fied by  the  development  of  aeroplanes. 

One  of  the  most  striking  illustrations  of  the  revolution- 
ary results  of  introducing  new  types,  or  fundamental 
modifications  of  the  old,  is  that  of  the  launching  of  the 
first  "  dreadnought."  Great  Britain  launched  this  mon- 
ster of  the  deep  with  unrestrained  rejoicings;  for  it 
seemed  to  make  assurance  doubly  sure  that  with  such 
a  warship  British  preparedness  was  complete.  It  was 
soon  realized  in  England,  however,  that  the  advent  of  the 
monster  had  dwarfed  into  relative  insignificance  between 
700  and  800  of  Great  Britain's  sea-dogs  of  war.  In  Ger- 
many, too,  the  naval  experts  recognized  a  great  oppor- 
tunity, and  at  once  followed  the  example  of  building 
dreadnoughts.  So  well  did  Germany  succeed  in  this  that 
the  superiority  of  Britain's  navy  was  endangered; 
and,  to  maintain  its  two-power  policy,  it  was  neces- 
sary to  build  superdreadnoughts.  Along  this  line,  also, 
Germany  began  to  compete,  and  the  contest  waxed  hot- 
ter and  hotter  until  this  war  was  precipitated  to 
solve  by  tour  de  force  the  insoluble  problem.  Mean- 
while, the  superdreadnoughts  eclipsed  not  only  all  the 
pre-dreadnought  ships,  but  even  the  dreadnoughts  them- 
selves. 

But  it  is  not  merely  through  large  increase  in  size  and 
armor,  that  a  revolution  in  building  warships  may  be 
caused.  Radical  changes  in  ordnance  and  in  speed  have 
had  the  same  result.  For  example,  the  effectiveness  of 
12-inch  as  against  8-inch  guns,  and  of  6-inch  as  against 
4-inch  guns,  was  shown  in  the  battle  of  the  Falkland  Is- 
lands last  December,  when  the  Invincible  and  Inflexible 
sunk  the  Scharnhorst  and  Gneisenau,  and  the  Glasgow 
sunk  the  Leipzig.  The  loss  of  the  Bluecher,  in  the  Battle 
of  the  North  Sea,  and  of  the  Good  Hope  and  Monmouth, 
in  the  Battle  of  the  Pacific,  because  of  their  relative  slow- 
ness, illustrates  the  revolutionary  results  of  better  types 
of  engines  and  fuel.  "  If  you  can  outsail  and  outshoot 


196  PREPAREDNESS 

your  opponent,  the  battle  is  yours ! "  so  runs  the  rule  at 
present  in  vogue. 

The  development  of  the  battle  cruiser,  which,  like  the 
dreadnought,  is  constantly  growing  in  size  and  yet  far 
surpasses  it  in  speed,  threatens  to  supersede  even  the  su- 
perdreadnought.  Captain  Hobson,  among  other  naval 
experts,  pins  his  faith  to  this  new  type  of  warship,  and 
demands  that  we  should  add  them  to  our  navy  with  40,- 
ooo  tons'  displacement  and  with  a  speed  of  30  knots. 

Even  battle-cruisers  of  the  Queen  Elizabeth  type, 
of  which  Great  Britain  is  now  building  five  more, — with 
main  batteries  of  eight  1 5-inch  guns, — have  a  speed  of  25 
knots;  and  they  are  considered  to  have  outclassed  the 
Oklahomas  and  Pennsylvania^,  with  14-inch  guns  and  a 
speed  of  21  knots. 

As  for  the  battleship  of  whatever  type,  there  are  ex- 
perts who  confidently  declare  that  its  era  has  passed  away 
forever.  What  steam  did  to  the  sail,  what  the  iron-clad 
did  to  the  wooden  hull,  the  submarine  and  airship  have 
done  to  the  battleship :  made  it  a  back  number.  Take,  for 
example,  the  Monitor,  that  proud  sovereign  of  the  seas, 
which  is  credited  with  having  turned  the  tide  of  war  that 
was  running  against  the  Union  a  half-century  ago,  and 
revolutionized  the  art  of  naval  warfare  in  its  day.  Many 
later  and  greatly  improved  monitors  have  been  added 
since  that  time  to  our  navy.  But  what  are  they  now? 
They  have  not  been  utterly  discarded,  as  yet;  but  they 
have  been  resuscitated  to  serve  the  submarines  as  travel- 
ing blacksmith  shops  and  gasoline  tanks ! 

Consider,  again,  the  pre-dreadnought  battleships,  those 
supreme  sea-kings  of  a  short  decade  ago.  We  have  22 
of  them,  but  naval  experts  declare  that  13  of  these  "  be- 
long about  as  much  to  the  first  line  of  battleships  as  a 
2-cylinder  car  belongs  to  the  first  line  of  automobiles." 

The  super-dreadnought,  too,  which  now  wears  the 
Monitor's  crown  as  sovereign  of  the  seas,  is  destined, — 
and  that  right  soon, — to  the  limbo  of  the  has-beens.  One 


PREPAREDNESS  ON  AND  UNDER  SEA  197 

school  of  critics  and  inventors  declare  that  its  knell  has 
been  sounded,  and  that  it  is  already  being  replaced  in  Ger- 
many by  the  unsinkable  ship.  Such  a  ship,  of  the  Gath- 
mann  type,  is  provided  with  a  triple  hull  of  steel,  each 
of  the  three  steel  coats  only  three-fourths  of  an  inch 
thick,  but  enclosing  air-spaces  of  40  and  30  inches  be- 
tween them.  By  so  simple  a  device,  it  has  been  found 
possible  to  build  warships  that  are  unsinkable  by  mines, 
torpedoes  or  high  explosive  shells.  The  other  school  of 
critics  of  the  battleship  insist  that  the  submarine  will 
soon  put  it  out  of  business.  It  appears  that  it  is  im- 
possible to  protect  the  hull  of  a  battleship  against  the 
torpedoes  or  high  explosive  shells  of  the  submarine. 
And  this  brings  us  to  a  new  era  in  naval  warfare,  namely, 
warfare  under  the  sea. 

C.      PREPAREDNESS    UNDER    THE    SEA 

Warfare  on  a  large  scale  under  the  earth,  under  the 
sky,  and  under  the  sea,  has  been  the  preeminent  charac- 
teristic of  the  present  great  struggle.  Intrenchments, 
airships  and  submarines  have  filled  the  fields  of  battle, 
the  newspapers,  and  the  minds  of  non-combatants  alike. 

Submarine  Boats 

Of  these,  the  submarine,  while  it  may  not  have  achieved 
more  than  the  others,  has  been  most  prominent  in  the 
popular  mind.  It  is  natural,  therefore,  that  all  pro- 
grammes of  preparedness  should  stress  this  item  strongly. 
The  United  States,  particularly,  claims  to  be  a  non-ag- 
gressive power,  and  looking  at  armaments  from  the  point 
of  view  of  defense  regards  the  submarine  as  of  highest 
value  to  it  for  defensive  purposes ;  this  value,  it  believes, 
is  greatly  enhanced  because  of  the  relatively  long  coast- 
line. 

But  the  "defensive"  purpose  for  which  the  sub- 
marine has  proved  its  value  during  this  war  is  not  only 
that  of  defending  a  coast  line  against  attack,— as  in  the 


198  PREPAREDNESS 

case  of  the  German  and  Belgian  coasts  and  the  Darda- 
nelles,— but  also  of  defending  battleships  against  battle- 
ships, and  of  attacking  merchantmen,  transports,  sea- 
ports, and  even  battleships  themselves. 

Their  defense  of  battleships  was  illustrated  in  the 
Battle  of  Heligoland  Bight,  when  five  British  battle 
cruisers  pursued  four  German  battle  cruisers  and  sunk 
one  of  them,  the  Bluecher,  but  turned  back  from  the  pur- 
suit of  the  others  because  of  the  danger  of  submarines. 
In  the  words  of  the  victorious  British  Admiral :  "  The 
presence  of  the  enemy's  submarines  subsequently  [after 
the  sinking  of  the  Bluecher}  necessitated  the  action  being 
broken  off."  Thus  a  squadron  of  the  most  formidable 
capital  ships,  running  at  high  speed  and  accompanied  by 
torpedo  boat  destroyers,  was  checked  by  the  appearance, 
— planned  beforehand  or  summoned  during  the  pursuit, — 
of  a  line  of  submarines.  If  the  German  Admiral  had 
been  accompanied  by  submarines  at  the  beginning  of  his 
raid  on  the  English  coast,  the  question  may  well  be  raised 
as  to  the  success  of  his  attempted  invasion. 

The  attack  of  German  submarines  upon  belligerent  and 
contraband-carrying  merchantmen  was  for  many  weeks 
one  of  the  spectacular  and  significant  features  of  the 
present  war. 

The  proclamation  by  the  Germans  of  "  a  war  zone  " 
around  the  British  Isles,  and  the  activity  of  their  sub- 
marines within  that  zone,  are  but  too  familiar  to  Ameri- 
cans and  other  neutrals,  as  well  as  to  the  British  and 
French.  The  sinking  of  the  4-funneled,  32,oooton  Lusi- 
tania,  one  of  the  largest  of  ocean  greyhounds  and  the  loss 
of  more  than  1,000  of  its  passengers,  has  shown  in  most 
dramatic  and  terrible  fashion  the  effectiveness  of  the  sub- 
marine as  against  merchantmen.  In  every  week  during 
the  first  year  of  the  war,  with  the  exception  of  two,  the 
German  submarines,  mines  or  cruisers  inflicted  some  loss 
on  British  shipping.  Within  six  weeks,  43  ships  were 
sunk  in  the  "  war  zone  " ;  in  one  week,  19  British  ships,  of 


PREPAREDNESS  ON  AND  UNDER  SEA  199 

a  total  tonnage  of  76,000,  fell  victims  to  German  sub- 
marines ;  in  two  days,  14  steamers  of  47,698  tons,  were 
sunk  by  them.  Within  twenty-four  hours,  a  single  sub- 
marine, the  U-29,  in  a  raid  in  the  English  Channel,  tor- 
pedoed seven  steamers,  sinking  five  of  them  and  badly 
injuring  two. 

Great  Britain  has  a  merchant  fleet  of  about  40,000 
.ships,  and  builds  each  year  more  than  all  the  rest  of  the 
world  put  together.  Hence,  it  is  a  long,  long  way  that 
the  German  submarine  must  travel  before  it  can  attain 
its  goal  of  destroying  or  seriously  injuring  Great  Brit- 
ain's over-seas  commerce.  Since  the  yielding  of  Ger- 
many to  the  demands  of  the  United  States  in  regard  to 
the  protection  of  neutral  lives  and  property,  there  has 
been  a  lull  in  the  submarine  activity.  The  British  insist, 
of  course,  that  this  is  due  to  an  acknowledged  failure  of 
the  submarine  campaign;  but  Great  Britain,  with  its 
enormous  vulnerability  in  merchantmen  and  warships, 
has  feared  and  affected  to  despise  the  submarine  from  its 
very  inception.  It  seems  entirely  possible  that  Admiral 
von  Tirpitz,  while  forced  to  yield  on  the  question  of  neu- 
tral lives,  is  strenuously  utilizing  German  efficiency  in 
the  development  and  construction  of  his  beloved  subma- 
rines, and  will  yet  launch  an  attack  overpowering  in  its 
intensity  upon  both  merchantman  and  warship. 

Meanwhile,  in  recent  weeks,  the  British  submarines 
have  found  their  way  into  the  Baltic,  and  are  making 
havoc  among  the  German  merchant-ships  which  carry 
trade  to  and  from  Scandinavia,  and  supplies  and  recruits 
to  Russia.  Within  a  period  of  twelve  days,  these  sub- 
marines have  sunk  20  German  ships,  aggregating  a  ton- 
nage of  38,000. 

Meanwhile,  also,  the  German  people  remain  confident 
of  the  ultimate  success  of  the  "  submarine  net  around  the 
British  Isles."  The  "  toll  of  our  tireless  U-boats,"  they 
insist,  "has  amounted  to  more  than  $1,000,000  per 
week  " ;  and  they  declare  that  the  British  censor  has  not 


200  PREPAREDNESS 

permitted  half  the  truth  about  British  losses  to  be  known. 
These  losses,  they  say,  include  many  small  fishing  smacks, 
of  no  great  value  in  themselves,  but  of  very  great  impor- 
tance in  protecting  Britain's  coasts,  giving  warning,  as 
they  do,  by  means  of  their  wireless  outfit,  of  the  sub- 
marines' approach. 

One  of  the  chief  aims  of  the  German  submarine  is  the 
sinking  of  British  troop-ships.  Two  millions  of  soldiers 
have  been  transported  by  them,  many  of  these  crossing 
the  Atlantic  and  Pacific  Oceans.  So  well  guarded  in 
every  possible  way  are  these  troop-ships,  however,  that 
thus  far  only  one  of  them  is  known  to  have  fallen  a  vic- 
tim. The  sinking  of  the  Royal  Edward,  by  a  submarine 
in  the  Aegean  Sea,  on  August  14,  1915,  caused  the  loss 
of  more  than  1,000  men,  and  proved  the  vulnerability  of 
both  the  Mediterranean  Route  and  the  troop-ship. 

On  that  same  ominous  day,  also,  occurred  another  evi- 
dence of  the  submarines'  power,  when  three  English 
towns,  Whitehouse,  Harrington  and  Parton,  on  the  Irish 
Sea,  near  Solway  Firth,  were  bombarded  by  them.  Thus 
not  only  the  airship,  but  the  submarine  as  well,  has 
broken  the  charmed  ring  around  the  British  Isles. 

Dreadnoughts  and  battle  cruisers  have  not  yet  been 
attacked  or  sunk  by  the  submarine;  but  the  possibility 
of  their  being  mastered  by  it  has  been  brought  near  to  cer- 
tainty by  the  retreat  of  the  five  British  battle  cruisers  men- 
tioned above ; *  and  already  armored  cruisers  and  even 
pre-dreadnought  battleships  have  fallen  a  prey  to  it  on 
several  occasions.  The  French  armored  cruiser  Leon 
Gambetta  of  12,416  tons'  displacement,  was  sunk  by  the 
Austrian  submarine,  U~5,  of  273  tons'  displacement.  The 
British  armored  cruisers,  the  Hague,  Cressy  and  Aboukir, 
each  of  12,000  tons'  displacement  and  a  speed  of  22  knots, 
were  sunk  at  one  time  by  the  U-p,  which  soon  afterwards 
sunk  the  Hawke  of  7,350  tons  and  19  knots;  and  the 
British  battleship  Formidable,  of  15,000  tons  and  18 
knots,  was  torpedoed  and  sunk  by  a  German  submarine, 

1  See  page  198. 


PREPAREDNESS  ON  AND  UNDER  SEA  201 

probably  the  U-2I,  of  800  tons  and  17  knots.  In  the  Sea 
of  Marmora,  up  to  October  26,  1915,  the  British  premier 
stated,  the  British  submarines  had  sunk  or  damaged  2 
battleships,  5  gunboats,  i  torpedo  boat,  8  transports  and 
197  supply  ships. 

The  British  battleships,  Ocean  and  Irresistible,  of  13,- 
ooo  and  15,000  tons,  and  18.5  and  18  knots,  respectively, 
and  the  French  battleship,  Bouvet,  of  12,000  tons  and  18 
knots,  were  sunk  in  the  Dardanelles;  these,  too,  have 
been  claimed  as  prey  of  the  submarine  although  the  Brit- 
ish and  French  Admiralties  insist  that  they  were  blown 
up  by  floating  mines.  From  the  Baltic,  also,  come  con- 
flicting reports  of  the  sinking  of  German  cruisers  and 
pre-dreadnoughts  by  British  submarines. 

Submarine  Battleships 

The  rapid  development  of  the  submarine  during  the 
war  has  been  as  astounding  as  its  fighting  effectiveness. 
When  the  war  began,  Germany's  submarines  had  an  ef- 
fective cruising  radius,  on  the  surface  of  the  sea,  of 
less  than  1,000  miles.  After  six  months  of  war,  their 
exploits  proved  that  this  radius  had  been  increased  to 
3,000  miles.  So  astonishing  were  the  distances  made  by 
them  from  their  base  of  fuel  supply,  that  the  wild  theory 
arose  that  "  the  Germans  have  under-water  deposits  of 
fuel  oil  cached  about  the  coast  of  Great  Britain,  from 
which  the  browsing  submarines  replenish  their  tanks." 
"  The  latest "  type  is  now  said  to  possess  a  cruising  radius 
of  6,000  miles;  and  one  of  this  type  made  its  way,  with 
its  original  supply  of  fuel,  from  Wilhelmshaven  to  Con- 
stantinople. When  this  latter  feat  was  accomplished, 
the  Neueste  Nachrichten,  of  Munich,  pointed  out  the  fact 
that  the  distance  from  Bremen  to  New  York  is  3,600 
miles,  and  expressed  "  the  hope  that  this  submarine  ex- 
ploit will  make  the  war  party  in  the  United  States  think 
twice." 

Meanwhile,  the  experts  in  our  own  country  are  en- 


202  PREPAREDNESS 

deavoring  to  respond  to  this  warning  with  another  equally 
impressive.  During  this  summer,  the  Lake  Torpedo 
Boat  Co.,  of  Bridgeport,  Connecticut,  tested  their  new 
submarine  G-J,  and  declared  that  it  can  cross  the  Atlantic 
Ocean,  sink  an  enemy's  ship,  and  return  to  the  American 
coast,  without  dependence  on  any  base  of  supplies  other 
than  the  home-base. 

Again,  the  submarine  which  required,  a  few  years  ago, 
twenty  minutes  to  sink  below  the  surface,  can  now  do  so 
in  less  than  three.  Its  speed  has  been  increased,  on  the 
surface,  from  10  knots  to  2,2,  and  under  the  surface  from 
5  knots  to  1 6.  A  greater  increase  of  speed  is  requisite 
in  the  submarine  before  it  can  keep  pace  with  or  over- 
take a  warship  of  the  battle  cruiser  type.  But  because  of 
its  diminutive  size,  and  its  ability  to  conceal  beneath  the 
water  everything  but  its  periscope,  it  can  not  be  detected 
by  a  warship,  under  normal  circumstances,  at  more  than 
five  miles'  distance;  and  since  it  can  see  a  warship 
at  a  distance  of  ten  miles,  it  can  creep  up  with  im- 
punity upon  a  prey  of  even  the  largest  type  and  greatest 
speed. 

Even  when  its  intended  victim  is  surrounded  by  fields 
of  mines,  it  can  sink  beneath  them,  and  even  beneath 
torpedo  nets,  and  then  rising  beneath  the  ship  at  anchor 
or  under  slow  speed  can  attach  to  it  a  mine  that  can  be 
exploded  by  an  electric  time-fuse  when  the  submarine 
has  made  good  its  escape.  The  exploit  of  a  British  sub- 
marine in  diving  under  five  rows  of  mines  and  torpe- 
doing a  Turkish  warship  is  a  striking  example  of  this 
kind  of  submarine  warfare.  It  is  even  possible  for  a 
single  submarine  to  attach  bombs  to  a  row  of  warships 
in  turn,  and  then  blow  them  up  all  at  once ;  or  to  launch 
its  torpedoes  into  each  of  them  in  turn.  The  German  U-9 
showed  the  success  of  this,  when  it  sank  in  the  North 
Sea  at  one  time  the  British  armored  cruisers,  the  Hogue, 
Cressy  and  Aboukir,  each  of  12,000  tons'  displacement 
and  a  speed  of  22  knots;  and  followed  this  achievement 


PREPAREDNESS  ON  AND  UNDER  SEA  203 

by  sinking  the  protected  cruiser,  the  Hawke,  of  7,350  tons 
and  19  knots. 

Admiral  Dewey  says  of  the  effectiveness  of  subma- 
rines against  battleships,  "  From  what  I  have  seen  of  the 
work  of  the  submarines,  it  is  my  belief  that  I  could  not 
have  held  that  bay  [Manila]  with  my  squadron  of  fifteen 
ships  if  the  enemy  had  had  two  of  these  boats  with  de- 
termined operators  on  board.  We  should  have  had  to 
be  constantly  on  the  watch,  never  knowing  when  the 
blow  would  fall.  The  human  frame  could  not  have 
stood  it." 

With  the  development  of  an  Edison  undersea  battery, 
making  possible  a  submersion  of  100  days  and  an  under- 
surface  cruising-range  of  150  miles,  the  submarine  is 
expected  to  increase  enormously  its  capacity  for  terror- 
izing and  wearing  down  the  crews  of  enemy  ships.  But 
it  has  already  earned  the  name  of  "super-submarine," 
or  "  undersea  battleship,"  or  "  submarine  dreadnought," 
by  its  recent  extraordinary  increase  in  size  and  fighting 
capabilities.  Take  Germany's  recent  experience,  for  ex- 
ample. Six  years  ago,  it  had  only  four  small  submarine 
boats,  the  U-i  to  U-4,  designed  merely  for  coast  defense, 
and  very  feeble  even  for  that  purpose.  Within  the  next 
year,  1909-10,  it  built  eight,  the  U-$  to  U-I2,  with  300 
tons'  displacement  and  a  speed  of  13  knots  on  the  surface 
and  9  knots  under  it.  During  the  four  years  preceding 
the  war,  it  built  fifteen,  the  C/-JJ  to  U-2?,  with  a  dis- 
placement of  900  tons  and  a  speed  of  17  and  12  knots.  In 
these  years  of  war,  1914-16,  no  one  outside  of  Germany 
knows  what  further  progress  has  been  made ;  but  the  ex- 
ploits of  the  U-2$  have  given  the  rest  of  the  world  stimu- 
lating food  for  imagination  as  to  what  it  must  have  been. 

At  the  beginning  of  our  quarrel  with  Germany,  Ad- 
miral von  Tirpitz  declared  that  his  submarines  were  so 
fragile  and  slow  as  compared  with  the  ocean  liners,  that 
it  was  impossible  for  them  either  to  hail  their  intended 
victim  and  compel  it  to  submit  to  search  for  non-contra- 


204  PREPAREDNESS 

band  cargo  and  neutral  passengers,  or  to  afford  an  op- 
portunity for  passengers  and  crew  to  take  to  the  boats. 
The  arrival  of  destroyers,  or  the  use  of  guns  by  the  mer- 
chantmen, or  even  a  resort  to  ramming,  would  make  this 
impossible,  he  claimed.  Germany's  yielding  to  neutral 
demands,  as  championed  by  the  United  States,  is  shrewdly 
suspected  to  have  been  due  in  large  part  to  its  confidence 
in  its  ability  to  make  the  submarine  superior  to  even  the 
armed  merchantmen  by  converting  submarine  boats  into 
submarine  battleships.  Some  of  its  latest  submarines 
like  the  U-2I,  have  been  given  a  displacement  of  800  tons, 
a  speed  of  18  knots  on  the  surface  and  12  when  sub- 
merged; a  capability  of  sinking  to  a  depth  of  150  feet; 
an  armament  of  four  torpedo-tubes  and  two  3-inch,  14- 
pounder,  quick-firing  guns ;  and  an  armor  of  Krupp  plat- 
ing. The  world  has  already  received  a  hint  of  what  these 
guns  can  accomplish  from  the  shelling  of  the  Armenian 
and  the  Anglo-Calif 'ornian. 

What  further  developments  in  these  directions  Ger- 
many's most  recent  submarines  have  attained,  only  they 
who  live  will  see.  Meanwhile,  American  inventors  and 
constructors  have  been  stimulated  by  German  achieve- 
ments to  push  on  in  the  same  direction,  and  if  possible  to 
surpass  them.  The  three  submarines  of  the  L-type,  au- 
thorized by  Congress  at  its  last  session,  are  to  have  a 
displacement  of  450  tons,  and  a  speed  of  14  knots  on  the 
surface  and  n  knots  submerged;  they  are  also  to  be 
equipped,  in  addition  to  having  the  usual  tubes  for  the 
launching  of  torpedoes,  with  a  battery  of  3-inch  guns. 
These  guns,  with  an  effective  range  of  2^2  to  3  miles, 
together  with  the  submarines'  speed  of  14  knots,  will 
make  the  boats  or  ships  of  this  class  miniature  cruisers, 
which  no  merchant-ship  could  defy  or  ignore.  But  an- 
other class  of  submarines  is  already  projected,  namely, 
those  of  the  M-type,  which  are  to  be  larger,  faster  and 
heavier  armed.  These  are  to  have  600  tons'  displace- 
ment, a  speed  on  the  surface  of  from  20  to  23  knots,  and 


PREPAREDNESS  ON  AND  UNDER  SEA  205 

a  battery  of  6-inch  guns.  Their  guns  are  to  be  of  the 
disappearing  type,  automatically  sinking  into  the  hull 
after  each  discharge.  When  the  new  invention  which 
obviates  the  necessity  of  showing  their  periscopes  above 
the  water,  is  applied  to  submarines,  as  is  said  to  be  the 
case  with  the  U.  S.  submarine  Schley,  they  will  be  en- 
abled to  remain  entirely  submerged  and  at  the  same  time 
discover  and  attack  their  enemy  on  the  surface.  And 
when  the  next  logical  step  is  taken  of  enabling  the  sub- 
marine to  see  under  the  water,  we  may  confidently  ex- 
pect to  have  only  underwater  battleships  and  underwater 
naval  fights. 

It  was  in  view  of  such  possible  developments  as  these 
that  a  British  admiral  and  expert  naval  constructor,  Sir 
Percy  Scott,  was  led  to  declare  in  June,  1914,  that  money 
spent  on  dreadnoughts  is  just  so  much  money  thrown  into 
the  sea,  for  submarines  would  surely  antiquate  battle- 
ships. Nine  months  later,  after  seven  months  of  the 
present  war,  another  naval  expert,  who  invented  and 
constructed  a  type  of  submarine  now  used  in  Europe, 
declared  in  a  lecture  delivered  before  the  Society  of  Civil 
Engineers  in  Paris,  that  submarines  would  drive  battle- 
ships from  the  sea,  as  surely  as  railroads  have  banished 
stages-coaches,  and  trolley-cars  replaced  horse-cars. 

The  Kaiser  took  the  British  Admiral's  prophecy  so 
seriously  that  he  largely  increased  the  German  programme 
for  submarines  for  the  year  1914.  Our  own  Secretary  of 
the  Navy,  in  the  light  of  the  present  war,  has  declared : 
"  The  main  defense  of  the  United  States  in  the  wars  of 
the  future  will  be  the  aeroplane  and  the  submarine.  .  .  . 
Men  who  formerly  were  regarded  as  unreasonable  en- 
thusiasts for  submarines  find  themselves  in  every  sense 
justified  by  what  already  has  occurred  abroad." 

One  of  these  "  unreasonable  enthusiasts,"  who  pos- 
sesses also  some  scientific  claims  to  a  hearing,  declares: 
"  The  future  history  of  the  world  will  be  far  different 
from  what  it  would  otherwise  have  been,  because  of  the 


206  PREPAREDNESS 

submarine.  The  mastership  of  the  seas  has  passed  from 
every  nation.  Defence  is  made  perfectly  practicable 
against  overseas  expeditions  everywhere.  Japan  and 
Great  Britain  are  forever  safe  from  invasion  once  their 
submarine  forces  are  developed;  but  they  are  capable  of 
being  starved  by  their  enemies.  We  of  continental  situa- 
tion are  in  better  case  than  ever  before  as  against  trans- 
marine foes,  actual  or  potential.  .  .  .  The  submarine 
gives  us  only  two  possible  enemies  with  whom  we  can 
wage  war, — Canada  and  Mexico.  ...  It  carries  out  all 
over  the  seas  a  stalemate  as  complete  as  that  which  ex- 
ists in  the  trenches  in  France;  a  stalemate  in  which  real 
battles  are  impossible,  in  which  destructive  war  on  com- 
merce is  raised  to  the  nth  power,  and  in  which  world 
intercourse  must  be  based  on  peace,  or  in  so  far  aban- 
doned as  to  make  the  very  existence  of  the  insular  com- 
mercial nations  hazardous."  This  counsellor,  accordingly* 
admonishes  us  to  aim  at  becoming  invulnerable  rather 
than  invincible;  to  defend  ourselves  by  many  submarines, 
rather  than  to  menace  other  nations  by  a  small  number 
of  battleships. 

Haw  Many  Do  We  Need? 

Our  conservative  Naval  Board  is  evidently  far  from 
sure  of  what  constitutes  now,  or  will  constitute  in  the 
near  future,  either  invulnerability  or  invincibility;  and 
it  accordingly  attempts  to  provide  for  all  possible  contin- 
gencies by  urging,  in  the  new  programme  of  prepared- 
ness, not  only  76  battleships  of  the  five  kinds  described, 
but  also  15  fleet,  or  sea-going,  submarines  and  85  coast 
submarines.  This  programme  would  give  us  about  no 
"  up-to-date  "  submarines ;  for  although  we  had  about 
46  before  the  10  new  ones  now  building  were  authorized, 
almost  all  of  these  are  utterly  defective  or  antiquated. 
Commander  Yates  Stirling,  in  command  of  the  Atlantic 
flotilla  of  submarines,  testified  before  a  congressional 
committee  last  winter  that,  through  lack  of  proper  upkeep, 


PREPAREDNESS  ON  AND  UNDER  SEA    207 

the  efficiency  of  his  flotilla  had  so  far  deteriorated  that 
it  contained  only  one  submarine  capable  of  remaining  sub- 
merged with  safety  for  more  than  fifteen  minutes !  The 
submarines  in  the  Pacific  flotilla  are  apparently  in  as  bad 
condition,  to  judge  of  them  by  the  four  boats  of  the  F-type 
which  are  located  there.  One  of  this  type,  the  F-4,  dove 
last  Spring  in  the  harbor  of  Honolulu  and  did  not  come  up 
again.  Its  crew  of  twenty  men  was  lost ;  it  was  not  re- 
covered until  after  five  months  of  effort  and  the  expendi- 
ture of  $20,000;  and  it  had  cost,  three  years  before,  a 
half-million  dollars.  After  investigation,  a  report  of  the 
experts  has  condemned  as  dangerous  and  useless  the  other 
three  boats  of  its  type. 

In  view  of  such  experiences,  even  more  conservatism 
in  regard  to  submarines,  on  the  part  of  the  Naval  Board, 
would  be  highly  commendable.  Their  experimental  stage ; 
their  rapid  changes  in  type;  and  their  increase  in  size, 
speed  and  armament,  all  make  them  a  wholly  unknown 
and  almost  incalculable  factor  in  warfare.  The  only 
thing  entirely  definite  about  them  is  their  increasing  cost. 
The  sea-going  type  at  present  building  cost  about  $1,000,- 
ooo;  the  15  additional  ones  to  be  built  by  1921  are  esti- 
mated at  present  to  cost  50  per  cent.  more.  The  coast- 
defense  type  just  contracted  for  average  less  than  $550,- 
ooo;  the  85  new  ones  to  be  built  by  1921  are  estimated 
now  to  cost  $100,000  more  per  boat!  There  is  every 
reason  to  expect  a  still  greater  increase  in  price  during 
the  next  five  years ;  but,  accepting  the  present  estimates, 
we  are  asked  to  invest  $77,750,000  in  100  new  submarines, 
— not  to  mention  the  cost  of  maintenance, — which  may 
quite  probably  be  antiquated  by  the  time  we  have  bought 
and  paid  for  them. 

Even  in  point  of  mere  numbers,  our  no  "  up-to-date  " 
submarines  are  not  overwhelmingly  impressive  and  re- 
assuring, in  view  of  the  immense  coast-line  which  they 
are  supposed  to  defend,  and  in  view  of  the  "  enemy  "  sub- 
marines with  which  they  are  supposed  to  compete.  For 


208  PREPAREDNESS 

example,  Great  Britain  was  credited  with  84,  at  the  be- 
ginning of  this  war ;  France,  76 ;  and  Germany,  54.  The 
"  Almanach  de  Gotha  "  gave  Germany  72  at  the  beginning 
of  1915 ;  but  what  it,  or  Great  Britain,  or  Japan,  has  now, 
or  will  have  at  the  end  of  the  war,  only  the  wildest  of 
imaginations  would  undertake  to  hazard  a  guess. 

Submarine  Mines  and  Torpedoes 

The  Russo-Japanese  War  of  1905-06  first  brought  into 
great  prominence  the  use  of  submarine  mines  in  naval 
warfare.  During  that  war,  the  Russians  and  Japanese 
sowed  floating  and  anchored  mines  in  the  high  seas,  as 
well  as  within  the  territorial  waters  of  China  and  Japan. 
These  mines  caused  much  destruction  to  life  and  ship- 
ping, both  warlike  and  mercantile,  during  the  war;  and 
for  several  years  afterwards,  scores  of  ships  and  boats 
and  hundreds  of  lives  were  destroyed  by  these  "  demons 
of  the  sea."  A  strenuous  effort  was  made  at  the  Second 
Hague  Conference  to  curb  the  use  of  both  anchored  and 
unanchored,  or  floating,  mines.  But  in  the  present  war, 
this  restraint  has  been  flung  aside,  and  almost  unrestricted 
use  is  being  made  of  both  kinds  and  in  many  waters. 
German  mines,  for  example,  have  been  sowed  by  mer- 
chantmen, masquerading  as  neutrals,  or  by  submarines, 
throughout  British  waters,  in  the  Adriatic,  Mediter- 
ranean, Aegean  and  North  Seas,  and  even  on  the  north- 
ern coasts  of  Norway  and  Russia.  Russian  and  other 
steamships  have  been  obliged  to  wait  for  a  week  at  a 
time  in  Archangel  Channel,  while  trawlers  swept  the 
channel  clear  of  floating  and  cabled  mines.  Maximilian 
Harden,  in  a  lecture  in  Berlin  last  Spring,  prophesied 
that,  "  as  soon  as  we  have  succeeded  in  extending  the 
radius  of  action  of  the  four  large  submarine  types,  they 
can  be  used  for  the  lavish  laying  of  mines;  then,  on  a 
certain  morning  the  Island  Kingdom  will  find  itself  sur- 
rounded by  a  new  circle  of  mines,  and  its  mastership  of 
the  sea  will  be  at  an  end."  This  prophecy  has  not  yet 


PREPAREDNESS  ON  AND  UNDER  SEA    209 

been  realized,  as  far  as  the  final  result  is  concerned ;  but 
many  mines  have  been  sown,  and  they  have  done  large 
damage  to  shipping  in  the  North  Sea,  the  English  Chan- 
nel, and  elsewhere.  The  naval  experts  of  the  London 
Times,  the  Daily  News  and  the  Daily  Chronicle,  have 
been  warning  England  of  the  imminent  and  fatal  danger 
of  the  submarine  torpedo  and  the  mine ;  and  many  inci- 
dents have  furnished  points  to  their  warning.  The  sink- 
ing of  the  Pathfinder  and  Malachite  by  portable  mines, 
attached  by  the  submarine  U-2I,  and  with  fuses  so  placed 
as  to  blow  holes  below  the  water  line,  are  two  such  in- 
cidents out  of  many.  The  sinking  of  the  British  battle- 
ships, Irresistible  and  Ocean,  and  the  French  battleship 
Bouvet,  in  the  Dardanelles,  is  admitted  by  the  British  and 
French  admiralties  to  have  been  caused  by  floating  mines, 
while  the  Turkish  government  claims  it  to  have  been 
caused  by  automobile  torpedoes. 

To  the  menace  of  the  mine  and  automobile  torpedo, 
has  been  added  the  incalculable  terror  of  the  "  wireless  " 
torpedo,  which  has  been  developed  during  the  present 
war.  This  torpedo  is  so  devised  that  its  direction,  speed 
and  submergence  can  be  controlled  from  the  shore  or  from 
shipboard,  by  means  of  wireless  apparatus,  even  at  a 
distance,  it  is  said,  of  ten  or  twelve  miles.  It  is  equipped 
with  masts  that  rise  and  fall  like  plunger  elevators,  and 
thus  evade  the  enemy's  fire ;  with  "  eyes  "  of  silenium 
plate  that  follow  obediently  the  rays  of  light  directed  into 
them;  and  with  automatic  engines,  steering-gear  and 
weapons.  The  "  age  of  machinery,"  in  warfare  as  in 
everything  else,  is  surely  upon  us.  With  wireless  plants 
controlling  the  action  of  crewless  ships  and  aeroplanes, 
it  is  believed  that  "  no  battleship  or  other  vessel  of  an 
enemy  could  even  get  within  the  zone  of  action  of  these 
steel  automatic  craft,  without  incurring  a  risk  of  annihi- 
lation amounting  almost  to  certainty." 

Recognizing  the  value  of  mines  for  defensive  purposes, 
the  United  States  has  planted  mine  fields  on  various  parts 


210  PREPAREDNESS 

of  the  coast,  around  the  entrance  to  the  Panama  Canal, 
and  around  Pearl  Islands  in  the  Pacific.  The  United 
States  Marine  Corps  have  conducted  experiments  in 
Philadelphia  which  show  that  within  two  hours  a  mining 
company  can  assemble  and  plant  20  mines,  weighing  from 
350  to  800  pounds;  and  that  within  34  hours  it  could 
plant  300  mines,  and  thus  give  to  the  city  the  control  of 
Delaware  Bay,  so  far  as  the  passage  of  ships  is  con- 
cerned. 

For  the  laying  of  mines  at  sea,  we  are  said  to  be  very 
poorly  provided.  Rear-Admiral  Fiske  testified  last  De- 
cember before  the  House  Committee  on  Naval  Affairs 
that  our  navy  has  only  one  mine-layer,  the  San  Francisco, 
capable  of  laying  330  mines,  but  that  we  expect  to  have  an 
additional  one  in  two  or  three  months.  Germany,  at 
the  beginning  of  the  war,  had  five  regular  mine-layers, 
and  during  the  war  has  equipped  submarines  for  the 
same  service. 

In  torpedoes,  also,  we  are  said  to  be  badly  off.  A  few 
months  ago,  we  had  only  355  on  hand, — about  enough  to 
supply  one  to  each  tube  in  the  navy,  whereas,  experts  tell 
us,  we  should  have  scores  for  each  tube.  Aside  from  a 
wholly  insufficient  supply,  our  torpedoes  for  battleship 
use  are  said  to  be  obsolete.  Rear-Admiral  Straus  testi- 
fied that  all  battleships  in  commission  now,  or  which  will 
be  in  commission  before  the  Nevada  and  the  Oklahoma 
are  completed,  are  equipped  with  a  short-range  torpedo 
which  may  be  considered  obsolete  for  the  battle  fleet. 

Anti-Submarine  Devices 

The  enthusiasts  over  mines  and  torpedoes  naturally  in- 
sist that  if  we  are  really  preparing  for  defense,  we  should 
lay  chief  stress  on  mines  and  torpedoes,  the  two  agencies 
that  have  been  most  prominent  in  naval  warfare  this  year, 
and  not  squander  millions  on  obsolete  or  obsolescent  bat- 
tleships for  use  above  the  water.  But  the  battleship  en- 
thusiasts, while  admitting  the  great  power  of  submarine 


PREPAREDNESS  ON  AND  UNDER  SEA    211 

mines  and  torpedoes,  point  to  the  curbing  of  that  power 
by  numerous  and  varied  devices.  Among  these  may  be 
mentioned  the  use  of  England's  great  fleet  of  fishing- 
boats,  more  than  2,000  of  which  have  been  equipped  with 
wireless  outfit  for  reporting  the  presence  of  submarines, 
or  even  for  ramming  them,  and  for  trawling  or  dredging 
for  mines.  Many  a  German  submarine  boat  is  believed  to 
have  missed  its  intended  prey  through  timely  warning 
by  British  fishing-smacks,  though  many  of  the  latter  have 
themselves  fallen  victims.  Mine-fields,  too,  have  been 
uprooted,  and  at  least  one  German  submarine,  the  U-I4, 
has  been  rammed  and  sunk  by  them.  Hundreds  of  trawl- 
ers are  constantly  dragging  the  waters  around  the  British 
Isles  and  France  in  search  of  mines,  floating  singly  or  in 
fields;  and  all  the  British  fleets  are  equipped  with  mine 
sweepers  for  the  protection,  primarily,  of  battleships. 
Not  infrequently,  the  mine-sweepers  themselves  are  blown 
up  by  the  mines,  as  has  been  the  case  with  a  number  of 
those  accompanying  the  allied  fleets  to  the  Dardanelles. 

The  war  has  brought  out  new  devices  for  trapping  tor- 
pedoes and  snaring  submarines,  as  well  as  for  removing 
mines.  One  torpedo-net  has  been  perfected,  which  is 
held  to  be  well  worth  its  cost  of  $75,000,  even  though 
scores  of  them  are  necessary  for  the  protection  of  war- 
ships, sailing  singly  or  in  fleets.  The  Secretary  of  the 
Navy  includes  in  the  new  programme  the  sum  of  $480,- 
ooo  for  "  torpedo  defense  nets  for,  battleships."  At  $75,- 
ooo  apiece,  this  large  sum  will  not  go  very  far. 

To  snare  the  subtle  submarine,  a  net  of  steel  wire  has 
been  invented,  which  is  electrically  connected  with  the 
shore,  so  that  when  a  submarine  strikes  it  and  becomes 
entangled  in  it,  a  destroyer  is  summoned  for  its  destruc- 
tion. Another  net, — an  American  invention, — is  made 
of  iron  pipes,  connected  in  air-tight  sections,  the  inter- 
vening spaces  filled  with  wire  or  rope  mesh,  and  reen- 
forced  by  mines  fastened  in  the  mesh.  The  inventor  of 
this  net  claims  that  the  British  government  is  negotiating 


PREPAREDNESS 

for  the  laying  of  it  to  protect  the  transport  of  troops  and 
supplies  from  England  to  the  Continent;  and  he  also 
claims  that  his  net  could  be  stretched  at  the  rate  of  a  mile 
a  day  from  Long  Island  to  the  Jersey  and  Connecticut 
coasts,  thus  protecting  New  York  harbor  "  at  a  cost 
ridicuously  low  compared  with  the  cost  of  many  modern 
war  appliances." 

Still  another  promising  device  is  to  fill  the  water  near 
battleships  or  seaports  with  circular  wire  nooses,  each 
supplied  with  eight  trailing  ropes,  150  feet  in  length, 
which  become  entangled  in  the  submarine's  propellers, 
as  soon  as  it  thrusts  its  nose  into  the  noose.  This  snare 
is  equipped  also  with  a  hemispherical  buoy  or  float,  in 
which  there  is  a  signal-flare  that  burns  upon  the  surface 
of  the  water  as  soon  as  the  submarine  is  caught,  and  thus 
summons  a  destroyer  to  the  attack. 

These  devices  are  based  on  the  principle  that  the  easiest 
way  to  catch  a  fish  is  to  net  him  and  not  to  swim  after 
him.  But  the  British,  in  their  struggle  with  the  German 
submarines,  are  said  to  have  developed  the  sport  of  Izaak 
Walton  into  a  popular  chase  of  undersea  boats.  A  nu- 
merous fleet  of  small  electric  or  gasoline  motor  boats, — 
automobile  boats, — have  been  built,  and  equipped  with 
small  guns ;  these  are  said  to  be  too  swift  to  become  the 
prey  of  submarines  and,  armed  adequately  to  deal  with 
them,  and  stationed  at  distances  of  five  miles  apart,  are 
successfully  patrolling  Britain's  shores.  More  than  50 
German  submarines  are  claimed  by  the  British  govern- 
ment to  have  been  destroyed  by  one  or  more  of  these  de- 
vices, although  the  German  government  has  announced 
the  loss  of  only  7,  and  declares  that  it  now  has  more  sub- 
marines than  at  the  beginning  of  the  submarine  warfare. 

The  United  States  is  preparing  to  imitate  some  at  least 
of  these  methods  of  dealing  with  submarines,  and  the 
Navy  Department  is  cooperating  with  the  Waterway 
League  of  New  York,  whose  members  possess  500  swift 
motor  boats.  A  United  States  destroyer  participated  in 


PREPAREDNESS  ON  AND  UNDER  SEA  213 

the  maneuvers  of  these  "auxiliaries  of  the  navy"  last 
summer,  on  Jamaica  Bay.  Chicago,  not  to  be  outdone 
by  New  York,  has  mobilized  its  local  fleet  of  200  power- 
boats, and  demanded  of  the  navy  a  submarine  to  prac- 
tise with  and  on,  and  of  the  government  an  enrollment 
of  300,000  men  and  officers  to  be  trained  in  the  use  of 
rapid-fire  guns,  torpedo  tubes,  wireless  and  other  signal- 
ling equipment.  This  movement  to  organize  "  a  reserve 
scout  fleet "  on  the  Great  Lakes  may  find  an  obstacle 
in  the  Rush-Bagot  Agreement  of  1817,  which  forbids  the 
presence  on  the  Lakes  of  armed  ships  of  more  than  a 
total  displacement  of  400  tons.  Submarine  detectors, 
consisting  of  microphones  which  the  propellers  of  sub- 
marines and  warships  cause  to  vibrate  and  thus  to  trans- 
mit a  warning  signal  to  the  shore,  are  now  being  success- 
fully tested  in  Long  Island  Sound. 

An  American  college  professor,  also,  has  developed  a 
plan  for  the  construction  of  miniature  submarines,  so 
small  that  one  man  can  operate  them.  He  advocates 
building  a  large  flock  or  swarm  of  these  for  every  port, 
and  turning  them  loose  upon  hostile  submarines,  to 
"  sting  them  to  death."  The  difficulty  rith  this  device 
at  present  is  that  the  submarine,  large  or  small,  while  it 
has  proved  itself  capable  of  fighting  all  other  kinds  of 
watercraft,  cannot  fight  others  of  its  kind.  Its  "  eyes  " 
have  not  yet  been  developed  so  that  it  can  see  other  sub- 
marines under  water;  hence  a  swarm  of  small  "  jitney  " 
submarines  would  be  more  likely  to  sting  each  other  to 
death  than  their  less  numerous  foe. 

The  aeroplane,  however,  from  its  exalted  position,  can 
obtain  a  bird's-eye  view  of  submarines  even  when  sub- 
merged to  a  depth  of  150  feet;  and  the  aeroplane  has  al- 
ready been  used  against  the  submarine  with  success.  For 
example,  British  aviators  have  bombarded  seaports  in 
Belgium,  destroying  a  hangar,  a  dirigible  airship,  and  two 
submarines ;  this  feat  was  accomplished  by  moonlight. 

From  this  short  study  of  a  long  array  of  preparedness, 


and  re-preparedness,  and  counter-preparedness,  under 
the  sea,  it  will  be  readily  understood  why  the  preparedness 
upon  the  surface  is  almost  duplicated,  though  at  present 
on  a  smaller  scale,  beneath  the  waves.  It  will  be  readily 
understood,  also,  why  the  whole  science  and  art  of  naval 
warfare  have  been  thrown  into  turmoil,  and  why,  in  the 
throes  of  a  veritable  revolution,  no  one  is  wise  enough  to 
forecast  the  future.  Those  who  pretend  to  do  so  are  not 
good  pilots  for  our  ship  of  state. 

D.      SPEED,     FUEL    AND    ENGINES 

While  two  rival  schools  of  naval  experts  are  develop- 
ing as  rapidly  as  possible  the  building  of  overwater  and 
underwater  craft,  a  third  school  is  devoting  itself  to  the 
increase  in  the  speed  of  water  craft  of  all  kinds.  This 
school  is  chiefly  concerned  with  the  questions  of  fuel  and 
engines. 

In  the  olden  times,  when  the  wind  or  hurtlan  muscle  were 
alone  available,  the  problem  of  "  fuel  "  was  simple  and 
easy.  But  when  steam,  gasoline,  heavy  oils  and  electric- 
ity are  at  man's  command,  the  problem  is  complex  and 
difficult.  The  substitution  of  oils  for  coal,  as  fuel,  had 
begun  before  the  present  war;  and  it  was  soon  found 
that  this  substitution  had  changed  the  whole  problem 
of  coaling-stations  and  naval  bases,  had  given  ships  of 
all  kinds  a  far  greater  cruising  radius,  and  had  saved 
space  for  the  installation  of  more  and  heavier  guns.  The 
use  of  oils  by  destroyers,  too,  has  developed  the  possi- 
bility of  producing  thick  volumes  of  smoke,  extending 
for  100  miles  in  front  of  a  fleet,  behind  which,  as  behind 
a  screen  or  protecting  blanket,  escape  from  submarines 
or  superior  warships  may  be  effected,  or  as  from  behind 
an  ambush,  the  larger  ships  may  dash  to  the  attack. 

Electricity  as  a  motive-power  has  many  advantages 
over  both  coal  and  oils;  but  the  main  difficulty  with  it 
lies  in  its  generation.  The  use  of  lead  batteries  in  sub- 
marines, for  example,  is  quite  general  throughout  the 


PREPAREDNESS  ON  AND  UNDER  SEA  215 

world ;  but  it  has  been  found  that  salt  water  leaking  into 
the  batteries  generates  sufficient  quantities  of  chlorine 
gas  to  kill  the  crew.  This  appears  to  have  been  the  case 
with  the  F-4  of  the  United  States,  and  with  one  or  more 
of  the  submarines  of  France.  The  United  States  led  the 
way  in  equipping  the  first  collier,  the  Jupiter,  with  elec- 
tric propulsion ;  and  it  is  experimenting  with  the  electric 
drive  for  its  new  battleship,  the  California.  The  electric 
engine  for  the  latter  is  $200,000  cheaper  than  would  be  a 
steam  turbine  installation.  Mr.  Edison  has  developed  a 
nickel  submarine  battery,  which  is  said  to  prevent  all 
danger  of  chlorine,  sulphuric  and  carbonic  gases ;  to  give 
to  a  submarine  a  submerged  cruising-range  of  1 50  miles ; 
and  to  enable  a  submerged  crew  to  live  for  100  days ! 

The  Diesel,  Campbell,  Mietz  and  Heiss,  and  other  oil 
engines  are  competing  with  the  older  gas  engines  and  the 
newer  petrol  engines,  with  varying  and,  as  yet,  indecisive 
results.  The  French  submarines,  for  example,  have  run 
the  circuit  of  steam,  petrol,  heavy  oil  and  steam;  the 
Diesel  heavy  oil  engine  has  been  discarded  in  them  during 
the  present  war,  it  is  said,  and  a  return  made  to  steam. 
On  the  other  hand,  one  type  of  submarines  now  being 
constructed  by  the  United  States  is  being  fitted  with  a 
Swiss  engine,  which  burns  heavy  oil,  and  which  drives 
both  on  the  surface  and  under  water,  so  that  the  former 
double  engine, — one  for  gasoline  on  the  surface,  the  other 
for  electricity  under  the  surface, — is  discarded  in  this 
type.  This  latter  engine  is  said  to  be  so  efficient  that 
"  the  tiny  6-3  can  carry  enough  fuel  to  cross  the  Atlantic 
twice  without  stopping  for  a  new  supply." 

Evidently,  in  the  use  of  engines  and  fuel  in  warships, 
as  in  every  other  item  of  the  military  and  naval  pro- 
gramme, there  is  raging  a  great  struggle  for  existence, 
and  no  man  can  yet  say  which  is  the  fittest  to  survive. 
The  whole  world  is  in  the  stage  of  experimentation ;  and 
experiment  is  both  very  costly  and  wholly  uncertain. 


216  PREPAREDNESS 

E.      ARMOR,     EXPLOSIVES     AND     PROJECTILES 

Their  Endless  Competition 

In  another  great  department  of  naval  warfare,  there 
is  an  eternal  rivalry  between  the  conflicting  elements  of 
defense  and  attack,  namely,  armor  plate,  on  the  one  side, 
and  explosives  and  projectiles  on  the  other.  Especially 
since  the  iron-clad  Virginia,  or  Merrimac,  sunk  three 
wooden  frigates  in  Hampton  Roads,  a  half  century  ago, 
and  the  iron-clad  Monitor,  with  its  revolving  turret,  put 
the  Merrimac  out  of  the  fighting,  this  contest  between  ar- 
mor and  missile  has  been  constant  and  exceptionally  bit- 
ter, but  with  no  sign  of  ending. 

"  Protected  cruisers  "  have  been  eclipsed  by  "  armored 
cruisers,"  and  "  armored  cruisers  "  by  "  battle  cruisers," 
and  "  battle  cruisers "  by  "  battleships,"  and  "  battle- 
ships "  by  "  dreadnoughts,"  and  "  dreadnoughts "  by 
"  superdreadnoughts." 

Cast-iron  round  shot  gave  way  to  elongated  projectiles 
for  rifled  guns,  solid  shot  has  been  followed  by  case  shot, 
and  case  shot  by  common  shell,  and  common  shell  by 
shrapnel  shell,  and  shrapnel  shell  by  palliser  shell.  The 
whole  world  at  present  seems  to  have  gone  mad  over 
shells, — one-half  to  procure  and  use  them,  the  other  half 
to  manufacture  and  sell  them. 

To  meet  this  development  in  shells,  ship-builders  have 
called  every  resource  into  use  in  the  protection  of  hulls. 
Wooden  hulls  gave  place  to  wrought  iron,  and  wrought 
iron  to  steel;  the  iron  hulls  were  sheathed  in  wrought  iron 
plates;  these  were  discarded  for  compound  plates;  har- 
veyised  steel,  and  alloys  of  nickel-chrome,  molybdenum 
and  vanadium,  followed  in  quick  succession. 

The  attacking  party  met  this  challenge  by  substituting 
steel  for  iron  guns,  and  rifled-bores  for  smooth-bores; 
and  by  supplying  them  with  Whitehead  fish  torpedoes. 

The  defending  party  countered  by  increasing  the  thick- 
ness of  iron  armor  from  4^  inches,  in  1855,  to  $l/2  inches 


PREPAREDNESS  ON  AND  UNDER  SEA  217 

in  1861,  to  7  inches  in  1867,  to  24  inches  in  1873.  When 
compound  plates  succeeded,  the  thickness  could  be  re- 
duced to  16  inches,  in  1874,  but  soon  increased  to  18 
inches  in  1880.  Harveyized  plates  and  Krupp's  nickel- 
chromium-steel  combination  again  enabled  the  armor  to 
be  reduced  to  9.5  inches;  but  it  has  again  increased  to  15 
inches. 

.  The  rifled  guns  had  done  for  the  earlier  kinds  of  ar- 
mor, but  to  meet  the  new  increase  in  quality  and  thick- 
ness, the  guns  were  enlarged  from  7-inch  to  9-inch,  in 
1867,  to  12-inch  in  1900,  to  13-5-inch,  in  1910,  to  14-inch 
in  1914,  and  this  year  to  16  inches!  At  the  same 
time,  their  calibre  was  increased  from  40  to  45  to  50. 
But  the  new  kinds  of  armor  were  very  "  tough  custo- 
mers," and  the  increasing  size  of  guns  alone  was  not  suffi- 
cient to  overcome  them.  The  weight  of  shells  was  in- 
creased from  100  pounds  to  380  pounds,  to  850  pounds, 
to  1,675  pounds,  to  1,950  pounds ;  and  the  explosives  with 
which  they  were  propelled  and  charged  gave  rise  to  a 
whole  tribe  of  chemical  ishmaelites:  Dynamite  was  born 
in  1864,  and  amberite,  axite,  balistite,  bavarite,  bobbi- 
nite,  carmonite,  cheddite,  cordite,  dahmenite,  donarite, 
duplexite,  ecrasite,  electronite.  fractorite,  hellhoffite,  jah- 
nite,  kinetite,  lyddite,  melinite,  oxonite,  panclastite,  pem- 
brite,  pertite,  petrolite,  picrinite,  potentite,  progressite, 
rexite,  roburite,  romite,  solenite,  thunderite,  titanite,  tur- 
pinite,  vigorite  and  westfalite,  have  almost  exhausted  the 
alphabet  for  names,  and  have  filled  warfare  with  the 
fumes  and  furies  which  help  to  make  Sherman's  defini- 
tion of  it  entirely  correct.  Nitrates,  chlorates,  chromates 
and  picrates  have  made  the  fulminates  vie  with  the  hit- 
tites  and  the  chemical  ishmaelites  above-mentioned.  Gun- 
powder has  been  outclassed  by  gun-cotton;  picric  acid 
has  excelled  gun-cotton;  and  nitroglycerin  has  spelled 
terror  with  a  big  "  T." 

Sir  James  Thompson,  in  his  Romanes  Lecture  at  Ox- 
ford in  July,  1914,  announced  the  possibility  of  harness- 


218  PREPAREDNESS 

ing  atomic  energy  to  the  uses  of  man  by  causing  a  single 
electron  to  ooze  from  an  electric  light  wire,  which,  al- 
though it  is  the  mildest  form  of  atomic  energy,  generates 
enough  power  to  run  the  Mauretania  across  the  Atlantic. 
Thus  the  present  war  may  realize  the  novelist's  dream  of 
"  atomic  bombs,"  one  of  which  can  destroy  a  city.  An 
American  inventor  has  just  announced  the  development 
of  a  chemical  compound  which  "  can  melt  the  thickest 
armor-plate  and  pass  through  a  battleship  or  a  fort  like 
hot  lead  through  butter."  A  report  has  come  from  Paris 
of  the  invention  of  a  poiidre  turpin  which,  upon  explo- 
sion, "  asphyxiates  every  living  thing  for  a  mile  around." 
We  do  not  hear  much  from  Germany's  laboratories ;  but 
its  military  necessity  is  doubtless  the  mother  of  many 
inventions  which  may  verify  the  belief  that  they  "  will 
cause  our  most  destructive  weapons  of  to-day  to  seem  as 
impotent  as  the  cave-dweller's  flint  beside  a  42-centi- 
metre gun." 

Meanwhile,  even  the  13. 5-inch  guns  have  a  striking 
energy  of  63,187  tons  and  penetrate  a  wrought  iron  plate 
51  inches  thick.  Their  effective  range  has  been  increased 
from  750  yards,  Trafalgar's  record,  to  21,000  yards,  the 
Queen  Elisabeth's  record  at  Constantinople,  or  from  less 
than  half  a  mile  to  more  than  eleven.  Each  of  these  mod- 
ern guns,  says  .a  naval  expert,  "  has  a  striking  power 
nearly  five  times  greater  than  that  of  the  whole  broadside 
of  the  largest  line-of-battle  ship  of  a  century  ago,  through 
whose  lofty  wooden  walls  there  grinned  tier  upon  tier  of 
smooth-bore  cannon."  A  single  broadside  from  a  modern 
battleship  runs  to  more  than  eight  tons!  It  is  but  little 
wonder  that  the  armor-makers  are  burning  the  midnight 
oil  to  overtake  the  makers  of  guns  and  explosives.  And 
it  has  been  ever  thus.  The  mechanics  and  metallurgists 
first  invent  a  kind  of  armor  that  is  absolutely  impenetra- 
ble; and  the  governments  equip  their  ships  with  that  kind 
of  armor  plate.  Then  the  chemists  and  physicists  sit  up 
for  a  few  nights,  and  they  invent  an  explosive  or  projec- 


PREPAREDNESS  ON  AND  UNDER  SEA  219 

tile  that  is  absolutely  irresistible;  and  all  the  ships  are 
found  to  be  back  numbers. 

Our  "Absolute  Unpreparedness" 

We  are  told  to-day  in  the  United  States  that  because 
of  such  recent  and  rapid  developments,  not  a  single  one 
of  our  dreadnoughts,  even  those  which  have  cost  us  from 
twelve  to  fifteen  millions  of  dollars  each,  and  which  were 
supposed  to  be  the  last  word  in  naval  architecture,  is  ade- 
quately protected  against  the  projectiles  and  explosives 
invented  last!  Mr.  Louis  Gathmann,  inventor  of  the 
famous  gun,  tells  us  also  that  our  navy  is  wholly  lacking 
in  effective  projectiles.  "  Considered  in  relation  to  mod- 
ern methods  and  instruments  of  warfare,"  he  says, 
"  our  shells  are  a  joke.  Even  the  largest  of  them,  pro- 
vided for  the  great  14-inch  guns  on  our  newest  dread- 
noughts, carry  no  more  than  60  pounds  of  high  explo- 
sives. The  15-inch  guns  of  the  English  battle  cruiser, 
Queen  Elizabeth,  throw  projectiles  that  contain  300 
pounds  of  high  explosives.  .  .  A  single  well-aimed  shot 
from  one  of  her  guns  would  be  likely  to  drive  in  the  whole 
side  of  the  new-built  Pennsylvania,  armor  and  all, — and 
she  runs  26  knots  an  hour,  which  is  five  knots  faster 
than  our  swiftest  battleship ! "  This  critic  accordingly 
advises  that  "  the  main  batteries  of  our  battleships  be 
made  of  1 8-inch  guns, — four  inches  larger  in  calibre  than 
the  biggest  rifles  our  newest  dreadnoughts  carry  " ;  and 
that  these  guns  should  throw  shells  containing  500  pounds 
of  high  explosive.  "  With  such  weapons  and  projectiles," 
he  concludes,  "  it  would  not  be  necessary  to  hit  the  most 
formidable  enemy  ship  more  than  once.  .  .  .  The  armor 
would  be  likely  to  be  blown  clear  through  the  ship." 

But  the  defect  in  such  reasoning  would  appear  to  be 
that  the  ship  carrying  such  guns  would  itself  be  liable 
to  be  struck  before  it  could  strike  the  enemy, — especially 
if  that  enemy  were  a  submarine  or  a  mine.  Hence  the 
need  of  better  armor.  And  so  goes  on  the  endless  and 


220  PREPAREDNESS 

futile  struggle.  It  is  futile  because  it  is  an  attempt  to 
make  an  irresistible  force  overcome  an  invincible  obsta- 
cle; it  is  endless  because  it  is  the  application  to  warfare 
of  Twentieth  Century  science,  and  Twentieth  Century 
science  knows  no  end. 

The  Era  of  Scientists 

The  German,  British  and  American  navy  departments 
have  recognized  the  pre-eminence  of  science  in  present- 
day  warfare,  and  have  been  "  mobilizing  brains."  Thomas 
A.  Edison  told  our  Secretary  of  the  Navy  that  "  modern 
warfare  has  become  a  matter  of  chemistry,  machinery  and 
high  explosives."  The  secretary  believed  him  and  ap- 
pointed a  new  Naval  Advisory  Board  of  Invention  and 
Development  to  be  associated  with  a  new  Bureau  of  In- 
vention and  Development  in  the  Navy  Department.  Mr. 
Edison  and  two  representatives  from  each  of  eight  lead- 
ing scientific  societies  have  been  appointed  members  of 
the  Advisory  Board.  Their  duty  is  to  develop  new  de- 
vices, to  harness  Twentieth  Century  science  to  prepared- 
ness ;  and  they  have  gone  to  work  mainly  along  the  lines 
of  submarines,  aeroplanes  and  the  protection  of  battle- 
ships. The  Board  unanimously  recommended  at  its  first 
meeting  that  the  government  should  establish  a  large 
laboratory  to  be  used  for  experiment  and  research.  The 
estimated  cost  of  the  laboratory  is  $5,000,000,  and  the 
annual  expenditure  for  operation  is  placed  at  from  $2,- 
500,000  to  $3,000,000.  The  plan  includes  the  location  of 
the  laboratory  near  a  large  city,  and  on  tidewater,  where 
the  largest  battleships  can  come  to  dock.  The  equipment 
is  to  include  pattern  and  machine  shops,  brass  and  steel 
foundries,  a  marine  railway,  chemical,  physical  and  elec- 
trical laboratories,  a  motion  picture  department  and  other 
conveniences  which  might  be  needed  for  the  testing  and 
development  of  new  inventions  or  projects.  It  is  pro- 
posed that  a  naval  officer  of  exceptional  experience  shall 
be  in  charge,  and  that  there  shall  be  staffs  of  chemists 


PREPAREDNESS  ON  AND  UNDER  SEA  221 

and  physicists.  All  of  its  operations  are  to  be  carried  on 
in  absolute  secrecy,  and  adequate  guards  to  be  provided 
for  it. 

This  new  departure  has  been  hailed  throughout  the 
country  with  joyous  acclaim;  it  has  gone  a  long  way 
towards  restoring  the  waning  popularity  of  the  Secretary 
of  the  Navy ;  and  it  has  caused  confident  expectation  that 
the  revolution  it  will  inaugurate  in  our  military  prepared- 
ness will  cause  us  to  be  "  the  grandest  tiger  in  the  jun- 
gle." But  it  may  be  recalled  that  both  Germany  and 
Great  Britain  have  scientists,  and  have  mobilized  them  for 
the  development  of  naval  warfare.  It  may  also  be  sug- 
gested, that,  even  though  materials  and  machinery  be  all- 
important,  they  must  have  men  to  use  them;  hence  the 
personnel  of  the  navy  is  not  altogether  insignificant. 

F.      NAVY     PERSONNEL    AND    ORGANIZATION 

The  advocates  of  preparedness  have  urged  the  con- 
struction of  warships  of  every  kind  to  so  large  and  suc- 
cessful an  extent  during  the  past  fifteen  years,  that  the 
material  side  of  the  navy  has  outgrown  its  personnel. 
Even  naval  officers  themselves,  who  have  urged  on,  and 
rejoiced  in,  the  growing  popular  demand  for  more  fight- 
ing machines,  have  become  apprehensive  because  of  the 
growing  shortage  of  men  to  manage  those  machines. 

Our  Shortage  of  Officers  and  Men 

Admiral  Fletcher  forwarded  to  the  Secretary  of  the 
Navy  last  December  detailed  reports  from  the  command- 
.ing  officers  of  all  the  ships  in  the  fleet,  and  they  reported 
unanimously  that  the  shortage  of  officers  and  men  was 
so  serious  as  to  constitute  an  insurmountable  handicap 
to  the  fleet's  fighting  efficiency.  According  to  this  testi- 
mony, the  navy  lacks  by  10,000  the  men  fully  to  man  all 
the  ships  existing  even  at  present  which  ought  to  be  com- 
missioned upon  the  outbreak  of  war.  Admiral  Badger 
testified  before  the  Naval  Committee,  at  the  same  time, 


PREPAREDNESS 

that  "  to  provide  a  proper  complement  for  all  vessels  of 
the  navy  which  could  still  be  made  useful,  would  require 
an  additional  force  of  18,556  men  and  933  line  officers." 
Admiral  Fiske  testified  that  it  would  require  three  years 
to  get  the  personnel  up  to  a  standard  of  efficiency  neces- 
sary to  enable  it  successfully  to  meet  an  effective  enemy. 
Congressman  Gardner  assured  the  Congressional  Com- 
mittee that,  "  out  of  thirty  completed  battleships,  twelve 
are  unavailable  without  a  long  delay,  because  of  our  re- 
fusal to  pay  the  bills  for  manning  them.  ...  I  charge 
that  our  Navy  is  18,000  men  short,  and  a  further  shortage 
of  40,000  men  is  in  sight.  The  General  Board,  which  has 
actually  made  our  plans,  estimates  the  enlisted  force  of 
the  Navy  as  between  30,000  and  50,000  men  short  for 
war." 

This  deficiency,  it  seems,  is  found  in  all  ranks  of  the 
personnel,  from  the  admiral  down  to  the  marine;  and 
the  deficiency  appears  to  be  in  quality  as  well  as  in 
quantity.  A  distinguished  member  of  the  United  States 
Senate  declared  on  the  floor  of  that  august  body  that 
there  are  "  a  lot  of  men  in  command  of  the  navy  whom 
a  former  President  of  the  United  States  once  described 
to  me  as  a  lot  of  wheezy,  onion-eyed,  old,  stuffed  pud- 
dings." 

How  Can  They  Be  Increased? 

To  do  away  with  this  undignified  not  to  say  dangerous 
condition,  the  present  Secretary  of  the  Navy  plans  to 
increase  the  number  of  eligible  officers  by  persuading 
Congress  to  increase  the  number  of  midshipmen  at  An- 
napolis from  970,  the  present  number,  to  1,200,  which  is 
the  capacity  of  the  Naval  Academy.  It  costs  the  gov- 
ernment $12,000,  on  an  average,  for  the  education  of 
each  midshipman ;  on  this  basis,  it  would  cost  $6,000,000 
a  year  to  educate  1,200  midshipmen,  or  a  total  of  $24,- 
000,000  for  the  period  of  their  four-year  course.  This 
increase  of  230  midshipmen  would  make  itself  effective 


PREPAREDNESS  ON  AND  UNDER  SEA  223 

four  years  after  its  adoption ;  and  four  years  more  would 
be  required  before  the  933  additional  which  are  said  to 
be  necessary  now  could  be  secured  in  the  regular  way. 

If  a  large  number  of  new  ships  are  to  be  built  during 
the  next  five  years,  the  already  large  and  constantly 
growing  shortage  in  officers  would  appear  to  call  for  the 
establishment  of  another  Academy,  or  the  doubling  of 
the  present  one,  at  an  initial  cost  of,  say,  $12,000,000, 
and  an  annual  maintenance  of  another  $24,000,000. 

As  for  the  18,000  or  19,000  more  men  who  are  said  to 
be  needed  in  the  navy  at  once,  it  appears  that  an  act  of 
Congress  has  limited  the  number  of  enlisted  men  to  51,- 
500.  Last  year,  there  were  88,900  applicants  for  enlist- 
ment, but  this  law  prevented  the  enrollment  of  more  than 
18,948.  Hence,  to  man  our  existing  ships  properly,  ac- 
cording to  the  conservative  estimate,  we  should  have  to 
raise  the  legal  limit  by  35  per  cent. ;  and  according  to  Mr. 
Gardner's  estimate  of  the  shortage  "in  sight"  by  115 
per  cent.  Even  this  latter  estimate  is  endorsed  by  such 
naval  experts  as  Mr.  Robert  W.  Neeser  and  Mr.  John 
Hays  Hammond,  Jr.  Mr.  Neeser  declares  that  "  it  is 
murder  to  send  out  vessels  as  wofully  unprepared"  as 
ours  would  be,  to  engage  the  enemy's  fleet.  "  Of  2,000 
men,"  he  continues,  "  manning  the  German  ships  defeated 
off  the  Falkland  Islands  by  the  British  squadron,  only  90 
were  saved.  Does  the  nation  wish  to  place  its  citizens  in 
such  jeopardy?"  To  prevent  such  a  tragedy  and  "to 
man  properly  our  existing  ships,"  he  insists  that  70,000 
men  should  be  in  the  service.  Mr.  Hammond's  verdict 
is  that,  "  with  every  resource  tapped,  we  are  30,000  men 
short  in  our  navy.  We  have  1,900  officers  of  the  line. 
We  must  have  1,400  more."  The  new  programme  pro- 
vides for  the  addition  of  11,500  men  and  250  midshipmen. 

The  Lack  of  Training 

But  far  more  serious  than  deficiency  in  numbers,  it 
appears,  is  lack  of  training.  Admiral  Dewey  says  on  this 


PREPAREDNESS 

point :  "  It  cannot  be  too  often  repeated  that  ships  with- 
out a  trained  personnel  to  man  and  fight  them  are  use- 
less for  the  purposes  of  war.  The  training  needed  for 
the  purpose  is  long  and  arduous,  and  cannot  be  done 
after  the  outbreak  of  war.  This  must  have  been  provided 
for  long  previous  to  the  beginning  of  hostilities ;  and  any 
ship  of  the  fleet  found  at  the  outbreak  of  war  without  pro- 
vision having  been  made  for  its  manning  by  officers  and 
men  trained  for  service  can  be  counted  as  only  a  useless 
mass  of  steel  whose  existence  leads  to  a  false  sense  of 
security." 

Mr.  Hammond  declares  that  it  takes  ten  years  to  make 
a  well  trained  officer,  and  pointedly  inquires :  "  Who  will 
insure  us  peace  for  that  time  ?  " 

The  Naval  Reserve 

To  avoid  maintaining  in  time  of  peace,  at  American 
prices,  a  number  of  naval  officers  and  men  equal  to  a 
large  standing  army,  Congress  passed  at  its  last  session 
the  Naval  Reserve  Bill.  This  provides  for  the  enroll- 
ment of  "  citizens  of  the  United  States  who  have  been 
or  may  be  entitled  to  be  honorably  discharged  from  the 
United  States  Navy  after  not  less  than  a  four-year  en- 
listment, or  after  a  term  of  enlistment  during  minority." 
All  ex-sailors  and  marines  enrolled  in  the  Naval  Reserve 
are  paid  f  >m  $12  to  $100  per  annum;  and  they  are  not 
required  tv  perform  active  service  in  time  of  peace  except 
at  their  c,vn  request.  They  are  required  to  maintain  a 
suitable  uniform  and  to  attend  a  quarterly  muster  for  the 
purpose  of  inspection  and  signing  the  muster-roll,  and 
for  this  they  receive  transportation  expenses. 

This  measure  was  also  greeted  with  acclaim  as  having 
rich  promise  of  being  both  economical  and  effective ;  but 
it  has  not  yet  called  forth  so  many  recruits  as  it  was  ex- 
pected to  do.  In  the  first  six  months  after  its  passage, 
only  103  men  entered  the  Naval  Reserve.  Only  two  of 
these,  it  is  reported,  came  forward  in  New  York  City, — 


PREPAREDNESS  ON  AND  UNDER  SEA  225 

our  largest  seaport.  This  is  explained  by  the  argument 
that  "  modern  sea-fighting  is  a  mechanic's  job  more  than 
a  sailor-man's."  But  the  Navy  League  is  far  from  satisfied 
with  the  results  of  the  experiment  and  is  seeking  to  make 
it  a  success  by  securing  an  enlistment  of  50,000  graduates 
of  Annapolis,  former  warrant  officers  and  non-commis- 
sioned officers,  and  former  enlisted  men. 

Another  form  taken  by  the  demand  for  a  naval  reserve 
is  the  plea  of  the  Surgeon-General  of  the  United  States, 
who  declares  there  is  immediate  necessity  for  700  medical 
.  men,  under  45  years  of  age,  to  act  as  a  reserve  force  for 
the  navy.  He  also  urges  that  our  18  hospital  ships,  which 
are  capable  of  caring  for  100,000  sick  and  wounded  sail- 
ors, should  be  provided  with  a  reserve  hospital  corps  of 
men  of  high  type  to  act  as  nurses,  these  to  be  trained  in 
the  naval  hospitals;  and  the  training  of  800  women 
nurses,  who  would  be  absolutely  necessary  in  case  of  war, 
whereas  a  corps  of  only  120  is  available  at  present. 

The  Naval  Militia 

For  a  number  of  years,  a  Naval  Militia  in  the  various 
States  has  been  in  existence,  and  it  now  numbers  about 
7,000  men.  But  there  has  been  constant  complaint  of 
inefficiency  and  lack  of  training  facilities  in  this  militia; 
and  frequent  efforts  have  been  made  to  improve  it.  The 
new  law  passed  by  Congress  at  its  last  session  is  expected 
to  bring  about  more  cooperation  between  the  officers  of 
the  navy  and  of  the  militia,  and  to  provide  the  latter  with 
more  training  facilities.  The  Secretary  of  the  Navy  has 
included  in  the  new  programme  the  sum  of  $250,000  for 
the 'purchase  and  repair  of  ships  for  the  use  of  the  naval 
militia  of  Illinois  and  Minnesota,  and  a  further  sum  of 
$60,737.33  for  the  naval  militia  as  a  whole. 

The  Volunteer  Naval  Reserve 

Meanwhile,  there  has  been  formed,  on  private  initiative, 
the  United  States  Volunteer  Naval  Reserve,  which  is 


226  PREPAREDNESS 

expected  to  create  a  very  large  and  efficient  auxiliary 
naval  force.  All  citizens  between  18  and  45  years  of  age 
are  eligible  to  membership,  and  they  are  expected  to  meet 
on  Sunday  afternoon,  "  on  the  water-front,"  and  receive 
instructions  in  naval  science  and  art  at  the  hands  of  for- 
mer naval  men.  The  new  organization  is  said  to  have 
appealed,  very  promptly  and  quite  as  a  matter  of  course, 
to  the  United  States  government  for  "  recognition,"  for 
use  of  government  reservations,  and  for  the  occasional 
loan  of  a  warship  "  for  practice."  It  may  be  confidently 
anticipated  that  an  appeal  for  "  appropriations  "  will  fol- 
low in  due  course. 

The  Professional  Versus  the  Novice 

In  the  building  up  of  naval  reserves  and  militia,  we 
encounter  the  same  lack  of  expert  confidence  in  any- 
thing except  "  the  professional  "  that  we  find  in  the  army. 
Modern  naval  warfare  is  so  exclusively  the  business  of 
specialists  that  the  seasoned  "  sea-dogs  "  cannot  help  de- 
spising "  raw  recruits  "  or  "  half-baked  land-lubbers." 
The  Von  Tirpitzes  and  Fishers  of  our  time  stretch  out 
both  hands  and  arms  for  more  men,  more  men ;  but  they 
insist  that  it  takes  years  to  "  lick  them  into  shape." 

Even  lay  critics,  like  Mr.  Reuterdahl,  call  our  atten- 
tion to  the  fact  that  "  the  wastage  in  battle  is  enormous. 
One  action  might  wipe  out  thousands  of  highly  trained 
specialists :  gunpointers,  electricians,  machinists.  These 
places  could  not  be  filled  at  once,  and  our  raw  crews 
would  meet  the  fate  of  Cradock's  men,  who,  being  re- 
serves, were  only  half  trained  and  could  not  stand  up 
with  spirit  against  the  matured  organization  of  the 
enemy." 

How  many  professionals  and  reservists  shall  we  have  ? 
Before  the  present  war,  Great  Britain  had  150,60x3,  with 
58,000  reserves;  Germany,  79,200  with  110,000  reserves; 
Japan,  55,700  with  15,000  reserves;  the  United  States, 
66,273  with  no  reserves.  Hence,  to  overtake  our  "  possi- 


PREPAREDNESS  ON  AND  UNDER  SEA  227 

ble  enemies"  as  they  were  before  the  war,  we  should 
have  to  increase  our  naval  personnel  by  320  per  cent., 
280  per  cent,  and  10  per  cent,  respectively.  How  expen- 
sive this  increase  would  be  may  be  judged  by  the  fact 
that  the  expenses  of  the  British  navy,  per  capita  of  per- 
sonnel before  the  present  war,  was  $1,080;  of  the  Ger- 
man, $607;  of  the  Japanese,  $693;  and  of  the  United 
States,  $1,970!  Hence,  at  this  rate,  we  should  have  to 
pay,— in  order  to  equal  the  British,  German  and  Japanese 
navy  personnel,  nearly  twice  as  much  per  capita  as  Great 
Britain  pays ;  more  than  three  times  as  much  as  Germany 
pays ;  and  nearly  three  times  as  much  as  Japan  pays. 

A  Defective  Naval  Organisation 

Besides  the  deficiency  in  the  number  and  training  of 
our  naval  personnel,  of  which  a  host  of  critics  complain, 
our  naval  organization  is  condemned  as  being  far  behind 
the  times.  "  How  for  a  century  the  navy  has  carried 
out  its  duties  without  a  war  staff  is  a  marvel,"  says  Mr. 
Neeser.  "  The  creation  of  a  war  staff  in  England  as  a 
result  of  the  Beresford  Committee  of  1909  removed  that 
danger  for  our  cousins.  About  the  same  time,  the  Presi- 
dent appointed  a  commission  whose  report  was  strikingly 
similar  to  that  of  the  Beresford  Committee.  It  revealed 
a  condition  that  astounded  even  the  service.  But  it  ac- 
complished nothing.  Congress  refused  to  supply  the 
remedy.  Admiral  Fiske  also  emphasizes  this  defect. 
"  We  have  observed  [in  Europe],"  he  says,  "  the  forma- 
tion and  wonderful  work  of  the  general  staffs,  but  have 
provided  no  general  staff  or  similar  agency  ourselves." 

The  only  comfort  that  has  come  to  our  naval  men  along 
this  line  of  organization  is  the  recent  creation  of  the 
office  of  chief  of  naval  operations.  But  this  appears  to 
be  but  slight,  cold  comfort,  and  they  complain  that  it 
should  have  been  done  "  fifteen  years  ago." 

Admiral  Fiske,  after  detailing  the  great  deficiency  in 
numbers  and  training  in  our  naval  personnel,  sums  it 


228  PREPAREDNESS 

all  up  as  follows :  "  We  [naval  officers]  must  make  the 
laymen  realize  that  the  naval  profession  has  developed 
greatly  within  the  last  ten  years  in  Europe,  because  of 
the  imminence  of  the  awful  war  for  which  her  navies 
strenuously  prepared;  while  we  of  the  United  States, 
feeling  secure  behind  the  bulwark  of  the  ocean,  have  not 
seriously  prepared  and  have  therefore  dropped  behind 
in  the  march  of  naval  progress  and  have  been,  in  fact, 
outstripped.  We  have  seen  the  battle  cruiser,  the  scout,  the 
submarine,  the  airship,  the  aeroplane  and  the  mine  being 
developed  by  foreign  nations  into  effective  instruments 
of  war,  while  their  officers  and  men  have  been  efficiently 
trained  in  their  use  and  tactics;  but  we  have  not  devel- 
oped them  into  effective  instruments  of  war  ourselves, 
and  therefore  our  officers  and  men  have  not  been  effi- 
ciently trained  in  their  use  and  tactics.  We  have  observed 
the  formation  of  great  organizations  of  highly  trained 
reserves,  but  have  gotten  none  ourselves  worthy  of  the 
name." 

G.      WHAT    IS    "  ADEQUATE  "    NAVAL    PREPAREDNESS  ? 

When  an  attempt  is  made  to  gather  up  the  threads  of 
naval  preparedness  in  our  day,  they  are  found  to  be  much 
tangled,  to  be  mutually  destructive,  and  to  lead  to  no 
definite  or  satisfactory  conclusion.  The  overwater  craft 
and  the  underwater  craft  are  like  the  proverbial  Kil- 
kenny cats  that  leave  nothing  of  each  other;  the  various 
types  of  overwater  craft  are  continually  treading  each 
other  under;  and  the  various  types  of  underwater  craft 
are  continually  blowing  each  other  up ;  while  over  all  the 
aeroplane  and  airship  soar,  nullifying  the  usefulness  of 
some  and  threatening  the  usefulness  of  all  the  rest. 

The  war  of  the  war-machines  has  countless  factors,  and 
only  a  few  of  these  may  be  pointed  out  here. 

Overwater  Craft 

As  regards  overwater  craft,  it  may  be  noted,  first,  that 
any  navy  is  "  inadequate,"  however  numerous,  large,  bel- 


PREPAREDNESS  ON  AND  UNDER  SEA  229 

ligerent  and  expensive  its  ships  may  be,  if  the  enemy  has 
a  better  one.  Germany's  navy,  for  example,  which  is 
said  by  the  experts  to  be  much  better  than  ours,  though 
it  has  cost  far  less,  is  cooped  up  in  its  harbor,  does 
not  dare  to  attack  the  British  fleet  and  is  much  less  ef- 
fective than  fortifications  in  protecting  the  German, 
Turkish  and  Belgian  coasts. 

On  the  other  hand,  Great  Britain's  fleet,  mighty  though 
it  is,  is  unable  to  deliver  an  attack  on  the  German  or 
Belgian  coasts  and  has  failed  in  its  attack  on  the  Darda- 
nelles. True,  it  has  swept  the  German  commerce  from 
the  sea,  and  has  protected,  for  the  most  part,  its  own. 
How  many  battleships  then  shall  we  have?  As  many 
as  Great  Britain?  If  so  we  should  infallibly  repeat  Ger- 
many's rivalry,  and  perhaps  Germany's  war  with  Great 
Britain.  As  many  as  Germany  has?  If  so,  we  should 
have  very  largely  to  increase  the  recently  proposed  pro- 
gramme of  10  new  battleships,  at  a  cost  of  $188,000,000, 
for  even  according  to  this  generous  programme,  we 
should  have  in  1921  only  as  many  dreadnoughts,  and 
fewer  battle  cruisers,  than  Germany  had  in  1914! 

The  "  first-line  battleships,"  which  have  increased 
threefold  in  size,  and  more  than  threefold  in  cost,  within 
a  quarter-century,  are  now  trembling  on  the  brink  of 
"innocuous  desuetude."  The  pre-dreadnoughts  of  15 
years  ago  have  been  eclipsed  by  the  dreadnoughts  of  10 
years  ago.  The  dreadnoughts  of  10  years  ago  are  out- 
classed by  the  superdreadnoughts  of  five  years  ago ;  and 
the  superdreadnoughts  of  this  year  will  be  outclassed 
by  those  of  next.  The  dreadnoughts  of  all  kinds,  in  fact, 
are  being  surpassed  in  speed  and  fighting  effectiveness 
by  the  battle  cruisers;  and  they  are  in  mortal  terror  of 
the  submarine. 

The  submarine  has  also  checked  a  squadron  of  vic- 
torious battle  cruisers  in  full  pursuit  of  their  retreating 
foe ;  and  this  fact,  as  well  as  its  being  a  hybrid,— not  so 
fast  as  a  scout  cruiser,  nor  so  powerful  as  a  battleship, — 


230  PREPAREDNESS 

has  already  caused  the  battle  cruiser  to  be  condemned  by 
many  of  the  experts.  Nevertheless,  we  are  planning  to 
build  six  of  these  before  1921,  at  a  cost  of  $105,000,000, 
while  Germany  had  8,  Great  Britain  10,  and  Japan  4,  in 
1914! 

Our  eleven  armored  cruisers  are  already  antiquated; 
we  have  built  none  since  1905,  and  our  new  programme 
provides  for  no  more. 

Our  fourteen  scout-cruisers  are  to  be  increased  by  1921 
to  24,  according  to  the  new  programme,  at  a  cost  of  $50,- 
000,000;  but  even  then  we  shall  have  only  about  one-half 
as  many  as  Germany  had,  and  one-fourth  as  many  as 
Great  Britain  had,  in  1914!  Meanwhile,  the  aeroplane 
has  already  out-scouted  the  scout  cruiser  by  about  1,000 
per  cent. ! 

The  torpedo  boats,  which  were  hailed  with  such  ac- 
claim a  dozen  years  ago,  are  as  dead  as  a  door-nail.  We 
have  not  built  any  since  1900,  and  the  new  programme 
provides  for  no  more. 

The  destroyer  started  its  career  in  the  destruction  of 
torpedo  boats,  and  has  heretofore  been  called  a  torpedo 
boat  destroyer;  but  now  it  has  become,  in  name  only,  a 
destroyer,  and  in  function  principally  a  scout.  But  as 
a  destroyer  it  is  in  immediate  danger  of  being  antiquated 
by  the  submarine;  and  as  a  scout,  it  is  outclassed  by  the 
aeroplane.  Nevertheless,  our  new  programme  proposes 
to  add  to  our  navy  50  destroyers  at  a  cost  of  $68,000,000. 
Even  then,  in  1921,  we  should  have  30  less  than  Germany, 
and  112  less  than  Great  Britain,  had  in  1914! 

Our  four  coast  defense  ships  are  antiquated ;  we  have 
built  none  since  1899,  and  the  new  programme  provides 
for  no  more. 

As  to  naval  auxiliaries,  Great  Britain  has  5,000  in  use. 
According  to  Admiral  Fiske,  we  have  "  an  inadequate 
merchant  marine  from  which  to  get  auxiliaries."  The 
American  consul  at  Cardiff,  Wales,  reported  last  March, 
six  or  seven  months  after  the  beginning  of  the  war,  that 


PREPAREDNESS  ON  AND  UNDER  SEA  231 

the  British  had  taken  over  1,500  merchantmen,  aggregat- 
ing S.S00?000  tons>  for  the  purpose  of  transporting  and 
supplying  armies  in  the  field.  During  the  Spanish  War,— 
a  tempest  in  a  tea-pot, — our  War  Department  chartered 
57  ships  as  transports,  at  exorbitant  prices,  and  21  of 
these  were  procured  from  foreigners.  The  Board  of  In- 
spection of  the  Navy  Department  is  now  making  a  survey 
of  the  American  merchant  marine;  and  the  Secretary  of 
the  Treasury  advocates  subsidizing,  if  necessary,  a  trans- 
pacific line  to  be  used  in  case  of  military  necessity.  How 
far  we  should  have  to  go  along  this  relatively  unimpor- 
tant line, — as  far  as  the  actual  fighting  is  concerned, — 
may  be  estimated  from  the  fact  that  it  would  require  1,000 
ships  to  transport  350,000  soldiers  and  their  equipment 
across  the  ocean.  Count  Okuma  estimates  that  2,000,000 
tons  of  shipping  is  requisite  for  the  transportation  of 
400,000  soldiers.  Japan's  entire  commercial  fleet  aggre- 
gates 1,000,000  tons.  How  many  available  tons  should 
we  have,  in  case  of  war,  for  transports,  foodships,  am- 
munition ships,  hospital  ships,  repair  ships,  colliers,  oil 
ships,  fire  fighters,  floating  docks,  etc.,  etc.?  The  new 
programme  provides  for  six  of  these  ships  at  a  cost  of 
about  $10,000,000! 

Underwater  Craft 

Turning  to  "  adequate  "  preparedness  under  the  water, 
we  find  a  similar  unknown  and  constantly  changing  set 
of  factors  for  the  solution  of  the  problem. 

The  submarine  has  increased  in  size  from  300  tons  to 
900  tons'  displacement;  in  radius,  from  1,000  to  6,000 
miles;  in  speed,  from  10  to  22  knots,  above  water,  and 
from  5  to  1 1  knots,  under  the  surface ;  and  in  armament, 
from  one  torpedo  and  no  guns,  to  8  torpedoes  and  3-inch 
and  6-inch  guns.  It  is  used  for  the  defense  of  seacoasts, 
harbors,  battleships  and  for  attacks  upon  merchantmen, 
harbors,  transports  and  battleships.  It  can  even  dive 
under  submarine  mines,  in  its  attacks  upon  its  prey.  So 


PREPAREDNESS 

revolutionary  has  it  already  become, — within  a  mere 
span  of  time, — that  it  has  effected  a  stalemate  in  warfare 
on  the  sea  as  complete  as  is  the  warfare  in  the  trenches, 
and  has  challenged  the  mastery  of  the  sea  by  even  the 
proudest  fleet  that  plows  the  waves. 

We  are  planning  to  increase  our  number  of  varied  but 
inefficient  submarines  by  adding,  within  the  next  five 
years,  15  fleet  and  85  coast  submarines,  at  a  cost  of  about 
$78,000,000.  We  should  even  then  lag  behind  what 
Great  Britain  and  Germany  have  now. 

Submarine  mines,  anchored  and  floating;  wireless  tor- 
pedoes, fired  from  crewless  boats  and  crewless  aeroplanes, 
from  distant  points  on  shore  or  on  the  ocean :  these  are 
two  more  of  the  many  known  and  secret  devices  used  in 
our  day  for  the  destruction  of  battleships,  and  the  nullifi- 
cation or  complete  transformation  of  all  the  old  familiar 
means  of  attack  and  defense.  While  to  counteract  these, 
or  to  revolutionize  them  in  their  turn,  aeroplanes,  "  jitney 
submarines,"  motor-boats,  and  a  host  of  nets  and  traps, 
are  being  launched  upon  the  market  and  the  sea. 

How  many  of  these  shall  we  invest  in,  to  make  our 
armaments  really  "adequate"?  How  much  equipment 
of  this  kind  do  we  require?  The  new  programme  pro- 
vides $480,000  "  for  torpedo  defense  nets."  How  far 
would  this  go  towards  really  "adequate"  armament? 
Can  any  man  say  what  is  really  adequate  armament? 
Within  a  year  after  the  beginning  of  the  present  war, 
the  British  Admiralty  received  more  than  32,000  "  new 
ideas,"  and  is  working  on  some  of  these  which,  it  is  freely 
predicted,  will  make  the  submarine  of  to-day  as  innocuous 
as  a  goldfish,  and  a  superdreadnought  as  helpless  as  a 
jellyfish.  The  rapid  trend  of  naval  science  appears  to  be 
away  from  size  and  towards  the  maximum  of  force  in 
the  minimum  of  space.  Thus  is  recalled  the  old-fash- 
ioned reductio  ad  absurdum: 

As  naturalists  observe,  a  flea 

Has  smaller  fleas  that  on  him  prey ; 


PREPAREDNESS  ON  AND  UNDER  SEA  233 

And  these  have  smaller  still  to  bite  'em ; 
And  so  proceed,  ad  infinitum. 

Speed;  Guns,  Projectiles,  Explosives;  Armor 

For  both  overwater  and  underwater  craft,  a  constant 
revolution  is  in  progress  in  the  development  of  new  kinds 
of  fuel  and  engines.  Speed,  SPEED,  SPEED,  is  the  inces- 
sant demand ;  and  scientists  of  many  kinds  are  doing  their 
marvellous  best  to  satisfy  this  demand  for  land  vehicles, 
watercraft,  submarines  and  aeroplanes.  Victory  goes  to 
the  fastest  and  the  hardest  hitter.  Hence,  vying  with  the 
speed-makers  are  the  manufacturers  of  guns,  projectiles 
and  explosives;  and  these  in  turn  are  breathlessly  pur- 
sued by  the  makers  of  armor. 

Guns  have  grown  in  range  from  less  than  one-half  mile 
to  more  than  eleven  miles,  and  in  size  from  7-inch  to  16- 
inch,  which  last  are  now  "  the  heaviest  ever  " ;  their  ma- 
terial, too,  is  constantly  changing.  "  Krupp  "  is  a  magic 
word,  and  every  nation  has  had  its  attack  of  this  kind  of 
croup;  but  the  President  of  the  Bethlehem  Steel  Co.  re- 
cently declared  that  the  "  Krupp  naval  gun  is  the  poorest 
in  the  world,  because  battleships  have  passed  beyond  the 
antiquated  crucible  steel  gun."  Again,  the  aeroplane, 
as  the  guide  of  the  gunner,  and  the  submarine,  have  pulled 
in  opposite  directions ;  the  former  urges  on  the  increasing 
size  and  range  of  guns,  while  the  latter  demands  smaller 
and  quicker-firing  ones.  Our  New  York  and  Pennsyl- 
vania battleships  will  carry  14-inch  guns ;  the  next  class, 
1 6-inch  guns ;  but  these  are  criticised  for  various  reasons, 
and  the  class  for  next  year,  it  is  insisted,  must  return  to 
14-inch  guns.  Which  shall  it  be,  great  guns  or  small; 
how  great  and  how  many? 

Projectiles,  too,  have  grown  from  shot  to  shells,  and 
shells  from  100  pounds  to  850  pounds  in  explosive  charge. 
A  motley  crew  of  ites  and  ates  have  sprung  up  in  labora- 
tories to  fill  these  shells  with  explosives  that  will  make 
them  "irresistible";  and  gases  are  fast  replacing  shot 
and  shell  on  battlefield  and  intrenchment. 


234  PREPAREDNESS 

To  meet  this  challenge  of  shell  and  gas,  the  hulls  of 
battleships  have  been  made  "  impenetrable  "  by  sheath- 
ing them  in  armor,  which  has  radically  changed  its  sub- 
stance at  least  three  times,  and  three  times  has  increased 
in  thickness  from  ^y2  to  14  inches  or  more;  while  the 
men  who  fight  on  shipboard  or  in  trench  equip  themselves 
with  helmets,  breast-plates  and  masks.  And  now  that 
scientists  and  inventive  wizards  have  been  mobilized  in 
all  the  military  laboratories  of  the  world,  we  may  expect 
to  see  perfected  some  device  for  utilizing  such  forces  as 
"  atomic  energy,"  which  will  wage  war  to  extermination, 
and  bring  peace  on  earth  by  making  it  a  desert. 

What  Revolution  Will  This  War  Create? 

What  revolution  in  naval  warfare  this  present  war  may 
accomplish,  no  scientist  or  romancer  is  bold  enough  to 
prophesy. 

The  Crimean  War  revolutionized  naval  warfare  by 
producing  iron-clad  and  breech-loading  guns  with  rifled 
bores.  The  American  Civil  War  produced  the  epoch- 
making  revolving  turrets.  The  Russo-Japanese  War 
ushered  in  another  revolution  by  creating  the  dread- 
nought, 12-inch  guns,  and  a  firing  range  of  12,000  yards. 
The  present  war  has  already  given  us  the  submarine,  the 
submarine  battleship,  and  the  aeroplane  as  great  fighting 
machines.  Fifteen  years  ago,  a  rear  admiral,  the  lead- 
ing member  of  the  Board  of  Construction  of  the  United 
States  Navy,  brushed  aside  the  advocacy  of  submarines 
and  airships  with  the  unanswerable  argument  that 
"  swimming  was  intended  for  fishes  and  flying  for  birds, 
but  neither  for  men."  Within  this  short  space  of  time, 
men  have  learned  both  to  swim  and  to  fly  so  fast  and  to 
fight  so  fiercely  under  water  and  over  land,  that  the  fish- 
men  and  the  bird-men  give  fair  promise  of  doing  away 
first  with  the  warriors  on  the  surface  of  sea  and  land, 
and  then  with  each  other.  In  this  Twentieth  Century 
has  been  literally  realized  the  seemingly  impossible  taunt 


PREPAREDNESS  ON  AND  UNDER  SEA  235 

which  the  Scythian  chieftain  hurled  at  the  Persian  king, 
2,300  years  ago :  "  Unless,  O  Persians,  ye  become  birds 
and  fly  into  the  air,  or  become  mice  and  hide  yourselves 
beneath  the  earth,  or  become  frogs  and  leap  into  the 
lakes,  ye  shall  never  return  home  again,  but  shall  die 
by  these  arrows."  Thus,  Twentieth  Century  science  has 
enabled  belligerent  man  to  transform  himself  into  birds, 
mice  and  frogs,  as  well  as  into  the  shark  of  the  sea  and 
the  tiger  of  the  jungle.  Which  and  how  many  of  these 
noble  brutes  shall  we  Americans  become,  in  our  frantic 
efforts  to  "  prepare  "  ? 


VIII 
PREPAREDNESS  IN  AND  FROM  THE  AIR 

THE  military  experts  who  declare  that  the  real  war- 
fare of  the  future  is  to  be,  not  on  and  under  the 
land,  but  on  and  under  the  sea,  are  rivalled  by 
other  experts  who  declare  that  the  real  warfare  of  the 
future  is  to  be,  not  on  and  under  the  sea,  but  in  and  from 
the  air.  The  marvellous  inventions  of  the  past  ten  years 
have  made  Darius  Green's  flying-machine  no  longer  a 
laughing-stock,  and  have  enabled  the  belligerents  in  the 
present  war  to  fulfill  literally  Tennyson's  poetic  prophecy 
of  "  the  nations'  airy  navies  grappling  in  the  central  blue." 
For  example,  in  an  aerial  battle  in  Alsace,  twenty  aero- 
planes engaged;  rifles,  machine-guns  and  bombs  were 
the  weapons ;  the  ships,  or  planes,  maneuvred  for  posi- 
tion, dashed  in  and  rammed  each  other;  and  finally,  one 
side  was  defeated,  and  retreat  and  pursuit  ensued. 

CAPTIVE    BALLOONS 

For  centuries,  it  was  deemed  a  great  scientific  triumph 
for  men  to  ascend  in  lighter-than-air  balloons,  even 
though  they  were  blown  hither  and  thither  as  the  winds 
listed.  Our  Twentieth  Century  has  developed,  not  only 
a  dirigible  balloon,  but  a  heavier-than-air  machine.  And 
yet  even  the  despised  balloon  has  played  an  unsuspected 
role  in  the  present  war.  Captive  balloons  are  to  be  seen 
at  many  points  on  the  line  of  battle,  equipped  with  photo- 
graphic and  signalling  apparatus,  and  acting  as  the  eyes 
of  the  artillery.  Especially  on  battlefields  where  both 
guns  and  men  are  invisible,  the  captive  balloon  has  proved 
of  vast  importance  in  detecting  and  reporting  accurately 
the  disposition  and  strength  of  "  the  enemy."  Slow  and 
sure,  as  compared  with  the  aviator,  the  stationary  bal- 

236 


PREPAREDNESS  IN  AND  FROM  THE  AIR    237 

loon  has  earned  in  military  service  its  continuance  even 
amidst  dirigibles  and  aeroplanes. 

DIRIGIBLE    BALLOONS,    OR    AIRSHIPS 

The  dirigible  balloons,  or  airships  proper,  like  those  of 
the  Zeppelin,  Parse val  (or  Parzival),  Spiess,  or  La 
Patrie  types,  seem  not  so  wonderful  as  the  heavier-than- 
air  aeroplanes ;  and  yet  they  are  marvellous  in  their  way, 
and  bear  an  incalculable  promise  of  military  efficiency. 
Acting  on  the  principle  that  if  might  is  right,  dynamite  is 
more  right,  the  airship  drops  bombs  on  warship,  camp 
or  fortress.  It  participates  prominently  in  the  campaign 
of  "  frightfulness,"  which  is  designed  to  distract  the 
enemy's  thoughts,  prevent  him  from  concentrating  all 
his  energies  and  resources  on  offensive  warfare  and  bring 
pressure  from  his  own  terrified  people  at  home  to  demand 
a  cessation  of  the  war. 

Equipped  with  loo-horse  power,  six-cylinder  engines, 
or  510  horse-power  in  all;  supplied  with  fuel  for  twenty- 
four  hours  at  top  speed,  or  for  96  hours  at  normal  speed ; 
maintaining  a  speed  of  sixty  miles  an  hour;  carrying 
a  load  of  seven  to  ten  tons  and  a  gondola  for  militant 
air-men  and  for  a  shell-firing  anti-aircraft  gun;  and 
furnished  forth  with  death-dealing  bombs;  such  is  the 
military  airship  proper  of  our  time.  Developed  from  the 
original  cigar-shape  into  a  fish-like  form,  and  painted  a 
leaden  gray,  or  an  "  invisible  green,"  they  fly,  like  verita- 
ble messengers  of  death,  in  the  darkness  of  the  night, 
when  on  their  raids.  These  raids  have  proven  that  Eng- 
land's sea-girt,  navy-encircled,  fortified  coasts  and  cities 
are  not  immune  from  an  aerial  fleet.  Dirigibles  have 
disputed  also  England's  mastery  of  the  ocean,  having 
overhauled  and  stopped  at  least  one  ship  at  sea. 

Another  novel  use  made  of  the  dirigible  airship  is  the 
transportation  of  machinery  from  Austria-Hungary  to 
Turkey,  by  which  shells  were  to  be  manufactured  for  the 
defense  of  the  Dardanelles.  A  dozen  of  the  largest  Zep- 


238  PREPAREDNESS 

pelins,  each  carrying  from  three  to  four  tons  of  machin- 
ery and  making  two  or  three  trips  of  280  miles  each, 
across  Bulgaria,  are  said  to  have  performed  this  feat 
of  aerial  transportation. 

DEFENSES    AGAINST   DIRIGIBLES 

The  advent  of  these  "  dreadnoughts  of  the  air "  has 
caused  the  invention  of  giant  search-lights  and  of  re- 
versed megaphones,  and  microphone  listening-stations, 
for  their  discovery;  of  various  types  of  guns,  with  ex- 
ceptionally wide  angles,  or  mounted  on  lofty  towers  for 
their  destruction ;  and  especially  of  "  aerial  torpedo- 
boats  "  for  their  annihilation.  This  novel  torpedo-boat 
is  small  in  size,  though  carrying  large  torpedoes  or  bombs, 
and  dispenses  with  an  aviator's  presence,  since  it  is  me- 
chanically adjusted  before  it  is  launched  in  the  air.  Thus, 
like  "  a  torpedo  with  a  brain,"  it  flies  and  .guides  itself 
by  means  of  a  gyroscopic  stabilizer,  until  the  moment  is 
reached  for  it  to  fire  its  torpedo  or  drop  its  bomb.  The 
torpedo  or  bomb  is  released  by  a  time-clock  arrangement, 
and  has  been  fired  or  dropped  accurately  as  far  distant  as 
twenty-five  miles  from  the  torpedo-boat's  starting  point. 
The  cost  of  these  air-boats,  complete,  is  about  $10,000, 
and  many  hundreds  of  them  have  been  built  and  used 
against  Zeppelins  and  for  other  purposes.  A  numerous 
fleet  is  reported  to  be  now  building  for  an  attack  upon 
the  Turkish  forts  in  the  Dardanelles. 

Another  defense  called  forth  by  the  dirigible  airship 
is  a  small  hydrogen  balloon,  which  lifts  a  high  explosive 
and  inflammable  fuse.  When  Zeppelins  are  sighted,  these 
balloons,  attached  to  fine  wires  two  miles  long,  are  re- 
leased and,  shooting  up  above  the  Zeppelin,  cause  a  con- 
tact with  the  wire  and  balloon  and  explode  the  charge. 

These  various  devices  have  caused  Zeppelins,  which, 
before  the  war,  had  a  radius  of  1,000  miles  and  carried 
several  tons  of  bombs  at  a  height  of  2,000  feet,  to  shorten 
their  radius  and  to  fly  at  a  height  of  7,000  feet,  thus  pre- 


PREPAREDNESS  IN  AND  FROM  THE  AIR    239 

venting  them  from  carrying,  on  their  long  raids,  more 
than  one  ton  of  bombs. 

But  in  spite  of  air-guns  and  other  devices  for  coping 
with  the  airship,  the  cities  of  Europe  are  living  under  a 
reign  of  mental  terror  and  of  physical  darkness  at  night ; 
and  their  inhabitants  are  resorting  to  bomb-proof  cellars,' 
or  to  the  use  of  respirators  for  the  nullification  of  as- 
phyxiating gases  diffused  from  airship  bombs. 

AEROPLANES 

Spectacular  as  is  the  airship,  the  aeroplane  is  the  favor- 
ite child  of  this  century.  Three  types  of  these  have  been 
developed  with  success,  namely,  the  monoplane,  the  bi- 
plane and  the  triplane.  The  monoplane,  with  but  one 
supporting  plane,  has  become  famous  because  of  the  mili- 
tary exploits  of  the  German  taubes.  Far  from  being 
doves  of  peace,  these  doves  flock  with  the  Hohenzollern 
eagles  of  various  kinds  and  have  made  many  a  destruc- 
tive raid  into  France,  as  far  as  and  beyond  Paris. 

Biplanes,  with  two  supporting  planes,  one  above  the 
other,  and  triplanes,  with  three  supporting  planes,  have 
been  added  to  the  aerial  navies,  especially  of  France,  and 
have  enabled  those  navies  to  more  than  duplicate  in  the 
air  the  biremes  and  triremes  of  the  water-navies  of  an- 
cient Greece  and  Rome. 

When  the  present  war  began,  aeroplanes  were  used 
chiefly  for  scouting  purposes,  and  they  are  still  indispen- 
sable for  those  purposes;  but  one  year  ago,  they  were 
small  and  light-armed,  and  were  not  very  formidable  as 
fighting  machines.  Equipped  with  only  a  27  horse-power 
motor,  and  able  to  carry  only  a  four  hours'  supply  of 
gasoline  as  fuel,  their  radius  of  action  was  little  more 
than  200  miles. 

Today,  huge  biplanes,  or  "  superplanes,"  or  "  dread- 
nought war-planes,"  are  being  built  and  used,  equipped 
with  twin  motors  of  160  to  200  horse-power  each,  carry- 
ing a  fuel  supply  for  nearly  twenty  hours,  with  a  rate  of 


240  PREPAREDNESS 

speed  of  nearly  seventy-five  miles  an  hour,  and  a  radius 
of  action  of  nearly  1,500  miles.  If  fuel  alone  were  car- 
ried in  these  biplanes,  they  could  cover  the  distance  of 
1,900  miles  across  the  Atlantic  from  Newfoundland  to 
Ireland ;  but  an  important  part  of  their  cargo  is  a  ton  of 
dynamite  or  other  explosive,  which  is  used  for  destroy- 
ing bridges,  intrenchments,  fortifications,  railroads  and 
other  lines  of  communication.  Admiral  Fiske  testified 
before  a  Committee  of  Congress  last  winter  that  a  hostile 
fleet  need  approach  to  within  only  500  or  600  miles  from 
our  coast  in  order  to  launch  a  successful  aeroplane  ex- 
pedition against  us  for  the  purpose  of  dropping  bombs  on 
our  cities. 

In  Germany,  England,  Russia  and  Italy  many  huge 
war-planes  are  under  construction  or  already  launched, 
and,  under  the  names  of  Kolossals,  Ilja  Mouramets,  De- 
stroyers, Acrobusses,  etc.,  are  beginning  to  play  a  fearful 
role  of  destruction  in  the  great  war. 

Already,  the  small  aeroplanes  have  accomplished  much 
in  a  military  way  besides  their  principal  service  of  scout- 
ing. As  scouts,  they  have  headed  off  many  an  airship 
attack  upon  London  and  Paris,  and  were  instrumental  in 
preventing  Von  Kluck's  army  from  being  attacked  by  a 
flanking  force,  and  in  causing  its  retreat  from  Paris.  Be- 
sides such  services,  they  have  fought  each  other,  hav- 
ing as  many  as  40  battles  in  18  days ;  they  have  dropped 
explosives  weighing  frpm  300  to  400  pounds  on  the  Zep- 
pelin base  at  Friedrichshaven,  the  hangar  at  Evere,  Bel- 
gium, the  submarine  bases  at  Zeebrugge  and  Antwerp, 
the  Krupp  works  at  Diisseldorf,  the  fortifications  of 
Goritz,  the  asphyxiating  gas  base  at  Dornach,  the  railroad 
station  and  electric  power  house  at  Miihlheim  and  on 
towns  of  varied  importance  like  Cologne,  Cuxhaven  and 
Karlsruhe,  in  Germany,  Bari  in  Italy  and  towns  and  cities 
in  England  and  France,  including  London  and  Paris.  A 
French  aviator  dropped  a  bomb  on  the  largest  coal 
depot  on  the  Rhine,  located  at  Strassburg,  and  caused  the 


PREPAREDNESS  IN  AND  FROM  THE  AIR    241 

destruction  of  4,000  tons  of  coal  and  endangered  20,000 
more  tons  and  the  city  of  Strassburg  itself.  Another  set 
fire  to  a  powder  magazine  in  Southern  Baden ;  a  squad- 
ron of  thirty-five  shelled  a  large  munition  depot  near 
Calonne;  an  Austrian  flier  destroyed  by  bombs  a  squad- 
ron of  three  Russian  aeroplanes ;  another  flew  above  the 
mountain  ramparts  of  Montenegro  and  caused  havoc  in 
one  of  its  supposedly  inaccessible  towns ;  and  a  veritable 
fleet  of  62  French  aeroplanes  bombarded  a  munitions 
plant  at  Saarlouis  in  Rhenish  Prussia,  while  another,  of  84 
planes,  bombarded  German  intrenchments.  Two  French 
and  two  English  aeroplanes  attacked  and  destroyed  a 
Zeppelin;  Russian  aeroplanes  have  guarded  the  coasts 
of  the  Black  Sea ;  German  aeroplanes  have  acted  as  eyes 
of  the  submarines  and  have  guided  them  in  their  attacks 
on  merchantmen,  destroyers  and  cruisers ;  the  warship 
fleets  of  the  warring  nations  are  protected  by  them  from 
hourly  danger  of  attack  from  submarines  and  floating 
mines ;  aeroplanes  have  guarded  and  guided  the  naval  at- 
tacks in  the  Dardanelles,  and  convoyed  troops  across  the 
English  Channel ;  and,  to  cap  the  climax  of  seeming  ro- 
mance, a  British  aviator  bombarded  and  sunk  a  sub- 
marine moored  in  the  mole  at  Zeebrugge.  A  short  ad- 
vance over  this  will  enable  an  airman  to  dive  like  a  fish- 
hawk  beneath  the  surface  of  the  sea  and,  clutching  a 
submarine  in  his  talons,  fly  away  with  it  to  his  eyrie ! 

So  impressive  has  been  the  work  of  aeroplanes  that  it 
is  seriously  proposed  to  establish  in  Great  Britain  a  Min- 
istry of  Aviation,  to  construct  thousands  of  aeroplanes 
and  with  them  to  destroy  the  Krupp  works  at  Essen, 
batter  down  the  bridges  over  the  Meuse  and  the  Rhine, 
and  thus  prevent  the  daily  transit  of  2,160  trains  laden 
with  food,  ammunition  and  reinforcements  for  the  Ger- 
man armies  in  the  West. 

So  efficient  is  the  aeroplane  of  today  in  the  destruc- 
tion of  defenses,  the  demoralization  of  armies  in  the 
field,  and  the  paralysis  of  lines  of  communication,  as  well 


PREPAREDNESS 

as  in  scouting,  that  military  experts  declare  that  no  army 
or  fleet,  no  matter  how  strong  and  completely  equipped 
it  may  be,  can  dare  to  move  unless  it  has  secured  com- 
mand of  the  air.  As  one  of  these  experts  puts  it :  "  Every 
military  and  naval  authority  in  Europe  now  recognizes 
that  a  navy  without  aerial  eyes  is  as  helpless  as  a  sub- 
marine without  a  periscope;  an  army  without  aerial 
scouts  can  be  corraled  and  slaughtered  like  a  herd  of 
sheep ;  a  harbor  or  naval  station  is  at  the  mercy  of  every 
puny  submarine  and  cruiser." 

With  such  views  prevalent  in  Europe,  the  statement 
of  Orville  Wright  is  credible  that  as  early  in  the  war 
as  November,  1914,  the  British  were  turning  out  planes 
at  the  rate  of  sixty  per  week,  and  that  by  May,  1915, 
they  had  constructed  new  planes  to  the  number  of  1,560. 
Both  France  and  Germany  have  pushed  on  aeroplane  con- 
struction with  feverish  rapidity.  How  rapid  it  was  in 
Germany  before  the  war  may  be  estimated  by  the  fact 
that  constructors  increased  them  from  20,  in  1912,  to  50, 
in  1913.  American  manufacturers  are  adding  their  hun- 
dreds of  planes  to  the  belligerents'  large  stock.  For  ex- 
ample, on  a  single  trip  from  New  York  to  Europe,  the 
Baltic  carried  as  part  of  its  cargo  197  aeroplanes,  valued 
at  $600,000.  Orders  for  aeroplanes  to  the  value  of  $15,- 
000,000  had  been  placed  in  the  United  States  by  the 
Allies  before  the  first  six  months  of  the  war  had  passed, 
and  two  more  orders,  each  for  1,000  planes,  could  not  be 
placed  on  account  of  lack  of  facilities  for  manufacturing. 
German  manufacturers  of  aeroplanes  have  also  revolu- 
tionized their  equipments  and  methods,  and  have  been 
constructing  more  than  100  planes  per  week,  with  greatly 
increased  motor  power  and  with  "  pusher "  instead  of 
"  tractor  "  propellers. 

AERIAL    TORPEDO-BOATS 

Already  an  aerial  torpedo-boat  has  been  patented, 
which  will  be  to  the  airship  what  the  submarine  is  to 


PREPAREDNESS  IN  AND  FROM  THE  AIR    243 

the  superdreadnought.  This  boat,  equipped  with  a 
Whitehead  torpedo  having  a  range  of  10,000  yards,  is 
designed  to  swoop  down  at  a  distance  of  some  five  miles 
from  a  fleet  of  warships  and,  dropping  a  torpedo  in  the 
water,  set  its  machinery  in  motion  and  send  it  at  a  speed 
of  more  than  forty  knots  an  hour  towards  the  doomed 
ship.  Such  boats  can  be  used  either  in  open  waters  or 
in  land-locked  harbors  (like  that  at  Santiago  de  Cuba), 
and  may  yet  be  able  to  launch  torpedoes  in  the  air  against 
the  superdreadnoughts  of  the  firmaments ! 

HYDROAEROPLANES 

There  are  authentic  instances  in  history  where  cavalry 
and  infantry  have  fought  sea-battles,  and  ships  have  bat- 
tled on  the  land.  But  these  episodes  have  been  eclipsed 
by  the  hydroaeroplane  of  our  time.  This  amphibious 
machine  is  well  called  the  connecting  link  between  the 
army,  the  navy  and  the  air-fleet.  It  is  capable  of  alight- 
ing upon,  traveling  on,  and  rising  from,  the  water,  and 
of  flying  over  land  and  sea.  There  are  ordinary  hydro- 
aeroplanes, for  use  over  land  and  on  small  bodies  of 
water;  and  sea-planes,  especially  designed  for  use  at 
sea.  The  former  are  designed  to  give  eyes  to  the  army, 
and  the  latter  to  give  wings  to  the  navy.  The  sea-planes 
can  put  out  from  the  shore,  or  be  launched  from  a  ship, 
or  rise  from  the  water.  Their  uses  are  varied  and  im- 
portant,— so  important  that  no  warship  is  considered 
complete  unless  it  carries  and  uses  them  as  regularly 
and  normally  as  it  carries  and  uses  small  boats.  They 
are  three  times  as  fast  as  cruisers,  and,  equipped  with 
trained  observers  and  wireless  apparatus,  they  are 
launched  from  a  ship's  side  and  sent  on  scouting  expedi- 
tions of  a  hundred  miles,  communicating  their  discoveries 
by  means  of  wireless  over  a  radius  of  fifty  miles  from  their 
base.  As  "  kingfishers  of  the  submarine,"  while  they  are 
soaring  at  an  altitude  of  300  to  500  feet  above  the  water, 
they  can  detect  a  submarine  boat  or  mine,  even  when 


244  PREPAREDNESS 

these  are  submerged  to  the  depth  of  from  150  to  200  feet. 
Then,  far  outfacing  the  submarine,  they  can  report  its 
presence  to  warships  and  enable  them  to  escape  or  to 
destroyers  and  enable  them  to  pursue  it.  Mounting  high 
in  the  air  from  a  ship's  side,  the  hydroaeroplane  directs 
the  firing  of  the  gun;  both  when  the  mast-head  spotters 
cannot  secure  or  have  lost  the  range,  because  of  distance, 
and  when  indirect  firing  is  necessary,  as  at  the  Darda- 
nelles. It  reports  to  landing  parties  the  nature  and  loca- 
tion of  defenses,  and  aids  in  the  attack  by  shelling,  from 
the  air,  defenses,  troops,  depots  and  transports.  A  fleet 
of  them  have  even  set  forth  from  hangar-ships  at  sea 
to  attack  forts  and  naval  bases.  Independently  or  to- 
gether, they  sink  submarines,  merchant-vessels  and  trans- 
ports, and  greatly  harass  even  men-of-war. 

For  coast-defense  purposes,  the  aeroplane  of  all  kinds 
is  widely  used.  It  launches  forth  into  the  air  from  shore, 
mounts  high  above  the  land,  or  flies  far  out  over  the  sea ; 
and  then,  returning  at  rapid  speed  to  base,  or  utilizing  its 
wireless  outfit,  it  reports  the  presence  of  warships  hidden 
below  the  horizon  from  observers  on  even  the  highest 
points  on  shore.  By  means  of  signals,  such  as  the  drop- 
ping of  smoke-bombs,  it  can  direct  the  fire  of  shore  bat- 
teries and  forts  upon  warships  long  distances  at  sea. 

THE    OBSOLESCENCE    OF    AIRCRAFT 

Meanwhile,  rapid  as  has  been  the  development  of  avia- 
tion, the  obsolescence  of  aircraft  has  been  even  more 
rapid ;  it  has  far  exceeded  the  rate  of  obsolescence  of  the 
dreadnought,  and  will  doubtless  continue  at  the  same 
rapid  rate  for  some  time  in  the  future,  and  especially  until 
the  end  of  the  present  war.  Frederick  A.  Talbot,  the  dis- 
tinguished aeronaut  of  Great  Britain,  declares :  "  The 
first  year  of  the  war  has  completely  revolutionized  the 
design,  equipment  and  methods  of  operating  the  aero- 
plane. Will  the  second  twelve  months'  campaigning  bring 
about  any  further  developments  equally  startling?  The 


PREPAREDNESS  IN  AND  FROM  THE  AIR    245 

air-machine  is  in  the  melting-pot.  During  the  short  span 
of  a  single  year,  the  aerial  fleets  of  the  protagonists  have 
been  completely  remodeled  and  rebuilt;  but  it  is  safe 
to  assert  that  the  further  lessons  which  remain  to  be 
learned  will  exercise  just  as  far-reaching  influence  and 
contribute  to  the  production  of  still  more  wonderful  war- 
ships of  the  air." 

There  is  another  factor  of  obsolescence  which  should 
receive  some  consideration,  namely,  the  changing  rules 
of  the  game.  What  kind  of  aerial  warfare  in  the  future 
will  be  permissible  to  civilized  nations?  Will  they  con- 
tent themselves  with  the  destruction  of  cities  by  means 
of  bombs  or  barrels  of  inflammable  oils,  hurled  from  air- 
ships ?  Or  will  they  transfer  the  "  gas  warfare  "  of  the 
trenches  to  the  heavens,  and  hurl  down  projectiles  filled 
with  asphyxiating  gases  to  exterminate  the  inhabitants? 
The  decision  would  make  a  difference  in  the  type  of 
"  adequate "  aircraft.  It  might  therefore  be  wise  to 
wait  until  the  new  rules  of  the  game  have  been  issued, 
so  as  to  avoid  putting  our  money  on  the  wrong  horse, — 
or  bird. 

AERIAL    PERSONNEL 

As  to  the  problem  of  training  a  sufficient  number  of 
aeronauts  for  such  a  vast  fleet  of  airships,  Mr.  Orville 
Wright  admits  that  it  is,  even  for  only  2,000  machines, 
"  a  very  serious  problem.  There  should  be,"  he  says, 
"  at  least  three  men  for  each  machine ;  and  of  course,  at 
first,  the  dearth  of  machines  would  render  the  training 
process  very  slow.  The  small  number  of  available  offi- 
cers, also,  must  be  considered."  The  number  of  aviators 
in  our  army  and  navy  at  present  is  less  than  100,  instead 
of  Mr.  Wright's  desired  number  of  at  least  6,000. 

To  meet  this  demand,  the  government  is  being  urged 
by  the  aero  clubs  to  establish  aviation  schools, — "  on  the 
Atlantic,  Pacific  and  Gulf  coasts  " ;— and  meanwhile,  the 
Aero  Club  of  America  is  preparing  to  open  an  "  aviation 


246  PREPAREDNESS 

center  "  at  Sheepshead  Bay,  where  sportsmen  and  busi- 
ness men  are  to  be  trained  in  the  airman's  craft.  Con- 
crete hangars,  provided  with  steam  heat,  electric  light 
and  all  modern  conveniences  for  flying  during  both  win- 
ter and  summer,  are  to  be  opened  in  the  Spring  of  1916, 
and  daily  training  will  be  given,  supplemented  by  weekly 
meets. 

The  Aero  Club  of  America  has  also  turned  its  atten- 
tion to  the  States  and  large  cities,  and  is  collecting  a  fund 
of  $500,000  for  the  purchase  of  aeroplanes  to  be  used  by 
the  National  Guards  and  the  Naval  Militia.  The  Aero 
Club  of  Pennsylvania  is  raising  a  fund  of  $50,000  for 
"  the  complete  aerialization  "  of  Pennsylvania,  New  Jer- 
sey and  Delaware.  Aeronauts  are  to  police  this  aeronau- 
tical zone,  with  the  aid  of  wireless  telegraphy,  and  to  re- 
port the  passage  of  all  aircraft  as  well  as  the  approach 
of  "  the  enemy  "  on  the  ocean.  Its  fleet  of  aeroplanes 
and  hydroaeroplanes  is  to  form  "  the  first  line  of  aerial 
defense"  in  time  of  war;  and  in  time  of  peace  it  is  to 
afford  opportunity  for  instruction  in  aeronautics  for  mi- 
litiamen, marines  and  civilians.  The  appeal  issued  by 
the  Aero  Club  to  the  public  for  contributions  to  this  fund, 
says :  "  Contributions  are  expected  from  all  persons 
who  realize  the  necessity  for  adequate  defenses  for  this 
country.  The  huge  air-fleets  of  France  and  Germany 
were  made  possible  when,  in  1912-13,  the  French  and 
German  people,  through  popular  subscription,  raised  re- 
spectively $1,222,969  and  $1,808,606."  Among  others 
responding  to  this  appeal,  is  a  lady  of  Providence,  Rhode 
Island,  who  emphasizes  her  trust  in  aeroplanes  by  con- 
tributing $7,500  for  the  purchase  of  one.  The  Philadel- 
phia and  other  newspapers  welcomed  this  plea  in  vocifer- 
ous editorials,  and  confidently  predicted  that  "  aerial  pre- 
paredness "  is  going  to  be  as  vital  an  element  in  national 
defense  as  are  military  ahd  naval  preparedness  on  land 
and  sea."  The  National  Guard  of  Pennsylvania  has  looked 
askance  at  the  project;  but  the  Navy  Department  has 


PREPAREDNESS  IN  AND  FROM  THE  AIR    247 

provided  ground  at  League  Island  for  its  aviation  center, 
and  has  welcomed  the  assistance  of  the  amateur  aero- 
nautical experts  in  training  the  navy-yard  men  in  the  use 
of  aircraft.  The  Navy  Department  has  also  begun  the 
policy  of  providing  the  Naval  Reserves  of  the  States  with 
aeroplanes  for  the  instruction  of  aeronauts,  two  of  these 
having  already  been  sent  to  the  battalion  in  Camden,  New 
Jersey,  and  an  aviation  station  and  armory  to  train  aero- 
nauts having  been  arranged  for  in  St.  Louis. 

WHAT    IS    ADEQUATE    AERIAL    PREPAREDNESS? 

Such  are  some  of  the  military  uses  of  the  aircraft  of 
our  time.  Many  of  the  prepareders  of  America,  taking 
note  of  these,  insist  that  "  mastery  of  the  air  "  is  the  best, 
perhaps  the  only  effective,  preparation  available  for  us. 
They  urge  that,  as  England  is  the  Queen  of  the  sea,  and 
Germany  the  King  of  the  land,  now  is  the  time  for  the 
American  Eagle  to  become  in  fact  the  Birdmen's  King. 

Our  Unpreparedness 

What,  then,  is  "  adequate  preparedness "  along  this 
line?  How  much  of  it  have  we  today?  Numerous  ex- 
perts assure  us  that  we  are  absolutely  unprepared.  For 
example,  Mr.  Orville  Wright  declares :  "  It  would  be 
folly  for  the  United  States  to  engage  in  war  today  with 
any  of  the  European  powers,  owing  to  our  utter  unpre- 
paredness  in  the  line  of  aeronautical  equipment.  Two 
years  would  be  required  for  this  country  to  acquire  the 
aeroplanes  needed  to  assure  protection,  even  in  time  of 
peace.  "  Another  aerial  expert,  the  president  of  an  aero 
club,  declares :  "  The  American  navy  has  no  aeroplane 
scouts  worthy  of  the  name.  In  case  of  war,  our  fleets, 
as  they  are  now  constituted,  would  be  sent  to  face  cer- 
tain destruction  at  the  hands  of  fleets  supplied  with  aero- 
plane spotters.  On  land,  the  story  would  be  the  same; 
masses  of  troops  could  be  concentrated  to  be  hurled 
against  our  lines,  while  we  remained  utterly  in  ignorance 


248  PREPAREDNESS 

that  an  attack  was  to  be  made."  Senator  Lodge  declares 
that  we  are  wofully  deficient  in  aircraft,  and  points  to 
the  fact  that  we  have  no  dirigibles  and  only  twenty-five 
aeroplanes, — thirteen  for  the  army,  only  nine  of  which 
are  even  claimed  to  be  first-class, — and  twelve  for  the 
navy,  eleven  of  which,  according  to  an  aviator  recently 
returned  from  Europe,  are  altogether  unfit  for  use. 

Mr.  Henry  Reuterdahl  asserts :  "  The  United  States 
Navy  has  fourteen  aeroplanes  for  scouting.  Should  war 
break  out  to-morrow,  none  of  the  machines  would  be 
capable  of  continuous  military  duty;  there  would  not  be 
one  which  could  accompany  the  fleet  to  detect  submarines 
or  mine-fields.  Recently,  one  wabbled  to  earth  and  killed 
the  aviator.  The  country  where  the  aeroplane  was  born 
is  the  twentieth  power  in  aeronautics." 

In  contrast  with  us,  France  had,  at  the  beginning  of 
this  present  war,  22  dirigibles  and  1,400  aeroplanes ;  Ger- 
many, 40  dirigibles  and  1,000  aeroplanes;  Russia,  16 
dirigibles  and  800  aeroplanes ;  Great  Britain,  9  dirigibles 
and  400  aeroplanes ;  Belgium,  2  dirigibles  and  100  aero- 
planes; Serbia,  60  aeroplanes.  During  the  war,  the  Eu- 
ropean nations  have  enormously  increased  their  supply  of 
aeroplanes,  Great  Britain,  France  and  Germany  each 
being  now  credited  with  10,000!  On  the  Franco-Belgian 
battle-line,  there  are  said  to  be  1,500  French,  and  1,000 
British  aeroplanes,  and  still  the  commanding  generals  are 
clamoring  for  more.  The  productive  capacity  of  France 
and  England  has  been  increased  to  1,000  aeroplanes  per 
week;  while  in  the  United  States,  all  our  public  and 
private  facilities  can  turn  out  only  300  to  400  per  week. 

Coast  Defense 

When  we  compare  our  present  preparedness  along  this 
line  with  our  alleged  needs,  the  contrast  is  quite  as  strik- 
ing. In  addition  to  the  cloud  of  aeroplanes,  as  numerous 
as  the  locusts  in  Egypt,  that  is  demanded  for  army  and 
navy  scouting  purposes,  our  coast-line,  we  are  told,  must 


PREPAREDNESS  IN  AND  FROM  THE  AIR    249 

be  guarded  primarily  by  flying-machines.  "These  are 
dark  days  for  the  old  order  of  things,"  an  aviation  ex- 
pert declares,  "  and  there  are  persons  who  hold  in  greater 
likelihood  the  landing  of  troops  from  transports  at  out- 
of-the-way  places  upon  our  coasts  than  an  attack  by  a 
battle-fleet  upon  the  defenses  of  our  seaports.  Our  coast- 
line, bounding  two  oceans,  cannot  be  fortified  in  the  strict 
sense,  nor  do  fortifications  play  the  part  they  once  did. 
These  long  stretches  of  seacoast  and  the  line  of  the 
Panama  Canal, — so  tender  a  spot  that  no  one  in  the 
service  willingly  talks  about  it, — must  be  protected  by  a 
combination  of  mobile  land  forces  and  sea  power.  To 
this  combination,  the  aeroplane  brings  the  third  indis- 
pensable element ;  it  gives  land  and  sea  forces  their  high- 
est efficiency,  and  permits  them  to  cooperate."  In  the 
light  of  this  testimony,  it  is  proposed  to  establish  along- 
shore radio-receiving  stations  of  wireless  telegraphy,  100 
miles  apart,  each  equipped  with  one  or  more  aeroplanes, 
these  also  fitted  with  wireless  apparatus.  This  plan  of 
coast-patrol  is  endorsed  by  a  fellow-expert  as  "a  tragi- 
cally important  link  between  the  silent,  newsless  sea  and 
our  apprehensive  forces  ashore."  With  21,000  miles  of 
coasts  to  protect,  this  plan  would  require  210  stations, 
and  from  210  to  an  indefinite  number  of  aeroplanes. 

But  this  is  far  from  being  the  whole  story.  The  forti- 
fications along  our  coasts  without  aeroplanes  are  declared 
to  have  become  practically  useless,  for  the  reason  that 
"  whether  afloat  or  ashore,  a  gun  that  is  aerially  eyeless 
is  blind  in  the  modern  sense  of  the  word.  With  its  rap- 
idly increasing  bore  and  heightening  angle  of  elevation, 
the  growing  gun  is  fast  passing  in  range  beyond  the  ability 
of  the  observer  aground  to  spot  its  shots."  Hence  aero- 
planes are  demanded  so  that  the  necessary  miles  of  range 
may  be  added  to  the  gunner's  vision. 

As  aids  to  the  army,  to  the  navy,  and  to  the  coast  forti- 
fications, and  for  direct  attack  or  defense,  an  indefinite 
and  innumerable  fleet  of  airships  is  demanded,  in  order 


250  PREPAREDNESS 

to  compete  with  the  other  nations  and  to  supply  ourselves 
with  "  adequate  defense." 

Our  Programme  for  Dirigibles 

What  are  we  doing  to  supply  this  demand?  Well,  the 
Navy  Department  saved  last  year,  by  economical  admin- 
istration, the  sum  of  $12,000,000,  which  it  plans  to  expend 
in  the  building  of  an  aviation  station  at  Pensacola,  Flor- 
ida, and  the  purchase  of  high-class  aeroplanes.  Besides 
this,  Congress  appropriated  at  its  last  session,  $1,000,000 
for  the  use  of  the  navy's  Bureau  of  Aeronautics,  and 
$300,000  for  the  use  of  the  same  bureau  in  the  army. 
This  sum  was  regarded  as  but  "  a  drop  in  the  bucket," 
but  the  Navy  Department  determined  to  "  make  a  be- 
ginning "  by  asking  for  bids  on  two  dirigibles.  These 
dirigibles,  having  received  from  aeroplane  scouts  infor- 
mation as  to  the  approach  of  submarines  or  mines,  are 
designed  to  fly  forth  and  drop  5o-pound  bombs,  fitted 
with  fuses  to  explode  on  contact  with  the  submarines, 
or  after  sinking  to  a  certain  depth.  It  is  not  hoped,  of 
course,  to  become  "  adequately  prepared  "  by  means  of 
these  two  dirigibles ;  for  they  are  not  to  be  of  the  rigid 
type  which  alone  is  now  deemed  efficient,  and,  according 
to  the  Assistant  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  they  are  to  be 
"  of  the  smallest  size  that  will  be  serviceable  for  training 
and  experiment,  to  develop  officers  and  men  for  this  serv- 
ice and  obtain  the  necessary  experience  to  produce  a  large 
dirigible  fleet."  They  are,  in  fact,  to  be  only  "  baby  Zep- 
pelins," and  since  their  purchase  is  designed,  according 
to  the  Assistant  Secretary,  to  encourage  the  development 
of  the  manufacture  of  dirigibles  in  this  country,  it  may 
be  regarded  as  another  and  a  novel  form  of  "  protection 
to  infant  industry."  How  baby-like  they  will  be  can  be 
guessed  from  their  dimensions  of  175  feet  in  length,  50 
feet  in  height,  and  35  feet  in  width,  as  compared  with  a 
Zeppelin's  dimensions  of  three  times  that  size.  Like 
President  Jefferson's  "  warships,"  which  were  to  be  run 


PREPAREDNESS  IN  AND  FROM  THE  AIR    251 

out  of  the  water  on  wheels  and  kept  under  sheds  when 
not  in  use,  these  "  war-planes  "  are  to  be  taken  apart 
and  their  parts  conveyed  on  naval  transports  or  even  on 
a  battleship. 

In  addition  to  providing  for  the  two  dirigibles,  the  Navy 
Department  has  contracted  for  six  hydroaeroplanes,  of 
the  biplane  type,  each  to  carry  two  persons,  guns,  ammu- 
nition, wireless  outfit  and  a  certain  amount  of  armor  pro- 
tection, and  to  have  a  speed  of  from  50  to  80  miles  an 
hour.  The  bids  on  these  ran  from  $6,600  to  $18,000  for 
each  machine. 

The  building  of  new  aeroplanes  has  been  deferred 
pending  the  development  of  a  motor  entirely  satisfactory 
to  the  government. 

Scientific  Preparation 

A  portion  of  the  congressional  appropriation  of  last 
year,  namely,  $5,000,  is  to  be  devoted  to  the  expenses  of 
a  National  Advisory  Committee  for  Aeronautics,  which 
is  to  consist  of  not  more  than  twelve  scientists,  and  is 
"  to  supervise  and  direct  the  scientific  study  of  the  prob- 
lems of  flight  with  a  view  to  their  practical  solution." 
To  aid  this  Committee  and  the  new  Advisory  Committee 
of  the  Navy,  a  new  society,  called  the  American  Society 
of  Aeronautic  Engineers,  has  been  organized,  with  200 
charter  members.  The  members  are  either  aeronautic 
engineers  or  flying  experts,  and  forty  of  them  are  licensed 
pilots  and  aviators.  Four  directors  of  this  society  are 
appointed  by  the  Navy  Department  and  the  War  Depart- 
ment, and  one  each  by  the  Post  Office  Department,  the 
Smithsonian  Institution,  the  Weather  Bureau,  the  Bu- 
reau of  Standards,  the  Massachusetts  Institute  of  Tech- 
nology and  the  University  of  Michigan, — the  last  two  in- 
stitutions having  introduced  into  their  curriculum  a 
course  on  aeronautics. 


252  PREPAREDNESS 

Our  Needs 

Reviewing  the  demand  for  "  preparedness  "  along  the 
line  of  aviation,  it  is  seen  that  it  includes  a  vast  and  in- 
definite increase,  even  in  time  of  peace,  in  the  number  and 
size  of  dirigibles,  aeroplanes  and  hydroaeroplanes,  for 
the  army,  for  the  navy  (and  for  each  of  its  capital  ships), 
for  the  coast  fortifications,  for  the  frontier  patrol  and 
for  the  Panama  Canal  and  the  Island  possessions  in  the 
Atlantic  and  Pacific ;  a  chain  of  aircraft  bases  and  wire- 
less outfits  at  distances  of  100  miles  on  both  oceans  and 
the  Gulf;  an  auxiliary  organization  of  hangar  ships;  the 
training  and  equipment  of  the  State  militia  and  Naval 
militia  for  aeronautical  service;  scores  of  special  corps 
of  trained,  professional  experts,  and  a  reserve  of  trained 
pilots;  the  establishment  by  the  Post  Office  Department 
of  2,000  aerial  routes,  so  that  it  may  create  a  corps  of 
civil  aviators  who  could  be  recruited  for  military  pur- 
poses in  time  of  war ;  the  registration  of  all  amateur  and 
professional  aviators  in  private  life,  so  that  they  may  be 
speedily  corraled  and  mobilized  in  time  of  war;  the  de- 
velopment of  manufactures  that  can  produce  the  right 
kind  and  adequate  number  of  motors ;  the  establishment 
of  many  air-bases  and  innumerable  hangars ;  and  the  de- 
velopment, manufacture  and  purchase  of  aeroguns  and 
a  whole  arsenal  of  new  weapons  of  attack  and  de- 
fense. 

As  to  the  number  of  aeroplanes  needed,  Mr.  Orville 
Wright  testifies :  "  A  conservative  estimate  of  the  num- 
ber of  machines  needed  by  the  navy  alone,  based  on  in- 
formation given  by  naval  officers,  places  the  figures  some- 
where around  1,000.  Some  of  the  best  informed  officers 
have  told  me  that  1,300  would  be  required.  Allowing 
that  the  navy  needs  the  higher  figure,  and  by  estimating 
the  requirements  of  the  army  at  700,  the  United  States 
should  have,  to  insure  reasonable  protection  in  time  of 
peace,  2,000  machines.  These  would  suffice  as  a  guar- 


PREPAREDNESS  IN  AND  FROM  THE  AIR    353 

antee  of  safety,  in  case  of  sudden  war,  while  we  brought 
our  equipment  up  to  the  proportions  demanded  by  the 
occasion." 

"  The  occasion  "  hinted  at  by  Mr.  Wright  and  all  other 
prepareders  is,  and  must  remain  of  course,  delightfully 
indefinite.  But  when  it  is  recalled  that  the  average  "  life  " 
of  aeroplanes  in  the  present  war  is  about  seven  hours  of 
actual  flying,  the  imagination  may  perhaps  estimate  by 
the  use  of  very  large  figures  how  many  aeroplanes  would 
be  synonymous  with  genuine  preparedness  for  a  war 
with  a  first-class  power  at  some  time  in  the  indefinite 
future.  The  imagination  may  be  aided  in  this  estimate, 
also,  by  the  alleged  fact  that  France  has  at  present  as 
many  soldiers  in  the  air  as  we  have  on  the  ground ! 

Comparing  the  programme  of  adequate  preparedness 
in  and  from  the  air  with  our  present  equipment,  our  pres- 
ent rate  of  progress,  the  equipment  of  our  "  possible 
enemies,"  and  our  means  of  attaining  the  goal,  it  is  plain 
to  every  man  of  solid  understanding,  with  his  feet  on 
the  ground  and  his  thoughts  in  the  heavens,  that  it  would 
be  a  long,  long  way  for  us  to  go  to  the  Tipperary  of  com- 
plete aerial  defense.  As  to  the  cost  of  carrying  out  this 
programme,  a  faint  idea  of  it  may  be  gained  by  reflecting 
upon  the  single  item  of  one  aeroplane,  which  as  it  is  made 
today  costs  about  $10,000,  has  a  "  life  "  in  war-time  of 
seven  hours,  and  is  liable  to  become  as  useful  as  a  last 
year's  bird's-nest,  within  a  small  fraction  of  a  year,  by 
the  development  of  some  super-aircraft.  The  favorite 
statement  of  prepareders  who  demand  peace  or  defense 
at  any  price  that  this  cost  only  equals  the  expense  of  a 
single  shot  from  a  big  gun,  or  is  only  one-fifteen-hun- 
dredth of  the  cost  of  a  superdreadnought,  is  not  con- 
vincing or  reassuring;  for  a  man  who  is  required  to  pay 
$1,500  for  a  suit  of  clothes  is  not  consoled  by  being 
charged  $1.00  apiece  for  hat-bands  and  obliged  to  pur- 
chase ten  or  fifteen  thousand  of  them. 


IX 

RESULTS   OF   PREPAREDNESS 

THIS  brief  analysis  of  the  programmes  for  military 
preparedness  which  have  been  spread  before  the 
American  people  proves  them  to  be  wholly  indefi- 
nite, purely  theoretical,  endlessly  extravagant,  and  abso- 
lutely— in  fact,  ridiculously — inadequate. 

But  there  must  be  no  misunderstanding  of  the  full 
significance  and  certain  results  of  getting  down  to  busi- 
ness on  the  military  programme.  If  we  give  ourselves 
whole-heartedly  to  it,  we  must  bid  farewell  forever  to 
those  American  ideals  of  peaceful  industry,  of  genuine 
education,  of  real  democracy,  and  of  international  rela- 
tions dominated  by  law  and  justice.  The  military  powers 
of  the  Old  World  and  of  all  history  have  shown  us  but 
too  plainly  by  precept  and  example  the  necessary  conse- 
quences to  industry,  education,  democracy,  and  interna- 
tional morality,  of  a  whole-souled  devotion  to  a  consist- 
ently "  adequate  "  military  programme. 

Both  reason  and  recent  experience  have  burned  in 
upon  us  the  lesson  that  adequate  preparedness  includes 
the  preparation  of  plans  for  making  war.  The  "  cam- 
paign "  must  necessarily  be  mapped  out  beforehand,  and 
its  strategy  and  tactics  decided  upon  in  advance.  The 
German  officers'  clubs,  with  their  debates  on  "  the  best 
plan  "  and  prizes  for  its  author;  with  their  incessant  con- 
struction and  criticism  of  "  projects  of  attack  and  de- 
fense," and  their  habitual  and  enthusiastic  toast  to  "  The 
Day  "  when  these  projects  might  be  tested,  have  taught 
this  lesson  beyond  the  shadow  of  a  doubt.  The  "  agree- 
ments "  and  "  arrangements  "  between  Great  Britain  and 
France  have  taught  this  same  lesson,  with  the  further 

254 


RESULTS  OF  PREPAREDNESS         255 

one  of  the  futility  of  anything  short  of  absolute  ade- 
quacy in  military  preparedness.  Even  Germany,  with  its 
phenomenal,  apparent  military  success,  is  learning  anew 
that  Kant's  dictum,  "  we  cannot  grasp  the  absolute  by 
the  wool,"  is  true  in  the  military  and  material  world  as 
well  as  in  the  intellectual. 

Many  events  have  proven  the  truth  of  reason's  pro- 
phecy that  on  the  occasion  of  every  international  dis- 
pute the  country  "  prepared  "  with  big  armaments  rat- 
tles the  sabre  in  its  sheath,  or  draws  the  sword  from  its 
scabbard,  in  its  effort  to  back  up  its  diplomacy  and  incline 
"  justice  "  to  its  side.  In  this  era  when  the  whole  world 
is  a  neighborhood,  such  preparedness  on  the  part  of  one 
nation  is  emulated  by  the  others  who  regard  the  iron  fist 
as  a  necessary  concomitant  of  their  own  diplomacy. 

But  "preparedness"  instils  the  poison  of  militarism 
not  only  into  international  relations;  it  militarizes  na- 
tional and  individual  life  and  character  as  well.  "  The 
Earth  rests  not  more  securely  on  the  shoulders  of  Atlas 
than  Germany  on  her  Army  and  Navy  " :  so  said  one  of 
the  prime  supporters  of  military  preparedness,  the  Crown 
Prince  of  Prussia.  "  After  all,"  said  the  editor  of  a  great 
London  journal,  "  the  British  Empire  is  built  up  by  good 
fighting  by  its  Army  and  Navy.  The  spirit  of  war  is 
native  to  the  British  race.  .  .  .  Only  by  militarism  can 
we  guard  against  the  abuses  of  militarism."  Such  are 
the  natural  fruits  of  military  preparedness;  and  their 
counterparts  are  already  pressing  upon  public  attention 
in  our  own  Republic. 

Military  preparedness,  which,  to  be  adequate,  must 
necessarily  be  based  on  despotism  in  the  army,  has  caused 
despotism  to  be  retained  in  the  monarchies  of  Conti- 
nental Europe,  and  to  be  revived  in  many  open  and  in- 
sidious ways  in  its  Republics.  In  practice,  the  rights  of 
freemen  have  been  ruthlessly  disregarded  in  Germany 
and  in  Great  Britain  alike,  under  the  stress  of  providing 
a  greater  preparedness;  in  theory,  the  Germans  insist 


256  PREPAREDNESS 

that  efficiency  in  military  preparedness  is  possible  only 
when  power  is  strictly  concentrated,  and  the  English  have 
grown  doubtful  as  to  the  possibility  of  its  achievement  in 
a  democracy.  In  Germany,  a  member  of  the  Reichstag 
voted  against  the  military  budget;  his  fellow  members 
shouted  to  him,  "  We  won't  permit  the  supreme  military 
authorities  to  be  criticised " ;  and  the  government 
promptly  ordered  him  to  tfie  trenches.  In  England,  an 
unprecedented  campaign  for  enlistment  has  come  to  the 
verge  of  conscription ;  the  state-church  has  been  ordered 
to  "  preach  more  patriotic  sermons  " ;  and  the  workmen 
in  fuel  and  munitions  plants  have  been  made  to  feel  that 
they  are  the  wards  of  the  government. 

One  of  the  prime  characteristics  of  the  progress  of  civi- 
lization is  a  growing  respect  for  law  and  for  the  sanctity 
of  human  life ;  and  yet  our  Republic  is  summoned  to  pre- 
pare to  engage  in  international  anarchy  and  in  the  whole- 
sale destruction  of  human  life.  One  of  our  leading  pre- 
pareders,  in  a  public  debate  in  Boston,  pictured  Uncle 
Sam  with  a  chip  on  each  shoulder  (the  Monroe  Doctrine 
and  Mongolian  Exclusion),  and  with  both  arms  (the 
Army  and  Navy)  in  a  sling.  To  such  an  ideal  of  our 
Republic  does  the  demand  for  "  preparedness  "  logically 
lead.  Shall  it  be  permitted  to  eclipse  the  traditional  ideal 
of  Uncle  Sam  with  international  rights  on  one  shoulder 
and  international  duties  on  the  other,  with  one  hand  bear- 
ing the  torch  of  liberty,  education  and  industry  enlight- 
ening the  world,  and  the  other  pressing  upon  the  nations 
the  scales  of  international  justice? 


X 

THE  AMERICAN   PROGRAMME 

THE  American  people  have  not  yet  become  a  blood- 
thirsty, a  militaristic  nation.    They  will  assuredly 
reject  with  scorn  and  contempt  the  irrational,  an- 
archistic, inadequate,  uncivilized,  unchristian,  and  un- 
American  programme  of  the  militarists,  and  accept  gladly 
and  eagerly  the  rational,  legal,  adequate,  civilized,  Chris- 
tian and  American  programme  of  the  Madisons,  Hamil- 
tons  and  Washingtons  of  our  time.    We  have,  once  be- 
fore in  our  history,  faced  the  same  great  question  and 
answered  it  aright. 

A.      THE    GREAT    EXPERIMENT    OF    THE    CONSTITUTION 

In  the  gloomy  "  critical  period  "  of  our  history,  from 
1783  to  1789,  the  burning  question  arose:  Shall  each  of 
the  Thirteen  States  build  up  its  armaments  on  land  and 
sea,  to  the  utmost  of  its  power,  and  by  means  of  them 
defend  its  soil  from  invasion  by  the  other,  jealous,  rival, 
hostile  States?  Or,  shall  the  great  experiment  of  the 
Constitution  be  tried,  by  means  of  which  inter-State  dis- 
putes may  be  settled  by  judicial  process,  and  the  arma- 
ments of  each  State  be  reduced  to  a  minimum? 

The  answer  was  not  so  simple  and  easy  and  matter-of- 
course  as  it  appears  today  after  a  century  and  a  quarter 
of  successful  operation  on  the  part  of  the  Constitution. 
Undoubtedly,  as  the  Founders  themselves  acknowledged, 
the  Constitution  was  "  wrung  from  the  grinding  necessi- 
ties of  a  reluctant  people."  There  were  many  men  then, 
in  the  various  States,  as  there  are  in  the  various  nations 
today,  who  declared  that  they  would  not  entrust  the 
safety  of  their  States  and  homes  to  a  "mere  scrap  of 

257 


258  PREPAREDNESS 

paper  " ;  and  insisted  that  the  "  good  old  plan  "  of  ade- 
quate armaments  and  preparedness  should  be  adhered  to, 
and  the  new-fangled  follies  of  the  mollycoddle  pacifists 
and  poltroon  legalists  should  be  rejected.  Fortunately 
for  America  and  the  world,  the  Founders  of  the  Republic 
triumphed,  and  an  end  was  put  forever  within  the  States 
of  the  Union  to  that  policy  of  adequate  armaments  and 
preparedness  which  would  inevitably,  if  allowed  to  con- 
tinue, have  made  of  the  Constitution  a  mere  scrap  of 
paper,  just  as  the  adequate  armaments  and  preparedness 
of  today  have  made  mere  scraps  of  paper  of  treaties  be- 
tween the  nations. 

Of  course,  it  is  wholly  undesirable  and  impossible  for 
the  world  today  to  establish  a  national  Union  such  as 
was  established  in  1789  between  the  States.  The  day  for 
a  world-empire,  or  even  a  world-republic,  has  probably 
passed  away  forever.  But  it  is  possible,  practicable  and 
mandatory  for  the  world  to  adopt  unreservedly  and  ad- 
here to  unwaveringly  the  rational,  legal,  adequate,  civi- 
lized, Christian  and  American  programme  which  it  en- 
tered upon  at  the  two  Hague  Conferences. 

B.      THE    PARTS    OF    THE    PROGRAMME 

This  programme  is  not  vaguely  indefinite  and  purely 
theoretical,  as  is  that  of  the  militarist.  On  the  contrary, 
every  part  of  it  is  clear-cut  and  every  part  of  it  has  been 
put  into  successful  operation.  Thus,  back  of  it  is  the 
convincing  force  of  sound  reason,  and  the  overwhelming 
proof  of  successful  practice.  Let  us  examine  it  briefly, 
and  at  the  same  time  consider  the  relation  of  adequate 
armaments  and  preparedness  to  the  programme  as  a 
whole  and  to  each  of  its  parts. 

Its  parts  are  four  in  number,  namely,  the  limitation  of 
armaments,  the  exclusive  use  of  mediation  and  good 
offices,  of  international  commissions  of  inquiry,  and  of 
international  arbitration. 


THE  AMERICAN  PROGRAMME         359 

I.      THE    LIMITATION    OF    ARMAMENTS 

'America's  Experience 

The  limitation  of  armaments  has  been  tried  for  a  cen- 
tury with  pre-eminent  success  between  the  United  States 
and  the  British  Empire,  and  for  a  quarter-century  be- 
tween Chile  and  Argentina.  Its  adoption  in  some  form, 
. — preferably  the  conversion  of  all  national  armaments 
into  an  international  police  force,— is  absolutely  essential 
to  preventing  the  other  parts  of  the  programme  from 
being  torn  into  scraps  of  paper.  The  whole  world  of 
civilization,  within  both  the  belligerent  and  the  neutral 
nations  as  well,  is  looking  forward  to  the  time  when,  after 
the  demolition  of  adequate  armaments  in  the  present 
Great  War,  an  end  shall  be  put  forever  to  the  persistent 
and  frightful  competition  between  the  nations  in  the 
building  up  of  adequate  armaments,  of  preparedness,  on 
land  and  sea.  And  even  the  terrible  evils  of  this  frightful 
war  are  borne  with  some  equanimity  in  the  prime  hope 
of  humanity  that  God  may  bring  out  of  these  evils  the 
total  destruction  of  the  nations'  means  of  mutual  destruc- 
tion. 

America's  Opportunity;  The  Obstacle  of  Preparedness 

Here,  then,  will  be  the  first  great  opportunity  of 
America  to  lead  the  world;  but  this  opportunity  will 
belong  only  to  an  America  with  clean  hands  and  pure 
heart.  In  that  future  conference  of  the  nations  which  is 
to  put  an  end  forever  to  competition  in  the  building  up 
of  armaments,  what  possible  influence  for  good  can  the 
American  delegates  exert  if  their  country  should  have 
itself  adopted  in  earnest  the  military  programme? 
Would  not  the  other  delegates  say,  with  entire  justice  and 
finality :  "  While  we  were  destroying  each  other's  arma- 
ments, you  seized  the  opportunity  of  building  up  your 
own ;  go  to,  we  will  go  and  do  likewise  "  ?  So  far  from 
influencing  a  world  conference  to  limit  armaments,  the 


260  PREPAREDNESS 

United  States  would  give  such  an  impulse  to  competition 
in  the  building  up  of  armaments  as  the  world  has  never 
known  before !  And  it  would  thus  become  its  own  chief 
opponent  in  leading  the  world  to  adopt  the  rest  of  the 
truly  American  programme.  It  would  be  as  if  Virginia, 
the  home  of  Madison  and  Washington,  or  New  York, 
the  home  of  Hamilton,  had  said  to  the  other  States: 
"  Let  us  adopt  a  judicial  means  of  settling  all  disputes 
between  us  " ;  and  had,  at  the  same  time,  persisted  in 
building  up  armaments  on  land  and  sea. 

At  the  first  Hague  Conference  in  1899,  Russia  earnestly 
advocated  the  limitation  of  armaments ;  but  at  the  second 
Conference  in  1907,  after  Russia's  war  with  Japan  had 
impelled  it  to  undertake  an  enormous  increase  in  its  arma- 
ments, it  refused  not  only  to  advocate  limitation  of  arma- 
ments but  even  to  place  the  subject  upon  the  programme 
for  discussion. 

It  will  take  the  United  States  years,  according  to  our 
military  and  naval  experts,  to  reach  even  the  standard 
of  preparedness  set  by  this  present  war.  Meanwhile,  im- 
mediately on  the  close  of  the  war,  the  third  Hague  Con- 
ference must  be  held,  and  the  delegation  from  the  United 
States  should  be  prepared  and  enabled,  by  their  country's 
attitude  on  armaments,  to  accomplish  that  limitation  of 
armaments  which  was  defeated  at  the  first  two  confer- 
ences by  a  reliance  upon  "  adequate  armaments,"  and 
which  a  bleeding  and  panting  world  will  demand  with  a 
thousand-fold  more  imperiousness  after  the  Armageddon 
that  has  followed  the  "  preparedness  "  of  recent  years. 

2.      MEDIATION 

America's  Experience 

Mediation  and  good  offices  were  placed  in  the  pro- 
gramme by  the  Hague  Conferences.  They  have  been 
tried  by  the  United  States  scores  of  times,  both  before 
and  since  the  Conferences,  and  with  conspicuous  success. 
On  many  occasions,  Latin-American  wars  have  been  pre- 


THE  AMERICAN  PROGRAMME         261 

vented  or  ended  by  American  mediation.  Through  the 
good  offices  of  the  United  States,  the  Russo-Japanese 
War,— up  to  that  time  the  most  terrible  of  modern  wars, 
— was  brought  to  an  end. 

This  means  of  preventing  war  is  obviously  capable  of 
far  greater  use  and  success ;  and  it  was  not  only  endorsed 
by  the  Hague  Conferences  as  useful  and  desirable,  but 
it  was  unanimously  declared  not  to  be  an  "  unfriendly  " 
act  on  the  part  of  the  mediator  either  before  or  after  the 
outbreak  of  hostilities. 

Its  Rejection  in  the  Present  War;  the  Obstacle  of  Pre- 
paredness 

Why  has  it  not  been  successful  in  preventing  or  ending 
the  present  Great  War  ?  Because  of  adequate  armaments. 
It  was  pressed  repeatedly  before  the  war  began,  but  was 
rejected  because  of  the  belief  on  the  part  of  the  respective 
disputants  that  they  could  gain  more  by  means  of  their 
adequate  armaments.  Our  own  President  was  prompt 
and  urgent  in  the  extension  of  good  offices  and  mediation 
on  the  part  of  the  United  States.  His  offer  was  rejected. 
Why?  Because  of  adequate  armaments.  Our  country 
and  humanity  are  watchfully  and  hopefully  waiting  for  a 
repetition  of  that  offer.  When  will  the  opportunity  to 
offer  them  again  and  with  success  occur?  When,  only 
when,  the  adequate  armaments  of  one  side  or  the  other 
shall  have  been  smashed  into  smithereens. 

The  unanswerable  logic  of  this  proposition  is  fortified 
by  the  mediation  at  Portsmouth,  when  it  was  found  pos- 
sible to  mediate  only  after  the  Russian  and  Japanese 
armaments  had  been  greatly  reduced  and  when  the  finan- 
cial resources  of  the  belligerents  prevented  them  from 
speedily  renewing  those  armaments.  As  a  man  must 
sow  what  he  reaps,  a  country  will  assuredly  get  what  it 
prepares  for,  whether  it  be  a  peaceful  adjustment  of  dis- 
putes or  war. 

A  conference  of  the  neutral  nations  to  offer  continu- 


262  PREPAREDNESS 

ous  mediation  in  the  present  war  has  been  repeatedly 
urged  in  and  upon  the  United  States,  and  there  is  no 
doubt  that  it  could  be  summoned  and  could  act  with  suc- 
cess were  it  not  for  "  adequate  "  armaments, — armaments 
adequate,  so  their  respective  possessors  believe,  to  secure 
"  justice  "  by  means  of  them.  Indeed,  we  have  the  testi- 
mony of  the  British  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Af- 
fairs that  even  a  conference  of  the  belligerent  nations 
themselves  could  have  prevented  this  war.  He  places 
the  blame,  of  course,  upon  Germany  for  not  agreeing  to 
this  conference;  but  the  impartial  observer  sees  behind 
Germany's  refusal  the  spectre  of  preparedness  on  both 
sides.  Sir  Edward  Grey's  words,  spoken  in  Parliament 
nearly  nine  months  after  the  war  began,  were  as  follows  : 
"  The  expenditure  of  hundreds  of  millions  of  money  and 
the  loss  of  millions  of  lives  might  have  been  avoided  by 
a  conference  of  the  European  powers  held  in  London  or 
at  The  Hague,  or  wherever  and  in  whatever^  f orm  Ger- 
many would  have  consented  to  hold  it.  It  would  have  been 
far  easier  to  have  settled  the  dispute  between  Austria- 
Hungary  and  Servia,  which  Germany  made  the  occasion 
of  the  war,  than  it  was  to  get  successfully  through  the 
Balkan  crisis  of  two  years  ago." 

Precisely  so.  The  Serbian,  or  Balkan,  or  Moroccan, 
or  almost  any  other  "  incident,"  is  liable  to  be  made  the 
occasion  of  war,  when  athwart  such  incidents  lies  the 
shadow  of  "  preparedness." 

3.   COMMISSIONS    OF    INQUIRY 

Their  Success 

International  Commissions  of  Inquiry  were  also  en- 
dorsed by  the  Hague  Conferences,  and  they  too  have 
been  put  into  successful  practice.  Founded  upon  the 
principle  of  ordinary  common  sense  that  we  should  in- 
vestigate before  we  fight,  it  has  been  found  that,  in  nine 
cases  out  of  ten,  if  we  investigate  we  will  not  fight  at  all. 
Among  the  applications  of  this  rational  means  of  settling 


THE  AMERICAN  PROGRAMME         263 

international  disputes,  may  be  mentioned  the  famous  in- 
cident of  the  Dogger  Bank.  On  this  occasion,  Great 
Britain,  Japan's  ally  and  Russia's  suspicious  rival,  was 
prevented  from  going  into  the  Russo-Japanese  war,  by 
an  impartial,  international  investigation  of  an  occurrence 
which  had  destroyed  British  lives  and  touched  closely 
British  honor. 

Their  Rejection  in  the  Present  War;  the  Obstacle  of  Pre- 
paredness 

How  eminently  suitable  would  have  been  the  resort  to 
an  international  commission  of  inquiry  for  the  prevention 
of  the  present  war.  This  war, — it  has  almost  been  for- 
gotten,— was  precipitated  by  the  assassination  of  an  Aus- 
trian archduke  and  duchess.  Austria  accused  the  Serbian 
government  of  complicity  in  the  crime.  Here  was  a 
question  of  fact,  which  an  impartial,  international  com- 
mission of  inquiry  could  have  readily  sifted  and  reported 
upon  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  world's  public  opinion. 
This  rational  course  was  repeatedly  urged  before  the 
war  began.  Why  was  it  not  resorted  to?  Because  of 
"  adequate  armaments."  Because  Austria  and  her  allies, 
and  Serbia  and  her  allies,  believed  that  they  had  invinci- 
ble or  irresistible  armaments,  adequate  to  secure  "jus- 
tice "  for  their  respective  contentions. 

4.      ARBITRATION 

Its  Success 

International  arbitration  is  another  pre-eminently 
American  and  rational  means  of  settling  disputes  between 
nations,  and  it  is  one  which  has  been  applied  with  success 
many  scores  of  times.  One  of  the  proudest  pages  in  Amer- 
ican history  is  that  which  records  the  success  of  scores  of 
arbitrations  of  international  disputes  to  which  the  United 
States  has  been  a  party.  The  Founder  of  Pennsylvania 
advocated  two  centuries  ago  the  creation  of  an  interna- 
tional court  of  arbitration,  whose  counterpart  was  estab- 


264  PREPAREDNESS 

lished  by  the  first  Hague  Conference,  largely  under 
American  initiative  and  support.  The  Jay  Treaty  of  1794 
provided  for  the  arbitrations  which  ushered  in  the  modern 
history  of  arbitration ;  and  on  the  roll  of  such  arbitrations, 
that  at  Geneva,  which  settled  the  Anglo-American  dispute 
over  the  Alabama  claims,  stands  out  conspicuous  because 
of  the  magnitude  of  the  claims,  the  bitterness  of  feeling 
and  the  national  honor  and  vital  interests  involved  in  the 
case. 

More  than  two  hundred  disputes  between  sundry  na- 
tions had  been  settled  by  arbitration  before  the  first 
Hague  Conference  assembled.  At  that  Conference  a  re- 
sort to  arbitration  was  unanimously  approved;  and  at 
that  Conference  the  very  Prime  Minister  of  England  who 
had  condemned  and  derided  arbitration  as  "  a  quack  nos- 
trum of  our  time,"  just  a  quarter-century  before,  in- 
structed the  British  delegates  to  move  the  adoption  of  a 
court  of  arbitration  and  a  regular  code  of  arbitral  pro- 
cedure. 

The  International  Court 

This  court, — the  "  Permanent  Court  of  Arbitration," 
and  the  first  truly  international  court  in  history, — was 
unanimously  agreed  upon  by  the  delegates  and  ratified 
by  their  governments.  Four  years  later,  on  the  initiative 
of  the  government  of  the  United  States,  it  was  assigned 
its  first  case.  A  dozen  years  have  passed  since  then, — 
only  a  tiny  span  in  history, — and  yet,  already  that  court 
has  settled  fifteen  disputes  between  the  nations.  Some 
of  these  disputes  have  involved  grave  issues  of  national 
honor  and  vital  interests;  and  before  this  greatest  of 
earthly  tribunals  have  bowed  not  only  the  "  little  fellows  " 
in  the  family  of  nations,  like  Venezuela  and  Belgium,  but 
every  one  of  the  eight  "  great  powers,"  with  the  single  ex- 
ception of  Austria-Hungary.  The  United  States  repeat- 
edly, Great  Britain,  Japan,  Russia,  Italy,  France,  Ger- 
many,— each  and  all  of  them  have  recognized  the  juris- 


THE  AMERICAN  PROGRAMME         265 

diction  of  the  court  and  yielded  to  its  decision.  One  of 
these  disputes  was  between  the  bitter  enemies  of  a  gen- 
eration, Germany  and  France ;  and  yet  this  dispute,  like 
all  the  others,  was  settled  by  the  court,  and  settled  so 
thoroughly  that  the  world  has  well-nigh  forgotten  that 
they  ever  existed.  In  fact,  of  all  the  two  hundred  and 
forty-odd  cases  of  arbitration  in  history,  there  has  not 
been  a  single  one  in  which  the  award  of  the  arbitral 
tribunal  was  resisted !  Thus  potent  is  the  rule  of  reason 
and  an  enlightened  public  opinion. 

Its  Rejection  in  the  Present  War;  the  Obstacle  of  Pre- 
paredness 

Now  why  is  it  that  arbitration  did  not  prevent  the  pres- 
ent war?  Because  it  did  not  do  so,  the  work  of  the 
Hague  Conferences  has  been  condemned  and  derided,  and 
their  conventions  called  "  mere  scraps  of  paper."  But 
here  again,  as  in  the  case  of  the  other  measures  adopted 
at  The  Hague,  the  existence  of  "  adequate  armaments  " 
has  been  responsible  for  its  rejection.  Of  course  it  could 
not  be  successful  in  preventing  or  ending  the  war,  unless 
it  were  resorted  to ;  and  a  resort  to  it,  though  repeatedly 
urged,  was  rejected  by  the  belligerents  concerned  because 
of  Germany's  and  of  Russia's  armies  and  of  Britain's 
fleet. 

Experience  as  well  as  reason  proves  conclusively  that 
"  adequate  armaments  "  are  inevitably  and  insuperably 
opposed  to  arbitration.  At  the  first  Hague  Conference, 
when  the  Permanent  Court  of  Arbitration  was  proposed, 
a  German  military  delegate  declared :  "  Germany  will 
have  none  of  arbitration.  It  has  an  army  ready  to  fight 
at  the  drop  of  the  hat,  and  by  means  of  that  it  will  settle 
its  quarrels."  A  British  naval  delegate  said  practically 
the  same  thing :  "  Great  Britain  has  a  navy  that  rules  the 
sea :  by  means  of  that  it  will  secure  justice.  Arbitration 
is  merely  a  device  to  enable  the  other  fellow  to  get 
ready." 


266  PREPAREDNESS 

Fortunately,  the  military  and  naval  delegates  were 
brushed  aside,  in  this  matter,  at  The  Hague;  the  Per- 
manent Court  of  Arbitration  was  established ;  and  it  has 
proved  its  efficacy,  in  preventing  war  and  enforcing  jus- 
tice, by  the  unanswerable  logic  of  accomplished  facts. 

The  doors  of  the  Temple  of  Justice  at  The  Hague  were 
open  at  the  beginning  of  the  present  war.  The  famous 
Twenty-seventh  Article  of  The  Hague  Convention  for  the 
Pacific  Settlement  of  International  Disputes  had  made  it, 
not  merely  the  right,  but  the  duty  of  the  governments, 
separately  or  together,  to  call  the  attention  of  the  dis- 
putants to  the  fact  that  these  doors  stood  hospitably  open 
for  the  rational  adjudication  of  the  dispute  between  them. 
This  duty  was  fulfilled  by  various  governments,  our  own 
included.  But  the  Temple  of  Janus  still  held  the  faith 
and  worship  of  the  leaders  of  the  peoples,  and  that  Tem- 
ple was  filled  with  Dogs  of  War  whose  baying  drowned 
the  voice  of  reason.  So  it  has  always  been,  so  it  must 
ever  be,  until  those  Dogs  of  War  are  converted  into  the 
genuine  watch-dogs  of  civilization. 

5.      AN     AMERICAN     ARMY     AND     NAVY 

But,  in  the  adoption  of  the  true  American  programme, 
shall  we  have  no  army  and  navy,  or  keep  them  inadequate, 
inefficient,  unprepared?  No.  Whatever  we  have,  we 
want  it  to  be  adequate,  efficient,  prepared.  But  adequate 
for  what?  For  the  legitimate  needs  of  a  Twentieth 
Century  Republic.  For  whatever  police  service  may  be 
required  of  them  to  enforce  national  law  on  land  and  to 
suppress  pirates  or  other  criminals  within  the  three-mile 
limit  of  our  shores;  for  such  magnificent  sanitary  and 
medical  service  as  has  been  rendered  in  the  Canal  Zone, 
and  the  Philippines;  for  such  splendid  engineering  work 
as  has  been  done  at  Panama.  These  are  the  legitimate 
tasks  of  a  Twentieth  Century  army  and  navy;  and  for 
these  they  should  be  as  adequate,  efficient,  and  prepared 
as  possible. 


THE  AMERICAN  PROGRAMME         267 

One  of  the  great  advantages  of  an  army  and  navy 
used  for  such  purposes  is,  that  with  the  advance  of 
progress  and  civilization,  the  size  of  the  army  and  navy 
decreases  proportionately  to  population,  and  its  expense 
decreases  proportionately  to  wealth. 

But  let  us  no  longer  load  ourselves  in  times  of  peace 
with  enormous  and  constantly  increasing  military  burdens 
in  order  to  prepare  for  the  settlement  of  disputes  between 
nations  by  means  of  war.  National  armies  and  navies 
are  strictly  national  tools,  and  they  should  have  no  place 
nor  function  in  international  affairs. 


XI 
THE  TWO  DIVERGENT  PATHS 

IS  it  possible  that  we  are  going  to  permit  our  own  be- 
loved Republic  to  enter  upon  that  foolish,  fatal, 
bloody,  brutal  path  of  militarism  which  has  led  the 
nations  of  today  into  the  abyss, — which  inevitably  has 
led  and  must  lead  always  to  the  abyss  ?  We  are  standing 
today  at  the  parting  of  the  ways.  Which  shall  we  take? 
The  irrational,  anarchistic,  inadequate,  uncivilized,  un- 
christian, un-American  path  of  so-called  adequate  arma- 
ments ?  Or  the  rational,  legal,  adequate,  civilized,  Chris- 
tian, and  American  path  of  adequate  justice j* 

The  United  States  has  today  an  opportunity  unpar- 
alleled in  its  history, — in  all  history, — of  answerng  this 
question  aright,  and  of  leading  the  world  along  the  better 
way. 

These,  then,  are  the  two  paths  that  stretch  fatefully  be- 
fore our  country  and  the  world  today.  Which  shall  we 
take,  and  lead  the  world  to  take  ?  Let  us  make  no  mistake 
about  it :  We  cannot  take  them  both.  We  cannot  gather 
grapes  from  thorns,  or  figs  from  thistles.  If  we  sow  the 
wind,  we  must  reap  the  whirlwind;  if  we  prepare  for 
war,  we  cannot  preserve  the  peace.  No  nation  can  serve 
both  the  God  of  Battle  and  the  Prince  of  Peace.  Rea- 
son and  experience  prove  conclusively  that  the  military 
programme,  if  adopted  in  earnest,  makes  impossible  the 
desire  to  adopt,  as  well  as  the  adoption  of,  the  American 
programme.  And  a  military  programme  that  is  not 
adopted  in  earnest  is  mere  foolishness  and  a  criminal 
waste  of  money,  brains  and  men. 

To  lead  the  world  along  the  American  path  is  diffi- 
cult? Yes ;  so  have  been  all  of  the  world's  great  reforms. 


THE  TWO  DIVERGENT  PATHS         269 

But  it  is  not  impossible;  and  there  are  considerations 
which  make  it  most  promising.  If  our  own  great  Repub- 
lic keeps  the  faith,  and  reassures  the  world  both  by  pre- 
cept and  example  that  it  has  definitely  turned  its  face 
away  from  militarism  and  towards  judicial  settlement  of 
international,  as  of  State  and  individual  disputes,  then 
indeed  it  will  be  in  a  position,  not  only  to  play  a  useful 
role  in  shortening  the  present  war  and  influencing  the 
terms  of  peace,  but  also  in  persuading  the  world  to  adopt 
the  American  programme.  A  generation  of  groaning 
under  the  terrible,  increasing  and  apparently  unending 
burden  of  competitive  armaments ;  an  unknown  period  of 
suffering  and  dying  in  the  throes  of  the  present  war ;  and 
the  prospect  of  a  long  future  burdened  to  the  earth  by 
the  economic,  physical  and  moral  losses  of  this  war,  will 
assuredly  incline  the  nations  to  the  better  way.  The  voice 
of  democracy  at  home  and  of  international  law  and  equity 
abroad  must  infallibly  and  invincibly  be  heard.  Let 
America  prepare  now  and  persist  then  in  giving  expres- 
sion to  that  voice,  which  is  its  natural,  its  historic,  and  its 
destined  role.  Friendships,  not  battleships;  statesmen, 
not  men-of-war,  must  and  can  perform  this  great  service 
to  ourselves  and  to  all  mankind. 

"  Thou,  too,  sail  on,  O  Ship  of  State! 
Sail  on,  O  Union,  strong  and  great ! 
Humanity  with  all  its  fears, 
With  all  the  hopes  of  future  years. 
Is  hanging  breathless  on  thy  fate !  " 

The  triumph  of  the  American  programme  will  be  diffi- 
cult of  achievement?  Yes.  But  consider  the  alternative. 
Even  the  Prussianization  of  our  Republic  will  not  suffice 
to  achieve  victory  over  a  first-class  power  in  Twentieth 
Century  war.  Shall  our  America  be  made  a  Twentieth 
Century  Sparta?  No  I  Life  under  such  circumstances 
would  no  longer  be  dear  to  any  true  American.  Give  us 
liberty,— freedom  from  tyranny  of  any  militarism,— or 
for  ourselves  and  our  Republic,  give  us  death! 


XII 
THE  PRESENT  CRISIS 

THESE,  then,  are  the  two  paths  that  have  opened 
up  before  us.    Which  shall  we  choose?    In  this 
great  national  and  international  crisis,  let  us  re- 
call and  act  rightly  upon  those  appealing  and  prophetic 
words  which  one  of  our  own  great  poets  uttered  in  an- 
other crisis  of  the  history  of  our  country  and  of  the 
world : 

"  Once  to  every  man  and  nation  comes  the  moment  to  decide, 
In  the  strife  of  Truth  and  Falsehood,  for  the  good  or  evil  side. 
Hast  thou  chosen,  O  my  people,  on  whose  party  thou  shalt  stand, 
Ere  the  Doom  from  its  worn  sandals  shakes  the  dust  against  our 
land? 


"  Was  the  Mayflower  launched  by  cowards,  steered  by  men  behind 

their  time? 
Turn  those  tracks  toward  Past  or  Future,  that  make  Plymouth 

Rock  sublime? 


"  New  occasions  teach  new  duties ;  Time  makes  ancient  good 

uncouth ; 
They  must  upward  still,  and  onward,  who  would  keep  abreast  of 

Truth ; 
Lo,  before  us  gleam  her  camp-fires !  we  ourselves  must  Pilgrims 

be, 
Launch  our  Mayflower,  and  steer  boldly  through  the  desperate 

winter  sea, 
Nor  attempt  the  Future's  portal  with  the  Past's  blood-rusted  key." 

If  we  can  steadfastly  sustain  our  courage  beneath  the 
shadow  of  the  "  frightfulness  "  of  the  present  war;  if 
we  can  follow  steadfastly  that  vision  of  Peace  through 
Justice  which  we  have  seen  revealed  so  clearly,  though 
a  century  apart,  in  Philadelphia  and  at  The  Hague ;  then 

270 


THE  PRESENT  CRISIS  271 

only  can  we  look  forward  with  hopeful  assurance  to 
the  realization  of  that  ideal  of  our  Republic  which  Presi- 
dent Wilson  has  recently  portrayed  in  the  following  noble 
words :  "  It  is  probably  a  fortunate  circumstance,  there- 
fore, that  America  has  been  cried  awake  by  these  voices 
of  the  disturbed  and  reddened  night,  when  fire  sweeps 
sullenly  from  continent  to  continent;  and  it  may  be  that 
in  this  red  flame  of  light  there  will  rise  again  that  ideal 
figure  of  America,  holding  up  her  hand  of  hope  and 
guidance  to  the  people  of  the  world,  saying:  I  stand 
ready  to  counsel  and  to  help;  I  stand  ready  to  assert, 
whenever  the  flame  is  quieted,  those  infinite  principles 
of  rectitude  and  peace,  which  alone  can  bring  happiness 
and  liberty  to  mankind." 


PRINTED  IN  THE  UNITED  STATES  OF  AMERICA 


UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA  AT  LOS  ANGELtS 

THE  UNIVERSITY  LIBRARY 
This  book  is  DUE  on  the  last  date  stamped  below 


DEC  9     1952 


JAN  £  < 

JAN      2  195ft 

I 

NOV  19   1959 

DEC  11  19S9 

Otc  £01959 


7-4 

A. 


4-9 


9-1O 


LO 

urn. 


Form  L-I> 
2um-l,<43UCilU) 


UWFIKERSITT 

LOS  ANGELES 


A    000  691  601     9 


University  of  California 

SOUTHERN  REGIONAL  LIBRARY  FACILITY 

405  Hilgard  Avenue,  Los  Angeles,  CA  90024-1388 

Return  this  material  to  the  library 

from  which  It  was  borrowed. 


SRLF 
OL 


°CT  1  7  1994 


